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A Philosophical System of Theistic Idealism

BY

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P R E F A C E.

“A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM”! That sounds audacious enough in days when we are being constantly told that philosophers have ceased to frame systems, and now merely write essays. No further back than 1900, Sidgwick wrote that “the philosophic mind of the modern world is now at the ebb, with its constructive impulses comparatively feeble” (*Mind*, 1900). Doubtless he was thinking mainly of metaphysical construction, of which he had at another time said that system-making is pre-eminently the affair of philosophy (*Mind*, 1895). But, even as to “system,” it is possible to do a bold thing in a modest spirit. I have called my “Theistic Idealism” a “system” because it is, as far as may be, concerned with, and drawn from, the system of things, rather than from the systems of the Schools. To all of these latter I am yet debtor, and like God’s people when they spoilt the Egyptians, I have not hesitated to lay violent hands—but more frequently critical hands—on what is valuable in any of them that incidentally chanced to lie in the line of my thought-aims and purpose. But this without savour of anything resembling eclecticism, or the admission of heterogeneous elements into the synthesis. I share the modern aversion to the word “system,” but so long as thought remains orderly and systematic, system is necessary, and need convey no outworn suggestions of finality. In dealing with the inner connection of philosophical thought, it is thereby justified. I use it in the simplest manner possible, avoiding those very artificial con-

structions for which, as system, some thinkers, Münsterberg for instance, claim a purely fictitious merit. I do not know any system that has, in its conceptional methods, less need of anything arbitrary or artificial, than Theistic Idealism. It is a "philosophical" system, because its concern is with Universal Philosophy; it is not obsessed with the divine, or with anything so partial, however important, as, say, the philosophy of religion. Our chapters on the "Foundations of Idealism," on "The Philosophy of Nature," "The Philosophy of Science," "The Philosophy of Art," and "The Metaphysics of Time and of Eternity," were enough to shew that. Our system runs, idealistically, all the interests of Science, Art, Religion, and Morality, back to the original activity of Spirit. These, as manifestations, have, in this original and creative activity of spirit, their common and fundamental base, and they call philosophy to its own distinctive study of them, in their source, norms, and laws. As belonging to Universal Philosophy, our system draws, as occasion requires, from every philosophical discipline—Psychology, Logic, Epistemology, Metaphysics, and Ethics, with the philosophies of Religion, Nature, History, Science, and Art. But I mean it as a system as little as possible in the sense of a closed doctrinal edifice, which no system can ever be. Neo-Hegelian Idealisms, with their one-sided objective stress, we have had, and not without constructive intentions; Neo-Kantist idealisms, too, which, with a curious swing of the pendulum, have terminated in pure, extreme subjectivity; Ethical idealisms also, with moralistic stress and metaphysical lack, we have had in abundance, and again not without some constructive aim or impulse; Realisms, too, sometimes with logical constructions of curiously fictitious character, but in other cases with the character of more sensible recoil from excessive idealisms; but a sane and moderate Idealism, that shall lay due stress on objective reality, and also on subjective factor; that shall meet every logical claim, while rising to do justice to the religious consciousness; that shall satisfy ontological or metaphysical need, without failing to appreciate, in full, ethical essence and end: such a Theistic Idealism cannot be

said to have been yet presented, and will not be presented in perfect form for many a day. In a system, fundamental problems must be dealt with in some fulness: individual points need only be implicitly dealt with. I present the system of theistic idealism only in its main outlines, with deep enough consciousness of manifold imperfections; but I have at least earned a title to some say, without presumption, in these matters, as having, for thirty years, made close and unbroken study of the world-literature of all the subjects involved. This is not to say anything of the character or results of my work, but only of the legitimacy of the undertaking. The question, in any such attempt at system, is not alone of the novelty or originality of the undertaking, but also of the boldness, power, and consistency with which changes of emphasis, colour, tone, atmosphere, and perspective, are presented. It must be remembered that the greatest theistic writers in Britain and America—Flint, Martineau, S. Harris, Calderwood, and many others—have not been idealistic in their philosophic standpoints or views. As this seemed to me to mean loss to Theism, it has appeared to me both timely and urgent to make some sort of systematic beginning, in the endeavour to present a system of Theistic Idealism. Mr A. J. Balfour's Glasgow examination of Theism, from the standpoint only of the "plain man" with all his uncritical beliefs, was an additional reason for my undertaking, which occupies a philosophical standpoint significantly other than that of naïve unreflecting realism. Theism has little to fear at the hands of the "plain man." I am one of those who think philosophy has nothing to do with the "plain man" but to teach him to think critically. I do not intend, either, to shun "theological metaphysics," as Mr Balfour has done. Of course, this absence of a theistically idealistic standpoint does not keep Mr Balfour's teaching, which is not very technical, from being interesting, able, and wholesome. Indeed, the aim of Mr Balfour carries my cordial assent, so far, when he claims that theistic belief is no accidental or unessential ornament, but a necessary part of all values whatsoever. But it is for the philosopher that must be shewn. I

have already, in the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, set forth the grounds of my disappointment with Dr James Ward's theistic treatment in his 'Realm of Ends,' in spite of the excellencies of that work. I should add that the exhibition of the genius and possibilities of Theistic Idealism seemed to me the more necessary also, in view of the fact that philosophic German scholars—Deussen for example—have not been wanting, who have regarded Theism and all its consequences as pure products of "Semitic Realism." In this systematic attempt, it is my hope and endeavour that the theistic contents shall not be sacrificed to the form of the Idealism, and that in it Theistic Idealism shall appear in its greatness, as at once an intellectual and a spiritual system of the universe. If, it seems almost superfluous to say, no such system of constructive thought can be final, it is equally unnecessary to forget that every such attempt has, nevertheless, its own distinctive worth or value.

The history of this work is soon told. I had some growing desire, subsequent to the issue of my large work entitled 'Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion,' to write in a specific way on Theistic Idealism. That was already made evident in my 'Studies in European Philosophy.' But that desire was still too vague and formless when Dr Rashdall's review of the latter work appeared in 'Mind.' It was to me a great encouragement to find so eminent a critic expressing the "wish" that I "would undertake a systematic exposition and defence of Theistic Idealism." For that suggestion I now offer Dr Rashdall my best thanks. Much of the credit of this work, whatever that may be, is due to the wish so definitely and kindly expressed, although the suggestion lay in my mind for a long time before it took actual root. Then, in a time of solitary reflection, the whole subject was so forcefully borne in upon my mind, that I had no alternative than to set to work.

I would take occasion to remark that there is a type of mind, happily rare, but not quite extinct, on either side of the Atlantic, which does not yet understand that, while Philosophy must be a reasoned system, it must leave some room for in-

sight. But the mere discursive reasoner of the type I have in mind is one who would have made a Hegel or an Aristotle an impossibility, because he would have written down their best insights as *ex cathedrâ* statements! I have no wish to fall into the pitfall even of a Bradley in trying to meet such a type of mind. For I agree with Dr Rashdall that many of Bradley's difficulties have been due to his "taking ultimate notions, and demanding that they shall be explained," not seeing that "there must be a limit to all explanation." One is surely entitled to give the people, for whom one writes, some credit for insight, and for some power to appreciate truths that should be as plain as that two and two make four. Philosophy should, as Joubert said, have a Muse of its own, and not be "a mere reasoning shop."

Another point I wish to state as explicitly as possible, viz., that while a deal of critical reference is almost inevitably necessary to the constructive work of such an undertaking as the present, this is done because what one views as the truth must come before any and every man: principles are more to me than persons. *Veritas ante omnia*. My concern is with truth, not disciples, when I speak of system: it would be absurd were it otherwise. Discipleship is nothing to me. I write for intellectual compeers. Dr M'Taggart has said that if some form of Idealism should prove the final form of philosophy, it will not be any of the existing Idealisms: that I, too, believe; it will be a system of Theistic Idealism, not as I present it, but as it is capable of being presented, from study of the whole Universe of thought and things. In seeking to present Theistic Idealism as a coherent philosophical system, I regard it as a transcript of the theistic structure inherent in all the vast realm of being. The system of thought can only be an approximation to the system of being, which latter is not only, in important respects, the richer, but is in process of constant enlargement. The approximate system has its high uses, for all that, as a necessity to thought, even though philosophy be an avenue rather than a goal. I do not pretend to hope that I have made everything clear to everybody: that is never easy in any system.

Thought, of course, should, in a system, be clear, but it should be remembered by those who make such a virtue of clear thinking that this is always easiest—often fatally easy—where the contents of life and thought are not particularly rich and deep. The difficulty of clearness, where life is profound—deep in volume and vivid in content—ought by this time to be better understood. The call, however, remains for clearness and effectiveness to be aimed at, even where, and just because, Philosophy is, and must be, outrun. Not in particular points, of course, is the difficulty as to clearness greatest, but rather in the integration of thought as a whole. Dr Bradley has lately given an example of refreshing courage and remarkable candour on this subject of “clearness” and “consistency.” He says he has ceased to listen to “a one-sided cry for clearness and consequence,” and declares himself “emancipated once and for all from the narrowness of all one-sided attempts at consistency,” with more of the same sort, forming important modifications of his earlier attitude, to which I have already alluded. My own attitude has, I think, been already sufficiently indicated, and I am not quite able to emulate Dr Bradley’s fine disregard of consistency in a system. Though I have not shrunk from venturing particular judgments on all matters involved, yet I would point out that the system of Theistic Idealism does not depend upon this or that particular judgment, but stands or falls as a system by the way in which, as a whole, it mirrors or reflects the reality of the universe. Petty verbalisms, too, are another matter, without which the minor critic’s occupation would be gone. Had I loved the system of Theistic Idealism, which I so imperfectly expound, less, I should have given way more readily to timidity. But, with vision and love both very imperfect, I yet think the temerity of publication much more worthy than would be the timidity of silence and refraining.

It only remains to say that the appearance of the work has been delayed by the distractions of the great and ineffably sad European War, but that the work itself has nevertheless been carried through in the spirit of complete

detachment proper to a philosophical work. For if science knows no frontiers, that is still more true of philosophy, which is concerned with things *sub specie aeterni*, and not a single reference to any thinker, whatever his nationality, has been coloured or affected by any extraneous considerations whatsoever. The claims on my gratitude, beyond the confines of my country, make such a thing impossible for me. Through a long series of years, indeed, I have had no greater philosophical encouragements than those which have come to me from abroad: the latest of these was the recent appreciative and comprehensive account of my work in the 'Nuova Antologia' of Rome, to the writer of which my cordial thanks are now tendered.

For sufficient reasons, I deem it advisable to add that, for many years, I have held no office of any kind, have been exempt from what Prof. A. E. Taylor rightly terms "the grind of a profession," even in the case of the professional philosopher, so that my freedom as thinker and as critic has been desirably and practically complete. But the freest criticism is compatible with absolute mental tolerance.

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A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM OF THEISTIC IDEALISM.

CHAPTER I.

FOUNDATIONS OF IDEALISM: LAWS OF LOGIC AND PSYCHOLOGY.

OF current analyses of the psychology of cognition, the difficulties circle round presentationism, and the nature of the reference, in the act of knowing, to the external world. It seems clear that, from the strictly psychological standpoint, we are confined to the phenomena of conscious life, when we try to trace the rise of cognition. Then are we greeted by Logic, as the Science of the categories—their evolution and their criticism. How impossible knowledge is without thought, we have known since Kant, percepts without concepts being blind; but we must make due account of logical laws—the laws of thought—in our cognition of reality. To these logical laws or forms we shall return later, premising only that the notion that the recent findings of Symbolic Logic are unfavourable to Idealism rests, in my view, on a complete misconception. One of the recent claims made for psychology has been the concentration of all knowledge in Psychology—the making psychology base and foundation of all our knowledge. This would make empirical psychology very much

more than simply one of the special sciences, and would throw us back upon life as too much made up of accidental feelings or arbitrary acts of will, with the discipline of thought withdrawn. It is not seen how absurd and impossible is the attempt to rear a philosophy, on basis of psychology alone. The attempts of Fries, Beneke, Lipps, and others, to identify psychology with philosophy, cannot be sustained, for psychology must remain but a part, and not the whole, of philosophy, which latter, however, finds its appropriate starting-point in psychology. Psychological sanction has sometimes been lent to the futile and absurd attempt to isolate feeling, or thought, or will, from the soul or "I," which is the centre of reference to them all, and is, indeed, the unified sum of all these individual events in consciousness. These may of course be scientifically regarded apart from their relation to the "I," but if the soul be not taken as independent unity at start, we shall have enough need of it to give coherence to our thought before we have done. For the soul or self is an inexpugnable assumption, without which the unity and continuity of psychical life must be rendered inexplicable. The ultimate basis of this notion of the subject lies, no doubt, in experience, and in the knowledge which every one, according to his determinate grade of development, has of himself. He is being which is experienced as existing *per se*. There is, however, something to be said for Brentano's defining psychology, which is concerned with subjectivity, as the science of psychical phenomena. We are told how this "I," however, arises, through repeated presentations, feelings, and striving experiences, as if these experiences made the "I"—as if the "I" were built out of them—instead of the "I" having the experiences, and being developed through them. We are not to say that we have feelings, sensations, perceptions, presentations, but that we are the harmonious sum of these intermingled. Thus the whole higher life of man has sometimes been ascribed to what is called the psychological mechanism, of which, presumably, logical laws are to be taken as product. Thus thought itself is viewed as a psychological occurrence, to be comprehended

in its becoming. Thought is then taken to be, as by Cornelius and Mach in our time, a form of the psychological mechanism, after a sort of natural science mechanical point of view. Cornelius has, however, said that the most accurate knowledge of the process in the nerve substance could not give us an idea of the corresponding psychical facts if we did not otherwise possess it. With Mach, the whole psychic life of the individual becomes, in the last analysis, reduced to sensations. Psychology has, however, frankly admitted the disadvantage of discontinuity, in the psychic sphere, as compared with the unity or continuity of substance in the physical realm. This had been already noted or felt by Descartes, while the continuity of psychic life has been emphasised by Averroës, Spinoza, and Hegel, to name no others. James was, metaphysically, very disappointing when, in his reluctance to recognise "absolutely individual souls," he had recourse to "the notion of some sort of *anima mundi* thinking in all of us"; a mere recrudescence of certain types of mediæval pantheism, is all that can be said of it. That, however, is only a passing reflection. But what most concerns us is, that both Logic and Psychology occupy themselves with thought, each in its own way. (See A. Messer, 'Empfindung und Denken,' pp. 163-182.)

In Neo-Kantism we have seen every form of knowledge denied, save that which is given in experience, such experience being taken as psychological in character, and as resting only on a sense basis. (See my Art. "Neo-Kantism" in Hastings' 'Ency.')

Noëtical thinkers like Schuppe, Rehmke, and Schubert-Soldern, reject all extramental elements, and treat all being as only conscious content. "Ganze Welt Bewusstseinsinhalt ist," according to Schuppe, while to Rehmke a thing and its representation (*Dingvorstellung*) are one and the same. Schuppe recognises no substantial "I," the "I" for him consisting only in the knowledge or consciousness of itself; for him the content of knowledge is equivalent to the object, space and time being abstract objectivities; and for him the individual is but a moment in the process, to be lost in the universal knowledge. (See my Art.

"Il Movimento Neo-Kantiano in Filosofia" in 'Cenobium,' 1911.) In the critico-idealistic psychology of Cohen, again, psychologic reflection asserts itself in the concept-producing activity of thought, in spite of himself. He would have psychology reconstruct the mental out of its own factual productions. The content of thought is for him not matter or stuff, but unity. So, too, Natorp applies the Neo-Kantian position rigorously to psychology. But he tends to break from his own logical positions into the psychologic sphere. Natorp goes so far as to hold that the thought of the content, and the content, which forms the object of knowledge, is thought itself, reducing us pretty well to an empty abstraction. Natorp does not concern himself with the subject of changes and relations, but with the changes and relations themselves, but it is no easy matter, indeed, to reduce to clearness the given being of subjectless changes and relations. These thinkers both hold to the Marburg principle that subject and object are only constituted by fiat of thought itself. It must be said, however, that so long as we occupy a purely psychological standpoint, we are only concerned with the process of knowing—a position which is but partial and preparatory to knowledge of the what that we know. This I say, in spite of recent attempts of German critical psychology to make psychology a system. Knowing is mental action, and is a conscious activity, but knowledge itself is something extramental or external. The prejudice of recent German Logical Idealism against Metaphysics has been proved absurd. Psychology has, however keeping its proper character as a science, not a whole thought-system, suffered frequent reduction to metaphysics at the hands of Neo-Hegelianism, psychical process being treated as so elusive, that no being is allowed to it save that which is derived from the world of known objects. But Psychology is still the positive science of mental process, and its laws, distinct from those of Logic, are laws of happenings. Psychology played a relatively minor part in Kant's system, and was not even a science, in the strict sense of the term. Still, it contained—even for him—the conditions for the realisa-

tion of the categories. It may be usefully remembered, in connection with Neo-Kantist contentions, that Thiele has remarked that not only the philosophy of an Aristotle or a Kant or a Herbart, but also that of a Plato, a Fichte, or a Hegel, rests finally on what is empirically given. Also, that in Neo-Kantism, there has been a limitation of the field of psychology, at the instance of polemical logical idealism.

From the middle of the nineteenth century, the acceptance of the soul or ego has, in psychology, been growingly opposed, as an assumption not to be made at the outset, because of its being an unproved supposition. It has been contended that we must rather set out from what lies before us in experience, and that experience knows only of individual processes of willing and feeling, and of individual presentations. Whether these phenomena warrant the postulation of a soul is held to be matter for inquiry. The soul would thus be a result, rather than a presupposition. But as a matter of fact, this empirical psychology, as we shall see, proves to be really concerned with hypotheses, rather than with experience. Experience always involves a consciousness of the self, undefined in psychology. Psychology without a soul came intelligibly enough into being, and was set up as the central science, since all events of experience, occurrences, or *Ereignisse*, were taken to be subjective in character. But this is only one instance of the general truth that the psychological superstructures of recent times have too often had the lack of foundations as their main defect, a defect to be steadily remedied. All the recent talk of psychological mechanism is a mere darkening of counsel with words. Like Dr A. Dorner, we in our way ask, What really is this mechanism? How is it to be evidenced in the workings of thought? Consciousness is itself a quality in a sense in which mechanism is obviously not. Whence derives our thought its impulses to unity? Is the said unity that of a mechanism? Or is thought a union or combination of the manifold effected through a unified activity? In this connection it must be held to have been better realised of late that the standpoint of pure psychology is merely concerned with the process of

knowing, and—so far as without loss of truth can be—calls for avoidance of epistemological considerations that would divert psychology from properly adhering to its position as the science of mental processes—that is, of purely psychical events and the laws of their inter-connections. Pure psychology is concerned with consciousness-experiences themselves, and with these alone. The distinguishing feature of psychology is just its standpoint, as we shall later see, when we come to consider tendencies to lose sight of it, in relation to the standpoint of logic. For all that, it is in the subject that the world of rationality and of logicality becomes concrete or actual. As for Logic, Windelband would impose on the logician the somewhat strange task of beginning by defining psychological concepts, in order to safeguard his own work. There is, of course, a psychical aspect or side to all essentially and distinctively logical processes. Connections, I come back to say, formed by anything that may be called mechanism must be of a causal order, and we know how far the connections of thought, in its abstracting, comprehending, and unifying power, are from belonging to that order. Presentations are for the “making thought discriminative,” as Stout puts it, through perceptions, ideas, and conceptions, so far as they fulfil their function. Sensations and ideas are now taken, in psychology, to be *Erlebnisse*, or data of immediate experience. It is the function of thought to illuminate and to interpret the work of perception, not to do that work over again. But mere conceptual thinking, as Fichte and Schelling insisted, can only transform the immediate life-process into what is stationary and dead. By Wundt, Sully, Höffding, Ladd, and others, it has been shown how far psychical processes are from being part of the functional activities of the physical organism, closely connected with the latter as they may be. This connection of mental action with physical or brain action is one, indeed, of the most intimate dependence of the former upon the latter, and our increased knowledge of these relations of mind and body has been properly allowed to modify or correct the immediate deliverances of consciousness concerning itself. In strict

psychology, psychical processes are not even related to a material object—outside consciousness—as in philosophy, but are regarded as mental formations, knowledge by means of the mental. This does not keep the subject from being the perfect expression of individuality and concreteness.

Psychology must regard with disfavour attempts like those of Münsterberg, and Avenarius earlier, to replace psychological modes of definition by those which are physiological, for the independence of psychology must not be sacrificed in such a way. The same thing must be said of the position of the Italian philosopher Ardigò, who, while contending for the non-materialistic character of psychical phenomena, takes the function of intelligence to be a biological function, and regards psychical facts as the exact equivalents of the excitements of the physiological apparatus. Psychical and physiological phenomena are for him expressions of one and the same substance or reality. By Ardigò, however, that free spontaneity in view of an end, which is characteristic of psychical phenomenonism, is provided for, in his own opinion, by the doctrine of what he calls the impulsiveness of idea. His psychophysical reality is no real explanation, nor does he pretend it to be. Jerusalem, of pragmatist tendency, is among those who follow the biologic method of interpreting mind, with its attendant dangers. Physiology, however, is plainly incapable of solving the problems of discontinuity and qualitative differences. It will be obvious that the limits within which we may, in any intelligible sense, speak of a psychological mechanism, are very narrow and determinate, and that we have no right to speak of a psychological mechanism in the broad complete sense already referred to, unless we are prepared to apply the category of causation to psychological events. It must be remembered that mental facts, not being quantitative, must not be brought into causal series or connections. And yet we know that it is really on the mental we depend for the knowledge we attain. This does not mean that, in such knowledge, what we ultimately know must always be merely mental. There could not even be subjective idealism, save as based on what

we know. Failure to realise this is finely exemplified in Avenarius, who, seeking "pure" experience or an absolute realism, forgot the environing world is still distinct from us, and landed himself in subjective idealism, even while appearing as its critic. He failed to see how "pure" experience—or the given without subjective admixture—can never be more than a mere approximation. It is needful, also, to resume, to be kept in mind that psychological laws are not at all the same as those which are logical, with their element of necessity, and that we cannot even conceive of the psychological mechanism except through thought. This very conception is a product of thought.

It is philosophy that must give starting-point to psychology, and not *vice versâ*, as lack of understanding has often supposed. In psychology we have not to do with reality even, as presupposed in knowledge, but only with the process of knowing, the question of how we come to know. Psychologic laws enunciate causal *rappports*, but logical laws declare the relations between ideas, a difference sufficiently profound: the former relate to real thought-experiences, the latter do not, but contain the conditions under which our judgments are valid. Central for Logic, in the object of knowledge, has been placed by Rickert the concept of worth or value—the category, be it said, for the non-sensible. But such value exists only for a feeling and willing subject. Logical laws are, no doubt, psychological facts, but they are much more, for they carry validity for all reason, and objective validity for all empiric reality—are, indeed, universally valid. But no such validity is involved in the psychological rise of thought. Kant had already put the difference well in his "Logic," wherein he says that, "were we to take principles from Psychology," we should but see "how thinking goes on" under the various "subjective impediments and conditions; this would consequently lead to the knowledge of merely contingent laws. In Logic, however, the inquiry is after, not contingent, but necessary rules; not how we think, but how we are to think." The world exists for me, it must be psychologically said, only in presentation,

but it objectively exists for Logic, quite independently of, and apart from, my individual consciousness. Logic examines concepts without caring how they can be presented to this or that mind. Logic is the concrete science of those ideological laws and categories which constitute the basis and the norm of all true thought. The conclusions of Logic are necessary, but are not causally conditioned. The truth, involved in and conveyed through these laws and categories, must be psychologically met by the will for truth. The methodical character of the thinking process is the concern of Logic. Logic is a theoretic science—the science of the formal conditions of valid judgments. Empirical as our knowledge may be, in respect of its origin, an aprioristic or logical basis must be sought in respect of the validity of our universal conceptions. Logical positions have not temporal qualities or relations, like the thought-acts of psychology. It is an artificial, but necessary and proper, standpoint of pure psychology, that what is in the mind is not viewed merely as our thought, but as belonging to the world of knowledge. There is an obvious sense in which thought is a psychological event—as actually appearing on the psychologic territory—but it is far more than that, overpassing, as it does, all factuality, and bearing with it over-empirical norms for the measurement of the merely factual.

But thought, it must be said, does not by itself reach reality: reality is there, naked, shining, intense: ideas, concepts, categories, have meaning only as they relate to reality; and reality is reached only through experience, inner and outer. That is because mind knows what the real means. But experience is not something you can take to pieces: experience means nothing less than the individual presupposed in knowledge, that is, the personality, and behind which you cannot get. Reality, as such, is cognised by mind itself, in underived and deeper mode even than that of experience. But still, reality as objective—the real world—exists and exerts for me its undeniable pressure, so long as I am the subject of experience. No need, however, to forget the un-acquired functioning of mind behind. The transcendent—

trans-subjective being—is reached only through and in experience, and not in the mere possibilities of thought. But thought and presentation are present, of course, in all real knowledge. We can here only presuppose knowledge of the valuable work done for Idealism by Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, and Lotze, in showing the logical aspects or connections of experience, over against the merely factual or psychological contentions of Hume, which imagined experience could not give us a knowledge of reality. So far, however, as pure psychology is concerned, sensations are to be taken as mental; they are not isolated, but are so artificially by an act of attention; and the growth of such objective reference is to be ascribed to the meaning which the world acquires for consciousness. The what of our knowledge may concern epistemology: psychology has only to do with its how. It must be obvious that categories like substance, cause, purpose, have no reality so long as they are merely thought, and not determined or distinguished through experience. Volkelt, Jerusalem, and Husserl, have shewn logical forms or laws to have no mere psychological grounding, but to be universal. They have taken universal intuitions to exist in correspondence with these logical forms. Volkelt is of decided opinion that experience does reach trans-subjective being, although he speaks of a minimum of trans-subjective knowledge. Husserl, in the polemic of his “*Logische Untersuchungen*,” wages war against the psychological conception of logical laws as nature laws of the psychic life, and makes for a radical clearing of the logical territory of all psychological and metaphysical elements. His logicism stands for pure *à priori* logic, and the necessity of knowledge. Truth is for him, not factual, but eternal and timeless. His attitude towards “being” is like that of the Neo-Kantists. He takes logical principles for absolute possibilities, and views logic as the ethic of thought. The relation of logical laws to psychic event must therefore, to him, be other than that of the nature laws of knowledge. Against these positions of Husserl, Dr K. Heim has directed his polemic, in which he holds every logically justified deliverance to be given through a positive

choice in a determinate manifoldness. Against Husserl, too, the psychologism of Jerusalem denies *à priori* principles, and urges the relativity of Knowledge. We, at any rate, hold to the logical category of absoluteness, as necessary reflex of the truth of the Absolute. Only this category of absoluteness, or the absolute principle, makes logical thought possible; also, to it is due our instinctive craving, not for mere experience, but for unconditional certainty in respect of objective truth. Knowledge is really both necessary and relative. Of other logical categories no more need, for the moment, be said.

We come back to say that we cannot but regard as absurd and preposterous the attempt to frame philosophy on the basis of psychology, since the taking of psychical events as data must leave a perfectly insuperable epistemological problem. There cannot possibly be, in such case, any real reference to reality, as justified by a tenable theory of knowledge. Nor can knowledge, as universalised in science, be explained by a merely individualistic psychology, however necessary and valuable. Science, it should also be remembered, is not confined to outward perception. The procedure of psychology is purely empirical, and its positions have only relative certainty. That is to say, they are valid only so far as they are verified by experience. But logic determines its concepts and develops its conclusions in *à priori* fashion. Its positions are of apodictic certainty. Their validity does not so depend on experience, but on immediate inner evidence. The philosophical inquiry into the validity of what we know is a much larger problem than the psychological one of how we know, and indeed, is inclusive of this latter. We recognise, of course, a nature side to our mental life—a side to which belong certain sensations, impulses, &c., and in respect of these we may, no doubt, intelligibly speak of the psychological mechanism. But it is quite otherwise when this so-called mechanism is taken to be the sole form or mode in which the complex of our psychological phenomena is reduced to unity. For the thinking self or I, which posits the psychological mechanism, and is the datum of psychology, is not to be so easily disposed of as some psychologising philosophers

seem to think, leaving us with functions but no functioner—with a predicate but no subject. When I turn to those past and present experiences, which have formed my soul—or the “I”—I find, in recalling past experiences, that what I recall is the soul itself in these particular past experiences, but not the single feeling itself, nor the individual presentation itself. ’Tis in such ways the soul evidences itself as a perduring self, as these activities of consciousness repeat themselves. A more spiritual character or aspect has been given to the psychic phenomena of memory through the influence of Bergson, whereby memory is invested with a creative character, under the spirit or controlling force of life, though I cannot now dwell on this, nor on what psychology owed to Taine and Galton in respect of mental imagery. But nothing could be more grotesquely absurd than the postulation by empiric psychology of an immortality of the single feeling itself, or the single presentation itself, or the simple conative impulse itself. Hence the lame endeavour has been indulged to mitigate the absurdity by talking of the feeling side of presentation, the willing mind (or intellect), thought willing, and the willing side of feeling. But these and similar psychological modes of speech do not, at any rate, tend to render psychology an impressively scientific affair. Inadmissible as are any rigid separations between spheres of feeling, intellect, and will, psychology must guard that everything in it be not reduced to a sickly indeterminateness, with no distinctive character of its own. Behind all the “aspects” will be something. The “I” will not be dissolved into temporal processes of sensation, perception, and memory. The “I” will not be so easily eliminated, in the interests of objective knowledge, as those philosophers have recently supposed who have reduced it to the position of a mirror in which unconscious functions are passively reflected. Their action is no better than that of Hume when he found no self, because, as one put it, he had gone out of his house, looked in at the window, and could not find himself at home! No scientific justification is possible for any string of mental states or processes without a presupposed soul or self. No one who has studied the per-

sistence, the creative power, and the universality, of the idea of the soul, through the whole course of history, will readily delude himself upon the subject.

The going forth of thought to know our mental life is itself a psychological fact not to be lost sight of, for whose thought, it may well be asked, is it that so goes forth, if not that of a thinking, acting ego? In such psychologic study the subject—or what is called consciousness—may have substantial existence predicated of it, since it is continuous amid its changes and presents multiplicity of characters. In such study or knowledge, the object is not merely objective, but consists of subject-object; these twain, in inseparable unity, make full reality. Because the I knows itself as subject-object, it knows that the psychical occurrences it studies are not those of a merely objective self, with which the “I” has nothing to do. It knows itself, thought Aquinas, rather through its act (*per actum suum*) than through its essence (*per essentiam suam*), but, through reflection upon its acts, it comes to know its own nature, or essence. Varisco, in our own time, holds that, “through knowing his own facts of consciousness,” the subject “comes to know himself;” he is “unity of consciousness.” The psychical occurrences, at any rate, Dr H. Schwarz has well said, are but as the leaves, twigs, blossoms, of a tree through which runs one life. But knowledge, though one, has its triple aspects of knower, known, and the act of knowing. Modern psychology has brought into very clear view the fact, already alluded to, that no forth-putting of any one of the powers—whether feeling or intellect or will—is possible without admixture or co-operation of the others. No thought is found without tincture of feeling and will; no feeling, however directionless and blind, is without some measure of thought and will; no volition is possible without presence of thought and feeling. Each of these three is marked off from the others, and even opposed to them, but thus inter-connected in virtue of mind being an organic unity—an unity whose parts stand in most intimate interdependence. All cognition is thought, but not all thought, of course, is cognition. In experience, as thus

homogeneous, we cannot stand with those who say feeling is nothing, is merely derivative, and cannot be classified with the cognitive states, its introspective characteristics being quality and intensity only. These insistences are too extreme for recent psychological development, which has sometimes made feeling the source of all knowledge, to be correctly described by them. But feeling is purely subjective, and is not to be confused with cognition, which latter involves the subject-object relation. Those thinkers who would eliminate every difference between sensation and thought, will and intelligence, are victims of the purest illusion when they hope thereby to reach a deeper conception of reality ; rather, greater exactitude is the scientific need. Psychology has properly insisted that thought or knowledge depends on feeling, finds in it a stimulus, for unless truth or object affected the mind in some feeling mode, it obviously could not come within the mind's sphere of knowledge at all. Lotze recognised this when he declared that the simplest and apparently driest notions of reason were never quite destitute of this attendant feeling. This, without suggesting that feeling is to be taken as existent apart from cognition. The distinctness of cognition—which is always knowledge of being or existence—is to be maintained, however, in respect of both feeling and will. Feeling remains inarticulate apart from its determination in cognition, and sensation is but the ground element in knowledge. Feelings are, to Lipps, qualities of the "I." Sully and others have set out the fundamental importance and primary place of feeling as subjective experience *par excellence*, and as influencing thought in twofold manner, negatively or in inhibitory form, and positively or in promotive mode. Feeling, in which there may be knowledge, does yet not conduct us to the grounding and necessity of knowledge. Recent affective theory, in France and elsewhere, holds that "feeling has its 'logic'" (J. M. Baldwin, 'History of Psychology,' vol. ii. p. 121).

On the other hand, psychology has equally insisted on the really intellectual aspect underlying feeling or emotions, connected as these are with religion, art, science, morals, and other objects of intellectual character, into whose investiga-

tions the further element of will most surely enters. No valid psychology can be built up, Hönigswald has contended, save on the basis of thought, its essential inseparability from all other psychic functions. The dominating factor, to him, in all psychic life, is meaning (*Sinn*). Not less clearly than in the other cases does psychology put forward the claim that every act of will involves both thought and feeling. The point that is so perpetually overlooked is, that, if we take the soul or the "I" away, on which all these occurrences hang, we shall be quite incapacitated from saying how each psychical part is related to the other, or whether they have anything on earth to do one with another. We cannot then tell what feeling has to do with will, or will with presentation, or presentation with feeling, in the upbuilding of the unity of character or personality. Yet no one would be so absurd as to pretend that sensations, perceptions, and the like, are *selbständig*—or anything but fleeting. Their *esse* is *percipi*. They exist for psychology as they are known to an individual mind. This, of course, does not keep the objects known from existing independently of such knowledge. Existence-conditions may be fulfilled—the colour red, for example, may exist—without being perceived. The perceiving is something over and above the existence. The sense-qualities are seized as sensations in Us, and the contents of perception contentually mingle with the complexes of sensation, in the perceiving subject. Even the psychology of Spencer was mainly an attempt to demonstrate the unity of knowledge, by reducing all mental phenomena to one ultimate, "the persistence of force"—"the sole truth which transcends experience by underlying it." But perception is so little a mere complex of sensations that the analysis of perception shows sensation, sense-quality, thought, and understanding, all working together in it. This in agreement with Messer and others.

In this connection it may be observed that psychology will not hesitate long in rejecting, or at least qualifying, the positions of Münsterberg, that the subjective attitude is never perceived—can never be object, and that the reality

of feeling, will, and judgment cannot be described. Psychology would, if these contentions were true, find its occupation gone: its *raison d'être* clearly lies just in the call to deal with these subjective sides or aspects of being. One may very well agree with Münsterberg as to the richness of the living insights of life's immediate experience, without doing detriment to the only possible—and necessary—procedure of psychology. There is no need to confound the self, so known, with external objects or presentations. His suggestions strongly remind one of the discussions in Indian philosophy on self-consciousness and cognition. It will be apparent from all that has now been advanced, that we may, no doubt, intelligibly speak of psychological mechanism so far as we seek to indicate the analysing and causally combining activities of thought. But, beyond this, there is the soul or self, as an unified active force, which we must seek to know always more in the unity of its subjective and objective sides. This last, going out beyond empiric psychology in its quest of the ideal, is teleological in character, and this teleologic aspect must be set in proper relation to the causal aspect of which we have spoken. I am, however, inclined to think that the teleological connection of our purer or more speculative forms of thinking, even granting the prospective character of the attentive process, has been overrated in recent psychology. To see disinterestedly how the thing stands in God, as Emerson expresses it, is, in itself, of great metaphysical and theoretic value, apart from anything of the nature either of information or practical endeavour. No psychology can be deemed scientific which does not fully explore the essence of psychic occurrences. That of Ribot, *e.g.*, does not pretend to have to do with more than "internal events" only. If we thus say that psychology is a science confined to the study of a series of conscious states or processes, and that we have nothing to do with distinguishing subject and object, we shall bring upon ourselves the need to justify the existence or actuality of these states or streams of consciousness. But the consciousness which is mine I can control and direct, and the thing most

surely actual is just the living centre—the soul or the “I”—which knows, seeks, attains. This soul life is an unity, an indivisible unity, standing above all processes of presentation in their manifoldness, and is certainly not evolved out of them. The soul is the individualising principle of corporeal life. What, in our view, Theistic Idealism sets before us is, the making this soul or ego, as real, as rich, and as comprehensive a totality as possible, in the manner shown in the following chapters. It does not attain to fulness of reality until, as Hegel insisted, the content of consciousness gained in feeling, apprehension, perception, is reconstructed by means of reflective thought.

Personality has been properly taken by recent psychology for its own pervading thought or central core, and the dominating interest in every human consciousness has been regarded as that which marks the soul of the individual. The subject is no mere form, but capable of rising to the vision of truth and reality. Modern psychology has shown, too, what a rich complex, personality is, taking up into the unity of self-consciousness our ideas, aspirations, and volitions. To such psychology, personality presupposes consciousness as a psychical continuum, and not a mere agglomeration of psychical elements. But this psychical whole is never easily nor wholly built up, but rather remains as the goal or ideal terminus of all psychological endeavour. The capability of thought is bound up in this unity of the self or soul life. And it is thought which gives meaning to presentation, just as presentation gives direction to thought. “Presentation,” it has been remarked by Prof. Stout, “without thought, is blind ; thought without presentation is empty.” Primitive perception gives us only a *‘that,’* and it must be remembered how rich and complex perception often is, how interwoven, in many cases, with memory and judgment. We may allow the contention of certain psychologists that perception is not merely cognitive, but has conative character and feeling tone, so long as, in this recognition of the complex character of perception, the distinctive character of perception, and its relation to thought, are not lost sight of. It

is never absolutely passive. Its origin and development, under differentiated sensation-values for perceptual consciousness, make an involved, interesting, and complicated study. Primary as perception may be as a source of Knowledge, such perceptive cognition soon grows more conceptual. Knowledge which has been built up out of perceptual elements or materials, is easily and sharply distinguishable from actual perception itself. Such knowledge grows under enlarged perceptive experience, in manifoldness and fulness of content. But many elements of so-called perception are to be distinguished as sensations. If, among the factors that make up the unified soul life, perception—as simplest form of cognition—be taken as the lowest form of the spontaneity of spirit, then will must be taken as the supreme, or at least most concentrated, form of its existence. For will is not only vehicle and transmitter of our most characteristic activities, but is itself, as focus of intellect and feeling, the central force of the soul or ego. Reason, as constituting, in its conceptual power, the mental travail of the soul, is still the highest in man, and is the guiding light of will. I am therefore in complete disagreement with those of our modern philosophers—Bradley and Spencer—who fancy it a “superstition” to regard reason as the highest in us. To me it is an inexpugnable conviction that reason, in full, true sense, is indeed the highest or divinest in man. No doctrine, which cannot be justified at the bar of reason, belongs to philosophy. Reason has for its content the ideal, the necessary, and the universally valid. But reason’s light were powerless and ineffective, but for the executive or motor force of the will. Not that truth depends on the will, only knowledge of the truth does so depend. It is all-important to recognise that reason puts forward her claims or demands on will, to be realised just because they are reasonable and necessary. Will is no special faculty, but it is certainly a condition of personality; it signally represents, as we may say, the tendency to pass into act; the very essence of volitional acts is transition; and the reason or intellect, on whose counsel will waits, is no more a faculty than is will.

This, of course, without meaning conation to be too dependent upon cognition, which gives determinate character to the one process.

By the will, psychology means the consciousness of the self or ego when allowing motor ideas to pass into Act. Every instinct, as McDougall has insisted, has a conative aspect, that is to say, some feeling of activity. The instinctive element in human thought I hold to belong to the basal constitution of mind, and to wear a cognitive, as well as a conative, aspect. The determinations of reason find their proper worth or value in life only as they are given expression to by the spontaneous motor force of the will. This effectuating activity of the will is evidenced in habitual determination, with resultant self-affirmation. Without real belief in the power or active force of our will we shall never make any manner of progress, but remain weak and "strengthless heads," like those whom the Greek heroes of the Iliad had to do with on the day of battle. But this realisation of the self or will does not keep the growth of the social consciousness from developing at the same time. Psychological inter-communication proceeds and there obtains further that study of the whole, not the part, which is known as general psychology. Nothing could be further from the truth of experience than to resolve the will into a mere mechanical interweaving of feelings and presentations. The will, in its spontaneity, must be held not to be determined by sensations and perceptions, but to determine itself by means of consciousness and feeling. It will be seen, however, that we cannot agree with those distinguished psychologists who make will the deepest or most fundamental idea in psychical activity, for intelligence or cognition is, in my view, to be taken as more fundamental than will, with its concomitant feeling. Intelligence cannot be secondary, since idea and perception are implied in any proper view of reasonable will. The primacy of the idea, and its determining influence on will and feeling, have recently been well shewn. Reason is a much finer thing than will, as such, and the potentialities of reason naturally and properly crowd out instinct. In this primacy of intelligence, therefore, I stand like Meumann and others,

but on independent grounds, as against the pure Voluntarists. Intellectual processes are said to be thinkable without will, but not will without them. But it is a hasty conclusion of certain psychologists to suppose that will is not to be taken as a real psychical element, because it does not lend itself to immediate self-observation. Certainly the will cannot be made object of self-observation in the same way as ideas and feelings, but the activities of will, in our view, run back into, and are merged in, originally combining influences exerted by intellectual and emotional elements or factors in the process whereby the will is determined. Fouillée's bald resolution of psychology into the study of will—and he is not alone—does not seem to me defensible, and Wundt, in his psychology, refrains from doing so, despite his voluntaristic emphasis. It is worthy of remark, however, in this connection, that a world without desire would be one in which there could be no value. Hence Fries made so much of the feeling of desire. We do not take the will problem, however, to be covered by a merely individualistic psychology, for desire is a very variant element in men, and the gap between spontaneity and deliberate action is widened, or tends to be, with every increase of the reflective or rational spirit. When it is said that thought is only the outworking of the implications of desire, it should be remembered that higher forms of desire spring up with all development of ideational thought. This does not prevent a due recognition of the dependence of thought upon desire. Desire, however, craves satisfaction rather than continuance, as does pure thought.

But the growth of the unified self, on which we have been insisting, recent psychology has finely brought out by its insistence on such concrete stages in the development of mental life as the sensational, the perceptual, and the ideational. It has taken due account of the naïve fashion in which all psychic life works, and has noted that the psychical elements, as they are termed, are always determined by the relations in which they are actually found. In the developed consciousness, the soul finds expression in a synthesis of feeling and ideality. The whole intellectual, emotional, and volitional elements of man's experience spring out of the self-

activity which carries within itself these moments of feeling and ideality. Psychology has, of course, explicitly recognised that, though methods of observation, experiment, and analysis, all have their place, in psychologic endeavours to expound the synthetic character of consciousness, yet personality always carries a *plus* within itself, which makes it more than product of any given elements. The unity of our conscious life is to be found in the unifying power of reflection, and the splendid dominance of purposiveness in the life itself. We are not concerned to deny that this rich heritage has accrued to us only from long imperfectly-conscious stages. Our psychic activity tends towards the ideal as something immanent and internal. But recent psychology has taken better account of the background of awareness from which consciousness stands distinguished, such awareness finding place in some sort in every system. When Dr Ward (in his 'Ency. Brit.' 9th edn. Art. on "Psychology") says that "the sole function of perception and intellection is to guide action and subserve volition," I should have accepted his statement in its entirety, if for "subserve" he had substituted, in respect of intellect, enlighten or direct. Reason, as only subservient to will, I utterly reject, especially in the case of developed man. Psychology has taken the discontinuity, I return to say, of psychical phenomena to have been exaggerated, and has held that qualitative difference and discontinuity must not be over strongly emphasised. To Leibniz belongs the merit to have given the principle of continuity a juster psychical emphasis, even if his theory of psychical differences be not held quite satisfactory. A dominating purpose, as exemplified in the highest mental life, yields evidence of more causal character than is frequently supposed, and lessens the degree of discontinuity. Yet do we prefer to attribute our conscious acts to reason, rather than cause. The continuity of consciousness is, to psychology, more traceable than has sometimes been lightly imagined. Modern thought has laid great stress on the slow, continuous evolution by which consciousness has arisen out of the universal dynamism.

The question of psychical energy is as difficult as it is interesting, and has never, one may safely say, received any

satisfactory or final treatment. We can, in a purely psychological way, frame a concept of energy, but we cannot possibly consent to this psychical energy being straightway identified with nerve energy of the natural science type. Here lies the defect of Ostwald, that he cannot show how the one energy takes up so many forms of energy. His energy is, at bottom, only activity, and is not the same thing as force. It presupposes a manifold for its unity, and yields no satisfactory monism, as I shall later shew. Energy we can, no doubt, take as our fundamental psychological concept, just as natural science takes energy as its fundamental concept. But the relation of these two types of energy is a very different matter, for we certainly cannot light-heartedly take the concept of energy to be the same for psychical phenomena that it is for physical, as is too easily assumed by those whose predilections are towards emphasis on physical connections. It was the merit of Ostwald and Duhem to point out the weaknesses of mechanistic theory, to which I shall return in the chapter on "The Philosophy of Nature." The theory of energetics renounced all hypotheses, and was a method more than a doctrine. It unreservedly condemned the dualism of mechanistic theory. But it has not effected an unification between physical energy and those energies of mind and soul which act on brain and body. It should be said, however, that better recognition has been made, apart from that theory, of the fact that mental energy or action is not substantive, but rather transitive in character—passes, that is to say, into practice. Hence the forward character of voluntary conation, as it is seen springing out of ideational levels. "The category of trans-perceptual reality is now," as James has said, "one of the foundations of our life" ('Meaning of Truth,' p. 64). For the most important concept, after time and space, is, he remarks, that of a permanent kind of existence. But let us proceed. In the development of personality, the body, as percept, plays at first a large part, as Höfding, Wundt, and others have shewn, but soon gives place to a much more distinctively psychical stage, wherein higher powers of our consciousness are called forth, as in phases, for

example, of desire or imagination or impulse. There has still to supervene what we call personality proper, the sphere of spiritual activity, wherein our organised or stable modes of feeling, thought, and action, make us what, from the standpoint of moral personality, we really are. In this region there is no limit to the possibilities of consciousness, for the law of increase of spiritual energy, which Wundt has finely formulated, obtains, in opposition, as he holds, to the law of conservation of energy in the physical sphere. Höffding prefers concentration and organisation of energy (psychical), to increase, but I distinctly favour the view of Wundt: its significance will be seen when we come to treat of historical progress and development. Psychology thus concerns itself with the soul as a development, rather than as a creation. Yet the "I" is, as Dr L. Stein has truly said, spontaneous, creative, self-formed—raised to the position of being *causa sui*, to divine self-activity, to creative activity, to freedom. For it must be said that the soul itself—complex resultant of congenital dispositions and consolidated experiences—is the one faculty properly recognised by psychology. It is, as M'Dougall remarks, the ground of unity of psychical processes, in our postulation.

Though psychology has become an independent discipline only within comparatively recent years, yet that independence is to be maintained, and the approach to psychology must be from philosophy, in the way we have shewn. But it is not necessary that psychology subsume logic as a mere "psychological discipline," after the manner of Lipps, and others, which overreaches itself. Psychology has done well to heed Münsterberg's reminder that, in the abstract atomism with which psychology treats feelings, ideas, and volitions, an artificial transformation—away from the actual setting of life—has taken place, but it does equally well to keep in view how necessary and legitimate, for the purposes of psychology, the abstract and presentational method is. The atomism is not so great after all. Our total selfhood is involved in every act of cognition. It is absurd and unjust when those who stand for the distinctive functionings of Reason—as a finished pro-

duct—are blamed for treating Reason as “external” to the emotional nature, As if the knower could be anything but an ethical (and æsthetical) being at the same time! The attempt to reduce Reason to a mere by-product of the interactions of instincts, impulses, and emotions, will not rob Reason of its distinctive power and glory, in its developed form. Coherence or continuity is presupposed in true personality, wherein sporadic elements are seen welded together; but in the highest reaches or most spiritual levels of Psychology much territory remains unexplored—and that the most difficult of exploration. Such spiritualisation, when it comes, will undoubtedly be the crown of psychological science. We now return to our inquiry into the relations of this “I,” which psychology has given us, to those logical laws and categories, of which we have spoken. For both the ego, and the laws of logic, have their importance for theistic investigation.

As concerns the self or ego, it has always been of the essence of the theistic view, that the soul or self is no mere simulacrum of real being—as in systems of pantheistic tendency—but is a real being or self, set, however, in deep dependence for its activities and powers on the constant action of God. Accordingly, for our theistic idealism, the ego or self-conscious subject is no mere continuous tissue of mental processes, but something which preserves its self-identical character amid all continuity—something which, as distinct from the complex of mental processes, is a unity, an essentially necessary identity in all continuity and change. As for the laws of logic, these exist as ideal laws for this self or ego, and condition its theistic knowledge. The logical laws here in view are not reached by way of induction, but are recognised as necessary by immediate intuition. True, the evidence by which they are so recognised may belong to the sphere of psychic fact, for the structure of thought is one, and the continuity of the psychic life fundamental; and if the logical laws re-enter or reappear in the psychologic laws, it is without any opposition between them. But the logical laws are ideal laws, which exist by themselves, independently of every form of real thought; norms they are which express the conditions

to which real thought, in its development, ought to conform. In them the necessity of thought is brought into view. The normative character of these logical laws may be found implicitly in their very value as laws for real thought. Yet the logical laws are not laws of things, but only laws of thought. They are regulative of correct thinking, thought as it ought to be. They are thus distinct from the laws of psychology that govern, as Stout puts it, "the cognitive process as it actually takes place." The manifold logical relations which we set up between concepts are logical entities (*entia rationis*), and these relations or logical entities exist solely as products or creations of the mind. Their existence, that is to say, lies in their being thought of by the mind. That, of course, is not to say that they have no real basis or foundation in mind-objects. In psychology, the inquiry is one as to matters of fact, or the actual causal connection in mental occurrences. About these causes Logic, on the other hand, does not trouble; its concern is with the proper critical use of logical norms in thinking. It treats logical entities and relations as real, though they affect not the reality of things. Sigwart has distinguished the logical from the psychological treatment of Thought in this very manner, to the end that judgments which are true, that is, necessary and certain, may be reached, since the antithesis of the true and the false is no psychological one.

There is a good deal to be said, no doubt, for the contentions of those philosophic critics who dissent from the regulative or normative view of Logic, already referred to, and who take logic to be concerned with the principles of thought as thought, that is to say, with the true nature of reasoning as it *is*. But into that we are not here concerned to go, nor can we discuss the claim sometimes put forward for psychology, that it is one with logic. We leave aside also the recent contentions that Logic is the Science of that which *is*. Dr Bosanquet intelligibly speaks of "creative Logic, the nature of the whole working in the detail," but strict Logic is static, and it is rather we who are "creative" in a logical way of working. His line of thought is abstract and artificial. We must be content to take Logic as so far formal, that, as pure logic, it

has to do with purely logical entities, and with the general laws and modes of thinking by means of, or in accordance with which, knowledge is constructed. What is of particular consequence to remember is, that the discussion of the relations of psychology and logic has been greatly hindered and obscured by the "logical" aspects being loosely and indifferently related to the "psychological" and the "psychical," as if, in such a connection, either of these two terms might at pleasure be set over against the "logical." There is no occasion to point out how notoriously indifferent Dr Schiller has been in his use of the terms in his "Studies in Humanism," brilliant enough as I allow that work in some respects to be. It is all very well for him to say that logic and psychology are inseparable, yet perfectly distinct, but when it comes to the working out of his extravagant "psychological" claims, his "conscious application to logic of a teleological psychology" (with a "voluntaristic metaphysic"), there is not much left of a distinctive standpoint for logic. It is out of the very looseness, precariousness, and subjectivism, of such a psychologistic study of the individual, that there is born the need—the "logical" need—to find some more adequate measure and criterion of truth. Little wonder that from the individual, the contingent, the merely factual, we have seen Husserl and others raise the demand for eternally valid truths, independent of the judging individual. Otherwise, truth would be, Husserl clearly sees, hopelessly relative, whereas truth is inextinguishable and eternal, did the human species ever lay hold on it or not. The logical individual is still needed; and his logical need will bring him into greater consistency with reality. With some force in parts of his contentions, Dr Schiller has psychologised away any proper relation between Logic and Psychology, and failed to realise the logical insufficiency of his grounds. Logic can rest in nothing short of universally valid thought or truth. The logical universe is static. Logical laws do not relate to the data of external experience, nor to the subjectivities or vagaries of individuals, but to the realm of psychic fact and phenomena. The traditional logical modalities of possibility, reality, and necessity must be re-

tained for knowledge or judgments, however inadequate for the modes of being they may be : ontological reality is more than it logically appears—more than possibility or necessity, however it may presuppose them. Kierkegaard treated of the limitations of logic in respect of the contingent and the particular, with a view to setting the static concept into relation to actuality, and so forth, if possible.

Experience yields us observations, but logical laws are only concerned with the mode of regarding or considering them. 'Tis the primary function of thought to reduce experience to judgments of affirmative or negative character, and that is just to put it under logical laws. Our Idealism is logically supported—by the logic of the cosmos. Of course, the logical laws carry the character of necessity, as we have hinted earlier, because of the impossibility of their contraries, as seen in such laws as the law of contradiction and that of excluded middle. They do not overpass the sphere of internal observation, but are yet free of dependence upon the individual who judges, as they are turned upon reality, as already shown. Transcending the domain of experience, the logical laws may be said to have a concrete existence in the individual spirit or ego. The universe being a dynamic whole, in which logical categories are universally present, it seems to present possible conditions for cosmic thought. So much we say, on our own account, without turning aside at present to discuss the variations in such matters of Spir, Windelband, Rickert, and others.

When it comes to the categories, these are not to be taken as mere *à priori* forms, to which objects must conform, but as forms which the mind, in its constructive activity, sets up in its efforts after a valid knowledge of reality. They may be regarded as forming such part of the constituted order of things—not being without foundation in the reality—that their nature is only seen or revealed in their concrete use in objective experience. Subjective transcripts they are of relations found to subsist in the object-world. Such fundamental logical laws as the principle of Identity, and the principle of Non-contradiction, abstractly taken I accept.

premising only that the former can be no true law of thought, unless the sameness which it postulates be of a kind that is compatible with difference, and that the limits of thinking merely in accordance with the latter be realised. What I have here and now been concerned to note is, that while there are laws of formal logic, they easily become abstract and futile. For the materials of Logic are the universes of discourse, each a system. Psychology is interested in the real aspect of the object—the empirical content of knowledge and its functionings—logic is engaged with the ideal aspect of the idea, and occupied with the rational laws and functions involved in the act of credence. Logic is thus of an *à priori* character in its working, while psychology wears an *à posteriori* aspect. We should remember, as a general truth in the foregoing connection, that *à priori* principles are only discovered *à posteriori*. Kant took the *à priori* forms of knowledge, speculatively, as logical demand: Fries, who took over Kant's system so largely, in empirical fashion, made them rest on inner observation. But these forms or modes are of our thought or cognition rather than of things or reality.

The logistic principle of causality—but carrying with it, in this connection, the idea of dynamic efficiency—as a category of the ideological order, has figured too largely in the history of theistic thought to be left without notice. The causality of being is just the activity whereby it becomes effective. The causal principle, conditioned as it may be in its rise by experience, in connection with the abstracting power of thought, was yet to Kant, an *à priori*, analytic principle. Like other *à priori* principles, it had an objective significance, but Kant on experiential grounds made causality subjective. There is, however, more room than ever for the insinuations of Hume and Kant, that the real connection between cause and effect be determined through experience, that is, in empiric and synthetic fashion by means of the events of uniform sequence; for the cause and substance categories are not unshapen by experience. Experience invests causality with an unconditionally valid character.

But that fact does not keep thought from meriting a larger place in its working, whereby it will yield, not independently of the perceptive elements, a necessary connection of effect with cause, such as experience itself could not yield. Kant and Schopenhauer did, in fact, better by this necessary connection of cause and effect, as an essential feature of their relation, than Hume and Mill. It must be kept in view how essential it is that the necessary truths of reason be held fast, and objects of experience made conform to them, if the universe is still to be determined by universal reason, and irrational scepticism is not to result. On the other hand, experience has shaped, in some degree, such categories as substance and cause—to a much greater degree than Kant supposed, in his defective Epistemology, overpassed psychology, and needless artificiality. For, as Wundt has said, “the substantialising of the causal concept undoubtedly has its psychological roots in our active personality.” These considerations are not unnecessary, even in view of the treatment of causality by great Scholastic writers, like Kleutgen, Balmez, Harper, and others, whose work I have not failed to appreciate. (On the principle, see Harper’s ‘Metaphysics,’ vol. ii. pp. 145-153.)

Those Neo-Hegelians, who find the solution of the causal problem in identity, adopt a too facile and not very satisfactory attitude, since the identity is not taken as identity in difference, nor causality as only a virtual pre-existence. It is certainly desirable that the cause be recognised as a fact, and a determining fact; that the effect be recognised as a fact—a fact determined; for only mischievous error can result from not seeing causality to mean the expansion of being—from the denial of causes, or their identification with effects. The principle of causality is, in truth, the dynamic form of identity among existent beings, a principle—of virtual pre-existence—higher than experience. Hinton held causal law to be “a form of thought” under which we see Nature.

An illogical and ineffective plea was lately made by Mr Bertrand Russell for the extrusion of cause from the philo-

sophical sphere, as not necessary there. (Arist. Soc. Proc., vol. xiii., 1913.) His main contention was, that there are no causes in science, but only "functional relations," and he permitted himself to say that the law of causality is "a relic of a bygone age," for whose stupid survival philosophers are responsible. Well, Kirchhoff and Hertz, no doubt, led the way in excluding hidden impetus from physics. By some, causality has been over-confidently made a survival of animistic principle, badly understood, an easy—much too easy—way, in view of recent criticism, of being rid of the problem. There is no need to do despite to thought in such a fashion, because of animistic positions which are, to some, opposed by fact and probability alike, only because the category of cause, or the causal principle, can only be comprehended by us in the way peculiar to our thought. All idealism, for that matter, has been charged with subtle animistic flavour! Because science can fulfil, the inductive, observational, and experimental work, which is all that is necessary to the mere transformations or functions of science, philosophy ought to abandon her peculiar function, discard all metaphysical criticism, and take the plain level of science. Because, in short, Mr Russell has no metaphysical instincts but what the mere causal uniformities of science can easily satisfy, philosophy ought to commit metaphysical suicide! As if, because it has suited scientific convenience to take "cause" in the sense of mere sequence or "real condition," science had thereby banished efficiency from the universe, and proved causation illusory! But the Causality of God, in philosophical theism, lies on quite another plane from scientific causation, and cannot come into conflict with it, as merely relative. Mr Russell elsewhere dispenses with the concepts of "becoming" and "change," as well as "cause," from his skeleton metaphysics, but it is only in the process of "becoming" that causes and effects are taken away, as he wants.

He ought to have known that there are no causes for science only so long as the Scientist, *quâ* Scientist, is content to seek no theoretic or philosophic basis for his work; when-

ever he does so, he knows that reality is marked by intrinsic causal connections, and that cause and effect, though outside mental phenomena, are yet affairs of thought, involving a metaphysical interpretation of the empirical facts. Physics alone cannot give you philosophy. The scientific explanation, we shall see, aims at reducing difference to identity. Such explanation is due to science growing in ideality as it advances, but causal idea or explanation is not, for all that, eliminated from science, even though we may prefer to think in terms of continuity or regular sequence rather than in terms of cause and effect. If physics can do its work without seeking causes, Mr Russell comfortably concludes that "there are no such things." That is all right from the merely spectatorial standpoint of the scientific observer, but metaphysical thought cannot thus ignore the factor of personal agency or the activity of the ego in respect of those proximate causes—or cases of effectuating power—with which scientific causation is concerned. Of course, no one doubts the very obvious fact that there can be forms of continuity without causal connection; but that does not settle what, in any given case, there is, nor take account of the positive influence exerted in true causal relation. If Mr Russell had considered and properly understood the "functional relations" on which he insists, he would have seen that these "functional relations" are, as the general task of science, just adaptations, purifications, elaborations, of the causal relation—as the initial outstanding fact—according to the needs of the special sciences concerned. True as it is that there are, strictly taken, no single or isolated causes, yet science has her proximate—never ultimate—explanations, and mechanical causation is found, says Haeckel, in all the processes of the universe. Causation, as Prof. J. S. Mackenzie remarks, "is generally recognised as the most fundamental of all the categories" for "the scientific interpretation of the world." Its elaborations call forth a richer unity through differences. Mr Whetham and others have written somewhat more correctly or carefully than Mr Russell of cause in science, in the partial

or relative sense of scientific explanation. Of Mr Russell's detailed references, I can here remark only on the one which shows that he does not correctly understand the causal relation with respect to time. If he had understood the causal relation or concept as essentially motion, he would not have made the mistake of insisting on "a finite time-interval" between the cause and the effect—in which procedure Mr C. D. Broad (in 'Perception, Physics, and Reality') seems to follow him (p. 129)—as he would then have seen that the whole time involved is filled with motion.

The universal consists in continuity through difference, not in merely establishing sequences. Mere equational identity means less for reason than identity in difference. The trend of the law of causation is away from bare identity. When all is said, the causal law—no idle and mischievous identification of the determining and the determined—still stands as a necessary requirement or postulate of our thought, but not in independence of all experience. Vaihinger—noted for his quasi-pragmatist spirit—has even said that cause and effect are only the abstract expression of will and action. He has, however, too great a predilection, in his idealistic positivism, for the use of "fictions" in interpreting the universe: the only real thing for him is sensation: when he treats causality as an anthropomorphic fiction, he unscientifically fails to appreciate the necessary relation of cause and effect as one in which the unalterable succession is the real thing. But I think it is not an abstract or deductive method that is here called for, but an empirical or concrete procedure, even though our causal theory may remain ideal rather than actual. That, of course, arises both from logical demand, and the intuitive character of the belief, and from causation being so internal to the particulars of the world, as actual. It is precisely the business of philosophy not to be misled by talk of scientific procedures or occasions, but to find the real causes in the facts of mind, whose intuition of cause is a thing for more profound dealing than may be found in animistic or scientific suggestions. Cause and effect are "things of thought," as Mach says, "having an economi-

cal office." The causality category, then, which Mill, in his 'Logic,' declared to be "the root of the whole theory of Induction," is still inevitable, dealing, as it does, with the inner connection of events. Science, when not merely empirical but reflective, regards as causation every case wherein, in virtue of some law or principle, one fact is uniquely determined by some other fact. The range of causal law thus still covers the phenomena of mechanics, static and dynamic; it covers also the properties of matter, as seen in elasticity, density, capillarity, &c.; and it embraces such transformations of energy as motion into heat, electricity into light, and so forth. Efficient cause still stands as an objectively valid concept, to metaphysics. It has stood since the days when, not to speak of Aristotle, Proclus said that "the knowledge of causes is the work of science" ('Metaphysical Fragments,' Prop. XI., by Thos. M. Johnson). But Mach and others reject it in science, while Du Bois Reymond, Haeckel, and Wundt, base all science upon it. As I cannot here linger upon the subject, I must beg the reader to take what I have said, much more fully, and in the metaphysical interest, on Causality in the third Chapter of my 'Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics,' as part of my System of Theistic Idealism. (To which might be added my Art. on "First Cause." in Hastings' 'Ency.')

I would only recall the words of Spencer, in relation to Comte, "the idea of cause cannot be abolished except by the abolition of thought itself."

In my treatment of First Cause, I have shown the valid form of the argument to be that of a World-Ground, rather than a First Cause reached by a *salto mortale* in the regress of causes, as in the older argumentation. A writer in 'The International Journal of Ethics,' who professes not to feel the weight of this argument, affords an example of the dangers of enslavement of mind to a misplaced logical verbalism (G. A. Johnston, 'International Jour. of Ethics,' 1914). He fails to perceive the correctness of my objection to God being called *causa sui*, instead of *ens a se*. He misses completely the essence of the argument I used from the contingency of

the world, as conditioned, to a necessary Ground, as a fundamental conviction or necessity of reason. The force of its appeal must depend on the strength of one's speculative instincts, or the depth of one's metaphysical needs, under pressure of the world-problem. But, leaving the realm of world-experience, fact, and dynamism quite aside, the critic in question absurdly diverts discussion into another channel—a logical, not a metaphysical one. As if the question were merely one of a static logical concept! More than a logical pawing and champing of bits is clearly required. He airily informs us that "logic knows nothing of effects," and does not even see that "effects" were spoken of precisely because it would be shewn that the matter is not the play of merely formal logic which he imagined. For he does not know, as Dr F. R. Tennant properly remarks, that ground and consequence can be taken in "both senses." His notion of the Ground of the world is that of a term in a static logical concept, and he is not even aware that metaphysical writers treat the World-Ground as an active Ground of the world, with all that this implies. What Theistic Idealism maintains is, that the world is no uncaused succession of appearances, but is interpenetrated and made real, in all its causal relations, by the One, absolute, self-existent Cause, which is its Ground. This as ultimate, without impugning secondary causation.

The inner *nexus* between cause and effect is not some power, says Lewes ('Problems of Life and Mind,' vol. ii. p. 384), "over and above the action of the co-operating agents"; nor is it something transferred to them by our subjectivity, but something, Hume and Dr James Ward notwithstanding, to be taken as objectively existent before our thought, and independently of it. This, though human knowledge may not yet understand—for there the limit of knowledge has been reached—the working or the *quomodo* of the forces involved. But any activity in causation must be found by thought, and not based on induction as though observed. But not all the thought and ingenuity of metaphysicians have sufficed to explain the inner nature of cause

—the *why*, and not merely the *how*, of causal happenings. Metaphysical thought has not, however, been able to divest itself of the elements of power and necessity in causal relation. Our necessities of thought do not, of course, carry with them, either here or elsewhere, corresponding necessities of existence, but they may yet mean objective validity for us, because of the inconceivability of their opposites. Ontology will never be perfect, so long as it has not traced the causal connection everywhere. As for real cognition, that is not possible without thought—actual use of the principles of thinking; and the principles of our thinking must be exercised in no merely formal way, for any fruitful result, but in cognitive judgments based on the perception of real things or being. We have certainly no warrant to say that things of the real universe are *not* as they appear to us, in the full exercise of all our faculties of knowing. Such knowing (*ratio cognoscendi*) rests, of course, upon real being (*ratio essendi*), taken in the largest, most inclusive sense, for knowledge is, at bottom, ontological. Such knowledge is possible, as conditioned by the ego or self which psychology has given us, conscious as such “I” is of its unity and self-identity.

It must not be supposed, from the reference already made, that the principle of identity has been adopted, as a solution of the causal problem, only by Neo-Hegelian philosophers, for that is by no means the case. Dr McTaggart has recently (in ‘Mind,’ 1915) expressed disavowal of the identity position, but gives no very coherent or thoroughgoing view of cause, when he denies to it exerting any activity or effect, in the same breath that he thinks it “strained and inconvenient” to say the beheading of Charles I. “had no effect at all”! Both science and thought find more activism than this to-day. Identity has been in some sort adopted by many others, who hold to the logical origin of cause. Riehl is one of the best of these. He takes causality to mean the application of the principle of identity to time. He does not think the cause and the effect are to be taken as objects by themselves, but only viewed as parts of one end or issue, between which parts an equalisation (*Gleichung*) must be presupposed. The perfectly

idle character of this postulation of a merely logical identity is what we are here concerned to maintain, since identity is not the relation of cause and effect. No such relation of dependence as that of cause and effect can rightly be spoken of as an identity. The element of irreversibility suggests a difference between antecedent and consequent. The only thing which it might be possible to grant, if it were of any use, is that the causality principle be viewed as the dynamic form of the principle of identity in real existents. We are strengthened in our view when we find Riehl, in another connection, candidly saying that "cause and effect are identical only from the mechanical standpoint, and there because we have made them identical by abstraction from the specific and qualitative." Quite so; a purely "mechanical" result, for those who are content with that. The truth is, there is too much schematism in the whole matter; really, the identity principle explains nothing; it rests upon the unity and identity of consciousness; but it yields no knowledge of the nature of the identity of objects, and affords no light as to the grounds on which force is carried over, in transeunt causality, beyond anything psychic laws can yield as to the form of consciousness, into the contents. The differences, and the sequence in time, remain, unexplained. But dynamical conceptions are not to be dispensed with in dealing with the things of nature's system—not even, with Schopenhauerian timidity, from the doctrine of causality (*ratio fiendi*).

For our present inquiry, it is important to recall that substance, like causality, is a logical category. The substance concept, strictly taken, means reality that exists in itself. The permanent or persistent in the phenomenon, for my perception, is, by logical necessity, something that is needful to my apprehension of substance. The substance concept logically means the positing of a subject, in which accidents inhere, and is affirmative only of a thought-relation of things. The persistent in phenomena just spoken of is the subject of judgments of experience, but it is only relatively permanent in comparison with the accidents. Substance is not meaningless and abstract, for substances—in spite of the generic

notion of substance being so abstract—are known only in their qualities and relations. In the case of the external world, matter and force are, of course, the substance of experience: in the inner world of experience, the substance for thought consists in the simple, self-consistent form of the ego. Bauch has shown how, in Greek thought, the substance was the permanent within the change, and how even Heraclitean thought required a spiritualised substance in the logos principle. The substance concept has this element of the permanent within the change as the substance of the concept, in its variant forms of historic development. The substance category (*ens per se existens*) formed the very keystone of Continental Rationalism, and that, too, as I think, in a natural and suggestive way. No fact of observation but was known, through the law of causality, to be deducible from antecedent fact or facts. These last must be conceived as at some stage eternally necessary, else the whole chain of facts would be without support. But such eternal and necessary fact could not be attested by perception, that “interpretation of sensation,” according to Titchener, but must have the witness of reason itself. Any entity in which such eternal and necessary fact might inhere or be embodied, was regarded as a substance. But it was absurdly gratuitous in Descartes to treat substance, whether matter or spirit, as essentially inert, we may remark in passing. Leibniz, Kant, and Ulrici, held to acting force as inherent in all substances. But to return. If a plurality of substances were held, one of these was yet supreme, to all who thought theistically, and was called God. He was also supreme, of course, to those who postulated only one substance, in the ultimate sense just spoken of. In this way the existence of God was viewed as unique, and as the necessary presupposition of all other facts. For it was a fact self-evident—evident to reason.

Illustrative of what has just been said, we find Leibniz, to whom an identical quality may exist in varying degrees, holding that a plurality of substances may possess the same attributes in different degrees, one only, which is God, possessing them in infinite degree. Spinoza, on the other hand,

abides by one substance, since any substance must, in his view, contain or carry every possible attribute. It was only substance as an unknowable substratum that Hume "reasoned away," not true substance. Kant, as we know, left a self-subsistent substance behind the phenomenal substance, in his own peculiar fashion. Hegel only got away from this substance by substituting for it the actual system of things as a self-subsistent unity or concrete universal. 'Twas a system complete and self-contained, in his view, which followed the analogy of the finite organism. But the insight never came to Hegel—and has not yet come to most of his followers—that the organism concept is quite relative to the conception of an environment, the organism as whole being thus itself part of a larger whole. The truth is, the Hegelian viewpoint of the whole is a fine figurative expression, but represents as idle and unsubstantial a unity as any pure abstraction must be. For Theistic Idealism, there is a foundational unity of the world in the fact of order or system, eternal, necessary, self-subsistent.

What I have said elsewhere as to Lotze, in respect of the substance doctrine, I need not here repeat (Cf. ch. ii. of my 'Fundamental Problems of Metaphysics'). I will only now say that, from the standpoint of Theistic Idealism, the significance of the modern emphasis on spirit in lieu of substance, must be taken to lie in phenomena and spiritual subjects alike having their fundamental unity in that Primal Being, whose essential determinations they are. Their unity in us lies in the Parmenidean conception of being as belonging to thought, and not existing outside it. For our Idealism, reality exists only through our thought or knowledge: in the fact of such thought or knowledge does reality come to be taken as necessary and universal. Also, that it should be kept in mind, as touching that unity of system to which reference has already been made, that the unity of system is too often of a kind that takes no proper account of the multiplicity of beings and phenomena, and the relations that bind them, whereas the real unity is that which makes no demand for an absolutely closed system, and takes the unity of the universe

to coincide amid all differences, conflicts, changes, found in it, with the unity of the subject. The unity of reality is, for us, found in the concrete nature of the content of experience. For of the world's multiplicity it is I—the same self or ego—who am conscious of, and through, all these things. Substance is the thought-form of the real. The world is still, in this sense, substance, not subflux. But that does not keep substances from operating, if so be that active force inheres in substance. The identity of a substance means the identity of its qualities. Substances are known by their properties or powers, and are thus the groundwork of causation.

I would here emphatically dissent from the strange reading of the history of philosophy, whereby Dr James Ward, after Schopenhauer, sees the concept of substance to have been "either useless or mischievous." On the contrary, I think it wiser to see, in the triumphant way the substance category has survived every unfortunate use, and every metaphysical attack, an evidence that it answers to something ineradicably planted in our cognitive being or experience, and that its splendid persistence well deserved to issue in the notable result of its replacement by spirit or subject, in the higher reaches of later philosophy. Essentiality is the character of the concept; surely no "useless" or "mischievous" one. Indeed, I do not understand how metaphysics or metaphysicians can regard the historic attempts to deal with the substance category otherwise than with gratitude. Even the attempts of great Scholastic writers, Kleutgen for a single example (in his '*La Philosophie Scolastique*,' 4 vols., Paris, 1868-70), will reward patient study, in every case, even in view of pan-psychic extremism. It is too indispensable a scientific postulate, for the scientific mind ever to regard it so; just as necessary a scientific postulate as the principle of causality, which, says Haeckel, must be "taken in conjunction with" it. Philosophy will be able to dispense with it in the future just as little as it has in the past.

Finality is a category of the logical process which our theistic investigation, advancing from *le Dieu Fainéant*, can by no means dispense with. The truth, which we seek in its

absoluteness, must be sought through the category of finality, Bergson notwithstanding. It does not seem to me at all necessary to read into the finalist or teleological conception any pre-established plan of such a kind that no place is left for new forms or properties to arise, for world-freedom is not excluded from theistic idea of plan. No creative evolution of theistic character will have any need or wish to expunge teleology from its philosophy of the cosmic process, for it does not treat such categories as cause and purpose as static absolutes. Many of the pettinesses and puerilities of finality have rightly passed away, but the concepts of purpose, teleology, appreciation, are in every form of Idealism; and the whole structure of the inductive sciences rests upon the assumption of the rational relations of nature's parts and whole to discoverable ends, in virtue of the immanence of finality in nature. Man belongs so obviously to the realm of ends, that the objection of many to finality is confined to nature and its products. But, on our idealistic interpretation, such a severance of nature from man is not admissible. Man, in his physical being, is a part of nature; his soul is not independent of his body; and Nature is known by him only through mind, or the forms of human thought. Purpose is a real cause, and, in the order of causality, first in its real conditioning. Teleology is undoubtedly inherent in all organic life, and takes its most explicit—though by no means perfect—forms in man's conscious ends. Our conscious life is essentially an activity, but such an activity is not to be thought of without the notion of end. The constructive activity of spirit, in the teleological construction of reality, proceeds on the principle that everything that is voluntarily produced, has an end. The teleological principle of our life in whole can only be conscience. As man is an originated being, the very functionings of his mind are themselves adaptations to ends. His freedom is only a freedom to choose from among ends, not to act without ends. It is necessary to distinguish carefully, however, between end and purpose. Nature is truly purposive. It would be very short-sighted—and, as such, impossible to Theistic Idealism—to deny an immanent, evolutionary, tele-

ology to the cosmic process in whole. God is, for it, both in, and throughout, the physical manifold.

It is wholly unnecessary to impose Nature's final end from without. Finality is the very law of the mind's constitution. Final end or purpose is implied in all values. Teleology, as applied to Nature or the world, tends now to take vaster forms, but it is extremely difficult to do much to make a system of final causes anything like so definite and intelligible as a system of efficient causes. The final cause category is apt, therefore, to remain inexact, and of a merely indicative character, or, at least, without the universality, say, of number. Still, evolution may easily suggest certain of the highest developments as the end of existence. And, in any case, it seems to me a worthier procedure, in matters teleological, to follow clear, self-conscious intelligence, rather than, with Bergson, depend upon analogical reasoning, drawn from life of spontaneous and semi-unconscious character. If the teleology of which we have spoken is of so immanent a character as to make Nature's working very different from our methods of piecing things together from design, there is yet no reason why end should, or may, not exist for some super-consciousness, if not for our own. Our finalism must needs purge itself, so far as it may, of anthropomorphism, and it may perhaps best do so by thus recalling how fearful—beyond all thought—is, in its majesty, the universe in which we are so infinitesimal a part of being.

But it need not purge itself out of existence, like Dr Bosanquet, whose "purpose of the whole" is simply "the whole," and to whom everything that savours of purpose must be so completely absorbed in his system of the concrete universal, as to leave no possible room for any part to be singled out and regarded as an end. Such a postulation of end is due, in his view, to our finitude being compelled "to exercise selection within the universe." As if such selection were not the mark of consciousness, at its highest and most efficient working, in every case! If we wished to reach the nadir of its working, should we not just have to reduce or expunge such selective exercise? He offers us, of course, a

timeless system wherein the distinction of means and end is transcended. But we have not yet bidden farewell to the world of experience, and made the omniscience of a logical universal our foible; all experience may aspire to a whole, but there is no whole conceivable to the world of experience, in which selection and teleological interpretation do not find place, as powers of progress, not marks of imperfection. If life is essentially psychological to Bergson, and essentially logical to Bosanquet, it is neither of these, in such extreme form, to Theistic Idealism; to it, life is, in measure, *both* of these, but ethical, metaphysical, and spiritual, as well. And why such acknowledged incapacity to deal with the significance of time? It may be possible, no doubt, for teleology to give "an unreal importance to time," and the true question of value may be "independent of temporal relations," but it is yet to be proved that Dr Bosanquet's dismissal of the temporal order is at all compatible with justice to our concrete experience. One might rejoin that it is possible to give "an unreal importance" to the timeless, as a character of reality, for it carries the metaphysical legerdemain whereby creation and change disappear. The integrity of experience; the *nisus* of experience; the continuity of experience; what are we doing but getting adrift from all these, concretely understood, when we hand ourselves over to bare logical universals, and suppositious immanent principles of things, which Dr Bosanquet has deluded himself into thinking he knows in their pure "objectiveness"?

I shall revert to this later, only remarking now that there is no call to confound objectivity with objectivism. The objectivity of truth is what we are concerned to maintain, which just means its accord with reality in the world of fact, or in that of reason. Objective reality is the fundamental concern of our experience. Dr Bosanquet will have it (p. 136) that the notion that the "ideal belongs to the future" is "the great enemy of all sane Idealism": it would be so if the universe were a static whole, complete, finished, unprogressive, in the present. "The end," he says, *is* "the whole"; Theistic Idealism accounts it saner still to view the universe

as groaning and travailing towards a more completed state; for it, "the whole" *has* an "end," which is its "ideal" in the present, but also "belongs to the future"; the future also, I may add, belongs to it. For the end, indeed, is absolute, of its "whole." Teleology and causality are but two different sides of the one logical determination, the former, as we shall see, later, having an ideal priority. Teleology is not to be conceived as meaning the destruction of mechanism; it only signifies that all effects—whether mechanical, or physical, or chemical—are conform to law; that Nature is not a closed system in its mechanism, but open to the inworking of spiritual activity. Mechanism itself involves purpose. Teleology and mechanism both qualify reality in its totality. Higher than all mechanic laws stands spirit, which can fashion ideals and frame purposes of its own, which mechanism may serve. Only as teleologically possible, can development be properly conceived. Only as the harmony of the manifold, based upon grounds of an all-connecting unity, can monism be held aright. Already Kant, in his 'Critique of Judgment,' put forward that Nature can be teleologically grasped, so that such a teleological conception supplies a bridge to ethics. Though Kant's teaching was not, in certain other respects, helpful to such an issue, yet he yielded a possible basis for the theistic view. Hence the insight, subsequently, of Lotze, of Ulrici, of Harms, and others, developed a linking together of the mechanical causal connection in Nature with a teleological and ethical view, in such wise that the resultant influence, in varying forms, is still felt in theistic thinking. But I shall return to this subject later, when dealing with the philosophy of Nature.

Other categories, like those of space and time, will be dwelt upon, in the light of modern psychology, later, only now I remark further that perceived and conceived time, perceptual and conceptual space, are subsequently noticed so far as seems necessary. But the categories we have touched upon are those most needful for our theistic interpretation. They are fundamental, and not an outgrowth of the evolution of things; the world-development of

Hegel, as an evolution of categories, is no correct or tenable view. These categories condition experience, render it possible. They are necessary, are *à priori*, as Kant held, being non-empirical elements contributed to objects experienced by us, and thus are not, Spencer-wise, merely accumulated results of experience, in which they were not originally contained. But, while our idealism takes this position, I must emphatically disapprove the way in which extreme forms of idealism often set out these categories in their *à priori* character, as having a mind-existence apart from matter—a thought-existence apart from, and prior to, things. This makes the *à priori* existence of the categories take a very artificial and mechanical cast. It cannot, I think, be too clearly insisted upon that, *à priori* as the categories are, they must ever be kept in the closest relation to things or reality. For it is not to be so lightly assumed, as is often done, that the categories are simply forms imposed upon matter or things by the mind. They may yet, and also, be in some sort the characters of things, and may have some sort of ontological validity. One of the best examples of this is causality, in which we rejected the “see-saw” of bare logical identity, finding the difficulty just in the fact that causality is, in some sort, there—in the things, at the demand of metaphysical thought. And even in the case of space and time, it seems rather absurd to allow no kind of ontological validity to these categories, even when dealing with movements that are comparable and measurable. All that is now meant is, to show the unwisdom of idealistically setting out the *à priori* principles of mind in stark isolation or grotesque divorce from things or reality.

Though our idealism makes matter or reality depend upon mind, as prior, and perceiving subject, yet, in experience, such subject is never to be thought of save as organically and indissolubly related to the object or things. Distinguish between them we may, and must, for philosophical purposes, but separate them we never should. And I agree with Bradley that “the subject, the object, and their relation, are experienced as elements or aspects in a One which is there from

the first." That happens to be the precise contention of our Theistic Idealism. Such an idealism, as is here maintained, is open to no absurd reproach of running metaphysics into epistemology, or unduly magnifying the function of knowledge. For while knowledge and its processes may have their due, reality has justice done to it, and the world is treated as, in some sort, an honest world. The objection, that all systems of idealism reject *being* as the fundamental category, does not apply to theistic idealism, as expounded in this work, for *being* is its primal presupposition. But this does not make idealistic forms—such as being perceived, or being thought, or being willed—unnecessary or unserviceable in the interests of knowledge. Being as the primal presupposition of the real, has, for its opposite, non-being, which also *is*. Empiric reality is there, with its time-priority of existence, and my knowledge of it comes through its acting upon my sensorium, such knowledge testifying to the fact of extra-mental reality. God, too, as spiritual reality, exists, before my ratiocinations about Him, and acts upon my soul. But the active powers of mind, in their logical priority, shape and condition my knowledge of empiric reality in such wise that the world, acting upon me, and validly known by me, is yet in the end a mental construction. But in this latter part perception is not an outstanding, but yet real, activity; there is, in the process in whole, an activity of the object, as well as of the consciousness of the perceiver, but there is, in the resultant knowledge, no *tertium quid*. The "real," as I have said, and important character of the perceptive process is evidenced by the selective attention involved, based as that is upon a profound interest. Such interest is the mother of attention, and it is by attention that thought, in distinction from perception, becomes an arrest. In such processes of knowledge it would seem absurd to deny that there is a certain dualism implied—that which I know cannot be one with my own mental state, but must belong to reality beyond knowledge itself. But that does not keep such dualism from being eventually transcended in knowledge itself, as the union of subject and object. For the

subjectivity, which is energetic and progressive, will always find the objectivity which exists for it. But it does seem rather absurd for epistemological critics to write as if having, or being, a mind, already meant perfectly organised knowledge, and no analysis of the process of knowledge were permissible. No talk of the Absolute Idealist about reality as one and unique can reasonably account for the fact that, in the experience of the individual, the distinction of subject and object exists, for his knowledge. The presence and activity of the subject are, in all knowledge, indispensable; they select and construct the data. By study of its own activities, my mind can acquire a knowledge of its own knowing. Hence a broader statement is possible. The ideal, the limitations, the inadequacies, of knowledge, must all be sifted, and largely have been.

Psychology has surely taught us clearly enough, how subject to growth are our powers, both of perception and conception. The discriminating activity of sense-perception is very progressive. However we may suppose that we think the world, knowledge will never be without its kingdoms to conquer, for it never is, or can be, identical or co-extensive with reality. My idealism, or idealistically acquired knowledge, I do not care to call "personal" idealism, because it seems narrowing and pleonastic; it is just Idealism, for in it I relate my perceptions, freed of personal conditions, to a general or common consciousness, which means for them a certain universal validity; and in it, too, the values possible to me are open and valid for every other self, each from its particular standpoint. They are so little "personal" to me that every subject may, in this sense, have them. They belong to the world of inter-subjective intercourse as open to all. Not as an isolated subject, can I know God as objectively real and valid, however personal or individual my knowledge of Him may be. It is quite clear that the validity and necessity of those synthetic *à priori* principles, of which I have spoken, can be realised only through a necessary connection of perceptions. My perceptions, I am compelled, in this way, to regard as always the same for me, under like conditions,

and for every consciousness similar to my own. But this similarity or partial (logical) identity is significant for our powers of intercommunication or trans-subjective intercourse. This is in keeping with the logic of idealism, which, whether agreeing or not with Wundt that consciousness does not admit of definition, certainly regards the conscious individual as part of an organic whole, set in essentially harmonious relation to others, or to society, by a "consciousness of kind." It is of fundamental import to our Idealism, however, that consciousness be taken as formative and regulative principle of our knowledge of matter or the world—since these exist only for consciousness—albeit not without such reality and determining power of the object as may keep our idealistic knowledge from being arbitrary and fanciful. Recent psychology, in the main, has held to the view that consciousness cannot be defined, since it is presupposed in all definition, and attempts to define it must be circular; hence we can only deal with the forms of consciousness, taking account, of course, of the conditions of their rise. But the usual bald psychological statement, that consciousnesses are mutually exclusive, must be viewed in the light of what has already been advanced. The beauty of Theistic Idealism as a system appears to me to lie in the way it does justice to the world as God's world, at the same time that it does justice to the universe as man's universe. It does the former, in making God the base, bottom, ground, and sustaining principle of the world, in virtue of the theistic idea, element, or factor, in the system. This is the diastole of the system, dilating thought to the full compass of absolute reality or existence, overpassing knowledge and even outrunning thought and imagination. It does the latter, making the universe really man's, in virtue of the idealistic element or factor, without which all the values of the God-created universe would be non-existent for us, since all existence and reality are known by us only through the veil of our ideas or the media of our own mental powers. Or, as it might be more idealistically put, all being or existence is a form or appearance of the ego. Things, in their necessity, and universality, are inevitably

related to our knowing mind. This constitutes the systole of the system, for the contractile action or aspect is not to be denied, wherein idealistic knowledge falls short of absolute existence or full reality. In this attitude of pure Idealism, or anthropocentric method of approach, the reality of the outer world is not denied. But, though in idealism, I make logical apprehension of the world of things, my knowledge of the world—my world-view—has yet a certain note or element of strangeness in it. And if I find the unity of reality in the concrete nature of the content of my experience, that does not keep reality from being, at the same time, over-individual, with content still unabsorbed by me. But reality is still one, this higher order of reality independent of me manifesting itself always more fully in my experience, for which it wears at present a certain foreign aspect. To this element of foreignness there is, I hold, abundant and impressive testimony in the history and literature of philosophy. At this point the theistic or religious element comes in, and suffuses my idealism with a feeling warmth, in virtue of which the world is much more intimately mine. Hence the theistic and the idealistic factors, though quite distinct, are not at all such different factors—say rather, they are not such diverse modes of apprehending things: in their essence—as they might be supposed to be. The theistic or religious view or apprehension has, it should be observed, its own modes of presentation, as well as feeling, and it is therefore nearer of kin to the idealistic apprehension than might be imagined, since thought and feeling are, in strict philosophy, never separable. If, in all this, the humanistic interest is terribly dependent upon theistic action and result, it is also true that theistic action and reality are terribly dependent on the being and powers of human idealism. Without these last, God's world would be one vast unpeopled blank. The universe is man's, not only because God made it for him, but because, in another and true sense, he has made it for himself, and—if you audaciously will—for God. It is not in the least necessary, in order to do justice to theistic interests, to lay any hand of restraint on humanistic play and interests. What we are here concerned with is the

great and growing fact of consciousness in its matchless significance for man and for the world. We are not here concerned with any organic conditions or basis of consciousness, but simply with the importance of the fact or reality of consciousness as free from the operation—not of law but—of natural or mechanical law. An entirely new, free, rational force let loose upon the world! It is not to be supposed, from what has already been said, that the outer world is a mere part of the empiric ego, for the “I” and the world are, in Theistic Idealism, both parts of one vast whole or system of being. But it is meant to bring out the fundamental part played by the “I” in the upbuilding of our whole thought. The only evidence of fact is consciousness, which is by nature a knowing. The world is, to pure idealism, an appearance in consciousness; I am myself an appearance in consciousness; and so is everything else, so far as the philosophical essence of consciousness is concerned. And to the expansion of consciousness no limit can be set. But the human experiences, which are all, to idealism, facts of consciousness, are not without a unity. For consciousness is both one and many, in a true sense. In the world of “manyness” or manifoldness, in which I am set, I am so little a mere bundle of instincts or qualities as to be a perfect unity, and, for idealism, an essential being. But, granting that Idealism defines mind or consciousness in terms of contents or relations drawn or, as it is said, “borrowed” from the world of objects, it does not follow that this is the whole of consciousness. Such mode of defining it makes mind merely a form of cognitive relation—a purely cognitive awareness. But consciousness may very properly be taken as more of an activity than this implies, its activity wearing also an ethical and purposive character. Its every idea is also aim and ideal. Cognitive values or relations, in respect of the world of objects, may be fully appreciated, without necessity for the world of social, ethical, and religious values—as products of mind or spirit—being ignored or depreciated. The larger Idealism seems to me the truer one. Why must our idealism treat consciousness as wholly relational, to the neglect of those acts of consciousness which are

intentional — and non-presentational — in character? These latter have their own mental objects, and the psychical activities in question have been recognised by logicians like Husserl, to whom reference has already been made, and by psychologists like Messer. Idealism ought not to miss or exclude any parts of the world of meaning or value, for the precise and priceless gift of consciousness to the world, and to experience, is just meaning. Consciousness is the measure and source of value. It seems to me a terrible contraction or impoverishment of Idealism to restrict it to sense data or objective presentations, when a broader and more exalted theory of mind than the relational or “borrowed” one is open and possible to us, if not forced upon us. If one thus seeks to avoid a truncated Idealism, there need be no injustice to intellectualism in so doing, since the cognitive and relational aspects are fully admitted, recognised, and subsumed. Talk of objective value can be properly made, only as signifying the being or quality of a reality that exists outside the subject; factual values are yet, in a sense, subjective; they are the feeling-reactions of a subject. I do not take consciousness—which always consists of objectification—to remain other than active in the relational results already spoken of. Though these may, for philosophical purposes, be so usefully distinguished or segregated, they do not exhaust the activities of consciousness, which extend to or embrace intentional or purposive aspects or functions. Ethical, social, and religious duties and rights are truly objective, albeit they cannot be expressed in terms of the purely relational theory of knowledge.

I come back to say that, in the cruder forms of theism, there is, no doubt, too great contentedness to represent God as a Being or Essence outside the spatial and sensible world, but the more refined or idealistic forms of theistic thought are much more in harmony with the essential unity of all being, which pure Idealism demands, than such a view would suggest. For such a theistic view is not ultimate, the final view of theistic idealism being that of a spiritualistic monism, wherein God—as the living unity—is all, and in all. Dis-

tinguish God as we theistically may, and must, from all pantheistic confusions and identifications with the world, we yet rise, even from the visible things of Creation to the thought of an invisible and ultimate Unity, which we call God. We so think Him as the One, Eternal, and Incomprehensible Essence. Then the theism and the idealism have become really one. But the universality, complexity, and profundity of the contents of Theistic Idealism are, as I have already hinted in the Preface, such that they do not readily lend themselves to the glib clearness which, though not sounding experience deeply, is often all that is asked or valued in philosophical writing. It may profitably be remembered that "even the deeper Sciences—those with most of concrete content, such as History and Psychology—and Philosophy, will always remain out-distanced, not in clearness, but in volume and vividness of content, by Life wheresoever it is profound." (F. von Hügel, 'The Constructive Quarterly,' 1914.) This must not be taken, however, to mean any real antithesis between life and thought. Theistic Idealism must move along the lines of seeking out, and setting forth, its objective contents and ends, rather than pursue any mere Kantian formal universal validity. Indeed, it seems to me that the empty character of a merely formal validity of the idea of God might have been apparent ever since the theism of Voltaire. The idea of God was highly important to Voltaire; the necessities of society were such that this idea could not be dispensed with. But this tenuous theism was no necessity of Voltaire's soul; it had only to do with his good sense; it was a specious thing that led to nothing. But now this same idea is so natural and non-artificial an element of life as to represent the objectively necessary, in virtue of the grand specific oughtness so characteristic of the answering religious consciousness.

Of Idealism itself, it is, no doubt, true that it inclines to rate our knowledge of our mental or inner life as deeper and more assured than our knowledge of the outer world of sense-experience. Külpe has recently shewn the senses in which this view must be modified or restricted. He has insisted,

properly enough, that inner perceptions, psychic states and processes, are not to be accepted as self-evident and entirely trustworthy, without any deduction or modification that psychological criticism may find necessary. Some thinkers have even denied a gnoseological character to our psychic experience, from the point of view of theory of knowledge. But, after every psychological scrutiny and deduction, we may, I think, hold, with Schopenhauer, Beneke, Brentano, Wundt, and others, to the superior worth or idealistic value of inner experience. Objects of our inner perception can in a directly and strictly objective sense be known by us, but our knowledge of the outer world is mediated by appearances, and can only be of an indirect character. Our knowledge of physical things and events is no merely objective affair, even though it carries objective contents. There is no more fundamental philosophical truth than that there is no being outside the "I." This knowledge of the outer world, as not outside the "I," constitutes pure Idealism. One may hold to that, I maintain, without caring to deny that there is a sense in which the world of things does exist without my sense-perception and my thought. For extreme idealism does great and unnecessary injustice to objective reality, when it is not content to make its idealistic claim without investing the world of outer form with the character of unreality or shadowy appearance. There is not much left of the activity of the object when such idealism insists that all being is an appearance of the "I," and that all appearance of the "I" is only sense-perception or the representation of sense-perception. To say that objects exist only for consciousness—or for a subject—need not land us in the absurd position of denying the reality of objects or things that have not yet entered into actual consciousness. Our Idealism can be real, without being absurdly extreme, and holding that, not only for us, but absolutely, all reality is mental. It can avoid the mistake of Hegelianism in devouring its own data, when it makes the logical process take the place of perception. It can be just to the newer Realism, which admits that sense-data are not to be viewed as inde-

pendent of percipients. It is not required of a thoroughgoing Idealism that it be blind or indiscriminating or unjust.

The contents of consciousness are obviously not mental, if and when by such contents are meant objects of consciousness. This is shewn in our chapter on "The Philosophy of Nature." Such objects are, of course, never seen by us save as illuminated by consciousness, but it is an unwarranted and extreme idealism which denies them any existence save that which is cast by this illuminating power. To say, with Bradley, that nothing exists but experience, is, no doubt, idealistically true, but, left without explication or qualification, it is really an excessive and unphilosophical subjectivism. We shall have occasion to deal with Berkeley's discovery that things are ideas; without is within, according to Berkeley. But the foundations of idealism, it may now be said, lie deeper than the Berkeleyan positions, as has too often been overlooked. Not that the views of Berkeley were anything but really significant, on any fair historic view, but that they still left the work of philosophy to be done. Consequently, one can accept the following remark as forcefully stating the position:—"The same things that were called *without* or *noumenal*, are now called '*within*' or *phenomenal*, but, call them as you may, it is their *systematic explanation* that is wanted." For such systematic explanation, it is rightly contended, is alone philosophy, and anything short of that remains inadequate. Theistic Idealism can very well agree with any Idealism which seeks the foundations of truth or system in the nature of the mind itself, as keyed to the true structure of the universe. For there surely can be no more basal possibilities for us than such a correspondence between the universe and mind. But a true Idealism will interpret the universe in terms of mind, and not mind in terms of the universe, a requirement not always fulfilled by vaunted Idealism. The foundation-stone is laid, not in matter, but in its perception, as the primary fact of knowledge. For we may hold, with Ferrier, that matter is never object of knowledge, but always "*matter mecum*." In this taking of the self of consciousness together with the object, psychology is alone

among the sciences. I have maintained, throughout this work, that the world of objects exists independently alike of the passive awareness of consciousness and of the constructive activity of thought. This I hold, because our immediate experience would be unintelligible without such a real world being presupposed. But, beyond the fact *that* there is such a real and independent world to be presupposed, we have, I think, no further philosophic concern, beyond the interests such *that* may bear for thought, conception, and imagination. I think much loss may and does accrue, on the side of knowledge, to much extreme idealism, from the excessive manner in which it merges the object in the subject. Surely the activity of the object—its declaration of itself—is no less desirable than the activity of the subject.

Our great concern must be with the *what* of the world, the problem of reality on an idealistic theory of the universe. The objectively real is then constituted by the mind of the knower, and does not simply consist of the perception of “given” reality. The “given” is not to be taken as without psychical activity. The selective and constructive character of our activity in perception, under process of attention, is to be clearly kept in view. But there is no need to be extreme, like Cohen and Natorp, in their rejection of the “given”; what is perceived is the “given”; this is very different from the cognitive activity or thought, which is essentially and pre-eminently order. The real form and position of things have still to be constructed. But, because the real object is not simply and immediately given, it has no need to be called merely mental—a “content” of consciousness, as the stock philosophic phrase, which in many connections cannot be done without, goes. It is, properly speaking, an object of consciousness, and how poor the subject would be without the object and its relations! It is such an object, because knowledge, to be possible, demands its independence of the knower. A recent writer says, “that entities may exist, independently of their being known, is true but irrelevant” (*Philosophical Review*, 1914). “Until such entities come within the sphere of knowledge, they

are for science and philosophy non-entities," he continues. The admission of what is here "true" cannot be allowed to be wholly without significance for philosophy. No doubt, the ideal of knowledge—the ideality of thought—is that their *what* be known. The assertion of their independent existence, he had already said, "has significance only in so far as the nature of our knowledge of physical things, and of consciousness in the concrete, leads logically to the assertion that the nature of physical things is such that they must exist in the totality of experience, independent of their presence immediately in or to a finite consciousness." Is this "significance" really an "irrelevant" interest to philosophy? That finite experience is not equivalent to reality: is this a "true" but "irrelevant" issue for philosophic inquiry? Theistic idealism, as here expounded, will incidentally show how far the irrelevance is from being matter of unimportance: the *what* of content cannot dispense with the *that* of existence, so relevant is it to reality: each requires the other: inseparable as they are, they are distinguishable enough. Their distinction is important for our Idealism. Existence is involved in all judgments as their "presumptive point." It is the balance, the sanity, the justness, the moderation, of the Idealism that are finally involved. The writer quoted has hazarded the opinion—"to say *that* a thing exists is to say *what* it is, or it is to say nothing." This dogmatism betrays a gross and incredible confusion of existence with essence or nature—of passive awareness or possible experience with direct perception—which even the insight of the Middle Ages would not have tolerated. Another writer, strongly Hegelian, inveighs against the *that*, but yet admits it is "pure being" or the "bare potentiality of a thought reality"; that is all I ask; but I deny that being, and such potentiality, have no interest or significance for philosophy (J. Watson, 'Christianity and Idealism,' p. 144). Little wonder that Neo-Realism has revolted against such philosophically half-minded types of objective Idealism. To say *that* God exists, without determining *what* He is, may be futile, if you will, but it is not without truth, and relevance

for possible experience. The mere existence or presence in the *that* calls, of course, for completion as determinate existence in the *what*, but there is no need to confound them. Thought needs their distinction.

Extreme forms of Idealism are often narrow and indiscriminating in their modes of expression. "Narrow" because they represent the philosopher as shut up in the narrow range as his own idealistic watch-tower, with, all the while, "a world whose totality stands under the condition of being a possible object of experience" (Münsterberg, 'The Eternal Values,' p. 48). "Possible" for "experience" it may very well be, but how little of it falls within the particular philosopher's "experience," especially if he feels not the weight of its *that* goading him on to know its *what*. Unless "experience" is to be explicated in some very broad and comprehensive form, we are left with a rather poor and narrow philosophical purview. It must be made to embrace the thought and knowledge that outrun experience as bare existence. "Even where the conviction transcends the world of experience, and seeks an over-experience, such a last reality must still remain dependent upon the conditions of consciousness" (Ibid., p. 48). True, in a sense, but what a lack of explication in all this! In that "over-experience" which we call God, there is here no felt need to explicate the kind of consciousness; nor is there any discrimination of the fact that my knowledge *that* the Deity exists, however assured, does not mean anything resembling a "totality" of knowledge of *what* He is. God is yet the absolute object of knowledge, however limited and partial my knowledge of Him may be. He is my first and truest, my Absolute Other; others are true for me in and through Him. Such is Theistic Idealism. No theory of Idealism can be satisfactory to me which does not enlarge my field of vision, and broaden my whole level of values.

Reason has a much larger part to play in establishing the knowledge and value of God for me, than is allowed in voluntaristic Idealisms, like that of Münsterberg, with their one-sided stress on will. Münsterberg makes virtual denial

of reason, when he resolves it into the connection of valuations, in his quest of "pure" will or will of value; but before you can deny reason, you must already have it, and, having it, you ought to do better than turn thought itself into a will. Our idea of God is one which is real in experience, as purified of mere sense reference, for our idealism must have an experiential grounding. But God as the absolutely First Principle, the Absolute Reason, and the Absolute Will, is a necessary postulate of all our thought. It is, of course, in regions like this that the validity of our knowledge, in a thorough epistemological sense, is most difficult to establish or maintain. Nevertheless, Theistic Idealism confidently maintains the cognitive value of our knowledge of God. No one thinks of denying validity to our knowledge of mathematical truth, however the kind of knowledge may there transcend experience in the narrow form of sense reference. With even less show of reason can the claim to true and valid knowledge be denied to our knowledge of God. In the name of Theistic Idealism, I even claim for it that it is knowledge in the purest, most irrefragable, most undeceivable sense. This, because it is knowledge, which is utterly dissociated from the deceptions and limitations and impurities of sense-experience; and because it is, at the same time, knowledge of no abstract, and possibly fictitious, forms of being, but of the most concrete form of Being or Reality. Certainly the ideality of such a form of knowledge is pure gain, but it is sheer irrationality or superstition to suppose that the absence of grosser modes of apprehension could imply anything else than a strengthening of the validity title of such knowledge. The grounds for these statements are too often hid from the wise and prudent in philosophy, and may so remain for a timid and un-philosophical traditionalism.

I pass to remark that, in all which has now been advanced, the involved constructive power of mind has lain in the discovery of possibilities that reach out from, and beyond, the actual. Constructive power and process are present in the perceptual value reached by our sensational

experience; and the ideas by which the construction is effected are furnished by the reason. The world, indeed, is an ideal construction through our powers of unifying perceptual data. Its two realms of fact and of ideal must be synthesised and reconciled, if the supreme task of philosophy is to be fulfilled. All such intellectual construction is from mind, not from matter, and in it reason and reflection are not to be undervalued, as they are by Bergson. The ideas of resemblance and causation are examples of this, and they work together from the start. The purely mental notion of causation finds forces expressed in colour, form, sound, and motion. Reason is the constructive idea in dealing with the world of matter, which carries no law of construction within itself. But thought, too, is real, and thought-reality can, in my judgment, be so thought of that this latter thought is truth. But the *reality* of thought is one notion, and the *truth* of thought is another and quite distinct notion. Truth is a mode and a determination of reality, as we shall see later. Physicism, atomism, sensationalism—indeed, naturalism in general—are but artificial constructions of experience, though not without their necessity from certain points of view. Our experience is continually giving rise to the idea of an Absolute, and it has nothing to set against it. Reason moves towards the Absolute, and if we trust in reason as we should, we shall feel bound to recognise the fact of such movement. The unity of the world is, for our idealism, the unity of Reason. Unity is product of mind, in its free creative activity. The world-order is the same for all, and the world of thought must rise to unity. The world's unity is thus not that of a simple unit, which has indeed no unity. Its unity is necessary even to rational pluralistic contention. Its unity is a unity in diversity, an identity in difference. Mind is, for us, the source of that unity of a world-order wherein reality consists; and the unity is the result of the relations of reason being introduced into things. Although the universe is one, any of its parts possesses a certain relative independence, and is open to a certain measure or degree of independent

knowableness. An approximate knowledge of the Whole is thus built up from our partial knowledge of the parts. Our cognitive reconstructions are founded on concrete objects, of which we have a consciousness. Our consciousness of the characteristics of such objects is a consciousness of laws and relations. Yet there is no abstract consciousness, says Cornelius, but only concrete contents of consciousness. And, whereas Wundt and Külpe are content to speak of object and content, Witasek distinguishes object, content, and act, while Lipps and Husserl give a more determinate relation of the consciousness-content to the "I." The most universal function of consciousness is its knowing function, with which we are here concerned. Our constructions may individually differ, but, though neither identical nor unified, will have more or less similarity or resemblance. They are based upon those forms of knowledge—perception and memory. Even the self is an ideal construction, under developing perceptual and ideational processes. In memory, which, to Bergson, realises continuity, we have an ideal construction of the past. By memory, said Aristotle, we see distance, not in space, but in time. To interpret the world of realities as facts of mind, and make mental laws the one genetic process, is to present a constructive idealism, such as is here attempted, but with justice to reality. For constructive ideas need not be simply mental forms, since things, as known by our minds, are not so known without some determining influence by things as they are. Things differ, however, from sense-data, as Mr B. Russell rightly says, and can only have a correspondence with them.

Against Heracliteanism and other engulfing forces, Plato set up a positive and constructive theory of knowledge, and already had something to say of "truth and real existence," "of science and of truth" (*Rep.*, 508). Of course, he lacked scientific insight, and left no theory of nature of any particular value to scientific thought. In so far, however, as science is Being in its relations, Plato did much for relation. Precursor of Kant he in a measure was, in shewing how the world becomes intelligible only in virtue of the formative

laws of human reason, and those categories of thought, which, for the knowing subject, are in a certain sense prior to experience. The ideas or types were, to him, constant and unchanging. From finding this permanency in the subjective realm, Plato passed to find a certain permanence, on the objective side, in the ideal world of his philosophical creation—his transcendental world of Nature. Kant took the constructive imagination to lay hold on sense-data and reflective ideas, building them up, with the aid of the categories, into an ideal world, which is yet for us the real world. Will power, under the categorical imperative, was, for Kant, the force in mind. For Bergson, the important thing is the concentration of our powers of attention in such a mode of attending as shall enable us to include as much as possible of the whole present-past. This hyphenated whole certainly deserves the effort of attention so forcefully demanded for it by that philosopher. In constructive effort, the concern of philosophy is, no doubt, with the absolutely necessary and universal, not the artificially constructed. Synthesis is one of the final laws of progress, but, for idealism, the content of knowledge does not exist outside the synthesis of the subject. The moral impulse is the synthetic impulse, but a synthetic view rests on thought and severe analysis. The moral impulse is the organic impulse taking a clear form, towards the furtherance of synthetic view. The function of conceptual synthesis is, that is to say, to fuse and re-combine into one whole the parts, aspects, qualities, and relations, laid bare by analysis. Attention analyses the data. The aspects or parts are, in ideational thinking, rendered definite and determinate by their relations within the ideal or constructive whole. This determinateness, due to conceptual synthesis, supersedes, in fact, the determinateness of sense-perception, with the concreteness that appertained to it. Only by means of such ideal combination and construction does the world ever become presented as a really unified system. The Bergsonian polemic against intellect is pointless for metaphysics, which is an intellectual interpretation: intuition is not metaphysics, but only supplies the starting-point and material for meta-

physical interpretation. Thought is not essentially lifeless: organic order is the life of thought. The foundations of our Theistic Idealism are, as a spiritualistic philosophy, laid along lines in advance of, and not quite coincident with, those of Lotze's basal philosophical thesis, and are wholly independent of them in the outworking. In Lotze we merely see "how absolutely universal is the extent and, at the same time, how completely subordinate the significance of the mission, which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world." Our Idealism seeks, though following an idealistic method, to keep as close as possible to experience, fact, and reality, in its attempt to produce and present a system of living theism, which shall be an idealistically theistic philosophy. It will be for the subsequent chapters of this work to show the consistency of our system, by the way in which all the varied theistic postulates and positions are shewn to hold good, or be true of, the terms of our system, viz., God, Freedom, and Immortality, theistically, but also idealistically, conceived.

I adopt, for the moment, as a means of indicating what is here meant by Theistic Idealism, the method of negating the recent declarations of Idealism made by a certain Neo-Hegelian professor (H. Jones, Martineau Lecture). "The Idealist is committed beyond recall, and without reservation, to the unity of man with the system in which he lives." "Nor can he retain any part or element of man—not the will, nor the ghostly shadow of the will which is called 'activity'—in aloofness from the system of the real." It sounds strange to have his metaphysical issues thus pre-determined. "If his ego is 'impervious,' if no other being, not even God, can occupy the point of outlook of his inner self, and look at the world of being through his eyes, it is still by means of the world that he looks at all, and God is the light of all his seeing." This is cosmocentric theory, with "his own irrevocable place" for man, and what a poor one. What an apotheosis, nay, deification of the "world"—the world "system"—"the system of the real"! Each of the foregoing statements Theistic Idealism negates in the most direct manner possible, as, to it, erroneous, misleading, and unwholesome. One had

supposed Idealism, of Neo-Hegelian type, to make much of spirit, but alas! the glories of spirit and spontaneity have fled from such naturalistic pronouncements. Correlated with the world system we, 'tis a truism to say, are on the physical side, as we shall see in dealing with Nature; but what man, with any theistic grasp or insight, would dream of rooting man, "without reservation" and without regard to "ethical consequences," to unity with the world? What value has the world without relation to man as a moral essence? Theistic Idealism does not teach that the world made me, or gave me my powers and my value, or claims my first allegiance; for it is theocentric enough, in aim, to make God the true correlate of man, and it asserts man's intrinsic and absolute superiority to nature; in all which, it is assuredly in essential harmony with the distinctively religious view of the world. That view posits a value of his own for the "I" over against the world. Our knowledge of God—His everlasting power and divinity—is, no doubt, mediated by the world; but that is just that thereby man may transcend the world, in his knowledge of Him, Who is not measured by the world. Nor is it only "by means of the world" that "God is the light of all his seeing," for no theistic thinker would be unspiritual enough to deny to man some more direct access of mind, in hours of visitation from the living God. The religious consciousness, for all that, arises only through the medium of our consciousness of the world. Even a knowledge of activity, which we should not call unmediated, may yet be immediate. Our God-consciousness supervenes only upon self-consciousness and world-consciousness. In our knowledge of finite spirits, we should not allow any intervention of sense-media, which physiological psychology may impose, to keep us from calling our knowledge immediate. No theistic idealism but utterly repudiates such a pantheistic merging of man's personality—his ethical individuality—in a nature-system, as is exemplified in the statements quoted. The naturalistic trend in these pronouncements is much more obvious than any tendencies truly idealistic, and, indeed, absolute idealism, speaking more generally, has just been doing its best, as a

sort of higher naturalism, to give the world intelligible unity, without the theistic hypothesis. God can be for it a theoretic superfluity.

There is no particular occasion or need for any one to use or retain the term "impervious," although Dr Bosanquet, also, succumbs to the fiction of believers in "an impervious and isolated self"; but the retention of man's ethical individuality, and inviolable freedom, is of vital moment to theistic idealism, and must not be weakened, "in any manner or degree." No weak antipathy to a word can obscure the fact of the measure or sense in which, as a feeling and willing individual, man remains "impervious" to other selves, but the imperviousness need imply only distinct consciousnesses or personalities, without which no true communion of spirits were possible. Theistic Idealism must be considered immeasurably superior to such an idealistic programme, as that we have quoted, for to it the world, instead of being supreme and all-controlling over man, is still God's world—a dependent manifestation of Him. And, though we have claimed God and man to be correlatives, that is not to say that the world is not, for us also, to be correlated with God; for that is a fundamental interest of philosophy. The world, too, is something for God: the relation subsisting between it and God is of determinative importance for us. But man is not the hopelessly dependent thing, in respect of the world, which he would be, if he were not a self-determining ethical spirit, capable, in spite of any impersonal world-ground, of raising himself to always higher freedom, and greater spiritual independence, in virtue of his voluntary and ethical union with God. The unity of the nature-system with the rational and spiritual world is found, in our theistic idealism, in the subordination of nature to spirit, whose theatre and medium it is, and whose ends it subserves.

We are conscious of the external world, because, as our physical environment, it constantly acts upon us through sense-perceptions, and presents itself in our consciousness. So, in analogous, but by no means in all respects like, manner, God, as our spiritual environment, ceaselessly acts upon us, and is present in our spiritual consciousness, through our

spiritual perceptions and susceptibilities. But the spiritual and the sensational aspects of life are not to be conceived as different spheres or realms, for experience is a whole, or a unity—a unity of purpose or end. Nor is it to be for an instant supposed that in these knowledges—whether of the sense-world, or of the spiritual world—the mind of man is ever anything but active, for this activity has been one of the chief insistences of modern psychology, although the precise nature of such activity has not yet been determined. Thus it will be seen we have discarded any theory of sensational copying of reality, in our knowledge of the external world; and, in our mode of allowing for the activity of objects, have overpassed Berkeleyan denial of trans-subjective reference. It was this denial that led Schuppe to say that Berkeley's error is like that of realism, in that it consisted in isolating one of the constitutive moments of knowledge from the other. In the insistences now made, there is certainly nothing "ghostly," but much that is distinctively and essentially true and human. We shall return to this in the chapter on "The Philosophy of Nature."

If it be asked why there should be an universe at all—why the World-Will should have manifested itself—our theistic idealism would say that that is more than we can tell. Lotze has maintained that the world is not a problem for philosophy: we only know it as an expression of God's mind, and as the result of His free volition; but we should neither, like some theologians, ascribe it to a rather absurd desire of enhancing His own blessedness, nor, like Hartmann, regard it as motivated by the unblestness of the World-Will itself. But the world is here, upon our hands, and our theistic idealism finds it to be a spiritual macrocosm, wherein man, as a spiritual being, can lose himself in ever-widening circles of thought and love and energy. Theistic idealism can claim not only high philosophic, but weighty scientific support, in the present and in the late generation, for holding it a most rational position that, in point of real and indubitable existence, the world without us must yield precedence to the world of spirit within. The world, and

all that is in it, must, to our Idealism, be a thing unintelligible apart from Mind: relative to mind are both the primary and the secondary qualities of objects. One never hears now the complaint of earlier philosophers that idealism, in taking the experience-world to be everything, was a grievous limitation of reason, while, in their view, the world of experience was quite irrelevant to intellectual knowledge. But what would they have said of the further reduction of reason by our "value" philosophers to a purely utilitarian rôle! The complaint was interesting, but of course not just to every idealism. I cannot, however, put my Idealism in the extreme form of Bradley, who says there is but one Reality, and its being consists in experience. For it seems to me there is a larger sense of the term, Reality, identified with objective validity, in which reality includes everything that subsists, independently of the mind that posits or affirms it. Such Reality, as outside consciousness, requires our rejection that nothing is real but experience. I yet take reality to consist idealistically, *i.e.*, for me, in experience. For this is just where our idealism comes in; for if reality is to be the object of my thought, it is not easy to see then how reality can be independent of my thought, as certain realistic types of thought suppose. Reality is a construct of our perceptions, a projection of our consciousness. Experience exhausts the real for me, but not all the reality there is. But I cannot accept Bradley's *what* without my own *that*: there is for me its factuality, if not also its quality; call this *that* bare presentational existence, if you will, it still—but only as unexperienced Reality, fully taken—arises only in the realm of experience. Reality is transcendent, but it is vain to think its transcendence can be solved by a concept of value, as some thinkers have supposed. It might, indeed, be more to the purpose to transform such values into concepts, but that is not to say that the transcendence would be abolished. Our idealism finds reality to be itself ideal—not bare existence, but realized idea. And I, too, am real. Every philosophical system has to do with this problem of reality, of which we ourselves form part,

hence my references now and later. But, after all, may we not say that reality is just the present of reason?

That form of thought, which identifies pure experience with ultimate reality, and makes such experience take the form of sensationalism, Theistic Idealism utterly rejects. For it cannot allow such notions as those of substance and cause, pure creations of mind as they in a sense are, to be reduced to sensations. Nor can it regard sensation as more than an element of experience, one which attains its value through the activity of thought. Hence to it such sensationalistic or positivistic type of experience amounts, in fact, to a depotentiation of reality. But Reality is richer than experience, even at its highest, although for our Idealism, conscious mind or spirit possesses real and independent existence, in the fullest sense that we experience or know. Nor is there in this world any higher source or kind of light than consciousness radiates on the meaning of the world and of existence, on the contents of life, and on all spiritual values.

In the Idealism presented in this work, being or the object, as not alien to the mind, is taken to provoke or cognitively call forth the act of recognition; the act of recognition does not create the object or being—it only creates or constructs it *for me*. Reality is not resolvable simply into a process; there is, for our idealism, no representation of reality without the presupposition of the mind as a real agent in the matter. Its knowing relation to the object is thus a causal one, in a sense. By a transcendental rise in thought, there is for us also an infinite Thought, yea, an infinite Thinker, but, as I am not He, I can only seek to decipher the marks or traces of His thought impressed upon, and expressed within, the universe. For philosophy attempts nothing so absurd as, by means of an imagined objectivity, to make His view-point its own. But Theistic Idealism, just because it is “theistic,” does not allow itself, in the egocentric blindness of current philosophy, to forget that there is such a view-point, not without primary significance for our idealistic “values.” Reality, however, must

be allowed to exist in itself, and cannot have its existence reduced to being only a content of consciousness, through its being identified with its existence in this and that particular mind. Such reality is always a necessity in its sense-stimulation, and essential as antecedent and accompaniment of our consciousness. It seems to me that the idealism, which does not allow to the object any existence independently of the mind which, in its particularity, perceives it in its endeavour to make itself one with reality as universal, is clearly an inadequate, or at least an unjustified, conception of Reality. So I prefer the Idealism which is larger in its view of Reality, and more just to realistic interests, while absolutely logical or free of contradiction, and thus thoroughgoing, in a correct sense, in its idealistic form. In this Idealism, being or spirit—the essence, that is to say, of the knowing mind—is the fundamental category in the construction of the world whose true nature it would profoundly know.

But I disown any ontology, in which such being or spirit appears as devoid of ethical quality or essence. It is to me the radical vice of Idealisms like those of Bosanquet, Bradley, Caird, and systems of Neo-Hegelian character generally, that they are bare ontologies, with a Deity or an Absolute of whom it is the last thing in the world one could say, that He is the primary ethical Being or Essence—the unity of the Real and the Ideal—the aboriginally perfect ethical Actuality. But this is an incurable defect in a metaphysical system, one whose evil effects must appear once and again in any systematic elaboration. To place the ethical originally outside the Absolute, is to perpetrate the sheerest absurdity. The metaphysical being or oneness of the Primal Being is, for me, the immediate or co-existent basis or foundation of His ethical being and oneness. God, as a metaphysical being, but not yet ethical spirit, is a figment of the philosophical imagination. Where the fountainhead of thought is not ethically pure—and pure it can never be while God is not felt and recognised as the ethical Absolute—the stream of thought must become turbid, as we shall plainly

see in the course of our discussions. Meantime, such a tendency as that sometimes evidenced by Dr Bosanquet, to set the religious over against the merely moral as something superior to it, is a tendency to be expressly reprobated in the name of Theistic Idealism. It utterly repudiates any religious thought or experience, which is not also wholly ethical in the first place, for the absolutely highest thought is for it the ethical.

The spiritualistic monism of our Theistic Idealism is not reached only after such a circuitous, oscillating, and distracting mode as Dr Ward has pursued in his "Realm of Ends," wherein the sufficiency, if not superiority, of monistic result is suddenly shot upon our view, after many pluralistic divagations and preferences on the subject. Vitality, cogency, impact, are lost in such a mode of treatment. Theistic thought always has, in ways more or less conscious, proceeded from the midst of pluralistic phenomena to unity of mind or conception, in natural and not precarious mode: its judgment of Reality is that it is One, and that the unity, totality, and system, of the universe call for One Eternal Mind as its source and ground. Even if we say the unity of the world is not a completed unity, but that the world is in process of being carried into perfect unity, its unity is still, in a sense, real, and is, as experience shows, not lacking in elements of formal unity, any more than in gradual unification of actual world-processes. The unity of Theistic Idealism does not exclude differences: its Deity is not an Absolute of the Bradleyan unrelated type—a One without a Many; its monism is not mechanical in its working. Our unity of mind is not of a kind that is complete and ready-made, but rather that of a unity, relatively complete, but still in course of being made up. By the logic of idealism, the same holds good, in a sense, of the mind of the universe, which, on the higher than finite side, is only being progressively disclosed. So, although I hold no brief for Lotze, I think a good deal of what Dr Schiller has urged against even such a monism as Lotze's rather slight and unconvincing, and not always quite just to Lotze, whose monism was resolute, but not thought

out to the end. But I do not in the least attach my spiritualistic monism to Lotze, or, for that matter, to anybody else. Thought has learned much since Lotze's time, and there has been too much weak watering down of Lotze in some of the most recent philosophy of religion, with "value" vainly substituted for defects of reason. Such a refuge in will and feeling values can be no substitute for the completion of reason's work, as that which is highest in, and most distinctive of, man. More and deeper reason is the real need. As for Truth, which I seek, even in system, I think that, while much of interest is said by Dr Schiller of truth as "value" in the apprehension of fact, he entirely fails to appreciate truth as applicable to those universal truths, which are norms in all thinking and knowing, and are to be distinguished from knowledge of particular realities called fact. These truths of reason carry objective validity as laws and principles of things, and do not wait for pragmatist "manipulation," in order to become "useful." To deny all such "abstract" truth, or truth in itself, is for me unwarranted pragmatist dogmatism and subjectivism.

Idealism tells us that, accepting the ultimate rationality of the world, we must, with Hegel, hold to philosophy as cosmocentric; and that the realisation of a world, and not of any finite part of it, must be the highest value. Well, Theistic Idealism accepts the cosmocentric mode of interpreting the Universe, so far as it goes, for it, too, seeks to explain the being and change of the cosmos. But it does not find the cosmocentric view free of defect and inadequacy for a world-theory. It is, to begin with, only an impersonal Whole, in whose light certain parts—the highest, the personal—cannot possibly be satisfyingly explained. "Justice, in the name of the Whole, to each aspect of the world according to its special place and proper rank," is Dr Bradley's plausible way of stating the case, but, unless the Whole is a mere vicious abstraction, it must be capable of some real interpretation through the parts, some of which may possibly suggest or represent higher values than are yielded by the abstract and impersonal Whole. At any rate, cosmic being and change,

in their totality, are not fully intelligible until the cosmos has been idealistically grounded in infinite spirit, of which nature is but the externalisation. But that can never be compassed while the cosmic interpretation—the unitary, all-embracing reality which runs back into spirit—takes not due account of man, the most spiritual being on earth, in its attempt to know the whole objective world. If our metaphysic were founded only on cosmological ideas, it would assume a materialistic, rather than an idealistic character. That has been precisely the faulty tendency of theistic metaphysics in the past, I mean, its too purely cosmological emphasis.

The cosmocentric position, then, can be accepted as satisfactory, only when taken in this exalted and defensible sense of being really an anthropocosmic Whole. That is what our Theistic Idealism essays to do; it may still find room, like Dr Bradley, for “an all-pervasive relativism”; its parts of highest value must be viewed in the light of the anthropocosmic Whole; only, it has juster weights and measures for doing so, than a purely cosmocentric theory. For the self is the inevitable centre of every man’s world and system, though both ego and non-ego are included in the Absolute Life. The knowledge which this self has of the world of reality, through intuition, is to be clearly distinguished from the systematic knowledge of interpretation, in which latter one must be outside and above the world of reality interpreted. Everything in the world, however, is relative to man, the being of absolute value. His true self is not, apart from the deep need of systematic or interpretative knowledge now insisted upon, to be thought of as experienced content: the view of his self as a content of consciousness is valid and necessary for scientific psychology; but the self is a living reality, conscious of itself in its own attitudes, activities, and efforts. The living subject is no mere form, but an embodiment of concreteness, individuality, and activity, capable, as such, of rising to the vision, and thence to the representation, of truth and of reality. Living insight, not issuing in dead thought, is thus his characteristic,

or open possibility. Only in this intuitive sense, as even Bradley admits, are reality, truth, and knowledge, in experience one. But they cannot remain so for philosophy. Reality would not be reality without truth, and truth is not merely descriptive of, and external to, reality, but is itself reality, in sense of its own, of all-inclusive type. We shall distinguish them in the chapter on "The Philosophy of Nature." A system of Theistic Idealism is possible in virtue of its concrete truths having coherence, or capability of being mutually connected and adjusted in a system. One cannot claim a perfectly ideal coherence for the truths in such a system, for one is not dealing with a completed universe, but the systematised approximation may be relatively complete, and so intellectually valuable. A coherent and congruous system of Truth is, in all this, our aim, and such ideal truth we must hold to be determinative of Reality. For Truth in its absoluteness is still our quest in all dealings with fact or reality.

I put forward Theistic Idealism as a speculative hypothesis with these claims to consideration, that it forms a system, intelligible, self-consistent, and contravened by no known fact; and that, of all forms of philosophic theory, it is the last word of truth—*Der Wahrheit letzter Schluss* of Goethe—in that it is the most vital, satisfying, and inspiring; one, and the only one, to which we may for ever turn and say—

"Languor is not in your heart,
Weakness is not in your word,
Weariness not on your brow,¹
Ye alight in our van!"

CHAPTER II.

THE GOD OF THEISTIC IDEALISM.

THE God of Theistic Idealism is the God of Absolute and Energising Reason, and, as such, Ground or Cause of the Universe. He alone is the sufficient reason or *rationale* of the world, to reflective mind. His absolute essence is a necessity to thought, and short of that absolute essence as real, reason in its upbuilding cannot rest. Therein it finds the final, all-embracing unity of the ideal and the real. If it transcends empiricism, its spiritualistic monism is yet not that of mere abstract being. For the Absolute is no mere ground of the world's possibility, but the world is what it is only through His unified activity in it. This, although the strangeness abides of an imperfect world—not wholly free of irrationality—proceeding from a perfect God. But then, these characteristics of the world are there to be fought through and transcended, in an ever-increasing harmony of the world-factors. And the world is not to be conceived as without an activity of its own, or as the victim of an irreducible dualism. From all which it appears that the God of Theistic Idealism is the base and foundation of science and philosophy. For the universe is grounded in the Absolute and Eternal Reason, in Whose Mind or Spirit are the universal and immutable ideals, principles, and laws of reason. Theistic Idealism sets out from the absoluteness of God's Being, so that He becomes apprehended as the Absolute and Unconditioned Spirit, whose absoluteness has not been lost in the finite world. That world is not a mere function of Deity;

it has an existence of its own, as the product of divine, eternal resolve. In this way a certain relative independence may be claimed for the world—the world of spirit in contradistinction from Nature—over against the Absolute. As for the Deity, self-existing and self-determining is He, and before Him was no abyss of nonentity like that sometimes postulated, from the Gnostics to *l'abîme* of Renouvier. If we say, with Rothe, that “the absolute Being has determined Himself into the absolute *Ich* or the absolute Personality,” there must, in this talk of spirit or personality, be no slurring over His absoluteness. There must be no decline of Deity from His absoluteness by giving to His action in the world a relative and temporal character of such a kind as would compromise His absoluteness. Of His powers He imparts to the world; the world’s potencies spring from Him, and He is the guarantee of any unity that may characterise them; that is to say, the differences of the Many must be led up at last to a grounding in the One; but in all this Theistic Idealism is careful to enthrone Him above the world-process as the eternal, but active, Ground of the World. Just in His Personality, with its plenitude of content, is His absoluteness disclosed. For the Infinite Personality is not a personality by the side of, or in opposition to, any other: it is a quite “overcome” standpoint to talk of exclusiveness as a mark of the conception of personality, when we are dealing with the all-inclusive, all-comprehending Being, Who is the Absolute Personality. Dr Bradley is too much the victim of verbalism and externalism for his treatment of such matters to carry strength for help or insight for illuminative purpose. It is a poor way to talk of God as having “a private personality” when what is in question is, what the Germans finely call Being-in-and-for-Itself. When it is said that, “sundered from those relations which qualify Him, God is inconsistent emptiness,” the emptiness and the inconsistency belong, not to God, but to the conception of Dr Bradley. How inconsistent that God, out of relations, is “emptiness,” when, in Bradley’s whole thought, to be out of relation, is peculiarly and precisely made the essence of Reality! “Qualified by his relation to another,”

God is "distracted finitude," he tells us; but, in view of what I have already advanced, what a lack of philosophic imagination, ethical insight, and vital inwardness, in all this! One may, of course, conceive or postulate something grander than consciousness, even the superpersonal—human conceptions of personality being so inadequate—but theistic idealism finds no great gain in ceasing to pursue the highest ideal known to man for the sake of unintelligibility, even in the form of blind, reverent mystery. Theistic idealism is not troubled by the bugbear of personality as attaching to the Infinite Mind, for it has thoroughly purged itself of all notions of quantitative infinity as unthinkable and absurd. It knows that the Primal Being cannot be thought of save as Infinite Personality: infinite personality means infinite self-determination. On God's absoluteness all beings and things depend, and without Him were not.

Feuerbach is reported to have said that God was his first, the world his second, and man his last thought. If we, in our time, are prone to reverse his order, and start from man as our first, it is only to find, through man and the world, our goal in God. For theistic idealism has no intention to sink itself in anthropology. Instead of thus starting from empirical man, we may do better, from the constructive or system-building point of view, to proceed from the pure logico-metaphysical idea of the absoluteness of God's Being. But this must not be done in the arbitrary and discredited fashion of the Absolute Idea in the Hegelian Dialectic. The idea of God is not something created out of our experience alone; it is not a mere psychological product; it is not simply an historical truth; it is a logical truth or demand, a necessity of thought, super-temporal and super-spatial, as such. All opposition of thought and being is transcended in this final Unity which reason is necessitated to think—a unity of the Ideal and the Real, of Reason and Will, of Thought and Being, of Being and Action. But the idea of God is a truth with binding validity for the race, not the mere individual, because there is an identically organised reason in us all, leading us by what the Germans call a *Denkzwang* or thought-compulsion in this

direction. Such a Deity — the Absolute Thought — is a necessity to the objective worth of science, which must be more than an arbitrary projection of our own minds: nature would not otherwise be rational, nor our intellectual reconstructions of it have the value which they carry. Hence I have said that the necessary base or foundation of knowledge must be found in God: doubt Him, and you shake the objective value of your own cognition. Standing in midst of the world's multiplicity of laws and purposes, we are compelled, in the demand for a principle of higher unity, to think God in the manner aforesaid. Such a spiritual monism is the last word of Logic, to say nothing of historic religion. "The knowledge of God," said Bossuet, "is the most certain of all the kinds of knowledge that we have through reasoning." Our Idealism welcomes all the results of recent inquiries, such as those of James, Leuba, Starbuck, Coe, Pratt, Stratton, Flournoy, Hocking, and others, into the Psychology of Religion, on whose philosophical significance I have touched elsewhere [*'Psychology of Belief'* (1910), and *'Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion'* (1897)]. But it does not at all share the delusive notions of those who imagine that these results make the metaphysical aspects less necessary. Such an erroneous impression is largely the result of psychological study of religion having often been a recoil from Absolutist theories, just as Buddhism with its psychological insight and emphasis — starting from man, and not from an external universe and its cause — was a recoil from overwrought metaphysical speculations in Brahmanic doctrine of the Absolute. I have no call, however, to go back to the mystical idealisms of India or even of Eckhart. The ground of the psychological phenomena, it is pertinent to say, remains to be sought, for a fundament they must have. God is, then, for us the ideal of the pure reason, the while that He is God of the real world, whose absolute Ground He is. Our theistic idealism, in its synthetic and speculative views of God, seeks an objective knowledge of Him, His essential nature, attributes, and working, so far as His manifestations and self-revealings go. Neo-Hegelian idealism professes to do the

same, to base itself upon the objective reality of God, and not upon a mere ideal, but the deep defects in its manner of doing so, I have elsewhere made apparent. Green, however, must be allowed the merit to have made his position definitely theistic in his insistence upon a personal, supreme, and Eternal Consciousness, as the Thinker of the world-system of intelligible relations. I do not think Green's doctrine was "fairly described" by Dr J. S. Mackenzie as "pantheistic" ('Mind,' 1914).

The theistic aim just spoken of must lead us on very different lines from the theistic idealism of Berkeley, than whose there has been no more interesting historical attempt at such a system. The way had been prepared by the little-studied philosophy of John Norris, of Bemerton, for the transition from dualism to idealism, the uncritical realism of Norris bearing, in fact, certain tendencies towards an absolute idealism. Arthur Collier, author of the '*Clavis Universalis*'—also little known or studied—and an uncompromising supporter of idealistic theory, came under the influence of Norris, but without losing his own independence as a thinker. On them I cannot dwell, but turn to Berkeley, who was not alone in arguing to the existence of God from the existence of ideas. By ideas, according to Fraser, Berkeley meant objects presented to the senses, or represented in imagination. The line of thought was, that the things I immediately perceive are ideas; that ideas can exist only in the mind; that these ideas have an existence which is exterior to my mind, and that they therefore must exist in an omnipresent eternal Mind—that of God. Ideas there are, he thinks, which exist though we do not perceive them; the world, as made up of ideas, gets its unity from the mind of God. In his hands, idea and non-idea became an indispensable antithesis. In his demonstration of the subjectivity of experience, he shewed, by his famous theory of vision, the relative and subjective character of visual space. The methods, says Berkeley, whereby this Mind excites in us the ideas of sense—ideas marked, he says, by steadiness, order, and coherence—are called the laws of nature, and are learnt by experience. This

was because Berkeley had eliminated all causality from the external world; there was, for him, no cause but the will of a spirit; and had reduced everything to ideas and their relations. These relations were not, however, necessary relations; they did not arise out of the nature of things. Very curious was this theory of his as to the externality of relations. The nature of ideas was not affected by their relations: relations differed from ideas, and were differently cognized: relations existed between ideas, but of relations we have only "notions" *sensu stricto*. His theory of the "notion," as distinguished from the "idea," is lacking in explication. All this was part of that brilliant beginning of the psychological analysis of fundamental philosophical concepts made by Berkeley. He resorted to spiritualism in order to explain his psychological findings, and the result was a "theological or universalised sensationalism." He felt the need of a spiritual substance in which ideas should inhere; he accepted the necessity of an external cause for the idea, though not a distinct cause for each idea; but the only substance, for him, was spirit, and the only cause, he recognised, belonged to the spiritual sphere; and he viewed things as merely a class of ideas, "images," as his phrase runs, resembling "real things," by which they can be corrected. Though we are dealing with Berkeley's shortcomings, we may yet well agree that the new conception of matter introduced in Berkeley's Immaterialism was not without real significance, paving the way, in some sort, for the idealism and spiritual monism of the future, which is not saying that this great, has been in the view of all, his most significant, contribution to philosophy. For reality meant to Berkeley consciousness and its world: we immediately know only our own states. But he gave an idealistic impetus, rather than a constructive theory of idealism, and not even the scientist could be content with his theory of realism. Ideas, and the percipient spirits that possess them, alone have reality for Berkeley; matter, as the substratum of ideas, was to him absurd abstractionism; for the external world exists not, in his view, independently of the mind that perceives it. All objective ideas are nothing

but our own sensations. They are "in mind," not "in matter." Ideas are, to him, inactive, and they cannot, in any way, represent a spirit or its actions. There are no ideas of relations, any more than of substances; for a relation includes an act of the mind—something superadded to ideas to which he gave no adequate explication. His perceptual apprehension of reality he supplemented by the conceptual one, especially in his later idealism. From the *esse* of things being in their *percipi*, there is advance to making their *esse*, in the case of thinking things, consist in their *percipere* or their *velle*. Thus the real world is made to consist of perceivers, not of perceptions, and the senses are despoiled of what had been sometimes claimed for them. Berkeley does not so much object to matter that it cannot be known, as that it cannot *know*, is, in fact, an "inert" and "unthinking substratum." This *active* knowing, I remark, is vital in idealistic thought. The underlying substance which supports ideas is active, in his view, while the ideas—or the unthinking objects of the mind—are passive and inert. Nothing exists, for him, but spirits. Spirits are active, indivisible, thinking, and willing substances—for Berkeley does not realise that the substance category is abstracted from the individual—and on these spirits God imprints, in a way which it is impossible to sustain, in my judgment, sense-presentations or ideas, which are ectypal of His own eternal ideas. It is interesting to find Berkeley thus overpassing Locke, by making the primary, no less than the secondary, qualities of objects, mental; foreshadowing Fichte, and, in our own time, Rickert, in holding to the idea of an over-individual subject, giving, to our thinking, worth or value not to be dispensed with. Interesting also to find him anticipating the voluntarism of Münsterberg, whereby thought becomes a willing, and, earlier, Schopenhauer's substantialising of the will. His idealism is not the mere consequence of his theistic position. Ideas are, to Berkeley's psychological idealism, not to be thought of as copies of an unknown "material substance," nor as creations of our own mind, nor as products of our will, but as caused and guaranteed by the Supreme Spirit Whom

we call God. It is obvious that, in all this, Berkeley does great injustice to our ideas, and to the self, in not relating them in some better mode. His epistemological analysis of the cognitive process in relation to the object, as extra-mental, was also, it may be remarked, very faulty, but need not now detain us. It must suffice to say that our ideas must be allowed some free power of Construction, so that our sensations can be bound together, and referred, as Berkeley himself—strangely, but distinctly enough—does, to a thinking subject. Else we shall be left with nothing but sensations on our hands, and no proper power of reaching reality. Berkeley's objection to the inexperienceable substratum called matter did not keep him from taking objects as real. His was, Rosmini yet remarked, an empirical idealism, which regarded bodies as only appearances—but not unreal—and it referred to but a part of the human Knowable, while the Kantian transcendental idealism applied, later, the same treatment to the principle of reason likewise, so affecting the whole. Some real and adequate relation of our ideas to the self or thinking subject is vital, if we are to know either spirits or things beyond the closed circle of our own sensational existence. In the case of spirits or active beings, Berkeley postulates, without logical warrant, some "notion" of them, but not by "ideas," in the strict sense. But how can that be, since that only exists which is perceived? He himself tells us that spirit cannot be perceived, but is known only by its activities or effects. But the subject and the object now stand on the same plane. Though he maintains that the only objects of knowledge are "ideas," yet in his vague talk of "notion," he asserts that something, which is not an "idea," may be known ('Principles of Human Knowledge,' xxvii.) His subjective idealism here also remains inefficient and inadequate. He leaves us with the unsatisfactory feeling that his positive doctrine as to selves or spirits—in which he was certainly no solipsist—rests rather upon common sense than on reasoned grounds. Whether it be the finite self, or the Absolute Self Whom we call God, it is a case of assumption, rather than proof, in any philosophical sense, for Berkeley never faced

Hume's criticism that the arguments against the reality of matter outside us could equally be used against the existence of other minds outside us. Berkeley overlooked how much our knowledge of spirits depends on their self-communication. Berkeley's identification of things with perceptions must always remain a difficulty, so long as the perceptions of one and the same thing remain so various, different, and conflicting. Hamilton, for example, thought that ten men, looking at the sun or moon, see, each of them, a different object, which was, no doubt, true from the standpoint of individual experience. If we so identify the perception and the things as to say *Ens est quod percipitur*, we must surely find some mode of explaining—which Berkeley's subjective idealism did not—these many and diverse perceptions in their relations to the one thing. It may help our understanding if we keep in view how great is the wealth of concrete reality—so that we never exhaust even "the flower in the crannied wall," its root and its all of detail and relational significance. Existence may yet be the objective value of what in thought is common to diverse minds. Absolute knowledge of any single object or thing never is, or can be, ours, involving, as this would, the knowledge of the Absolute. There are aspects or valencies in objects, or in Nature, which no single knower can exhaust or use up, which looks, it has been said, as though Nature, in its very structure, were for the many, not the one. The features or detailed characteristics of the object we discriminate in part, not in their totality. From the parts I must turn to seek the whole, whensoever I would overcome or transcend relativity. Even then my perceiving will still be a relative matter, for the object given will be relative to other realities, so that the truly real—or the ideal real—is never reached. As for other persons, all I can say is whether I agree or disagree with what they find in the object. We must take experience as it is, even if its perceptions are not complete, and cannot be wholly correct. That they are not correct is only too clearly shewn by the non-agreement with them of the scientific conception of the universe. And science itself is only a limited organic perception. It helps us, how-

ever, imagine modes of perception other than our own. The remainder of Reality, beyond our perceptual experience, is immense, and the fact must be plainly recognised. The varying degrees of perceptive power or quality must therefore give rise to diversity—to extreme qualitative differences that remain a diversity marked by a certain common consciousness, that, namely, of supposedly perceiving the same object.

The problem of social consciousness has taken a deeper hold since Berkeley's time, for the difficulty is, to find other minds in experience, and not as a mere inference. For no inference, however simple and direct, can meet the case; for inference, however close, is not immediate experience. Hence the attempt of Royce, to find our fellows real, by virtue of their ideas, or their response—though I think they may be as real by repulsions as by response—goes far, but still comes short by leaving the matter in a too inferential form. By Rickert, even the epistemological subject is regarded as unknown; and the difficulty of genuine knowledge of other minds is therefore not surprising. But the apparently alien and inaccessible character of such knowledge of other minds is, no doubt, largely due to the too exclusive character of the knowledge we so seek. For the other minds we seek to know are, in no case, empty of contents; they are, in every instance, minds environed or set in Nature, and known by us as so set or enmeshed. Such an "immediate evidence" or "demonstrative knowledge" of them, as Berkeley thought could not be attained, may be impossible—in the mere sense in which we experience ourselves—but, to the logic of our theistic idealism, there would be something peculiarly absurd in not claiming a real and genuine knowledge of our fellows in experience (*Dial.* III.) Such knowledge is not scientific, but intuitive, and based upon community of organisation. It is necessary and valid. For my own part, I must hold the possibilities of knowing *that* the soul of my other is, and *what* that soul is, to be real and profound. For, laying aside all ideas of my self-conscious self derived from the mechanical social order, I find it to be here no isolated unit, but a *Socius* which includes, within its consciousness, the fact of its other and his agency,

along with its own agency. The perceptions of my individual consciousness are not merely individual perceptions, but are parts of a common experience of perception. Philosophy has nothing to do with any experience of so individual a character that there is not pre-supposed in it the great fact of inter-subjective intercourse, with all its significant results. It has been too much overlooked that my other is a soul, not merely an intellect; hence the deeps in his experience which I also can experience. He is a personality, and not simply a mind; hence our personalities can interfuse or interpenetrate, and, in feeling, thought, and will, make common ground of experience. I had begun by recognising his reality, as body, like any other object in Nature, but now I have passed to the *penetralia* of his inmost being; and you will find it difficult to place limits to my conscious knowledge and experience of him. If this be not knowledge, if it be not experience, these terms have no meaning. It will help us, when we come back to Berkeley's knowledge of the world of things, to remember how the world of individual experience is transformed for us by inter-subjective intercourse. Scientific psychology recognises, as Külpe has remarked, no essential difference between the mental life of the knowing subject and that of his fellow-man. Our common world, it was strikingly said by Schelling, arises by means of the co-operation of many intelligences. But, to do him justice, Berkeley himself was not without some insight into the importance for our thought of the fact that similar perceptions exist for others. Kant and Fichte, to name no other philosophers, recognised this importance of the perceptions of others for the upbuilding of our knowledge of the world of reality, and the objective significance of ideas that carry inter-subjective recognition. The object thus becomes for us the mediate object of universal experience. Thus accrues a continuation and extension to our individual knowledge of the world of things and causes.

But it is with the God of Berkeley's idealism we are now mainly concerned, when, feeling the string of our sensations to be nowise sufficient unto itself, he appeals to the idea of God. The immediate causative agency of God gives them,

for him, their order and necessary connection. For the only intelligible cause is, in his view, mental activity, "or a spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations, which continually affect us" (*Princ.* cxlix.) The ontological interest was very present to Berkeley, whose genius was psychological, but the need to-day is rather epistemological in character; and before we bring in God as the cause of our sensations, it is needful—so far as the grounds on which we seek God are concerned—first of all to recall how far sensationalism is from making up the whole of our conscious life. Berkeley yields too much to the senses, and fails to distinguish the necessary from the contingent, in cognition; he holds that though God is "the Cause of our sensations," He yet "perceives nothing by sense," and cannot be "affected with sensation" (*Dial.* III.); the continuous duration of things, moreover, implies for Berkeley the Existence of a constantly perceiving Mind, since this is needful as explanation of the similar sensations experienced by others. But, of course, he left the sphere of actual psychological analysis, when he fell back, in the way he did, upon the theological conception of the transcendent Mind. His heart lay with theistic idealism or idealistic theism. A Spirit infinitely wise and powerful may be sufficient, as Berkeley argues, to explain the phenomena involved, but the law of parsimony does not prevent other hypotheses also being here sufficient to explain them, so that proof and cogency are wanting. The so-called law of parsimony is neither a law of things nor a law of logic: it is merely a regulative principle of thought. The principle of causality, by which Berkeley sought to reach God, is really only a principle of reason, and, as such, essentially subjective; how then could he reach objective Deity? And how absurd it would be to limit the reality of God to what we know or perceive of Him. It may be correct to say, with Prof. Baldwin, that Berkeley logically follows Malebranche, who developed a generally idealistic theory of knowledge; but I think Malebranche must be allowed to have been somewhat more successful, since, with whatever consequences for his

philosophy, he at least put himself in the way of sharing Divine intelligence, linked himself to Divine Substance, and so may be held to have better reached reality or the object. This, although God may have been to Malebranche too much a postulate of logical and theological value, rather than a unifying idealistic principle. The activity of the Divine object of knowledge should here be remembered. Still, theistically, God may be allowed to have been, in some sort, to Berkeley the Spirit—for theistic immaterialism was his ceaseless objective—and the actively conscious Reason of the universe, imperfectly developed as his philosophy of theistic idealism might be. His psychological idealism, wherein objects all depend for their existence upon being thought or experienced by a subject, was as subjective and concrete as the ancient and logical idealism of Plato was objective and abstract. Berkeley's merit remains as having foreshadowed the implication of reality to be an eternal consciousness, the implication of nature to be a mind, without whose Existence nature were not.

I pass now to consider the idealism of Schelling in its bearings upon theism. There was something of freedom, and something of elevation, in Schelling's conception of pure and infinite Being as the absolute indifference; but the subject and object, annulled in the process, are never again methodically developed from that indifference. This mode of thinking was characteristic of Schelling's earlier system. This annihilation of consciousness scarcely seems a promising foundation for philosophy; the Absolute is the middle point of the magnet, the centre where there ceases to be any difference between the opposing poles of the real and the ideal; the knowledge of the Absolute which he brings us is a recognition of the essential identity and indifference of all things. In its purely pantheistic stage, the main—however variously estimated—service rendered by Schelling's philosophy, was this assertion of the identity of thought and being, this finding of the key to the problem how the ideal world of consciousness and the real world of being should correspond, and come into commerce with each other. Thought and

being, the ideal and the real, are to him identical; all activity and movement of the world of appearance are mere *Schein* of the absolute unity.

In Schelling's Absolute there is a dark, irrational ground, which has to be purified, developmentally, ere Personal Being is reached; there is for him something in God which may, no doubt, become God, but is not God. God must have the ground of existence within Himself, says Schelling, since nothing exists before or without God; but Schelling does not take this ground to be God, absolutely considered, that is to say, in so far as He exists. But if the world were taken, he says, to be different from God, then would the world have arisen from a ground different from God; but, as nothing can exist outside the Absolute, the solution of the contradiction is to be found, in his view, in the world having its ground in that original ground which is also the ground of the Divine Existence. This ground—or absolute potency—cannot be resolved, but remains as the ground, “the incomprehensible basis of reality.”

Naturally, the ascending powers, which are so prominent a feature of his philosophy of nature, are of great consequence in such a system. In that philosophy, the concept of powers and the concept of polarity have fundamental places. His metaphysical idealism draws largely upon analogy; and indeed the philosopher of Romanticism goes so far as to put his own symbolic expositions of nature before the painful searchings of science into the real and reciprocal interconnection of phenomena. It was his distorted conception of philosophic function—in which Fichte and Hegel in their own ways sinned along with him—that led Schelling to construct nature in his *à priori* fashion, with a fine scorn for the blind and senseless natural science that was everywhere establishing itself since the destruction of philosophy by Bacon and of physics by Boyle and Newton! Having originally claimed nature and spirit to be fundamentally one, Schelling later declared the ground of nature and spirit, the Absolute, to be “the identity of the real and the ideal.” The doctrine of identity is thus added to the phil-

osophies of nature and spirit, this philosophy of identity forming indeed their basis. Hence the world-ground is neither nature nor spirit, but the unity of both, rather the indifference of subjective and objective, in which the self-identity of the Absolute is never lost. Such was the goal to which Schelling's thought had travelled from the time when he extolled nature as source of spirit—as, in fact, undeveloped and unconscious intelligence. He had exalted nature to the position of subject, and only from creative nature—*natura naturans*—comes the ego, in this reversion of Fichtean procedure. Nature being to Schelling *à priori*, he thinks we can philosophically construct it anew. God at length becomes to Schelling life and personality, not an abstraction; He is becoming and development, not static being; the essence of the world is will, as primary being, though only presaging and unconscious. In the last and highest instance, he insists that there is no existence save willing, which is original existence, self-affirmed and independent of time. Schelling does not content himself with making freedom the principle of moral action, but regards it as also the principle of consciousness, so making it the common principle of theoretic and of practical philosophy. Nor does he fail to notice an irrational and contingent element in the world, especially in the sphere of organic life. But Schelling is not sufficiently careful to keep the irrationality of individual wills from being, by any possibility, grounded in the last resort in irrationality of the Absolute Will. His philosophy of religion—with its personal God, its freedom, and its individual immortality—is of merely negative value. All birth is, for Schelling, birth out of darkness into light; the process of creation is an inner transmutation of the original principle of darkness into light.

If we desire the dark ground, which is the common root of Deity and the world, to be brought nearer to us, then says Schelling—speaking now as characteristic philosopher of Romanticism—we shall find it to consist of something which is essentially longing—longing to give birth to itself. Man

does not at first perceive that he is not really separate from the Absolute, that he is himself an integral part of the Infinite Power, but this identity ever grows in its hold upon him, the infinite spirit acting in him by the different gradations of revelation. Schelling's theism is by no means of a kind that is free from contradictions, when taken as a complete world-view. It does by no means consort well with his pessimistic world-conception. He postulates an immediate, intuitive, and individual knowledge of the Absolute in man, but overlooks that this knowledge is not on all fours with the knowledge which the Absolute itself has. The speculative theism of his later thought was meant to give depth to his originally pure pantheism, while the pure rationalism of his earlier thought was supplemented, later, by a higher empiricism. I speak of his system, for nothing could be clearer or finer than Schelling's personal disavowal of pantheism. His later thought made the Divine Personality consist simply in the living unity of the Real and the Ideal—a position not so free from arbitrariness as to be quite easy to justify. The abstract, empty unity, of which his Absolute originally consisted, needed and received from him modification, in respect of the production of the world's multiplicity. In fact, no one presses on more than Schelling from empty speculation to an inquiring comprehension of reality. The irrationalities, discords, oppositions, found in nature and history, are, to Schelling, necessary in order to life. There can be no real unity in his view without such conflict. For only thus does substance first become living, intelligent, willing, active. For the unity of personal being, even in Deity, he must needs postulate an original antithesis in the Absolute. This new mode of conceiving Deity, though interesting and suggestive, does not really carry us far, since the conflict or opposition is entirely within Deity's own nature. In his later philosophy, Schelling begins his ontology with the indeterminate idea of the possibility of becoming (*Seinkönnen*), from which the critical and gradual separation of the ambiguous and indeterminate will educe the true concept of God, which, to Schelling, is that God is the Lord of Being. God was, to

him, the Original Possibility of Being; the science of reason shows Him to be the *natura necessaria*—existent in nature or concept, and not merely possible. A still subjectively-thought existence only for Deity; but reason so encloses Him that He is not to be held as essentially so enclosed—in fact, it must postulate Him as actually existing. These ontological suggestions or contentions have been unduly overshadowed by those of Hegel, superior as these latter, even with their exaggerated form, may be. Schelling's theistic conceptions are very unsatisfying, for he holds that God first comes to consciousness in man. In the final stage of Schelling's conceptions of Deity, we find him holding to personality-pantheism, in which all being is God's being, and three personalities are postulated as in Deity. (See my Art. on Schelling in 'The Philosophical Review,' 1910.)

I turn for a moment to the neglected Krause. Krause, in his constructive way sought to develop our knowledge from self-consciousness (*die Grundanschauung, Ich*), and to lead up in this way to God as the Divine Essence (*Wesen*), as the infinite principle of life. Krause maintains a Spinoza-like trust in the capability of human reason for knowing God through thought, pure science being thus possible, in his view. He avoided Hegel's extreme, however, of making abstract thought supreme, although he had not Hegel's grasp of historical development. In his Panentheism, on which I have written elsewhere, God is not the world; nor is God outside the world, but He is not measured by it. His absolutism or harmonism—the harmony, for Krause, of essence and being—combines the pantheistic emphasis on all that is finite being in God, with the theistic stress on God as the primal or absolute Being, throned high above all finite beings and qualities, in such wise that not all the sum or aggregate of such finite beings could by any possibility constitute God. The world of the finite is in, and with God, as the First Being, so that Krause can speak of the world-inwardness (*Weltinnigkeit*) of God. God Himself is, to Krause, the one infinite and unconditioned Reason, having a self-inwardness that is infinite and unconditioned, in the selfness and wholeness of His Being.

God knows, feels, wills, in His one self-conscious life, so that Krause would not object to His being called a person, although he cares not, because of possible misapprehension, to use that term in scientific discussion. Krause thus makes God, as Essence (*Wesen*), no mere indifferent Reason, but the living and personal Ground of the world. God, as *Urwesen*, occupies a relation of transcendence to the world, which lies outside and under Him: God, as *Urwesen*, has the conditioned part-beings of the world under Himself. Krause thinks he has a new insight or view in thus distinguishing God as First Being, above and outside the world, from God as Whole Being, with the world in Him and with Him as Whole Being. For it was Krause's aim to link the pantheistic world view with the theistic conception of Divine personality. Hence the emphasis he laid on the intuition which the Supreme or Divine Personality has of Himself, as such. Through the self-contemplation of the ego, which, in its feeling of being but limited and partial, craves an absolute or all-comprehending Whole, we are led, next, to the contemplation of essence, or the thought of God. But our thought of Him is already based in Him, as prior to our thought of Him, in Whom our very ego is wholly grounded. Krause's thought is of an infinite and independent essence, outside which nothing exists, which is in itself the one ground of all—the Ground of Reason, Nature, and Humanity, which are all infinite, each in its kind. God, in the content of His Being or Essence, is, to him, the whole of determinate Being, whether nature, or reason, or humanity, which last is the union or equilibration of the other two. God, in the form of His essence, is selfness and wholeness: to the selfness or unconditionality of God corresponds reason or mind, to the wholeness or infinity of God corresponds nature. There is an inwardness (*Innigkeit*) of God and of reason; and an inwardness of God and of nature. Union of reason and nature, of the ideal and the real, in the Absolute, had already appeared in Schelling's philosophy of identity. But Schelling had treated the unity as a merely neutral or indifferent thing, without giving it the distinctness and independence, in respect of things finite, which Krause

claimed for it, as self-conscious reason, and even as absolute spirit. Krause's philosophy progressed from self-consciousness as, to him, the first certainty in cognition; he found in the ego, whose truth was beyond doubt, both the fixed starting point we have seen, and a subjective criterion of truth. In so basing his philosophy upon self-consciousness or the ego, Krause was, of course, in line with Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who all made the ego their one foundation, each, of course, in his own way. It seems open to say that Krause's method of rising from our self-scrutinies to theories of Divine self-inwardness and fundamental essence is very liable to the entrance of arbitrary elements; and that his absolute co-ordination of self-hood and wholeness, of reason and nature, in the Divine Essence, was a far less satisfactorily accomplished thing than he dreamed (see my Art. on Krause in the 'Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,' 1913). This leads me to note the significant deepening of thought since Kant's time. For in Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher the religious life itself—the essence of Christianity—was the variously pursued quest. The whole tendency was towards the unifying of God and man, in virtue of the Spirit of God dwelling in man. The influence of Krause's thought is seen in Lotze, Fechner, Pfleiderer, Wundt, Eucken, and others, so that we are well brought up to our own time. I now affirm that no retreat into the subject can dispense us from seeking the Absolute without: I cannot agree with those philosophers who, like Bradley, think God and the world constitute the Absolute. Theistic Idealism has no concern to resolve the Absolute into God, but, as a philosophy, it is concerned to take God as, for it, the Absolute; and it does not regard the world as co-ordinate with God. For it needs a transcendent Deity in order that it may have One who is truly immanent. Bradley's Absolute, of course, is not God, and can do nothing to meet the demands of the religious nature of man. The Absolute of metaphysics is the Absolute because of its complete transcendence of every entity and every type of existence. Such an Absolute is only another name for the universe, as the unification of scientific and metaphysical inquiry and

thought. It neither is God, nor includes Him, and has no claim to be the object of religious devotion. This metaphysical Absolute is a logical necessity, and transcends time. Now, Theistic Idealism grants all the necessary metaphysical demands as to the Absolute, but it finds its Absolute in God. We are told that "neither spatial infinity nor spatial finitude has meaning, as applied to mind," although Bergsonism has something of its own to say to this latter at least; but we have never been given any reason for not holding to Infinite Mind or the Absolute Personality that was not grounded in pure, unwarranted dogmatism. God, as our Absolute, is the Unconditioned, having in His absoluteness, the necessity of being. Metaphysics can not ignore the demand of the religious consciousness, which stands for the Absolute Reason, the Absolute Will—the all-inclusive existence. God would not be God, were He not the Absolute. Whatever the qualities of the God Who is the Absolute in our Theistic Idealism, He may be as much more than personal as you like, but at least He is the one perfect Personality, as Lotze said. I am, however, more anxious to emphasise that He has Being-in-and-for-Himself. Only as such can He really be God-for-us. There is an infinite advantage in taking God, in the manner aforesaid, as our Absolute; otherwise, the Absolute is a mere creation of the intellectual instinct, and such a mode of conception leads to a vicious abstractionism, wherein metaphysics becomes divorced from reality, and is crudely confined to a single aspect of experience. Moreover, not a little metaphysical discussion of the Absolute, as a mere quantitative totality of existence, stands on anything but a lofty plane of thought. Theistic Idealism is quite unable to pay its Deity such more than dubious Bradleyan compliments as to make Him only an aspect of the Absolute; and the fact that it seeks a living intuition of Him does not in the least incapacitate it for intellectual conception of Him. I should say it is an unspeakable aid to conception of a vivid, vital, and valuable order. Our knowledge of God is grounded in experience, taken at its deepest, which is always more profoundly inwrought with the conviction *that* He is, as absolute objec-

tive Reality. Strange it would be, thought Hegel, if we could not ascribe to our conception of God this poorest of the categories. Already, of course, we must in such case know what we mean by God, Who is real as the world and the self. But an uncontradictory idea or *Begriff* of the personal Absolute is perfectly possible. But, though we may so ascribe Being to God, it must still be true that He, the great Universal, is so little to be thought of as mere existence, that we may paradoxically say, with Bradley, that "the God which could exist would most assuredly be no God." Better say that God alone is, and all else is through Him and in Him. But our experience, enriched by history, observation, and science, presses on to know *what* He is—a quest made possible in that He is "Rewarder of them that diligently seek Him." All this is much more satisfactory to the religious consciousness, which, in the ultimate issue, cannot be satisfied to allow anything to fall outside God. Of our knowledge of this great Universal, I agree with Mr Clement Webb when he says: "I would point out that when we speak of a Universal Mind or Spirit, we are not merely speaking of an abstract universal, in which the distinctive features of all real individual minds have been omitted, and only what is common to them all left behind. For it is the nature of mind, in the activity wherein it has its life and being, to *aim* at the elimination of what is *merely* individual or subjective, so that it is most truly *mind* when it apprehends what all other minds must also apprehend under the same intelligible conditions, when it knows the *truth*, which is not merely for it, but for all, when it understands or comprehends the objective nature of reality' ('Prob. in the Relations of God and Man,' p. 277).

When Royce tells us, in his Fichtean strain, that "the true God" is "existent in our universe as the pulse of its moral order, as the life of lives, the eternal spiritual Self-Creator, whose work is never done, and who is no individual being anywhere, but who is the life and organic unity of everything," our theistic idealism cannot but regard such a pronouncement as verging on pantheism, in its feeble grasp of the Absolute Personality. Royce's later and more character-

istic view of God as the "Individual of individuals," in a world where everything is individual, after the manner of the monads of Leibniz, means, that the pantheistic tendency has taken, logically or not, coherently or not, an individualistic cast. But, alike when Royce thus talks of God as the "Individual of individuals," and when Bosanquet calls the universe "the only real and ultimate individual," there is obviously a peculiar and illogical use of the term individual, not at all to be commended. But now, Royce's God is only the community or the company of the loyal—a Deity awaiting realisation! One may well agree with Bosanquet, when he says we all experience the Absolute, because the Absolute is in everything ('Principle of Individuality and Value,' p. 27). The Absolute will then be within me also, but that will by no means dispense me from seeking the Absolute without. But it is something to have the Absolute brought within experience—where alone we are in contact with metaphysical reality—for no Deity can have any value for us save as known. He must be found by us *in rebus*, as it has been put, and not be known merely *in abstracto*. Dr Rashdall has said that "if the word Absolute is to be used at all, we must say that the Absolute includes the subject or subjects together with the Nature which is, in the most ultimate analysis, the experience of those subjects." But this inclusive Absolute is just the very kind of Absolute which Dr Rashdall himself inveighs against in Bradley—a One without a Many. If we take God as this inclusive Absolute, then that would mean God as the Whole—as a kind of impersonal Deity—in which I am included; but it is clear this is another conception from that which obtains when I speak of my knowledge of the Absolute in its external relation to me. That is of prime moment to me, from the standpoint of my knowledge, and of the interests of human cognition, as a philosophic concern. If the Absolute must be so all-inclusive of subject and Nature, that can be so only in an ontological sense. But the ethical Absolute cannot be so inclusive of me, as subject, save as I yield myself in voluntary ethical union. This ethical aspect is con-

stantly overlooked in Neo-Hegelian ontological discussions of the Absolute. There is no change of venue involved in such ethical reference, for an Absolute that should not originally be the perfect ethical essence or spirit would, *ipso facto*, be no true Absolute at all. I am, of course, well aware of the contention of those who think the basis of the ethical may be found in metaphysic, without metaphysic itself needing to be ethical. God is then only a supra-moral or indifferent ground of the ethical, in Whom the opposition between Nature and spirit is taken to be overcome. But I think Kant was right in postulating an ethically determined Deity, in Whom the dualism of Nature and practical reason—of natural and moral law—is transcended. And I think, further, it is a root-defect of Bergsonism and of absolutism—as of Bosanquet and Bradley—that they only touch the metaphysical, and never really the moral, aspects of God. All this has a bearing on our preferring to make God our Absolute, rather than make an Absolute—which may be a purely unethical monster or a merely impersonal Whole—God. I am, of course, not at all concerned to deny that it may be taken as, in a sense, a truer conception of God to say that He is the Whole, inclusive of me, as dependent upon Him, and one with Him. But it is certainly not a sense which concerns us or philosophical knowledge; it is a bare unrelated abstraction, even if you are pleased to baptise it with the hypnotic name of a “concrete universal.” Even if we took God and the world to form, metaphysically, a “concrete universal,” it would by no means follow that God was best known in this way. Of no great use or value, speculatively, could such an absolute totality be, for a world like this, since, from the nature of the case, there could be no exteriority to oppose it—no existence to come into conflict with it, or be brought into harmony with it. It were a bare, blank, unrelated All. The God of Theistic Idealism, however, is One whose idea has, in our apprehension of it, no occasion to exclude either Nature or us; if there is any reality in that idea, it is real in our experience and its relations. God is for us

the Absolute Personality, true metaphysical Absolute, but this metaphysical Absolute is, at the same time, the absolute Ethical Essence: in virtue of His ethical relations, He is not a One without a Many. If we are content to treat the unity and the diversity in a merely verbal or logical manner, we shall always be leaning preponderatingly to the one to the detriment of the other: it seems to me the need is for reason, in its fulness, to recognise the concrete and complex character of the relations, finding not a One *and* a Many, but a One, which is *in* the Many, and the Many as *in* the One. The psychological consideration may be left aside for the present as to which is first perceived—the unity or the diversity, the whole or the parts. Enough for the present that the unity will be modified by knowledge of the diversity: the diverse parts will be taken up in their intensive relation to the whole. Theistic Idealism seeks its God as objective Deity, as why should it not, seeing it has relations of otherness and objectivity, and seeing also He is neither absent, nor apart, from His creations? It triumphantly leaves behind that Spinozism from whose influence—with its humanised attributes of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*—not even Bradley has been exempt, for it knows objective Reality, in its personal Absolute, from the very beginning, its personal Absolute performing all that which Substance does. Our Idealism has certainly no philosophical apology to make for so taking Deity as its personal Absolute, when it recalls with how many contradictions, enormities, and absurdities, such Absolutes, as those of Bradley, Bosanquet, and others, are infected. If Bradley's Absolute were an entity, rather than a fiction or idle abstraction, it would be a pitiful and despicable one—without “self-assertion,” without “self-sacrifice,” without “goodness,” and without “morality”! In the same way, our Idealism avoids the lack of metaphysical depth in pragmatist positions like that of Dr Schiller, who treats the Absolute as a principle of no philosophical value. But I claim for Theistic Idealism that its Absolute is derived from the concrete facts in which it manifests itself, precisely as Dr Schiller desiderates

(‘Humanism,’ p. 84). But the imperious necessities of thought do not allow us to rest there; our Absolute is not thus wholly derived from empiric study, apart from the activities of thought; for it must be plainly said that our Absolute is the result of thought of a dialectical character, with all the aspects of logical necessity. This, because the Absolute cannot rightly be derived simply from a finite world. Of course, although the absoluteness of the Absolute is thus drawn from other grounds than merely those of the finite world, yet the Absolute must, without relinquishment of its absoluteness, be such as to contain within itself the possibility of the world. It is no featureless unity in our theistic idealism.

Subject, then, has, for our Idealism, taken the place of Substance, as the latter was defined by Spinozan conception to be—that which is by itself, and is conceived by itself: its philosophical thought takes this absolute Subject as related in its objective activities to the finite, and, in this objectivity or otherness of God, it finds in immediate experience the Personality of God. For, as Dr Rashdall, in his brilliant British Academy paper on Bradley’s metaphysics, said, “if relation is not to be expelled from Reality”—and to me nothing could be more fatuous and absurd than Bradley’s attempt at such expulsion—“we need not more merge the object in the subject than the subject in the object.” But the danger of Idealism, in its extremer forms, seems to be that of treating the relation of consciousness and the object in such wise that the object is merged in the subject, so that no possibility remains either of any sort of justice to the object as real and independent, or to the possibility of any real knowledge of such an object. Such extreme forms of Idealism carry with them grave difficulties, from the side of any satisfying epistemology. I do not deny that, as Neo-Hegelianism contends, there is, in all my knowing, an immanence of the Absolute Spirit, but I reject a pantheistic immanence that does violence to the sacred realm of personality by taking no adequate and explicit account of the ethical—and not merely ontological—senses or factors in-

volved in my transcending the dualism of subject and object, when the object is the Absolute Other Whom I seek to know. Idealism sets out from knowledge, which experience first makes possible to us, but it must beware of idle ontologic unity: it must not fail to probe deeply the problem of the objective validity of its knowledge. It must be percipient of the fact that its 'organic' unities—of the mind and its objects—exist for knowledge, but not necessarily for being. Relation is, of course, the fundamental category of knowledge; and Hegel's oneness of cognition and reality is true only in the halting and inadequate sense that knowledge progressively seeks to bring itself into line with the wholeness of reality or the universe. It is not to be denied that there is an over-individuality of mind which apprehends the objective inter-relatedness of the real, but this can only be reached through the actual inter-relationships of particular beings and things. Our knowledge must be tested by universality: universality is what makes objectivity. Universality, indeed, is the underlying idea of philosophy. Our knowledge of God, the great Universal, is a consciousness of Him which is not of a kind with our knowledge of matters of fact—a consciousness not definable in the ordinary way or sense, as though He were external to us, but a consciousness of Him as, in principle, within us, and communicating of Himself to us. Knowledge can, at best, be only part of Being, which, as a totality, remains a more inclusive whole than our knowledge can be. But cosmic approach is possible to thought, in its quest of ideal Being—a quest which, as idealistic, is always carried on inside things. For the mind is never, so to speak, outside reality, ultimate reality being of the nature of consciousness; and it is with internal or relevant relations our knowledge has to do. There could not be a more damaging indictment of Idealism than that it should be charged with restricting the movement by which reason affirms the external world: any Idealism must be held self-condemned, which reduces us from being denizens of a real universe, to make us only dreamy recipients of our own impressions. But the world is still too honest a world, and

the processes of knowledge at least too valid, for that. But if we are to seek objectivity in our knowledge of God, it will be an ethical quest and not a search for a mere static natural immanence; it will not be without sense of the danger lest we take as the God we seek, only the God of our own ideal and our own defining, coloured by the individual quality of our own thinking. The God of Theistic Idealism is therefore to be sought through His self-revealings in Nature and in Art, in Science and in Philosophy, in Literature and in Life, in History and Experience. Of the knowledge of God gained in these ways, we may say, as a German theological thinker has done, that "it is more objective than any other knowledge, since it has reference to God, to the Reality which sustains and conditions all other reality." Even the Italian philosopher, Gioberti, who—as a precursor, in a sense, of Spencer—made God, as absolute and eternal Essence, unknowable in respect of His essential aspects, yet postulated, in the most explicit fashion, the completest objectivity for Deity. But thought cannot be satisfied to rest in such an incapacity for knowing the Highest, when that Highest is spirit comprehensible by spirit. True, our theistic idealist may never, in his creative speculative activity, have been able quite to overpass himself, or wholly lose the stamp of his own individuality, but he may have won, in the value-creations laid bare by his vast intellectual and spiritual perceptions, an objective universe wherein God is fountain-head of all his light—an approximate conception of the nature of the Absolute. But his thought is never of the universe effected by his own unification, as a universe of his creations; for his thought centres wholly on the idea of exterior and universal validity, in his modes of knowing that absolute Other. This, although his Idealism is real enough to find the ground and the construing power of all being in Universal Mind. His Absolute must represent the unity of active being and thought, of reason and will, of the ideal and the real. The opposition of thought and being is overpassed in such a conception of the Supreme Actuality, as bearing within Himself the unity of intelligence and will. This unity of the

Absolute is one, be it said, in which the reason is always real, and the will is always reasonable; hence the perfection of the unity. It is in men's living intuition of, and ethical relatedness to, the One, that the great problem of the One and the Many will be for them solved: there is, for Theistic Idealism, no other unifying principle for mankind. We must still, like Plato, find a principle of fixity and permanence in the flow of sensation—or the “flowing” philosophy of Bergsonism—if knowledge is to be possible and real. Not that any final formulation of the problem of the One and the Many may be possible to us, but at least the proper apprehension of the senses in which the One is in the Many, and the Many are in the One, may be significantly insisted upon as approachable and feasible. Experience is far too rich, complex, and expansive, to be pressed into a mere logical criterion: it never has, and never will, for all its splendid rationality, put itself in servitude to formal logic. Even against a Goethe, it was significantly charged by Emerson that he failed to worship the highest unity; but the living intuition of the One is, at any rate, something we cannot do without, if our Idealism is not to be radically lacking in spiritual elevation. The perception of that unity we can surely preserve without making everything else unreal. If Goethe so came short of worshipping the highest unity, it could only have been through failing to carry to a sufficiently practical issue his own maxim:—

“Willst du ins Unendliche schreiten?
Geh' nur im Endlichen nach allen Seiten.”

But the danger of not worshipping the Highest Unity really lies in that unity being so metaphysical and abstract that there is nothing for our emotional nature to lay hold of: the danger is of a Brahmanic conception of the One Universal Being as so absolutely homogeneous as to be shorn of attributes or qualities that our experience can grip. An idle, un-vital, non-theistic conception. I may believe in “an all-pervasive relativism,” no less than Dr Bradley at the close of his ‘Essays on Truth and Reality,’ but his relativism is not

mine: his abstract and impersonal Whole is not percipient of relative wholes, ends in themselves, the while they voluntarily subserve the whole. Bradley's parts are sacrificed to the Whole in a merely mechanical or "aspect" fashion. We are now dealing with ultimate metaphysic—the metaphysics of the Absolute—and Dr Schiller insists that an ultimate metaphysic must be ethical: I agree, as against Bradley and Bosanquet: God is for me the primary ethical Essence, or the absolutely ethical Spirit. God, as metaphysical, is not to me merely the Supreme Actuality; He is already, as the Absolute Essence, the active unity of the Real and the Ideal; if He is to me the Absolute Personality, and not an attribute of anything, if He is true Subject, then talk of inscrutable and unethical substance is out of the question, in respect of ultimate Being. There need be no confounding of the Infinite Personality with the All, for this Infinite is one and indivisible, exists for itself, and knows itself, both in thought and action, while the All is mechanically made up of parts, and is divisible. How different a conception is this Infinite Personality from what Cardinal Mercier even calls "the pantheistic willy-nilly becoming" of Bergson! Hartmann held that Deity could not be ethically determined, because God was, in his view, over-ethical. But why should we regard Him as super-ethical? Is He not self-purpose (*selbstzweck* as German thinkers expressively term it)? They do not make the confusion of some British writers who treat God as Purpose, as if the purpose were the Person, rather than the Person's, whose constitutive quality purpose is. Are not freedom and necessity—say, rather, rational and ethical necessity—one in Him? Is not Will in Him always reasonable Will, and therefore good? "Will is the spring-board of Reason," as Prof. Laurie remarked ('Synthetica,' vol. i. p. 166). To warn off the ultimately metaphysical, as thus super-ethical, is not admissible: the Absolute Essence cannot be held a blind Will, a static, non-active Being: absoluteness can have no reality save as predicated of a personal, active Absolute: the will of the Absolute is shot through with Absolute Reason, and what is good if not this?

It is the Absolute Reason who energises in power or Will which onesided Voluntarism is prone to forget; and thought which declines to regard such an Absolute as ethical, because He is supra-ethical, is always in danger of ending by making Him infra-ethical. Thinkers who contend for the over-personal and the over-ethical might do well to take to heart the saying of Carlyle, that "we must see before we begin to oversee." Of course, no one doubts that the ethical and the personal are, in God, infinitely more and higher than they are in us. We must take the highest which our thought knows, which is the ethical, and recognise not only the Supreme Being, but the one absolutely perfect *ethical* Being. I do not, however, for all this stress on Deity as ethical, agree with those who, in our knowledge of Him, make the moral consciousness ultimate, and base our knowledge of Him on the moral consciousness severed from consciousness-in-general. Of course, moral judgments rest on the moral consciousness. But I cannot agree, for all that, to having the moral consciousness torn away from the rest of being, out of its setting in the whole ultimate nature of things, that it may set up its autonomous realm, establish its conclusions, and then come back, as an after consideration, to look at the vast spheres of narrowly distinguished non-moral being, and see what is to be done with them. This is to do violence to the philosophical kingdom, which is one: truth is a concrete whole: such a separation seems to me a hindrance to the integral synthesis of real life. God is a true subject in our ontology, and is not a mere pantheistic deification of Becoming: He is not evaporated, phenomenistically, in His activities or functions, as too often happens in voluntaristic thought, the strength of which I have both felt and deeply considered. On the human side, will and idea are, for Wundt, the ultimate elements of reality, and the pure will is the end of that transcendent process wherein we seek a psychical unity, but, for my part, the primacy distinctly belongs to idea over will. "Intellectus movet voluntatem finaliter," as said Aquinas. This is not said in the interests of mere intellectualism, which, in its onesidedness, one may

utterly reject without at all seeking reality, like James, Bergson, Croce, and others, by relinquishing intellect for intuition. Nor can I relinquish Reason as fundamental in favour of Will, like Fouillée. The various, confused, and unsatisfactory forms in which Bergson treats intuition, have been pretty well and fully set out by Prof. Lovejoy and by Höfding, who shews it to be really a state in which there are no problems. It appears fairly certain that the Bergsonian result of holding to the shortcoming of reason or intellect has, in falling back upon primitivism, been a tendency to fall below reason or intellect, instead of transcending it. We certainly do not flee subjectivity in choosing intuition rather than intellect. The need for reflection must follow the fullest use of intuition, whose value we admit. The needed philosophy of intuition will not be attained without the aid of intellect as a preliminary condition. This, without at all forgetting what Aristotle had already seen, that intellect has its dependence on intuition, for its knowledge alike of what is above, or below, itself. But the anti-intellectualism, which rejects all rational proofs of the Being of God, forgets that our apprehension of the truth concerning Him calls for the exercise of our whole psychical nature, thereby rendering mere intellectualism a totally inadequate conception. No idea attests itself as more valid to the most mature and advanced reason or the highest synthetic intuition, than the idea of God—in the theistic sense of creative and personal Deity—but that idea has, in the regress of human thought, been attesting itself to human reason back to the time when the mere vague impression or dim instinctive sense—called by the ancients, especially the Platonists, *prolepsis* or *anticipation*—ante-dated the idea of God, in any clear, perceptive sense. Theistic Idealism takes the idea of God to be as natural and proper to humanity, in its race-consciousness, as is the idea of self to the unity of our individual self-consciousness. To this latter consciousness, the idea of God needs, of course, the idea of the self, as one of the anthropological presuppositions of theism. The whole History of Religion has shewn how connatural to man is the idea of

God. "The grand fable of God and the life to come," said Fechner, "would never have been so widely spread or firmly maintained, had it been but a fable." Nor is it the mere idea of God that becomes validated for man, but under the various self-revealings of Deity; the Supreme Reality or all Encompassing Existence is reached. Just as the law of gravitation is an idea or a mental construction, while gravitation itself is grim reality, so the God-idea, however abstract we make it, stands for the most real, concrete, and objective of beings or existences. Theistic Idealism is not content with the quest for the merely formal validity of the idea of God: it seeks deeper justification for the God-idea in that it suggests for man's life an objective determination, and an absolute spiritual content, in God and the consciousness of Him. Thus is met the demand of all the objective values for a theistic setting, whether these values be Society, Science, Literature, or Art. For the idea of God subsumes the ideas of the True, the Right, the Good, and the Beautiful: the idea of God, theistically conceived, implies His self-revealings, in some sort, in all these realms of value. Our only glimpses of reality, on Bergsonian theory, are to be got through intuiting the creative flux. As if man were devoid of spontaneity enough to resist the flux, and impose upon it a purpose firm, "the world's flowing fates in his own mould recast." Our idealism takes becoming to be itself being, that is, the being of becoming; and it holds, in this connection, to a spontaneity of the soul beyond the spontaneity of instinct. But that spontaneity must be neither exaggerated nor distorted, as it was by Voltaire when he said that "God made man in His own image, and man has returned the compliment," and by Dr Frederic Harrison, who recently said that "God is made in the likeness of each individual Theist." So far from that, each individual Theist expressly holds to God as infinitely transcending his own particular finite conception of Him. Any appeal to classical Theism would shew how erroneous these statements of Voltaire and Harrison are, and how really conducive, on a consistent view, to universal scepticism. Any real reflec-

tion on the subject would make evident that theistic knowledge is no more idiomorphic or anthropomorphic than is the whole body of scientific knowledge. Scepticism is as anthropomorphic as knowledge. It is as the Absolute Reason that theism knows God, and it is as finding the fundamental, eternal, and universal principles of reason in God, that man, as spirit, seeks Him. But to find the rational archetype of the Universe is not to make it, though it may be to find a ground for our idealism. Dr Bradley has said in 'Truth and Reality' (p. 432) that he cannot accept a personal God as the ultimate truth, for he does not know how to relate a God with such external relations, as he conceives this to mean, with finite minds: it seems to him to make God something within the universe, and thus imperfect. Such is the position of those who, with disconcerting lack of speculative capacity and power of imaginative realisation, fail to understand how God can be the all-embracing, all-comprehending, Infinite Personality, stripped of all the accidental limitations of human personality. Strauss, Fichte, Pfleiderer, spoke likewise. One can find something superior even in the days of Bossuet,—“Eternal, immense, infinite Being, exempt from all materiality, free from all limitation, destitute of all imperfection!” Nothing could be more explicit than the teaching of Plotinus that, in seeking to know the nature of a being, we must, to get at its essence, eliminate the accidental. I should like to know the philosopher who, in rejecting the Divine Personality, has ever really done so. Dr Bradley has here learned nothing from Leibniz, who expressly held the perfections of God to be those of our own souls, only raised to infinity. This is said, however, without any suggestion of co-ordinating God with man in these attributes, for His attributes or perfections are identical only with His own infinitely perfect, self-existent nature. He, the pure actuality of existence, is the sum total of all perfections. His infinity is intensive and positive—no mere absence of limitation. Consequent upon His simplicity and infinity, God as the necessary Being—*ens a se*—is one and indivisible. God is, to our Theistic Idealism, the Absolute Personality: absolute, as unconditioned and un-

limited in His spirituality; personal, as the unity of self-consciousness and self-determination. His unique and perfect individuality springs from the absolute indivisibility of His nature. Bradley's talk about "external relations" springs from inability to conceive God otherwise than as though He were, on a mechanical view of the individual, some sort of outward and finite Being, to whom "external" could be more properly applied than personal, ethical relations. Dr Bradley has signally failed to understand what an all-embracing, all-inclusive consciousness means, as belonging to the Perfect Personality. It is not difficult to conceive how severe would be Dr Bradley's criticism of such a speculative incapacity as this inability to transcend personal Being as a perfectly determinate quantity—for that is what it really comes to—if he met with it in others. Unfortunately, he is far from solitary, among modern philosophers, in his defect and shortcoming. Who, outside Dr Bradley's imagination, treats Personal Deity as "outside" the "strange and glorious Nature" He has made? It is rather out of date for Dr Bradley to raise such an issue, since theists who are not idealists, equally with those who are, admit or insist upon the Divine immanence in the world. But it is the distinctively theistic position that, though God is immanent in the world of nature, God is not nature, any more than nature is God. For our theistic idealism, we exist in God and not merely for Him. The nature of this personal Deity is complete—His infinite and plenary existence. Endowed He is with the plenitude of being or life, intelligence, and will or power, in His single and infinite nature. The Divine attributes of this omniscient and omnipresent Personality exist, each of them, in illimitable perfection. They are, viewed as objectively existent, quite inseparable, each from the rest. That is to say, they are absolutely inseparable—grounded as they all are in the One self-existent Being or Essence—when viewed in application or reference to objective reality. The attributes are our conceptual notions of God's real relations to the world, rather than moments of the Divine Essence, which last is to be regarded as absolutely simple. This Divine simplicity

is essentially free from entrance into any sort of composition. The attributes are varying aspects of His indivisible Personality, in which they are at one. He is the Absolute Reason, and, as such, the seat and the source of all the orderly relations of the universe, the secret of its unity and continuity. We cannot adopt, therefore, the unsatisfying position of Plotinus, who, through fear of reducing the One to "the category of determinate Beings," refused "to attribute being to the One, in order to avoid establishing a relation between Him and derivative beings." Plotinus does better, however, when he makes Deity the outside, the absolute measure of all things, and also the within, the infinite depth or infinite Ideal. No conception of the One, which should be reached by a merely abstract process, and be void of all real content, could be of value to Theistic Idealism. To it, God as real, indivisible, and sole Essence, is the entire fulness of possible being, as He is the whole fulness of thought, its possibility, and its fulfilment. Theistic Idealism finds the beginnings of its conception of Infinite Personality in ontological suggestions of perfect Being; it gathers strength from the apparent cosmological cravings for Will as the originative force or Power; it gleans confirmatory evidence from the Intelligence that underlies the purposive tendencies of vast, teleological reasonings; and it reaches the highest seal of self-existent Personality in the evidences of human reason, conscience, and moral law. There is an absoluteness of the self-revealing Divinity, which precedes our ratiocinated knowledge of Him, and is too often unrecognised or unremembered, in its infinite significance. Such an absoluteness of Deity must make itself manifest, objectively, in His creative works and purposes, in nature and in history; it must be met, subjectively, by the delight of man's cognitive powers in knowing the Eternal and His Divine excellencies; by the satisfaction of the æsthetic sentiment in beholding the beauty, sublimity, and ordered exquisiteness, of His works; by the joy of the moral sentiment in His righteousness, goodness, and truth; and by the response of the religious instincts to His claims on our reverence, love, gratitude, and worshipful adoration. Manifest as God makes

Himself in these various ways, the God-idea is yet one which shines by its own absolute light: there is no higher universal in which it can be apprehended. This should be remembered when the validity of the idea of God is spoken of: whatever predicates we may, validly enough, assert of God, none of them can compass the God-idea, or be expressive of its wealth: it is rather the God-idea that validates itself to, or in, our experiences. Hence it is not an unmeaning tautology, but the sole and legitimate logic of spiritual reason to say that God is God. For the God-idea is ultimate, and has no equivalent. It is more necessary, as well as more ancient, than conscious logical process; it is broader than any logical premiss. The Being of God is the deepest truth—the most essential postulate of rational thought—and in such a case, to attempt logical proof would be to contravene the God-idea itself. Such Being is the “ultima ratio rerum,” the *prius* of all predication: He is the never fully defined, but ever to be known God. The idea of God is thus one which we should, as Theistic Idealists, find blended with everything; it should mean for us the completion and fulfilment of life. Rightly said Rückert,—

“Wer Gott nicht fühlt in sich und allen Lebenskreisen,
Dem werdet ihr Ihn nicht beweisen mit Beweisen.”

No dislike of finalism to be found in modern science or philosophy can reasonably dissipate the idea of directive principle or cause behind all the order and harmony of the universe. Behind the whole realm of scientific phenomena, physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, botany, and the rest, the presence of *idea* is to be found—and that, too, in each of these separate spheres—suggestive of creative Intelligence. Of course, the finality is intrinsic and immanent, the fecundating Intelligence being, to our Idealism, that of a spiritualistic Monism. The vast scientific realm, as made up of these separate parts, cannot be viewed, to the satisfaction of reason, otherwise than as dependent on the absolute and unconditioned Being, Whom we call God. Hence it is impossible, for our Theistic Idealism, to agree with the idealistic positivism

of Vaihinger, who, in his philosophy of the "Als Ob," interprets the God-idea, after his critical Kantian mode, as having only a fictional, regulative, non-existential significance. For our idealism seeks a real, objective mode in its derivation of the essence and fact of God. It takes God, with Ludwig Stein, to be "the logical premiss of the world," and the thought-necessity of God to be the logical security or guarantee of His Being's necessity (L. Stein, 'Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart,' pp. 322-328). But it denies, as against Vaihinger and others, that the God-idea is a mere heuristic and regulative principle—a mere valuable thought-construction: it cleaves to the reality of the God-fact, and to the validity of the existentially conceived and embraced God-idea. When Vaihinger takes thought to be fictional, and thinks it mediates no knowledge of reality, Theistic Idealism rejects his sceptical representations as falsified by fact and history, wherein thought has always triumphantly justified itself against such modes of reckoning. I shall return to this presently. It is a far cry from the biologico-genetic and psychologistic method of the critical positivism of Vaihinger to the axiomatic reality and independence of the life of spirit, presented by Eucken, to whom the God-idea is—since the *Geistesleben* or Spirit-life is one and the same in all—embodied in the kingdom of the spirit as the kingdom of God. The God-fact is obviously not without an objective foundation in this axiomatic stress of Eucken, but its hypothetical character calls for strong supplementing from the side of knowledge. That is what our Theistic Idealism has been trying to assert and supply in this chapter, on its broader basis. It is not entirely a question of biologico-intellectualistic working, as with Vaihinger, on the one hand; nor a wholly spiritualistic problem, as with Eucken, on the other; what I have tried in this work to do has been to subsume all the vast and varied values found by man in life and the universe under the conception of a theistic-idealistic system. The World-Whole is therein conceived as from, in, and to, God, and conceived as, for us, an objectively existent reality, but not a reality finished and complete. But it should be remembered that, in speaking as I have done above, of the thought-necessity of

God, I mean no merely abstract intellectual need, but, more deeply, the rationally expressed necessity of our whole being, exercised on the Godward bearings of nature, experience, and history. This broadened insistence, in the interests of objectivity, is needful also in view of the too great subjectivity of some of the insistences of William James ('Varieties of Religious Experience,' pp. 517-518). In pursuance of the stress he lays on experience, James, dignifying subjective impressions with the name of experiences, admits, what is very obvious, that the hypothesis of God, as mere subjective content of religious experience, would not be an adequately fruitful one. He must, he asserts, be the God of the universe, to legitimise the interior peace and absolute confidence of the religious soul. He admits what a hardy over-belief is implied in so converting subjective Deity into the master of the world. But he does not see how little, in the light of our foregoing contentions, the passage from the experience of God to the existence of God can be effectuated by any such *salto mortale* as he proposes. That existence is affirmed, not only within, but immeasurably beyond, the limits of all our experience. Rather is the existence of the Absolute Personality to be taken as the fundamental presupposition of our personal being, which I have shown it to be. For, as Ulrici observed, "beside this Absolute, there can be nothing which does not belong to Him; our thinking is His thinking, our being His being. For the existence thereof, there is no need of proof; for it is precisely existence itself, the be-all and the whole of being. The conception of the same proves and verifies itself, for in Him existence and thinking are identical; the conception thereof is His existence, consequently truth itself." This is not to say that proof or evidence may not be so presented as to find place and power in the appeal to mind. That appeal is very subtle in its modes, and very deep and complex in its combinations. The resistless strength of its objective character will neither be minimised nor undermined, to its own peril, by Theistic Idealism. But the empiricism of James is near of kin to the empiricism of Hume and of Jacobi, the latter of whom claimed an absolute objectivity of his own. "All reality," he wrote, "both the physical which reveals

itself through the senses, and the spiritual which reveals itself through the reason, is certified (*bewährt*) to man by feeling; there is no other assurance beyond or above this." There is not much philosophic insight in thus classing our apprehension of God with that of a tree or a table, and certifying them only by feeling. His treatment of reason as a mere receptivity is obviously unsatisfactory, as is also his treatment of all proof, not as matter for justification, but as so much ground for subjective intuitions or faith. Little wonder that Hegel called this, not philosophy, but the despair of all philosophy. Later, however, Jacobi came to relate reason more expressly to the supersensible world, though his thought remained too enmeshed in subjectivity. His vision of God dropped, in the end, to a vague and somewhat mystical experience of deep emotional value. The truth is, a real transcendence of experience, in the narrow religious sense alike of Jacobi and of James, must be made, if we are to know the God of the universe in any real, objective sense, and none of the presentational or evidential and ideational elements or factors shall be excluded from such sense or sweep of knowledge. If we were, in spirit, less sense-bound or earth-bound, we should let neither sloth nor superstition defraud us of as real and true a cognoscibility of God and the highest realities of the Unseen, as any knowability that is in any wise open to us. Theistic Idealism contemplates no knowledge of its Deity from which anything in nature, reality, life, or human cognition, shall be excluded, for its idea or thought of God is that of One Who is the most concrete, as He is the most vital, of all the objects of knowledge. Why should it not cherish a conception of knowledge so bold and confident in its comprehensiveness, when what it goes forth to confront is nothing less than God's absolute self-activity, in its manifested workings in the world? True, my knowledge will be conditioned by my modes of perception and conception, and consequently will be relativistic, but it will be a constructive, and not a merely empirical, relativity. Locke in a certain place says: "The want of ideas of their real essences sends us from our thoughts to the things themselves as they exist. Experience here must

teach me what reason cannot." Now, we are here happily not called to any divorce of reason and experience, and as we are not concerned with "things," so dear to Locke, but with their Author, we shall take both reason and experience to help us construct our knowledge of the Divine Essence, as we turn "from our thoughts" to Deity, as He Himself exists. Nor, in so turning to Him, shall we rest in such a vague and relationless Unity as that of Plotinus, too abstractly conceived to be real Being and Life, or the One for and within our consciousness. Such is his so-called centripetal theism. Whatever his shortcomings, all this was finely supplemented and overpassed in Eckhart, who perceived the deep, mysterious, and unlocked over-individual life of Unity, in such wise that he could claim to be "one" with God in the act of "perceiving" Him. Thought then strives in vain to mediate the objectivity of transcendent spiritual magnitudes with our subjective inwardness. The eternal deeps of man's nature are then stirred within him; the Ideal in its movement flows through him. "For if I am pure," said Eckhart, "God must of His own nature give Himself to me, and flow into me." Ruysbroeck, too, maintained that in intense and simple contemplation we are "one life and one spirit with God." In the course of a lengthy and beautiful passage, Ruysbroeck says: "We live wholly in God, by possessing our beatitude, and we live wholly in ourselves by exercising our souls in love towards God; and although we live wholly in God and wholly in ourselves, yet it is but one life, which has twofold and contrary sensations." All this, and the like, clearly means the disappearance of alien objectivity in our knowledge of God, and the supersession of a bare Plotinian over-being by the immanent God, Who is the life of the Soul, the life, the pledge, the guarantee, of all its values, be they truth or love, righteousness or beauty. But justice to immanence or the subjective factors had no need of mystical excess, but we are by no means free in our time from the blind excessive stress on immanence. This frequent excess does injustice to spirit, of course, which, in its transcendence, preserves freedom and self-identity, and ought not to be necessary in the case of

what Newman called the only two "supreme and luminously self-evident beings, God and man." The luminousness of Deity, however, is not always very self-evident, else Dr M'Taggart would not have given us such a poor and grossly anthropomorphic conception of Him as "supreme" but not "omnipotent," and merely "more good than evil"—a veritable magnified Man, after Arnold's view, and, one may add, not a very ideal type at that, on the ethical side. To Theistic Idealism, such a mode of conceiving Deity is quite antiquated, and entirely out of date to rigorous and really enlightened thought. The exigencies of man's spiritual and intellectual natures are so great, that they utterly burst the bonds of such cramped and halting conceptions. Dr M'Taggart might just as well ask us to go back to the notions of pre-evolutionary science. It will be seen that, from what I have advanced in the latter part of this chapter, I am in agreement with Prof. A. E. Taylor, when he says that "it would manifestly be incompatible with the presence of any rational unity of structure in the experience-world that there should be a final and absolute lack of harmony between that world, as it must be conceived by true thinking, and as it must be, if our ethical aspirations are to be satisfied." But ethical aspirations and values are so utterly intellectualised, and shorn of their moral distinctiveness, by thinkers like Bradley and Bosanquet, that no satisfying unity of the experience-world is, or can be, reached. The "complete individuality of the universe as a conscious being" is what has value for Bosanquet, and, in this solipsistic mode of restricting value to the whole, he robs ordinarily understood ethical values of their worth and significance in a most unwarranted fashion. Ethical fact and value are most unjustly sacrificed to the exigencies of intellectualistic theory or logical system. An almost judicial blindness appears to stamp this extreme intellectualistic absolutism with a radical incapacity to perceive that the case is not at all on all fours with an ordinary whole and parts, as in the world of things, but is one of a whole made up of selves—that is to say, of wholes, if, for intelligibility's sake, such mode of expression may be allowed—every one of which

has being, value, import, of its own. Every one of these may, and should, in ethical freedom, relate itself to the Whole, a very different issue from remaining, as on the absolutist theory, a mere depersonalised aspect of the Absolute. Even the Deity is therein reduced or degraded to an aspect of the Absolute, to an appearance of some deeper Reality. But Theism has not been a sufficiently serious concern to Dr Bosanquet, and for lack of being "in bitter earnest" here, he has done nothing for it, not even by way of enlightened and relevant stricture. He has simply volatilised the individual, without even giving any intelligent or intelligible account of the process. He has tilted at windmills—crude suppositious views that all modern theism repudiates,—in his lack of what he himself would call philosophical imagination. Even Dr Ward has done much the same thing, speaking persistently of common views and usual views, of Theism, in a manner which results in the discussion being shorn of much of its value. For they are not the views of the theism of our time, in its best and most progressive representations. William James was guilty of the same sort of outworn performance, to a quite notable degree. No one wishes to see Philosophy credited with being a mere bungler, and it is time, therefore, to treat Theism as a high and serious philosophic concern, with the necessary insight and sympathy. But of these qualities there was little in the talk of James about a "static, timeless Absolute," gratuitously supposed to be "stagnating in the felicity of His own perfections." If Theology had been more resolute and open-eyed, she would have scored a speedy and complete victory over Philosophy in these regions, at any rate. For if the besetting sin of speculative thinking be, as Dr Ward, in what was already a commonplace, has remarked, the tendency to hypostatise abstractions, the tendency is one to which Theology ought easily to have been superior, in the close fellowship to which she is called with objective spiritual Reality.

Theistic Idealism grounds itself in the fact that, when we scrutinise our own consciousness, there is found in it, as finite and relative, not only a sense of being related to the Infinite and the Absolute, but also a sense of the Infinite as having

dwelling-place within us, so investing us with a certain potential infinitude, in virtue of which, if we may not know God as in Himself He is, we have at least an infinite capacity for progress in the knowledge of God. There is, in this sense, truth in Pascal's saying, that we would not seek God, if we had not already found Him. Our search for Him is thus a search with Him. It certainly would not be without Him, as we have earlier shown. Implicit the forms of our knowledge of Him may initially be, but they are indubitably real, and in His light we come to see light clearly. By all the implications of our thought and of our moral being, we are led at length, as we have seen, ontologically to affirm, and ethically to predicate, Him. It is in the divine fascination of such knowledge that the spiritual determination of man's life lies. In such knowledge, compelling reason there must be, but also the concurrence of the will, and the reinforcement of the affective or emotional factors. God is so known that He is the all-absorbing object of the whole-man knowledge. A striking defect in such whole-man knowledge is exemplified in Höffding, whose 'Problems of Philosophy' lays it down that "the core of religion is an interest of feeling and will," and whose 'Philosophy of Religion' axiomatically regards the conservation of value as the essence of religion. Our whole rational nature is smothered and suppressed in this narrow, partial, inadequate treatment of a great subject-whole. The rational nature of man must not be so quenched by values purely of feeling and will. But if we seek whole-man knowledge, I think we should also seek whole-God knowledge. Not a God who is Lord of the human soul only, but Lord of the universe as well. Not a God Who is only, with the monotonous iteration of much modern philosophy of religion, the supreme value *for us*, but the God Who is Lord of all, and *for Whom*, more worthily, we exist. For Theistic Idealism, of course, God has the significance of value (*Wertbedeutung*)—the "Supreme value"; but it does not lower Him as merely means to human end, to wit, the exaltation of our lives and the realisation of our personality. The true enrichment of

thought and life can never be secured but by recognising what is of deeper, more fundamental import than these limiting valuations of Deity, namely, His being Lord of all, *i.e.*, God objectively revealed in nature—even the nature-world of science—and in history, no less truly than in the soul and its experiences. Theistic Idealism will have supreme Reality, not merely supreme value—will have supreme, self-existent Being, rich, by infinite fulness and variety, beyond all value-computations: towards such Being or Reality, all its thought, desires, aspirations, converge, and thereby, as true but indirect result, all its sense of value is immeasurably deepened. So great is the difference between existence and value, with the tendency of this latter to foster a sickly and unfruitful subjectivism, when unduly dwelt upon, or disproportionately emphasised. But, for Theistic Idealism, God remains the absolute personal Power, alike over the world and over us, “the Father of an infinite Majesty,” not the mere equivalent of a value-judgment. All He thus is may not be cognoscible by us, but is in idea quite comprehensible. This, of course, has nothing to do with any disparagement of the Philosophy of Values—to which I shall return later—developed in the past decade, with important results for philosophy, in Germany, America, Austria, Italy, France, and Denmark; for it was all-important that the feeling, and willing, subject should learn to appreciate other worlds than the physical universe. But Theistic Idealism cannot be content with a philosophy of Life, but seeks a philosophy of the World, which shall include Man, in all his nature and activities. Even Eucken, who lays so much stress on the philosophy of life, is fain to admit that this cannot be deep in type without an intelligible world or absolute order of things being presupposed. The religious outlook on the world emphasises, in his view, the free, the reasonable, and the persistent, and the continuity of the world he takes to be transcendental rather than empirical. But Eucken seems to me to fail of giving any adequate metaphysic of nature, and to leave the empirical world simply too much outside his religious idealism. What he

overlooks is, that if the "invisible things of God"—His everlasting power and divinity—are "clearly seen," it is because they have been "perceived through the things that are made." Things that are so significant for the knowing mind cannot, in the view of Theistic Idealism, be left without being taken up into a world-philosophy, as though cosmic reality had no instrumental religious value. For it thus appears what nature as the "given," the antecedent state of things, may lead up to. But the invisible Deity, so discerned by the things He has made, is yet distinct from the world, even in its totality: the world-totality is not, for theistic idealism, as it is for Royce, the "self" of God, but the expression of His thought and will, which expression, in the religious relation, we transcend. The world, as experienced, is, no doubt, a world of value aspects—of meanings rather than of facts, but, all-important as the value category may be to our construction of the world on an experience basis, we are not thereby entitled to overlook or under-rate the objective aspects, elements, sources, at which experience itself is fed. To do so would be perilously like sawing off the bough on which we sit, but the feat is one which has, in a goodly number of cases, been pretty well performed. We can surely recognise or hold a value-philosophy, with discrimination and within limits, without dethronement of reason. We cannot consent to dwell in a cave of subjective values, out of which we shut the light and influence of reason upon existences, facts, realities, save the menial service of reason in the practical interest. If experience be progressive or advancing, its values must be tentative and advancing, and the last thing that can be allowed to happen is, that the values be roofed in, as accepted values, from contact with, or the activity of, existences or realities. But, on current value-theory, theoretic justification of religious knowledge is neither needed nor allowed, by the votaries of valuation. The idea which religion has of God, said Feuerbach incisively, "is, in its view, God Himself; God, as it represents Him, is the genuine, true God—God as He is in Himself. Religion is content with

nothing short of the entire, unreserved God; it wants God Himself, God in person. Religion ceases when it gives up the essence of God; it surrenders the claim to be truth when it surrenders the possession of the true God." But religious knowledge, when it is made to consist in value-judgments, tells us nothing about the objective nature of the objects to which these relate. For these judgments of value are affairs of feeling and will. Reason is sadly discounted, if we merely treat values, in general, as accepted results, instead of making a reasoned selection from the midst of meanings. Reason deals with cognitive and ideational elements; valuation, broadly speaking, involves a selection from these, but not without influence from the affective-volitional sides of our nature. These conative and emotional elements are by some held to be evolved from instincts; in the interests of continuity, of course. No contemplation or manipulation of our subjective values can possibly redeem our experience from lack of depth, richness, volume, and vividness, of content, whensoever that experience shall cease to be nourished at the breasts of objective reality or existence. Theistic Idealism not only sees all things in God, but God in all things. That is the very soul of the theistic hypothesis. It is no mere intellectualistic view, neither is it mere mystical God-intoxication: it is the clear, calm perception of spiritualised reason, as the result of a higher fusion of rational and spiritual elements. When Dr Bradley tells us, in his 'Ethical Studies,' that what we find in the religious consciousness, is "the ideal self considered as realised and real," theistic idealism finds the statement much too subjective to be satisfactory, since it has no reference to our consciousness or apprehension, in the religious relation, of higher and objective Reality. The religious consciousness is not, and has no right to be, so engrossed in itself, even its "ideal self," as to be oblivious of the infinitely more important Object and factor of its communion. To be "real" is not to be religious, until at least we have taken the trouble to show what is meant by "real," in some satisfactory fashion. The Divine Object in the religious communion is not the God of abstract philo-

sophers only, but is, to Theistic Idealism, the God of Science and Reality, of Fact and Criticism, of Life and Beauty, also. And if, as has been here maintained, such Deity is a self-revealing, self-communicating, nay, self-imparting God, the conception is one which, for our idealism, eclipses every other in grandeur, magnificence, and significance. Dr Bradley has told us, in his recent 'Essays,' that he has "seen far too much" of metaphysics "to think of staking vital issues on the result of speculative inquiry" (p. 132); but it seems to me more relevant and necessary to say that there has been "far too much," in the spheres of psychology of religion and of ethical idealism, of "staking vital issues" on totally inadequate metaphysical support. This, without disagreeing with his statement in every sense. It is in the line of our idealistic treatment to say that the religious unity of the values lies, in our view, not in the values themselves, but in the demand of the subject that conceives them. It is to the absolute identity of the "I," in a metaphysical sense, that the transcendent or absolute God-conception corresponds, although, for us, only the immanent God-conception is the really comprehensible one, giving interest to the other. But that does not mean that the absolute or transcendent God-conception is without significance as measure, standard, aim, direction. It just as little means any endorsement of the "Als Ob" philosophy of Vaihinger, whose refusal of existential reality to the God-idea Theistic Idealism emphatically repudiates, as I have already shown. Allying himself with Kant in his treatment of the God-idea as merely heuristic and regulative, Vaihinger proceeds, as we saw, in his own more critical and radical fashion, to treat the God-idea as regulative, but really fictitious, so far as its existential value is concerned. This weakening or reduction of the God-idea is not confined to Kant and Vaihinger, but has been shared by others, among whom are Schleiermacher, Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Strauss, and Nietzsche. The tendency is one which makes the God-idea only an idea, an heuristic, regulative, and valuable thought-construction, but not an Idea to be existentially thought or comprehended. The God-fact is,

of course, left in this sceptical issue as a mere fiction. This is no mere disrobing the God-idea of anthropomorphic coverings, but is a contention that the Absolute is to be given up, and treated as only a fiction. Like Dr Bradley, we have "seen far too much" of this fictitious metaphysical mode of inquiry to be able to do anything with it save cordially repudiate it, when "vital issues" are so unsatisfactorily treated. The "Als Ob" view has no absolute world to open up for us; its halting metaphysic has no inspiring vision or prospect to lay before us; it has no objective grounding of religion to present to thought or spirituality. But the idea of God is, in the view of Theistic Idealism, to be left unthought, or to be thought as absolute and self-existing. For it, God is not truly thought where He is not thought as a necessarily existent Being—as the Absolute we are necessitated to think—independent of our subjective thought. The whole reason and consciousness of man are constrained to hold that Infinite and Eternal Being does exist. This God-fact is evident to reason, and is the necessary presupposition of all other facts. We have not the least need, therefore, of any Kantian *as if* in viewing the organic world as the work of the Supreme Will and Understanding.

It must be kept in mind that it is the aim of Theistic Idealism, as expounded in this work, to find and exhibit the unity of all the values dealt with, whether logical or æsthetical, religious or ethical, cosmical or historical, for that must be the goal of any philosophical system. These partial and separate values must be bound together into a world-totality, in which these values shall be properly co-ordinated with each other. This world-totality must obviously be no mere sum of these partial and separate values, but such an Ultimate that in it each of the values shall have its final source or ground, while there will be an unification of the whole. But the Whole will have a value, which is not the sum of the separate values. This means our Absolute; and for Theistic Idealism, God is such fundamental Ultimate, in accordance with all that has been advanced in this chapter, and suggested in other chapters dealing with the trend of

the various values, as viewed by Theistic Idealism. It was for this ultimate Unity that we retained, in our opening chapter, the category of absoluteness, as a necessary presupposition of our God, and our treatment throughout is expressly designed to show how science and art, nature and history, religion and ethics, all demand such a theistic unity or setting, reached after idealistic method and conception. It is in this integration of the plurality of values that a concrete unity—not a merely formal one—is reached by reason, as demanded by the speculative problem. This concrete Unity is real and positive in the ontological order. There is yet a logical unity, for the Great Universal has been reached by the universalising power of thought. Thought and Being have thus, as far as may be for us, become one. Our Absolute is thus, as earlier contended, the active Unity of the Real and the Ideal. For this Absolute—that of the Absolute Being—it is our claim that it is the fullest, richest, and most comprehensive of all possible conceptions, since it contains the reality of being in unlimited fulness and extent, and is wholly delivered from any sickly indeterminateness that may attach to the mere concept of being in general. The Whole—of ontological unity—is also to be conceived as, ethically, the Highest. The goal of our system is Ethical oneness, with the Highest as the absolutely perfect Ethical Spirit, and we have not to choose between the whole and the highest, as is often said, for our Absolute is both. Such ethical unity, qualitatively, blends with the ontological unity, in the final synthesis of our idealistic theism. That the theist holds himself a real spiritual essence over against God, does not break the theistic unity, since his will is his to make it, ethically, one with God's. Nor is there any limitation, ontologically, to God's absoluteness, since, in the diversity of finite existences, none exists whose basis and continuance are not to be found in His absoluteness. The ontological unity does not exclude a cosmic unity of purpose or end. Nor does our ontological absolutism exclude relative distinctness, though it does exclude a plurality of unrelated units. The personal Absolute, who is for us Ultimate Reality,

is the single principle of the systematic world-unity, within which distinctness is compatible with relatedness, and the Many are in and through and for the One, while the One is in and through and for the Many, in ways and senses that may well be left to explain themselves. Theistic Idealism is keenly conscious of the great difficulty in the reconciliation of its various elements or factors: its Deity, as the personal Absolute, must be Lord of all, or All in All: the world is, for it, essential, as the object of His creative thought and care, so that He cannot be regarded as withdrawn or abstracted from it: man, too, is real, possessed of freedom, and is no mechanical fragment of Divinity, but set in living relations of dependence upon Him; but theistic idealism believes that the difficulties are apparent rather than real, mechanical rather than vital. Hence it persists in its quest of the full and systematic comprehension of Reality, whether complete and final solution be possible or not. It does so by positive conceptions, as I have tried to show, not by the negative fashion of thinking away limitations from Him, so creating "a vacuum" and calling it "God," nor by merely freeing the conception of Him from contradictions, but by presenting it, in its Divine fulness, as that of the Absolute Life. Dr Wildon Carr, in dealing with "the philosophy of change," seeks to contrast the Absolute, which is perfect and complete, with the Absolute which is a life that endures. But such attempts to draw antitheses between the so-called static Absolute, and the Absolute in activity, are futile and inapplicable to the case of Deity. He can only be conceived as eternally active (which does not, however, entitle us to dogmatise on the form of His activities); but into the idea of Divine rest or repose we may not, as unwarranted, read the idea of idle inactivity. The Absolute Life can have nothing less than absolute ends, which does not mean that these have no place in the time-world, and that, too, without His becoming thereby limited or dependent. Theistic Idealism rejects an Absolute that would mean a cosmic transcendence, but equally it rejects any Absolute that is dependent on the world's development: its personal Absolute subsumes both

types—for there cannot be two Absolutes—and is at once Being and Action, the Unity, if one may be allowed so to express it, of the ideal Absolute and the real Absolute. For this personal Absolute, aseity must be maintained, alike for His Being and His Volition. The Absolute, whose activities in the world receive sole emphasis, tends to become lost in the same, as has been seen in pantheistic developments again and again. But the true Absolute, the Absolute Life, cannot be so lost in action, for He has infinite fulness in Himself: He would not be the sole Absolute Being, if He emptied Himself, dissipated Himself, developed Himself, in His activities. Perhaps the insight will one day dawn on religious thinkers that the interests of theism are by no means secured or guaranteed, because certain theological writers make plentiful talk about a World-Ground. The faults of pantheistic tendency may, for all such phrasing, be far from really or properly avoided. A good deal of quite illusory theistic comfort can be taken out of the World-Ground: our real relation to it needs looking into. The pantheistic position is one in which every event or happening is only the event or happening of a World-Ground—has significance for this alone; the individual event is merely deciduous, and in itself lacks significance. Theistic idealism maintains our independence, as free individual spirits, in respect of any compelling mechanical Ground; and it rejects the oscillations between theistic and pantheistic thought-elements that are so conspicuous in Lotze, when all his works are considered. As Hartmann said, he never has a Yea without a Nay. It has been suggestively remarked by a modern writer that, “the clearer the form assumed by the religious consciousness, the more the religious idea of God passes over into a conscious metaphysical cognition of God;” but what the mediating thought of Lotze presents to our view is, Lotze’s being theistically righted by religious considerations, when on purely metaphysical grounds he was fain to agree with pantheistic representation. I have here meant by religion, of course, the relation of the human spirit to the Absolute Being or Essence, not religion as a mere maze of self-feeling,

or a morass of subjectivism, as often in recent philosophy of religion. Theistic idealism agrees with Descartes in ascribing metaphysical value to the God-concept, which he made the necessary presupposition of the existence of thought; but it also accepts the insight won by Pascal, wherein the God-concept has its place in the spheres of religion and of ethics. It was through religion Pascal discerned the God-concept as no purely ethical concern, but set in the closest connection with religious values. But the specific ethical ground-value of the conception of God may yet be found in the religious God-concept, wherein His ethical essence cannot be overlooked. For religion and morality interlace, and are mutually corrective. This justice to the religious genius of Pascal is not, of course, meant to imply satisfaction with the stark supernaturalism which he was prone, spite of his "every thought" breathing "nostalgia for the true," to set over against an equally stark naturalism. In religion, our knowledge of God is religious—not dialectical and discursive—in character; it recognises God as its object, and aims at living relation to, and communion with, Him. Religion would make of us great souls—as we love God with heart and soul, with strength and mind; and, with Pascal, we add, "in a great soul, everything is great." "This relation of spirit to spirit lies," as Hegel said, "at the ground of religion." It would, however, be hard and unjust to exclude from genuine religious belief, forms of faith that may lack definite and explicit trust in Deity conceived as really personal, however essential this latter form of belief may be to any full and satisfactory religious relation. That seeking for the ideal, the Divine, the eternal, which is found in man as man, and which marks his nature as religious, is a fact to which every philosophy of experience must have regard. It is this fact of man's religious nature which lifts humanity out of the abyss: it makes us share the greatness of the eternal outlook of the life of God: religion is the conquest of matter by spirit, of the visible by that which is invisible. Religion does not ask of science or philosophy leave to be; still less does it ask this of wordly empire or greatness; it has a

worth which is primary and unconditional, and is no arbitrary and accidental product, but necessary. The religious principle is, beyond all doubt, the noblest in human nature. The principle is seen at work in the creations of genius, in ideal forms of art, and in lives of humble but heroic virtue. Religion has, subjectively, for its kernel the psychologic force working: it is an original human necessity: it is man's essential mood and attitude towards the universe and the Deity, Who is its Author. But it carries a reason-ideal, and is not mere psychologic event. If you say it is primarily feeling after God, I aver that it is feeling penetrated with instinctive reason. Its interest is primary and universal, and grounded in an inner necessity of reason. It is with the philosophy underlying such religion that theistic idealism is concerned: its concern is that religion, on its subjective side, shall be so inward and vital as not to fail of reaching a real and fundamental relation to God, and cognition of Him; also, that, in this relation, our knowledge of God shall not be in the form of an overweighted transcendence, nor in the form of an overweighted and equally onesided immanence. It were a fundamentally false God-concept to make Him without relation to the individual essence or being, and to isolate Him above the human subjects. But, if the world is truly grounded in God, it is also to be held as grounded through Him, so that He is exalted above it, and sustains to it a truly free relation. What, then, I have been doing in this chapter is, to shew the validity of the idea of God in no empty or merely formal fashion, but as the richest and most comprehensive of all ideas in the fulness of its contents, wherein reason, thought, and knowledge, are brought into an organic unity. Ultimately centralised in this idea of God are all the varied world-spheres of truth, knowledge, and science. Metaphysical categories are there, in the idea of the Absolute Being: ethical categories are there, in the idea of God as the absolutely perfect Ethical Essence or Being: mental categories are represented, in the Infinite Mind or Absolute Spirit: not even physical categories are wanting, in the

conception of Him Who is the Supreme Force, the Eternal Energy, the Absolute Life. Such is the God of Theistic Idealism: the Absolute Reason, the Absolute Will, the Absolute Spirit, the Absolute Personality. Such a Deity is infinitely more than merely "the Supreme Value" for our will and feeling interests: He is the One ever-living, universal, and Objective Agency, Whose presence, power, and working, in the eternal scheme of things, we seek unceasingly to know. This free, ever-expanding knowledge of the mind will suffer no curtailment in the name of any "values" that may prove deadening and repressive, even though it may regard such knowledge itself as, in one sense, a value on the broadest or most universal scale. With Pascal so long ago, we must hold that without this consciousness of his reason-value, man cannot comprehend his moral call. This freedom and expansiveness of knowledge is necessary to the forming of one's thought-world as a "whole," as claimed, for example, even by religious thinkers like Rothe and Kähler. And theistic idealism does not shrink from building its thought into a system, albeit not closed and complete, but widening with the growth of the generations. Green properly enough held that the world tends to become for us such a system of related facts, even though our view cannot have the "wholeness" of that of the Infinite Mind. It was remarked by Trendelenburg also, that the organic and ethical view of the world leads us to recognise a "Whole" which conditions everything: the notion of everything is turned into the idea: knowledge is perfected only in the presupposition of One Spirit, whose thought is the Source of all being: this is idealism, but of a kind that does not block the way to reality (A. Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuchungen*, vol. ii. chs. xxii.-xxiii. Leipzig, 1862). Our theistic idealism gives no uncertain deliverance on the supreme philosophical problem, the alternatives of theism or pantheism, but its whole-souled pronouncement for the former is no merely personal preference, like that of Varisco, but is based on an amplitude of compelling reasons. Theism has not the faintest use to-day for presentations or pro-

nouncements that are not live, penetrative, and profound, in feeling and character: it has suffered infinitely less, in the most recent years, from pantheistic attack than from sickly, indeterminate, bloodless theisms. There is here a field for deeply inwrought mental and spiritual conviction which is rarely fully, or even strongly, occupied. Languid theisms, I mean to say, are of little account against naturalistic pantheism, with its power of historical criticism, and its firm hold on certain aspects or elements of the truth. Necessary and beneficial has been the emphasis of pantheistic thought on the Divine immanence; on the history of the world as a progressive revelation of the Divine; on the conception of God as the omnipresent Ground and the indwelling Life of the world. These gains to the philosophy of religion are largely discounted, however, when God is made to figure, in idealistic pantheism, only as impersonal Thought or abstract universal Reason. The philosophical interest demands a unitary conception of the world, but it is not enough, to Theism, that we hold to an ultimate reality: the nature or kind of this ultimate reality is, for it, of vital importance. An ultimate reality constituted solely of metaphysical attributes would, for it, not suffice: mere ontology is not religion, is not even theology; hence important as metaphysics may be, theistic idealism demands a religious Object possessed of personal qualities. Schleiermacher is a fine example of the endeavour to abide by impersonal conceptions, such as the infinite, the whole, the universe, until he was driven, by distinctively religious conception and stress, to invest his Deity with definite personal attributes. That is the logic of theistic idealism; and any purely metaphysical essence, devoid of all personal attributes, would be for religion the metaphysical monstrosity which thinkers so different as James and Feuerbach declared it to be. The truth is, that the various impersonal modes of conceiving the Supreme Reality of religious thought are as meaningless and absurd as to speak of "the love of a triangle, or the rationality of the equator." The trouble with monistic systems, Spinozan, Schellingian, Hegelian, always has been

to find due and proper place for moral freedom and responsibility within the scope or framework of the system, without doing violence to the facts, or to the system. The result is never satisfactory to a live and thoroughgoing theism: the individual being or person is sacrificed on the altar of impersonal unity; and neither dreamy pantheistic poetic sentiment, nor sentimental mysticism, can avert this issue. This is the result of the pantheistic conception being, as I have shewn earlier in this chapter, an undifferentiated unity devoid of events; and such a pantheism is not logically consistent with the world's evil, or with our unrealised ideals of the good. The dissatisfaction of theism—and of theistic idealism—with pantheism is, that it so identifies God with the universe, that we may not think of Him as a personal, self-conscious Being—after the manner of theism—distinct from the world, and transcending it, but merely as the Soul, the Reason, the Spirit, of the world, with Nature for His body. Nature, viewed *per se*, is made one with the essence of God, in the express claim of Spinoza, who does not allow that God works in pursuance of purpose, but only according to the *necessity* of His nature. All really theistic thought regards the issue as a most serious one, when things are posited in the nature of God, not in His Will: serious for man, who, under this “necessity,” becomes only a form of manifestation of the Universal Soul, and is really merged in a thoroughgoing impersonalism. It is quite impossible for such beings, as we are, to rest in the conception of “begetting Nature” as the ultimate reality. Only self-conscious being can posit itself, and this directly points to personality. Personality cannot proceed from an impersonal principle. Personality, even in the finite subject, has been decisively shewn by Lotze not to depend on any contraposition of the non-ego, but to be the necessary *prius* of such contraposition. It is the most concentrated form of power in the world. The Absolute Personality has infinitely less need of anything alien or external to it. The inconceivable, the self-contradictory thing is not at all that the Supreme Reality should be Absolute Personality, but that it should

be anything else, in a universe whose universal trend and tendency are towards personality. Just here lie the root defects of pantheism, that its Deity is so indeterminate, so lacking in cosmical efficiency, so powerless to enact and enforce moral law, so impotent to provide satisfaction to the demands of the religious consciousness. Even taking account of the many forms and shades of pantheism, which cannot here be discussed, theistic idealism cannot but rate it as vastly inferior to theism of any vital or energetic thought-character, and particularly so from the standpoint of practical religious needs and interests. I have earlier shewn that the personal Absolute—the Absolute Personality demanded of the religious consciousness—is not the Absolute of philosophical speculation, which latter has no need to posit its Absolute in this way as immediate Personality. Free and distinct from the world as this personal Absolute may be, Theistic Idealism does yet, as a philosophical system, not propose or profess to reach the really personal, existing God, in independence of cosmological and teleological considerations, which are, in fact and reality, blended with its ontological quest. Theistic Idealism would have studied Weisse, Baader, and others, to little purpose if it had not gained the insight that the Absolute of pure thought, the absolute Ideality of pure Reason, is by no means the living, personal God, but only a suggestion of the infinite possibility of such a living, personal Absolute. This still leaves, in the joint working of reason and experience, plenty of room for thought-necessity and speculative reason, in connection with the ontological elements or aspects, in the endeavour to win the universal contents of the God-concept for our consciousness. Certainly this Absolute Idea can never be grasped in any real thought-process without a real, thinking, absolute Subject as bearer of it, in and for Whom the real oppositions of our finite thought do not exist. But, as we have just seen, the concept of Absolute Personality is not, as concrete, to be simply deduced from the absolute Idea: God is to be concretely known as the free, self-

conscious, active, and creative Deity, in virtue of His being Will no less than Thought. It is in this creative moment of the Deity that the doom of pantheism is sealed. If God is no lifeless Being outside all existence, His Being is not yet to be viewed as interchangeable with the existence of the world. Will and Idea are in God identical, and if this has its difficulties in connection with the idea of Creation, why must we ask that the idea of creation be suddenly, and as by magic, realised, once and for all? God's Personality is a perfect, indivisible unity, and the deeper the secret of His unity, the clearer shines out for us His personality. It belongs to His unity that He is self-end and self-purpose, there being nothing, unlike the case of the finite subject, higher He can think. Theistic idealism maintains that, if God can only be thought in and through the world, He is in it as its pre-supposed, all-embracing, all-grounding unity: hence He is the essence of all things, because He is their Ground. It is, for all that, in the character of manifoldness or "manyness" that the world appears to us. These considerations are corrective of Schleiermacherian tendency. If God were to be identified with the world, in the pantheistic fashion, the world, now limited by space and time, would then become infinite, lose its dependent character, and have no need of a transcendent Ground. Such a difference in God, too, would deprive Him of absolute unity. The device whereby it was attempted to reduce the logical separation of God and the world, merely to a real one, proved thoroughly unsatisfactory, and need not be dwelt upon. I prefer rather to recall the sharp terms in which Schopenhauer set forth the essentially "absurd" character of pantheism by comparison with theism, after pointing out the precedence of theism, in that, only after you have found God, and become familiar with Him, can you proceed to identify Him with the world. It is sheer lack of vision that has led pantheistic talk of identity with God to suppose that it was thereby saving the absoluteness of God, regarded as no longer infinite, because there are beings outside Himself. The religious

consciousness has done little for us, if it has not given us a better mode of conceiving the unity of God and man, than that of simply reducing us to being parts of the Divine consciousness. We must beware how we speak of merely sharing an universal experience. Such an absorption or merging of our conscious being in one identical consciousness—a single and inseparable whole of conscious content—would be the utter destruction of all theistic relations, all real, personal, moral autonomy. These theistic relations ensure that there can be no endangering of our own reality, in view of the relational bonds of our separable being towards the Primal Source of all reality. Our immediate, personal experience is thus indefinitely expanded and enriched, not blindly sacrificed or vainly dissolved. Our conscious life is still ours, and a bare ontological unity is not confounded with an ethical community. The ethical oneness we are here to cultivate and achieve. We are in the realm of moral ends, not the arid region of bare, abstract unities. In its own place, we have not failed to give ontology its due. But the unphilosophical character of the pantheism we have been describing, with its identification of the actual and immediate forms of existence with the Divine, is evidenced in the fact that it is wholly uncritical. “But we do not escape Pantheism, and attain to Theism, by the easy course of excluding the Unconscious, or the sole Substance, or an inscrutable Mystery, from the seat of the Absolute. We must go farther, and attain to the distinct reality, the full *otherhood*, of the creation; so that there shall be no confusion of the creature with the Creator, nor any interfusion of the Creator with the creature” (G. H. Howison, ‘The Conception of God,’ p. 98). But this “otherhood” or distinctness does not mean anything so alien, or unrelated, that there cannot be the ethical oneness or the spiritual fusion of a spiritualistic monism, as the aim and goal of our philosophy. The mistake of pantheism has lain in taking that which is not-God to be God, that which is not-Being to be Being. It has been a persistent shortcoming of philosophy not to

take sufficient account of the negative in such matters. On the other hand, we get too much of the positive in Comtism, which professes to take the universe, the whole of phenomena, as the object of its study. But it remains, for all that, too lacking in co-ordination—for the positivist takes things simply as they are—too much a philosophy of parts, for nothing can be more manifestly parts than things that can be numbered, and the science of number is the fundamental science for Comte. But numbers are not even parts, are merely the signs used in distinguishing parts. Such a concentration on the numerable could obviously be marked by no vision and faculty divine. Indeed, Robinet tells how the students jested that Papa Comte had put God into an equation, and found no roots but imaginary ones. But the jest has a painful truth behind it. Square roots and cube roots he did not find; any other roots were to him imaginary. But the lack of philosophic roots is just the lack of Comte's System: its only root is Humanity, consisting chiefly of the dead, for whom no objective existence is claimed. His system came in divine depth far behind the pantheism which he so mistakenly regarded as merely generalised and systematised fetishism. No treatment of teleology in its higher diviner aspects could be more dreary and unsatisfying than that of positivism, with its blank negation of our spiritual aspirations after fellowship with God. Teleology is of the essence of spiritual personality; it cannot be kept out of philosophical systems of evolution; but ends, means, purposes, belong to the ideal or subjective relational spheres of the creative understanding or intelligence. Hence teleology in Nature points to personality in God. Windelband says it was this fundamental metaphysical thought of teleological idealism that was the thing of chief worth in the teaching of Lotze. But I share Ladd's view that nothing is more fundamentally important in Lotze than his conception of Absolute Being, or of the nature of the World-Ground, his Absolute being a rational, self-conscious, æsthetical, and Ethical Life. It is precisely in this region that theistic

idealism will suffer no agnostic arrest of the philosophic power and movement of reason, since it finds the knowableness of the Reality that underlies experience claimed even by pantheistic idealism, to which, indeed, reason itself is that reality. But a system which, like that of Spencer, asserts a necessary and noumenal Ground, makes its existence "a necessary datum of consciousness," but denies the knowableness of the nature of that Ground, is an incomplete and quite unsatisfying philosophy. For philosophy, of course, means explanation, of which there is here none. But knowledge, real though partial, of the Primal Reality is the insistent demand of reason, and so of Theistic Idealism, which feels our imperious obligation to know. Mystery and nescience may await us at points, but only sheer intellectual impotence or infirmity of reason would perpetrate the folly of treating our knowledge as though it were an unsubstantial cloud-bank. It is as far from that as anything can possibly be. Reality belongs to it, for Reality is nothing if not self-manifesting, self-revealing. Even matter is essentially known only as manifestation of infinite and eternal Spirit. The universe in its whole development is the revelation of something higher than itself—of God Whose expression it is. The higher the reality, the greater the revelation; hence man, the supreme medium for the manifestation of the Divine Life. The mind must shake itself clear of all false Absolutes—including those made up of all that is merely actual—and must realise that, however the Absolute may be reached by negative manner or process, the notion is itself positive, and indeed the most positive of all notions. This Absolute does not shirk responsibility for the actual relations which we experience, and of which it is the Ground. It is, in fact, the Source of these relations, Reality, in whole, being known only as such a system of relations. All the categories own allegiance to the category of relation, as, in fact, mother of them all. Knowledge is ontological; it is knowledge of being; it involves ontological judgment or inference. Things are always presented in their relations. God, the supreme

Revealer, is never an unrelated Absolute. But the relations are not mere creations of ours; rather are they found by us, as objectively existent. But they do not, of course, exist for us until—and only as—our minds perceive and recognise them, under the forms and working of reason. And it is the Absolute Reason which is always revealing itself in the universe.

Even Spencer spoke on occasion of the Power manifested in evolution as, in some sort, self-revealing, having “naturally-revealed end” towards which it works. These considerations have their importance, because man is not mere intellect or knowing intelligence, and cannot be content to know God merely as the Ground of all things, the ultimate principle of all existence. The whole complex nature of man is concerned in our knowledge of the Supreme Reality, which I have taken to be the personal Absolute, or the Absolute Life. Such an Absolute must, as spirit, reveal or manifest itself, and the material world is but the embodiment or expression of its Will. Things exist but as modes of the Divine activity: men are partakers of the Divine nature, and exist for themselves, as in God. Aseity or Self-Existence, Power, Self-Consciousness, our metaphysic has already claimed for God; but these by no means exhaust His self-revealings to man—nor even to the metaphysician. However, as this is not a theological treatise, the Divine attributes I do not discuss. I merely suggest that certain attributes are necessary to the interpretation of Nature and of Humanity, and that these must be taken to exist in the Divine nature and activity, not as mere attributions of our minds. I will only add that I feel fairly confident that even metaphysics could get a good deal farther, in quite a sure-footed way, in this direction, than it ever does. For the spirituality of the Deity, which our idealism has gained, is varied and far-reaching in its implications.

I shall only now refer to the *impasse*, dwelt upon by James in his ‘Pluralistic Universe,’ brought about by our having to think how so many consciousnesses can be, at the same time, One consciousness. I shall, without any mere logomachy, state my own position on the subject. The prevailing confu-

sion seems to be, in my judgment, largely due to lack of thought-distinction. I agree with the postulation of an all-inclusive Spirit, as by Royce, Green, Dr D'Arcy, and others, but I differ from them in taking this in a purely ontological sense, the sense of mere theistic dependence on it for natural being. This does not compel me, as it does those thinkers, to speak of our finite consciousnesses, more or less pantheistically, as parts or shares of the one all-inclusive Spirit. It implies that all being, and all finite experience, are known to, and depend, ontologically, upon the all-inclusive Spirit. But it does not touch the question of our consciousnesses as rational moral beings: there, it is no longer a question of whole and parts: we now enter a world of wholes, and a Whole of these many relative wholes can only be reached through the voluntary union of our rational-moral consciousnesses with the Ethical Highest. The ontological unity *is*: the ethical unity *ought* to be. When this latter is completely realised, the multiplicity of finite selves will be completely reconciled or unified, not blindly identified, with the Absolute Self. In this way, the ethical individuals, with their many consciousnesses, present no real difficulty in experience, such as James suggested. For there is neither "compounding" nor confounding of the consciousnesses: the Absolute Consciousness is that of the Absolute Self—His own—not absurdly made up of any aggregate of finite consciousnesses: the finite consciousness is, in every case, our own, which we have chosen to put in tune with the Infinite and all-comprehending Consciousness. In his later and overdone stress on the Community, Royce has done worse than Kierkegaard, who wisely retained the primacy of the individual. I shall return to the subject in our chapter on "The Moral Order and the Spiritual World," and there illustrate the fatuity, in the case of Royce and others, of treating the all-inclusive spirit in any other way. All systems of so-called Absolute Idealism have been wrecked on this reef, for in them parts are related only in mechanical or external way. The unity of the ethical world with the unity of the ontological world is, in kind, perfect, but is, as yet, only partially realised: the interaction between

the Absolute Consciousness and the finite consciousnesses is free and unhindered, and open to unlimited progress, as the ethical individuals are perfected. I prefer to speak of the monads or egos concerned as rational-moral consciousnesses rather than as volitional units, as in Wundt's system, which grounds reality, ultimately, in appetitive activity. Wundt, however, while founding psychical phenomena on appetition, does not resolve psychology into a mere onesided psychology of will: this latter tendency is seen in Fouillée, Ward, and Stout, in which they have been blindly followed by various writers. For my own part, I regard Dr Ward's entire subordination of reason to will in the historic development of man or pre-scientific psychology, as open to question, and overweighted on the side of will: this same pure subservience of reason to will, in a system of developed psychology, I regard as still less justified. I accept no authority on such matters but what can justify itself by the facts of psychological experience, in which genetic psychology is not the last term, and there I hold, with Varisco, that "the distrust of reason is unjustified," although his statement does not exactly occur in this connection. Early psychosis of pure *Trieb* or feeling-will without rudimentary thought I reject. Many of the results of this psychological tendency have been unwholesome and unfortunate, and one may very well entertain a healthy-minded scepticism as to many dogmatic positions laid down by psychologising philosophers when conjecturally dealing with the transitional stages from animal conation and animal consciousness to reason-developed and will-developed man. I know nothing more desperate in the sphere of human thinking than some of the feats performed. Prof. Laurie, with double-barrelled psychological gun, suddenly discharges upon us a "new potency, Will" [*Synthetica*, vol. i. p. 154], which contains more than "kinetic energy" (p. 147), to wit, the "empty form of end." He says "will is thus seen to be"—for in such discussions the continuity is taken to be established, in most cases, by assertion—"the root" of reason. His second discharge is "the new event or fact evolved in the cosmic system, Reason "

(p. 158). Prof. Laurie tells us that when he speaks of "Will as Reason" he really means will (p. 156), and that "the correct name is Will-reason"! Will is not subsequent to, or consequent on, reason. It is itself "root of reason" (p. 167). The sway and triumph of will are thus complete. But what of Reason, the second discharge? It "appears as supreme and governing, as constitutive of Man as Man" (p. 158), though we had just been told (p. 154) that, at the "heart" of man's self "lies Will as condition of its possibility." Of this "supreme and governing" reason, he asks, "What precisely is it"? And he answers "Assuredly an activity." "It is Will"! This is the sort of thing which the "science" of psychology, in its voluntaristic straits, palms upon us. While every other "science" is seeking more exact definitions and finer distinctions, this "science" luxuriates in loose identifications, wild confusions, and baseless assumptions, in the manner just exemplified. Hence I say that the redemption of reason from the blinding and grinding pressure of will is the greatest service that could be rendered to the psychology of to-day, which has in many instances fallen from Aristotelian heights of reason. I do not mean to suggest that will is not "the radical activity of the individual human subject," as said Rosmini, so far as the life of action is concerned; in that aspect, one may grant, with Varisco, a certain "species of supremacy and primacy" to will; but that is no reason for failure to do justice to reason or intellect, or for forgetting that, as Varisco insists, "it is essential to the will" to be "enlightened by cognition, to be altogether one with cognition." But that is not the note of subservience characteristic of the psychologies I have referred to, and, for my own part, I do not regard any conception of will as fit for a human psychology which does not conform to the idea of reasonable will, will which is one with reason-law. This ensures the rational character and content of will: it allows reason to come to independence. There is no need to question the splendid executive power, activity, and hold of will; but reason has insight, discernment, power of positing ideals, of guiding, judging, directing, of making surveys, systematiza-

tions, and elaborations, of adopting ends, selecting means, and checking or controlling appetencies; all which, although not exercised in divorce from will, give Reason a primacy of rank and a supremacy in dignity, all her own. The God of Theistic Idealism is, before all things, the Absolute Reason: this, of course, in conjunction with His being the Absolute Will. The absolute *prius* of the world is God's archetypal thought, as the Absolute Spirit. In man, will is no more independent of reason, than reason is of will; but the logical priority belongs to reason; and a psychology of man's concrete spiritual activity that reduces it to a psychology of will, stark and all-devouring, can never be rich and satisfying. An example is afforded by a recent Scottish writer on the philosophy of religion, Dr G. Galloway, who makes both "reason" and "value" "demands of the will" (p. 359), and declares will "the unifying principle of experience," "the basis of life," "the active principle which co-ordinates and unites" (pp. 430-431). The degradation or contempt of reason and intellect could not be more complete than in this extremely docile reproduction of voluntaristic psychology, but it cannot be compassed without the degradation of the psychological system itself, by which it is wrought. I am as far as possible from a mere intellectualist, but I should gladly be embraced by the "vice of intellectualism," sooner than fall into the abyss of this all-engulfing will, which is admittedly the fruit and offshoot of mere blind impulse, dragging a mere utilitarian reason in its train. No wonder Dr Schiller has lately said that "the helplessness of 'orthodox' psychology" is "most pathetic" [*Mind*, 1916]. It cannot do the smallest justice to Reason, the majestic. The writer on philosophy of religion just alluded to deduces, analogically, the "Supreme Will" as "the fundamental principle of unity or synthesis behind experience," and proceeds to argue, with characteristic plausibility, for this blind Schopenhauerian Will being possibly self-conscious Will, with the activities of self-consciousness possibly present from the first. Could anything be more at variance with the whole character and historic genius of theistic philosophy than such painful,

hesitant, circuitous, and lowering treatment? Theistic philosophy never dreamed of reducing the Absolute Reason, as its primal conception, to the level of a slow and possible deduction from such bare, blind Will. It is absurd to think reason not real until it has been so deduced. Theistic Idealism utterly repudiates this, in the name of Theism and of Idealism alike. It is the sort of argumentation that serves only to de-vitalise and discredit theism. Locke declared that "God has not been so sparing to men as to make them barely two-legged animals and left it to Aristotle to make them rational." I am confident that He has left it still less to any modern voluntaristic philosopher that can be named, who would be "so sparing to men" of rationality as is implied in a reason that exists only to obey the behests of blind and tyrannous will. Reason is no such slave to anything: it is ἀδέσποτον. Such a pure will-activity, taken by itself, as Wundt speaks of, does simply not exist, and such a rise of ideas, as he postulates, from the reciprocal action of pure wills, is, for any thorough psychological analysis, undemonstrable, if not absurd. A world of blind will is not a world of meaning. Our synthesising reason, from its sensorial material, works out its constructive way, as belonging to the system of universal reason. Reason or intelligence is the conceiving, designing, directing, and guiding principle in all teleological performances for the fulfilment of ends. To cognitive discrimination must be added volitional intention, in the case of action.

To Theistic Idealism, God as the Absolute Spirit, is the Absolute Reason no less than the Absolute Will. He is the ideal and Absolute Self in its actuality. His first activity is, and must logically be, intellection, for conception precedes volition. The Absolute Being is thought or reason, for there can be no rational action without thinking. But for world-realisation His Reason energises in Will. Rational insight into the nature of Absolute Being makes these things plain, and there is nothing precarious, artificial, degrading, or uncertain about them. The demand of the human spirit is, that a system shall be rational. This, however, without any sup-

pression of volition and feeling in the interests of abstract thought. The principle or category of God's activity is unity, and He is the unifying Spirit, but without being simply identified with the objects of His interest and working. Our finite consciousnesses should not be spoken of as simply differentiations of the ultimate Being or Ground of existence, as is done by some writers in a manner that still savours too much of the pantheistic.

I have said enough to shew the psychological incorrectness of loosely extending the province of will so as to cover every conative aspect and every instinct, however low, like those people who talk of every amœba having a "will of its own," and I have illustrated the disastrous results of this tendency as reflected in the philosophy of religion. The history of speculation might have taught the cultured despisers of reason, in any department whatsoever, that they cannot hope long to escape from the hidings of reason's power. Theistic idealism does not forget the appeal which theism has made to the rational nature of man ever since Plato shunned pantheism, "brought the idea of God into philosophy for the first time," and "was already trying to work out a rational justification of theism" [J. Burnet, 'Greek Philosophy,' 1914, pp. 336, 289]. At this end of the philosophic circuit, Theistic Idealism is found firmly refusing to believe that the human reason or mind can do nothing to solve the problem of the universe, and is marked by any incapacity to do anything higher than subserve will-impulsions, or take meek refuge in those will and feeling "values," which, as such, have no direct concern with truth. Theistic Idealism is smitten with no paralysis of distrust in reason or speculative thought, and lays on it no hand of arrest at bidding of any transient pathological tendency. It is not content with principles that are merely regulative, and not speculative, but insists on principles that will and do satisfy reason. The history of philosophy has taught us little, if it has not convinced us that despair of reason or lost confidence in mind is the surest path to philosophic scepticism. Speculation, as said Hamilton, does not consist in negation, but in "the highest energy of

the intellect." Indeed, one of the finest things in that philosopher is his synthesis of the intellectual endowments, wherein reason figures as the highest—in distinction from the mere understanding—being the *locus principiorum*, the home of universal and necessary truths. Such reason is regulative, in no inferior or subordinate sense, but as regnant and legislative. Hamilton failed to carry out his fine insight. Leibniz had already spoken of the mind as "not only capable of knowing universal, necessary truths, but of discovering them in itself." For him, too, the "ultimate reason of things is called God" [R. Latta, "Monadology," p. 415]. To this uncreated, all-creating Spirit, theistic idealism, which has shed all quantitative notions of the Infinite, adheres as the qualitative and intensive Infinite. And if its knowledge of this Infinite Spirit is only partial and relative, the relativity is not of a kind to create loss of feeling for absolute values. "Into every intelligence," said Emerson in the course of a memorable passage, "there is a door which is never closed, through which the Creator passes." What marvel, then, that we have a living intuition of the One, an apprehension so living and real that our sense of unity has no need whatever to grow so abstract and intense as to render the Many unreal, by comparison. Nor is there any reason why, when we have thought and striven our best, we should fall back with any feeling that every one of us is but a fleeting illusion in the bosom of infinite Illusion. That is precisely what Theistic Idealism, in its hold on supreme Being and ultimate Reality, will not allow us to feel: for has it not made God, for us, the supreme insight and the great reality? There is no reason in the world why the mind of man should not thus, in quiet and deliberate fashion, recall itself, or recollect itself, from the Many to the One. The impulse of our reason towards unity leads us to do so. When one is able to see and recognise both the One and the Many, in strength and with due sense of proportion, he is then such a man that Plato said he would follow in his footsteps as though he were a God. He is such a theistic philosopher that, caught up in the insights of reason and the flights of

spiritual intuition, in him the *amor Dei intellectualis* glows and burns, with strength and delicacy, with brilliancy and power, but rarely seen. I agree with Boutroux that the part played by reason, on the territory of religion, has not been well understood, even by those who ought to have known better. If we look at philosophers like Descartes, who gave his whole life with rare devotion to the cultivation of his reason, like Leibniz, who posited an intelligence of the compossible, the harmonious, above all merely abstract intelligence, like Kant, who stood for reason practical even more than pure or speculative, like Hegel, whose reason stood for the logic of synthesis, we surely cannot fail to see that, behind and above all schematising endeavours, the reason they sought was of a living and concrete character, that they were no mere mental dealers in concepts, as financiers deal in cheques; that reason was in them no mere power of dealing in abstract terms and concepts, but a power to find connection, solidarity, harmony, among beings themselves—an aim already announced in the Preface of this work, as part of my endeavour. A very different thing, be it said, from merely seeking to unify concepts by the use of the principles of identity and non-contradiction. It is reason that seeks, before all general concepts and abstractions, being itself in its original and individual essence. But its impulse is also to seek an unified immanent Being. Being, in its essential determinations, however, is what such reason seeks to know, although, in its idealising impulse, it rises to seek Perfect Being. And religion, in its gift to philosophy of the idea of a reason or λόγος which was with God and was God, has enriched philosophy with a more fruitful norm than it has always had the wisdom to realise. This norm has obviously shewn how rational may be the principle of absolute being. By it, the whole system of reality is shot through with intelligence. By it, the human psyche has an unbreakable kinship with God, the Absolute Logos. I do not, of course, mean to suggest, by the religious reference, that the logos idea or principle was not rooted far back in the idealism of Plato. In those early times the term λόγος could not possibly mean

“concept” [J. Burnet, ‘Greek Philosophy,’ 1914, p. 317]. The Logos is immanent Divine Reason, for us. But this I do not pursue, having treated the subject elsewhere [see my ‘Studies in European Philosophy,’ ch. v.] What I am now concerned to maintain, is, that the Universal Reason is king and lord, as said Plato (‘Philebus,’ 28 C); and that it is our business, as philosophers, to bring out the reason, which is immanent in us, into explicit and concrete forms. It is living reason, not a *caput mortuum*, Theistic Idealism pleads for and maintains, for only such a reason can have living apprehensions of the Deity. The self-realisation of such reason proceeds by finding in God *un point d’appui*, and its *rapport* with theistic religion thus becomes complete. It is really from, rather than towards, His existence, that we must reason. And the reasoning can never be of the nature of demonstration, for that is an absurd and impossible mode in the case of His existence—or indeed of any personal existence. Nor is it as mere knowers—in the abstract sense—that we know Him; it is as man knowing, as concretely real subjects, that our knowledge of Him is gained. Although Theistic Idealism takes full account of the real and manifold aspects of God, and the real aspects of the world in its imperfection, its change, and its evil, yet it seeks—as Idealism—the ideal significance of God, His truth-value for the reason, not less than His value for feeling and will; and for the world’s evil, conflict, and imperfection, it seeks an ideal completion or perfect realisation. God, in His ideal and infinite significance, can be, for it, no struggling, finitized Deity: raised above the din and dust, the struggle and confusion of the world, He is yet present in it as the strength and inspiration of those who do the world’s thought and work. Theistic idealism not only gives a Deity Who thus fulfils the demands of religion, contemplation, and worship, but it meets the need of ethics, which postulates an absolute Moral Ideal. For ethic here finds the objective and ideal order which it craves. But, in all that has now been said, Theistic Idealism does not pantheistically identify God with the actual world-process in its imperfection, nor does it

treat Him as any sort of infinite and impersonal reason, of which the world-process is the necessary manifestation. But it strenuously supports the metaphysical demand for the unity of reason, and, in our efforts at knowing Him, it regards none of the preliminary work of reason, none of its inherent interrogativeness and demands, as vain or without value. It knows no fatuous blindness or mental narrowness in respect of the fullest light which any form of revelation may bring, but, on the contrary, welcomes every crowning insight made possible to spiritualised reason. For it is profoundly aware that no reason is so arid, empty, abstract, and dreary, as the reason of the rationalism which limits me to my own reason, and tells me it is sufficient by its own light, and needs nothing beyond itself: no, theistic idealism bids me find in my reason a ray and a reflection of the Absolute Reason, which lays the imperative of reason upon me, and leads my reason or intellect to the heights where the insights of the spiritual consciousness are free, open, and possible, to me. From all that has just been said, we may, with Aristotle, hold it were "better not to say that the soul pities or learns or thinks, but that the man does so with the soul" [*βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ*. Arist. 'De Anima,' Bk. I. ch. iv.]

CHAPTER III.

THE METAPHYSICS OF CREATION.

THE idea of Creation, it has been said, has ceased to be credible: what is worse, we are told it has ceased to be interesting. For all our interest, it seems, is in the idea of process: the questions now asked are, whether the process tends, what are its laws, and whither it is a progress. Now, it may be allowed that the creative conceptions which clustered around a merely external Contriver—an otiose and absentee Divinity—are obsolete enough, but it must not be so easily taken for granted that the idea of Creation has ceased to be fraught with meaning and interest. For it is certainly very far from true that the idea of Creation—of the origin and persistence of all finite existences, as the work of God—has ceased to be a general postulation of the religious consciousness. If, as Herder said, the thought of the Creator of the world is the most fruitful of all ideas in human life, then it would be a strange irony that should make such an idea seem no longer of interest to-day. Be the nature of Creation what it may, what we are concerned with is, that God is the causative antecedent of the universe, its *prius* and Creator. Be the help afforded us by evolution what it may, it cannot yield us created being that exists independently of God. Indeed, nothing is more fatuous and blind than the frequent moral failure to see that evolution can be no substitute for a Creator. For evolution is only history, and the historico-genetic account of the world would

not give its causes or antecedents. Evolution begins with the existent, and if the historical evolution of the world—its unity in multiplicity, its determinate direction, its integrations, differentiations, &c.—has been discovered, that is not to say that its Cause or causes have been found, or that its movement, activity, change, may not be referred to the Absolute. Creation has, however, ceased to be a static and spectacular thing; its evolution has yet for its principle something stable, perfect, and absolute; the creation which we know is creative evolution, the ceaseless procession of the Divine Energy. There is the Bergsonian theory of an original impulse, *élan*, or impetus to matter, which immediately breaks into independent lines of evolution; but explosive force, or vital impulse, without a creative subject, is rather meaningless. There is the conception of epigenesis or creative synthesis, which, to the literal sense of evolution as preformation, adds the implicates of creative synthesis, or new formations in the shape of new values. The question is not one of new entities, of course, but of what one may call that overplus which is a characteristic result of synthesis. I know no good reason why theistic philosophy should have any hesitation or difficulty in accepting such creative theories or conceptions, so far as they can be scientifically established. Every theory is to be cordially welcomed which makes our understanding of creative process more satisfying or complete. No theistic evolution ever denied the part played—creatively—by free and spontaneous human agents, in compassing the world's creation, as we now know it, although the results accruing from such agencies may not have had strict and separate recognition in the shape of scientific formulation. That formulation—if not chaotically made to the exclusion of rationality, and definable norm and law—is clear gain, and I should think any form of scientific theism would welcome it. For is it not precisely one of the creational aspects which is verifiable by experience, accustomed as we are to say that Creation is transcendent—as it, no doubt, is—in relation to our experience? Still, such Bergsonian evolutionism, making new creations out of

qualitative emergences, not "given" in what went before, must be recognised as more radical in character than that of Darwin or of Spencer. Development may still be only accessory, not the *prius* of reality. But the real value of the creative aspects is, one must say, that through them do we know God, and not simply feel Him: this is so, because He is always present in His Creation, as essence and idea: Creation is ever alive with God, and without Him would not be. Evolutionary Science may be said to have itself given the thought of theistic evolution—the theistic conception of all cosmic existences, substances, events, as depending upon God—its best base and grounding. But that is more than Bergsonian evolutionism has done. Its vital principle is as far removed from teleology as from mechanical determinism. We are no longer content with religious thought, like that of Greece, that cannot rise to the transcendence of Deity, or find the universe to be the work of a pre-existing Divinity. Nor are we any longer content to think of God's creative agency as merely that of a First Cause, linked to the universe from the outside by innumerable sequences of causes and effects. Theistic Idealism remembers that all created things are, in the words of Voigt, "originally ideas in the Divine Spirit, and ideas related to one another in the unity of a system or plan. By Creation these ideas are realised in the forms of space and time, and are thus made finite and individual beings; but also, through their reciprocal dependence in an order of Nature, they are bound in unity in an universe." We here affirm the dynamic ubiquity of God as efficient energy, and maintain His ubiquity to hold everything in its eternal permanence. We regard Nature in her entirety—vehicle and vesture of living Deity—as being His creation to-day no less than she ever was. We view the energy and wisdom, by which that which was not, *became*, as being, in kind, other than its own. But our Theistic Idealism does certainly not find Royce's mode of viewing "the world in its wholeness," as "an only-begotten son of the central purpose," satisfying, for its emanative conception wears a rather pan-

theistic aspect. This, without taking Creation to connote the impersonal or the lifeless. The religious consciousness, to which we have already adverted, has deeper insight here than any that pertains to science. For it transcends the law of physical continuity presented by science, and views the world as, in Creation, solely the product of directive Divine Intelligence, immanent in the developing universe, with its all-pervading causality. But, if God is thus immanent in the universe, we shall surely find in it traces of His nature and working. Creative evolution is not reality, Bergson-wise: reality is in and behind the evolution. Creation is very far from disproved by evolution, since the latter neither explains the origin of the homogeneous stuff itself, nor accounts for the beginning of motion within it. Evolution presupposes a nature or being which cannot be reduced to a mere series of changes. *Im Anfang war die That*; but there was Reason behind the Will. And the free creative consciousness of the Absolute—a freedom not to be abrogated by our demands of His goodness—we are by no means prepared, as will be seen later, to set in such dependent and incongruous relation to time-duration, as has recently been done in Bergson's theorisings, and in the common notion of an empty time order. Time began only with the creation of finite beings, and in reality the act of creation transcends all time—belongs not to any moment of time. Most futile and pointless, therefore, is the saying of Hartmann—an objection as old as Augustine's day—which Dr James Ward has thought worth quoting, that it was absolutely inconceivable that a conscious God should wait half an eternity, content without a good that ought to be! It is absurd to speak of an eternal and inactive time in the case of a Being for Whom there is no time. Dependent existence is what inevitably leads thought to demand existence which is not dependent. Creation involves our rational and causal dependence upon God, and we have no right to maintain, as has sometimes been done—*e.g.*, by an American writer, A. K. Rogers in his 'Religious Conception of the World'—that we are "essential and original" con-

stituents of God as the Ultimate Reality. It is as false to experience, as it is untrue to religious conception, to suppose the human self no more secondary and derivative, but ultimate even as the Absolute Self. Such an ultimate or unconditioned human self is a monstrous and unthinkable absurdity. Our metaphysic should have no need to lower, or reduce, the Absolute Life, by modes of thought that unwarrantably infringe the absoluteness of His being as God, through absurd deification of man. The same kind of untenable teaching is put forward by Dr Bosanquet, who claims it as an "essential" of the "completeness" of the Supreme Being, that His nature should go out to find "completion" in "finite experience" as its "other" (Bosanquet, 'Individuality and Value,' p. 243). Our theistic idealism finds here two huge and extraordinary assumptions—to me they are grossly anthropomorphic sophisms—first, the need of an "other" to Deity, and, second, that the "other" can "only" be "finite experience." As to the first, it derogates from the character of God, as a unique Being, the Absolute Life, with Aseity—Being *a se* and *in se*—as a characteristic, to make His "completeness" dependent on some "other." As to the second, if He must find His "completeness" in some "other," why can it "only" be in "finite experience"? Hegel himself it is who has said, "God *is*, but is at the same time the Other, the self-differentiating, the Other in the sense that this Other is God Himself." Not that I in the least commit myself to the uses made of the Trinity in this connection, but that I accept still less the grotesque apotheosis of "finite experience." Royce, too, follows this extreme or exaggerated form of thought, even saying that without my experience, as "a unique constituent" of the Divine Life, "God would not be God." To me, "God would not be God," if He were such a dependent and composite Being: this sort of talk, as of a weary Titan, has too much the air of "poor God, with nobody to help Him," and one sighs for the God of the metaphysicians and the theologians, of Whom, and through Whom, and to Whom, are all things. The same sort of thing is found when Laurie besought men

not to "desert God in His difficulty" ('*Synthetica*,' vol. ii. p. 319). A dreary, inefficient Deity, for Whom I care not to conceal my scant respect! Sir Oliver Lodge gives his scientific blessing to this conception of a struggling, finitized Deity.

Neither, I maintain, must we suppose Creation to be so far involved in God's essence as to make the world's creation necessary to Him—a most objectionable form of subordinationism. Rather must we hold, with Aquinas, that "it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself," and that the world's existence is only due to His will or free volitional agency. But of this more presently. Science, which is concerned only with the manner of the process, is obviously in no position to speak of the original creative action, lying, as that does, beyond mortal ken or human observation. The accepted theories of science have not found eternity in the physical creation: they have, in fact, set themselves to account for the genesis of the world. I regard it as philosophically necessary to maintain that God, as the Absolute Being, must find the end of Creation in Himself. If the end were external to, and independent of, Him, then He would be conditioned thereby. There is no force in the speculative objection sometimes preferred, that it would not be consistent with God's absoluteness to give real being to the finite in creation. For it is supposed therein that such being would be not-God, and, as such, His absolute and contradictory antithesis. But such finite being is not self-existent, and independent of God; it is the object of His thought and care, but is not, in its dependence, a contradictory antithesis of Him. There is, however, a self-limitation of Deity involved in Creation, but, if God be God, we cannot deny Him the power to limit Himself, as Ground of the world. Martineau had the merit to shew that this Divine self-limitation was not exercised in a closed and mechanized universe, but amid the free play of contingent history. The religious consciousness maintains God's absolute freedom in creating or producing the universe. Because we maintain this free volition for God, as against any ethical necessitation, or supposed social necessity, in His

inmost nature, it would be a shallow thing to imagine that His Will—the Will of Absolute Reason—must be mere will, or sheer arbitrary exercise of Creative power. But will we maintain, just as it was maintained against the schematisms of Plotinus and Proclus. We may never be able to unveil the secret of Creation, but we can learn to conceive more clearly its possibilities. We can surely think of the Absolute Being, as lord of His own life, in such wise that He can order or control the Divine potencies inherent in Himself so as to form new and infinite combinations unknown to us. Why should He not create world-existences, distinguishing them from Himself, while they depend upon Him, and find in Him their unifying strength and principle? Such world-existences are not, to our theistic idealism, identical with God the Creator, immanent though He is in their life and activity. His absolute freedom over His own potencies must be firmly postulated, absolute as these are in their harmony within His Being. No one has any right to found the world in God's groundless *arbitrium* or mere good pleasure, which would be to make God treat the world in an unethical fashion, as having no reality in itself, and no good or worthy end of its own. If He decrees a world distinct from Himself, it is for moral ends He does so. But this does not entitle us to place Deity in abject and unworthy subservience to any forms of necessitation, that do not preserve inviolate His absolute freedom in Creation. Neo-Hegelian Idealism, as represented by J. Caird, Green, and others, makes the Creation the expression of God's nature or being, not of His will. It is derogatory to make God dependent upon the universe as a means to His own perfection, as though He were marked by deficiency and growth. Applied to the free volitional agency of the Unconditioned Being, such forms of thought are no better than gratuitous anthropomorphisms or pantheistic survivals. We are not going to say that so primary a fact as that of the beginning of the time-worlds—a fact so basal as the world's issuing into being at Divine call—is apprehensible apart from a religious or instinctive faith. As Aquinas said,—“Mundum incoepisse sola fide tenetur, nec

demonstrative sciri potest." But we are going to affirm that, where such a faith does exist, it is really an application—and a truly rational one—of first principles in the highest. We have certainly no direct knowledge of the origin of matter, and the conception of its necessary self-existence—its eternity—is fraught with hopeless difficulties and absurdities. But the eternal dependence of the world upon God we do maintain, and its contingent character, leaving the *onus probandi* with those who affirm matter to be eternal. Dr Wm. G. Ward, in diverging from Aquinas and Liberatore, remarked that, for him, the thesis that all contingent things have a commencement, was more obtrusively axiomatic than the thesis that all contingent things have a cause ('Philosophy of Theism,' vol. i. 319). The non-eternity of matter is no essential affair for theistic thought, to begin with, at any rate. Origen speculatively assumed an eternal or unbeginning activity in God as Creator, not only of our own, but of other worlds, doing so because he thought the Divine Nature must be eternally self-determined to create, in order to the manifestation of its own perfections (see more fully "Origen" in my 'Momenta of Life,' p. 107). More cautiously did Aquinas, to whom reason seemed to require that the world was without beginning, say that we cannot affirm an eternal creation impossible, the creative act not falling within our categories of time and space. To Aquinas God was *sufficiens causa mundi*, and a beginning matter of pure faith. Cousin thought that God of necessity created eternally, and Cousin was thereby in danger of falling into Spinozistic pantheism, by excluding from God absolute freedom in Creation, and identifying Him with the impersonal and unconscious substance of the universe. God is, of course, eternally creatively efficient, but it does not follow that the world is eternal, and without a beginning. William James, in our own time, has placed Deity in a position of unworthy dependence upon an eternal activity of world-making. No rational faith can hold ἔλγ or elemental matter to be the conditioning thing for the world, but only personal spirit or originaive Will. There is certainly noth-

ing inconceivable—as Spencer supposed—in a self-existent Creator having powers and resources within Himself adequate for creative purposes, although we may not be able to define the ways in which Creation is effected. In Neo-Platonism, the idea of the world as a physical or logical necessity of the unfolding of the Divine essence came so far short of the idea of Creation as an act of Divine Will, as to be in sharp antagonism to Christian philosophy. Yet, even in Plotinian thought, there was express idea of superfluity in Deity, a radiation of potencies from the Divinity. In the speculatively interesting and subtle system of Proclus, the world-process is taken to be an emanational development. Thus it was sought to bridge the chasm between God and the world. And the system was not without elements of ingenious objection to the doctrine of Creation. (See my Art. on “Proclus” in ‘Hibbert Journal,’ 1917.) No help is given us by Duns Scotus telling us that creation is *mutatio a non esse ad esse*: the unintelligibility remains. Schelling’s philosophy of nature did not provide for any Creation of objects, in the ordinary sense of creation. The Schellingian pantheism required the identity of the absolute and the creature to be preserved, so that the Absolute must itself enter into the finite, and be immanent in it. The common postulation of an eternal spirit first, then a material world consciously created or produced by it, is by him reversed—matter being to him first, and spirit supervening with growing subjectiveness, until pure and perfect ideality is reached, but such spirit, in this late sense, not being Creator of the world. In this way infinite nature came to objectivize itself in its own perfected works. The Absolute is, in all the real products of nature, identical with these, its products—identical with the material world. The real and the ideal are, in the Absolute, identical; the subject and the object, nature and spirit, are identical in the Absolute; and it is through intellectual intuition that we recognize this identity. For Schelling the function of all philosophy is to evolve nature from intelligence or intelligence out of nature. Hegel showed Schelling’s system of identity to be but logic, and not concerned with reality. In Schelling’s pantheistic con-

ception of Deity, God and the universe are only two sides or aspects of one and the same thing. God becomes an abstraction, and the world is nothing in particular! But the result was too complete, and led to that study of the rise of the finite out of the infinite, and of the phenomenon of evil, which ended in Schelling's acceptance of theism, of Divine Personality, and of real revelation. Modern naturalism is prone to the same tendency to fail of doing justice to Creation, by not interpreting Nature in terms of God. It fails to realise that Nature must be of God, and that, theistically interpreted, Nature can only be conceived as subject to law. There is something peculiarly irrational in the idea that any principle of becoming or development can take the place of God. The pantheism which is to be dreaded is that which foists on us the unsubstantiality of the human spirit, for any real and thoroughgoing pantheism would finally be merged in the idealistic theism for which I now contend. To any real and true pantheism, there can be no deadness, no inertness, but everywhere the mighty and facile tides of life, personality, consciousness, wherein God is all. Creationism still holds the field, for it is sheer blindness not to see that our inability to know what Creation is like, is no argument against its reality. Creation is the world's dependence upon God.

The theory of the eternity of matter seems put out of Court by the latest scientific views as to the dissipation of energy, notwithstanding Dr Ward's efforts to minimise arguments that make for the world's finitude. Creation does not come from nothing: the phrase "from nothing" is an antiquated and meaningless one: the universe comes from God. It is a case of—*Ex Aliquo aliquid fit*. The positive world is a willed, affirmed, and purposed world. Erigena held God's causal relation to precede the world in the idea, not in time. We are not entitled to suppose the world made out of nothing, and then to proceed, like Erigena, to identify this "nothing" with the essence of God. It will be seen that Erigena took creation to be involved in God's own essence. What we are really entitled to maintain is, that what God creates or calls into being owes its existence to His volition or will alone, that

being the Ground of all actualities. The world is nothing but the positive affirmation of the Absolute Being Whom we call God: the affirmation of God is the creation of existences. The Creation is not, therefore, so great a difficulty as the being of the Creator, Whom we can speak of only under the self-contradictory idea of *causa sui*. The categories connected with this Primal Being constitute the gravest difficulties of Theism, and our God-conception is conditioned, of course, by the Creation, which is not to say that this form of God-consciousness is never, in our highest experience, over-passed. How to connect this Primal Being with the created world—how to prove such Being a personal Cause, willing the world in freedom—is a graver task, than to seek metaphysical origin and basis for the world of contingent being. Creation is God's free act: creative decree is eternal; but its effect not necessarily so. If we assume Creation not to have been eternal, but an effect of personal Will, we must then relate it to no abstract forms of Being, but to a concrete Absolute of such infinite fulness that He may well be the fount of efficient energy to the universe. The universe, to our instinctive conviction, has been caused, even if we do not imply either transeunt or immanent causality in the empirical sense; its existence must have some Ground; even if we held a philosophy so idealistic as to make the scheme of created things one grand illusion, we should still need an explanatory Cause of an illusion so vast. But, in Creation, God, out of His own potencies, calls the universe, as Aquinas said, "according to its whole substance," into being; but He so calls it as an expression of His Absolute Reason, working under the limiting forms of space and time, causality and finite personality. Creation thus becomes a system of conditioned Divine activities—the result of self-expression and self-limitation. His title to both of these it is too late in the day to justify. Creation affords the possibility of perfect interaction between the Creator and the creature, but it does not necessarily make the universe perfect. The largest possible self-determination of dependent being—its freedom and individuality—has, for one thing, to be provided for.

It is, therefore, absurd for Mill to suppose that Creation can only be taken as the work of a perfect Creator, when the powers of the creature shall be found to be perfect, for we do not know anything of the way in which being is made, but do know the necessity for the universe being progressive. We know that the beginnings of motion, of life, and of consciousness, are hid in the creative activity of immanent Deity, which is some satisfaction to our rational natures, in view of the blurred and broken outlines of His working which are all that science has been able to give us. We cannot be content with the causal category, under which He so called the world into being, without pressing on to the teleological category, whereby He is assumed to have created with a purpose—with archetypal ends or ideals to be realised. Creation implies choice and intention. The idea of creation has, in Bergson, been merged into that of growth. But the concept of evolution has, in our view, been proved harmonious with creative end, plan, purpose, ordering, guidance; and it is a gross exaggeration, due to mechanical modes of thinking, to say that no real creation of the universe, as made known by science, seems possible. Everything is not so fixed and determined, as has sometimes been said; the permanence of phenomena is a permanence of change; the actuality of phenomena means transmutation; and making every welcome for scientific fact and natural law, we may still ask what is this Necessity, save an empty shadow of the mind's own throwing? The necessity is rational, not blind; behind it is Reason, Mind, or Spirit. Even in world-necessity, or in regular succession of events or phenomena, there is Divine Reason immanent. Reason, the great reality in us, is also the great reality behind the universe. Spencer has well shewn evolution to mean the union of differentiation with integration: the directivity involved in evolution is of essential importance: the connection of the notion of evolution with the concept of causality is here of great significance. For the causal relation will, under the concept of evolution, assume always more the form of continuous process wherein later results are determined by

earlier. In such process or series of events, new totalities take progressive rise. But we shall see Spencer's grave defect in this connection later on. Meantime, I note that there is, to our theistic idealism, not the slightest difficulty in accepting the palæontological and embryological sequences of evolutionary process.

I now pass to remark the absurd position of those who make a difficulty about Creation, because God is supposed to be infinite before the creation of the world, and is no more than infinite after it. Surely it might be seen that God's infinitude exists quite irrespectively of the world; that the world's existence does not touch His infinitude; that quantitative measurement has no applicability to things of the Spirit. It is the *en bloc* theory of Creation that must be kept out of the mind: "the progressiveness of Theism"—its evolutionary character—was the main thesis of my volume on the 'Recent Advances in Theistic Philosophy of Religion' (Blackwood, 1897). That the world must be a rational and systematic unity does not keep the unity from being a very progressive realisation, and not the unity merely of mechanical structure, apart from relations to, or actings of, minds. Not a mere logical principle or concept of Creation can content us, for mere intelligent conception must be supplemented by appeal to actual creation, with its manifest and perpetual drifts towards development, and its teleological successes in the creative formation of organic beings adapted to the medium in which they are found. What Theistic Idealism is in recalcitrant mood to admit is, that the creative sanction or inscrutable formative power or stress, in the whole evolutionary ascent, has been exercised or wielded without underlying ethical element, intent, or process, for the hidden work of God in the world, its origins, and developments, is the express and distinctive postulation of the theistic hypothesis. This while the *amoral* aspects or stages of His appearance only in terms of nature-powers are, of course, freely admitted, but admitted as appearance, not the full reality. But His working in the world becomes most visible—and morally as well as metaphysically satisfying—as He is

manifested in human experience and concerns. So far is God from being first conceived *in abstracto*, that it is really from His effects and workings in Nature that we rise at length to conceive Him as the Supreme Power and Creative Spirit. Creation is not without its logic and its method, hence the world, as it shall be, is being in some sort determined by the world that now is. For, as a French writer has remarked, "the true synonym for evolution is not change but permanence." In the whole flux of created being, God is the one changeless Ultimate, doing whatsoever Eternal Substance may be said to do, whether by Spinoza or by Haeckel. Immanent in Nature, for ever "making all things new," the living Deity is not confined to Bergsonian duration, but inhabiteth Eternity. Reality is to our Idealism, therefore, a Single System, in which the infinitude and absoluteness of Deity are compatible with His creative activity.

Of the created world, as it appears to science, in the august splendour of its method, order, law, and co-ordinated harmonies, it would be fatuous and absurd to say that it has no meaning for intelligence. Spencer declared it to have within it an energy infinite and eternal, "from which all things proceed." But the working of that eternal power or energy is intelligible, its inner unity being seen in the conformity to law, and why, therefore, may we not speak of an eternal Intelligence? Accepting the whole account of the world's evolution at the hands of science, through all its increasing differentiations, and its distributions and re-distributions of matter and motion, we may still ask, what there is of irrationality in taking the vast activity involved to be purposive, or even in holding that there is a Divinity that shapes Earth's intelligible ends, rough-hewn as Nature will? As for life, there is no need for attempting to derive it from inorganic matter, since it is enough to take it as having been implicit in world-existence, or as one explicit form of the world-manifestations of the Power that underlies all existence. The inorganic and the organic, in their reciprocal relations, that is to say, the transforming systems of physics and the evolving systems of biology, form one

world-process, under immanent rational principle. And how shall we postulate less than the One Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed, for that conscious life which, as Höffding says, is made up of presentation, preservation, recognition, all combined in the unity of experience? Thus, when we come back to the universe in whole, we find all our idealisms too small for a Creation, whose process is far from complete, and nothing can be more needful or wholesome than for us to recognise this fact. If we take Creation to mean a theistic evolution, we may not then forget how much of His immeasurable fulness the Deity may yet have to give the progressive world. Neither may we forget that, proceed as we may along the lines of matter and of mind, wherein we exhaust the possibilities of experience, we never know of a surety that we have really got down to the bed-rock of Primal Being. Cosmological philosophy must still do its best to interpret for us that continuous totality which we call the created world, as upon our hands here and now. That world is no ceaseless flux without relation to an enduring Ground: the last and most enduring thing is nothing but the eternal creative action of God. The world is His correlate, in that He is the active Cause or Ground of its whole connectedness. The whole possibilities and potencies of the finite world are to be found in Him as Creator, without His thereby losing His absoluteness. He wills the world in its evolutionary development, and gives it, in its divine createdness, a certain independence, without Himself entering into the spatial and temporal forms of its finitude. God is the unifying activity in all the world-potencies: His works do not follow Him, for He is ever in them, while not measured by them. As Creator, He is the producing Cause of the world and its ever-active Ground. If He takes not the forms of this world's finitude, He is yet by no means so unrelated to the world that it, in all its real and vast development, becomes for Him a mere superfluous appearance. So far from that, He has established the world in living intercourse and relation with Himself. Hence the unlikeness of our Theistic Idealism to the method of Bergson's philosophy,

which seeks the essential nature of all things apart from its relations to experience, with the result of a mere tendency, and that too abstract and irrational. His flux, no doubt, "forms a single whole," as he says, and there is a "unity of the impulse," but we are still unequal to the rational strain of having creation thrust upon us without a Creator. He boasts his Deity "has nothing of the already made": is a mere fluxional product God? Bergson's philosophy, it is said, transcends experience, but is founded upon it; but, at any rate, it cannot be satisfactory to Theistic Idealism—or indeed to any real forms of theism—to have the idea of God left to disengage itself, if it can, in any way it may, and never, in any shape, explicitly recognised, in the theorisings. Reality, which is not without its negative side, is broader than being; though the Heraclitean intuition has always leant towards the negative side, yet justice must be done to the fluxional aspects; what Theistic Idealism is concerned for is that our inveighings against "static categories" be not so overweighted that, in the ebb and flow of being, all due and proper sense is lost to us of the reality, abidingness, and eternity of the Creator, more real than all or any of the things that have been made. For the flux or becoming is no such real and unconditional thing as is sometimes represented, and we are still brought to the invisible things of God through the things that do appear—even to His eternal power and Godhead, Whose eternal self-revelation Creation is.

From God, as Ground of the world's possibility, we pass, in the fact of Creation, to a change in God, by reason of the forth-putting of His creative activity. In Creation he is, as we have seen, supra-temporal, but, by the Creation, He comes into immediate relation to man, and to the world in which He is immanent, without thereby losing Himself in it. It cannot be said that God is unrelated to time, or to change, which, as shewn in another chapter, is indispensable to a time-world. The time-changes God must certainly know; but it is another thing to throw the Divine unchangeableness overboard without more ado, because to us, in our time-world, no mind is conceivable which does not "imply states

of consciousness that change." The other Divine attributes are equally unknown to our experience, but not therefore inconceivable. Whatever God's knowledge of time-changes, He is not subject to time-process. When it is said that "an absolutely identical consciousness is not conceivable," and would be "without religious value" if it existed, are we not in danger of philosophical dogmatism by introducing gratuitous anthropomorphisms where they can ill be pressed? Is it so easy to make the absoluteness of Deity comport with a ready susceptibility to the world of time and change? Because, as Creator, God enters into relation to the finite world, is it necessary that He enter into spatial and temporal forms? As absolute, He can place no such limits to Himself; the temporal forms, factors, processes, are nowise unreal, illusory, or indifferent, to Him, since He oversees and grounds them all. From the world-essence He still stands distinguished, for we have not yet come to a monism so thoroughgoing as to be able to dispense with the transcendent. We must hold to God as an immutable and self-identical Being: the facts of human change, growth, and history, are all real for His knowledge; but, for all that, the range of His knowledge is absolute, embracing the present and the possible: whatever changes in His knowledge we may, in a sense, intelligibly speak of, His character as the Unchangeable is to be maintained—His self-identity to be upheld as One in Whom is no mutation. This self-identity is ethical in character, end, and purpose, in relation even to change and mutation, and it is this identicalness of the Eternal Consciousness which we are concerned to maintain, precisely for its higher values, ethical and religious. It is in this ethical self-identity that God's Immutability is to be found, so that He can neither fall nor fail. But such an ethical Immutability is the very guarantee of His maintaining a relation of living interest in the historic world, albeit His own supra-historical life is to be preserved. One of the most explicit of various German endeavours to modify the too exclusively metaphysical view of God's unchangeableness was that made by the elder Dorner in an elaborate Paper

in his 'Gesammelte Schriften' (Berlin, 1883). He retained, however, hold on God's ethical Immutability as the reason whereby the conception of God's unchangeableness could be modified, but much of our religious philosophy, failing in this grasp, escapes not a distinctly anthropopathic tendency. If we are to maintain a vital relation of God to the world of space, time, and history, we shall only find such a relation intelligible and satisfying, as we apprehend it as due to God's being ethically immutable. This, while we still hold that Creation has meant no essential change in God, Whose externalisations in Creation neither add to, nor subtract from, His unchangeable and infinite Power and Being.

Theistic Idealism holds to God as Creator, and does not, like Greem after Hegel, count the world as necessary to God as He is to the world. Since the world is willed by Him, it is not so. If it were so, we should have two absolutes, or a pure pantheism. Theistic idealism does not regard matter or the external world as knowable apart from mind: mind is for it the ultimate reality: since the universe in whole cannot materially exist apart from mind, theistic idealism infers a universal Mind—the same which we call God—for which the whole world-system exists. He is its logical *prius*. Our idealism dare not say that things do not exist apart from mind, but it does affirm that this is practically so, that is, so far as they have any known, significant, or intelligible being for us. When, to the thought of God as the universal Mind behind the universe, Theistic Idealism links the cosmological grounds for viewing Him as the absolute Causality, it finds in God the underlying Ground of the world, and the Source and Ultimate support of ourselves and our experience. For, touching this latter consideration, our idealism takes the notion of causality to spring from the knowledge of our rational and volitional being, and so runs the highest forms of Causality back, idealistically, to Ultimate Mind. Theistic Idealism clearly perceives the deep union or oneness of the two principles we have been considering, that of Reason or Thought, and that of Causation; for it finds the rational connection of things, in all Causation, to be precisely due to

the ever-present and ceaselessly operative Reason or Thought of the world. But, because Theistic Idealism desires its idealism to be effective, it is careful to maintain the importance of the created or external world for our idealism, as more than merely subjective, in the manner shewn throughout the present work. This, while the world is, to our idealistic metaphysics, no fixed, mechanical, and determinate whole, but an indefinitely elastic and infinitely expansive fact.

Even so early as Augustine, the world's preservation was taken to import a continuous Creation. Spinoza, with his *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, sought to restore God as the omnipresent Life of the world, which had for him neither beginning nor end. Lotze has taken the will to create as an absolutely eternal predicate of God, significant not so much of a deed of His, as of the absolute dependence of the world upon His will. Lipsius has regarded it as a sensuous representation to trace Creation back to a single past act, rather than refer it to the whole world-development. But all these views, and the like, cast for us no light on the nature of the Divine Creative activity. The secret of Creation we may not be able to unveil, but we need not be too summary and impatient in a field so barren of theory or fruitful suggestion, when theory or suggestion appears. Prof. A. Dorner, for example, founding on the Schellingian doctrine of *potence*, has spoken of Creation as the passing out into actuality of the potencies, or powers (*potenz*), which dwell in the Divine Nature as a living unity, at the instance of the Divine Will. Now, the theory is a suggestive one, whether one would care to adopt it or not. Easy criticisms of it (as by Dr Galloway) as verbal more than real, or of time-difficulties and the like, become pointless, or at least fall largely away, to any one who has made any full and careful study of Schelling's ingenious and suggestive teachings about the potencies or powers, or of the real difficulties involved. I shall only set down a few points of interest connected therewith, so far as theistic thought is concerned. Schelling stands for a personal Deity, before and above any

actual world. His Deity is the Absolute Personality from the unbeginning beginning, and does not stand in need of the world. There are, on Schelling's view, potencies or powers in God by means of which such oppositions as individual and universal, will and reason, nature and spirit, may be explained. But the potencies or powers are so bound in unity in God Himself, that He is lord over His own potencies, even if one is tempted to think it just a little troublesome, in Schelling's hands, to secure this lordship. Despite this unity, however, but without loss to the Divine harmony, these potencies form new combinations in the world, which is grounded in Deity. Schelling thinks in this process to account for any irrationality and empiric imperfection in the world. He hopes to determine the relations of nature and spirit in such wise that their opposition shall be overcome, and they shall be reduced to harmony, without violence being done to either. Spirit is, for him, given in personality. Nature is the full appearance of spirit. Nature and spirit are to him an harmonious unity. But God is not identified either with nature or with finite spirit. They are both grounded in the Absolute—the mechanism of nature and the ethical activity of spirit alike. In this relation, things are different "potencies," and the sum of all the "potencies" is the absolute Totality. To be lord over one's existence is, for Schelling, the idea of personality. God has been lord over all existence from all eternity, even though Schelling is concerned with the objective evolution of the Absolute. The possibility of the world was, as yet, hid in God, and had no actuality. If He was moved to create, it was not on His own account, nor for any necessity of either logical or physical character; for Schelling has regard for the ethical category of liberty. God is immediate and absolute existence; has, that is to say, aseity; or, exists in *actu puro existentie*. Such existence does not, of necessity, require the idea of *potence*, but the inclusion of the idea of *potence* is required for the full Schellingian idea of God. Unrealised potentiality in Deity has been claimed by some as necessary to power infinite. Potence is thus,

a real and no verbal affair, but seems meant rather to realise the world than to realise potentialities in Deity. Potence presents to existence the possibility of other, or what may be called accidental, existence, which that which eternally exists may choose to call into being. This possible volition brings being to its highest, renders it lord of its own existence, actual and potential. For nature and spirit there is an union of the real and the ideal "potencies." If Schelling speaks of an overthrow of the "potencies," that is because the Deity wishes to retain, as against outer opposedness, the lordship of being, and lead the potencies back to higher unity in Himself. For the potencies come to be, in actuality, outside each other, even antithetical to each other. It need not be a matter of time-difficulty at all, for the Deity—whose being has its reality *tota simul*—sees from all eternity all this capability of being, in virtue of His volition. For it is really, in Schelling's view, will which is first and supreme, not blind existence. More elaborate, no doubt, is Schelling's exposition than always clear or satisfying, but it is certainly more stimulating than the commonplace attitude of barring out thought upon the subject altogether. From the relation of potency to actuality in the theory, one may, theistically, infer the transcendent activity of the Absolute Personality to be the final explanation of the world. It is the unity of being and becoming—of Creator and Creature—which such theorising seeks, in spite of every difficulty and objectionable feature, to conserve, to make rational or intelligible, and for this it may well be allowed a certain meed of praise. I shall revert to this presently.

The Bergsonian theory of creative evolution, touched on at the beginning of this chapter, is also to be allowed the merit of at least stimulating thought on the creative problem. But Theistic Idealism does not find anything very constructive in telling us that there is a centre whence worlds spring forth; that God has done nothing; that He is incessant life, action, liberty; that Creation is no mystery, but an action that grows as it advances, creates as it

progresses; and that we experience it in ourselves from the moment in which we act freely. What Theistic Idealism believes is, that the transcendent, personal Deity sustains, as immanent ground, the whole ascent of the human race, informs and guides the total world-movement and process, and from Bergsonian source, it has received no philosophical support or direction. A momentous issue, for, as Gratry once said: "We approach God, and *we are more*; we depart from Him, and *we are less*." In such a statement as that Bergson has given, there is no insight like that which led Aquinas to say, *Deus operatur in omni operante*—"God operates in every operative being"; nor like that which led Plato to say, in the *Timaeus*, that all which becomes must needs have an author who is the cause of its becoming. As for the possible existences of our earlier statement, on the Schellingian potencies, no time-difficulty really emerges when it is kept in mind that all being is due to Divine action, apart from which possible being has no existence. The supposed time-interval between possibility and actuality is seen to be purely imaginary. The purely possible had, for Aristotle, no existence: its actuality marks no real change. It is no question here of development in Deity, but of the intelligibility of the creative evolution of the world. In a similarly suggestive manner, the Scholastics distinguished between God's power as absolute and as regulated (*potentia Dei absoluta et ordinata*), the latter signifying restriction to what He had decreed. There is no contradiction in the idea of an eternal decree to create in time. In the externalisations of the Divine power in Creation, nothing, as I have already hinted, is added to, or subtracted from, the infinite power and perfection of Deity. The God of Creation, from Whom the world and all its good derive, is a God Whose personality involves infinite perfections, but is not a Being engaged in pure *θεωρία* or everlasting self-contemplation. It may be that we must, with Lotze, "simply acknowledge" the created world "as a fact without being able to fathom the manner of its production," or make the "final surrender" to mystery

or unthinkable, of Dr Ward; but it does not seem to me good to take the refuge in mystery too blindly or too soon: we are ourselves not so ignorant of Creative power or activity, as if we were merely created and not creators, in our own way and measure; at anyrate, philosophy should be the last, at all times, to proscribe the speculative impulse in man. Every suggestion should be welcomed which in any way lessens for us the incomprehensibility of the mystery of Creation. When we have left behind the unreal, dead, mechanical notion of Creation as bare independent existence in time, and have viewed it as progressive, continuous, vital, and organic—a giving and sustaining of life; we must remember it is creation *for*, as well as creation *by*—creation, as a temporal process grounded in creation as an eternal process, if we may be allowed so to express it. Our knowledge of the Eternal Creator is thus as Eternal or Absolute Spirit, by and through Whom all things exist, but not as by any mechanico-fatalistic necessity, nor in any form of mechanico-pantheistic identity. Our knowledge of Him is as the concrete unity of Absolute Intelligence and Power, and our knowledge of the cosmical creation is that of something unlimited and unconditioned, save by the Absolute Creative Spirit. Creation has its crown and its completion only in man's consciously self-determining spirit. The universe, in whole, is the embodiment of the Divine Will, on which its continuance depends, and the old imaginings of created matter as a chaotic basis for the operations of metaphysical Mind are utterly discarded. From such external modes of conception, it is helpful to fall back on the sense of our being self-creative—each of us, in his measure, *causa sui*—in virtue of our capacity of self-determination. Such a sense or notion of self-creation lends itself more helpfully to the conception of a Creator-Spirit, whose action is immanent as well as transcendent. The Absolute, as Lotze remarks, is not located “in some remote region of extended space, and separated from the world of its creations”; “its indivisible unity, omnipresent at every point, would fill this space as well as others”; “the process, by which things that

possess a life and soul are formed," may be viewed as "something unusual and superior"; but the presence of the Absolute "is no less the basis necessarily implied in the most insignificant interaction of any two atoms"; "the Absolute is indivisibly present with the whole inner wealth of its nature" in each "particular spot" ('Metaphysic,' vol. ii. pp. 183-184). We should need this teaching of Lotze to glorify and illuminate the teaching of Bergson that change is the hidden substance of the world, and that such change is creative growth, which is hindered by matter. Matter, however, which is but the pure flux of dynamic energy, is subdued or vanquished by life, with its "immensity of potentiality." Plotinus stands nearer to Lotze than this Bergsonian teaching, when he makes the unbeginning and unending universe created only in the sense of being the permanent act or image of the Universal Soul, which soul is an indivisible, non-corporeal essence, present as a whole in each of its parts or faculties. Although, as we have seen, the Scholastics swallowed up potentiality in actuality—making form in God His Essence, according to their proposition, *Idea in Deo est ejus essentia*—and although God is not subject to time, yet the place and the meaning of the potencies are not to be denied in the creative evolution under, or within, Time. The *sub specie temporis* aspect has its real, though relative, truth and value, as we come to know the Creator by and in the things He has made. Modern stress on dynamism and creative evolution should not keep us, as it so often does, from realising that all the *becoming* aspects are really complementary to those of *being*, these together making, in a higher unity, the one Reality. It is being itself which becomes: and it becomes just because it is being. The creative evolution is the result of an ineffable collaboration of the Creator and the creature. But in our modern flux theories no real permanence is allowed—neither to things nor to the ego, save as these are an artificial construction of abstract intellect. But if every moment is to be held a new creation, there should be no knowledge of the anterior moment: if the

fleeing present is the sole creation, there can be no knowledge of the possibility of the past, nor any memory of the same. Just as little knowledge will there be, in such a case, of that purposiveness which is the central core of theistic belief in creation. The reality of the free creative deed lies in its purpose. For the Creation demands a Deity, Who is no mere almighty spectre, Whose creative Will calls into being only world-substances and natural laws or causes, but a Being Who is the guarantee and reconciliation of all the values—æsthetic and ethical. For the unity of all the different values must mark the created world—whether these values be natural, æsthetical, ethical, or spiritual—as willed by the Creator. It is in the mutual relation of its parts that the value of the world, in whole, is to be found. For none of these singly—nothing single as such—has value. Value belongs to relation. Creation realises its value through the vast evolutionary or developmental process. Even those who do not take so idealistic a view as to regard all reality as spiritual may yet, with Mr Hobhouse, believe “that there is a spiritual element integral to the structure and movement of Reality,” and that evolution is “the process by which this principle makes itself master of the residual conditions which at first dominate its life and thwart its efforts.” But whether the non-spiritual elements are satisfactorily accounted for by Mr Hobhouse, in his apparent dread of “Creation” by “an unconditioned Mind,” I do not stay to inquire. For Theistic Idealism, the Givenness and Reality of God are fundamental. In speaking of the values of development, Münsterberg tells us that “nothing is simplified,” from the naturalistic standpoint, “even when the hypothesis of a purposive intelligence of God is posited at the beginning of things” (*‘The Eternal Values,’* p. 266). No will, not even that of Deity, it is further said, “wills anything as soon as it has entered the system of nature” (*Ibid.*, p. 266). From the standpoint of Theistic Idealism, this is a “logically reckless”—to use a phrase of his own—way of talking. The theistic hypothesis does not posit purposive intelligence “at

the beginning of things" in this purely Deistic way: it never regards Divine power or intelligence as withdrawn from the created world, in a merely naturalistic development. The Creative Will is never expunged from "the system of nature": so far from that, to Theistic Idealism, the universe is now, and always, the organised expression of the indwelling and ever-present will of its Sustainer. It was only the rationality of this Will of the universe that Schopenhauer failed to grasp, and the truncated anthropomorphism of Münsterberg is worse than that of Hartmann. Theistic Idealism fully recognises the fundamental values of development and purpose for evolutionary science, but it will have nothing to do with the fundamental absurdity of a developing Deity, rather than one eternally self-existent and complete. It derives the world from Deity, and has not the faintest intention to seek a Deity that is only derived from the world—the world imperfect, unfinished, incomplete. It does not even follow Dr Ward, in whose cosmology of theism the pluralist alternative is "prior," "simpler," "adequate," "preferable," after which the announcement is suddenly shot upon us that, for all the time and facts, the theistic hypothesis has been, nevertheless, adequate! ('Realm of Ends,' pp. 260-262). Dr Ward puts the difficulty of understanding Creation on the same plane as understanding God, a wrong contention, as we have seen, the Primal Being in His relation to the created world being, in my view, a distinctly graver task than merely to seek origin and basis for a world of contingent being (*Ibid.*, pp. 245 and 232). The measure of Dr Bosanquet's capacity for doing justice to Theism may be seen in his talk of "a theistic Demiurge, in his blankness and isolation" ('Individuality and Value,' p. 133). A philosopher adds nothing to our light or his own claim to intellectual respect by thus espousing the language of the ignorant or unthinking. Not out of "blankness," but of the absolute fulness of His own Essence, does the creative power of Deity exert itself, whether in respect of form or of substance. The true "isolation" of the world-forming

Deity, or "Demiurge," is not apprehended, until it is seen to consist in His being the one absolutely self-originated Being, with all that this implies for issues of causality. His unity, as that of the *ens a se* or necessary Being, is undivided and indivisible, through all creative processes. Hence our treatment already suggests the activist nature of reality as the world is taken to be an immanent causal order or World-Will, in the theistic sense. This, without keeping God, as its Creator, from being transcendent to such world. Such transcendent Deity is guarantee of a living God within a living world, in which He is not differentiated, nor apportioned, nor dissipated. Nor is the self-limitation of Deity involved in creating the creaturely world an external one, so great after all, seeing He is their *ratio essendi*. But His relations to us, set up in Creation, guarantee that we be not simply absorbed in the Eternal One. I think Dr Ward errs in starting from, and emphasising so strongly, the bare Many, as all we have at first; and I am more in agreement with Bradley, who holds the One is there from the first. In both cases, the confident emphasis is to me somewhat extreme, but, so far as Theism is concerned, I think it obtains greater truth and justice in Bradley's position. The One is thereby much more surely attainable, and its attainment must not be left in doubt. These sharp antitheses as to starting-point should not be allowed to obscure the slowness of the developmental progress towards perfect grasp of the One. Pure, clear, and coherent theistic thought of the One is no swift and easy product, even if we postulate some sense of the One as present from the beginning. I say this in full view of the sudden intellectual developments of our time, no less than of the slowly formed and imperfect monotheism so often characteristic of particular minds and of some masses. Obviously, any initial sense of the One must be no mere abstraction, but have experiential footing, else it would be a negation of the world of concrete experience. But I think we are justified in holding to a background of "felt totality," as Bradley phrases it, which is certainly not an ignoring of the world of real ex-

perience. Indeed, this is only doing justice to the ontological consciousness, and to the rights of the theistic hypothesis, in the spirit of Goethe's words, that "man must abide by the belief that the incomprehensible is comprehensible, or else he would cease to investigate." Dr Ward seems to take a too early refuge in the inexplicable here, though he does not so readily shrink from the much more justifiable declinature of a psychology of the Eternal. His claim for the freedom of the Absolute Being does not seem very consistent or well-supported by his own contentions. He says—"A God that was not a Creator, a God Whose creatures had no independence, would not Himself be really a God" ('Realm of Ends,' p. 241). So far well; but it is he who has also said that "if Creation means anything, it means something so far involved in the Divine essence" that we are entitled to say that "without the world God is not God." That I regard as an entirely unwarranted assumption. The God that would not be God if His "creatures" had no "independence," is now so little possessed of "independence" of His own that, "without the world" He is not God! The necessitation in the Divine nature or "essence" is a purely gratuitous and unwarranted substitution for the free volitional agency of Deity. His contention, too, that creation is not a causal dependence is quite untenable, the difference from ordinary causation being too much a merely verbal affair. Theistic Idealism does not regard any world, as dependent upon God, as His creation, which is not orderly and obedient to law. But it knows that the world, however thus apparently sufficient unto itself, is, on the religious view, dependent for its order and its law upon God, Who is not of the world, but above it. It is not, and never has been, the view of theistic philosophy that the world is "involved in the Divine essence," for that is only a pleasant heresy of sundry modern thinkers who wish to deify the world in which they live. It would be quite absurd to hold it contrary to reason that the world and its phenomena could be conceived as non-existent; the world is no such necessary world as is claimed for it when it is bound up in the bundle of Divine Life or Essence.

What all really theistic philosophy does hold is, that the contingent nature of the world points, cosmologically, and for the satisfaction of reason, to a necessary ground and basis of its existence. The essence of the world's creation lies, for Theistic Idealism, in the fact that God's infinite Being, His *ἀτίδιος δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης*, is reflected in it, and stamped upon it. The world of time and space has its foundation of life and existence, therefore, in the eternal transcendent God, and, for that very reason, the eternal and omnipresent Deity is ever in the world, and actively operative within the same. This immanent presence and energy is a manifestation of His absoluteness, so far are we from finding the world to be a limit for that absoluteness.

It may be here noted how little Lotze has done to help the interpretation of Creation, which, in his hands, takes a pantheistic sense. Leaving aside "the process by which it was brought about," and regarding it "as having taken place," he seeks to explain the world in its concrete determination out of God ('*Mikrokosmos*,' Eng. ed., vol. ii. pp. 700-703). The most suitable expression for Creation, in Lotze's view, is that the world is willed by God, "Whose Will is identical with the result or consequence, a Will which is reality itself." The Mosaic account of the Creation is, for Lotze, "sublimar than any other, because it represents as forthwith existing what the Deity willed to be" ('*Mikrokosmos*,' vol. i. p. 6). There is no thought, in Lotze, of a rise of the world out of the concept of the Creation: the word Creation receives a pantheistic sense. For God's creating the world comes to mean, God is the world; it is, while He creates or wills it. The Divine will and thought are the immediate being of the world. Indeed, in the "*Kleine Schriften*," Lotze holds not a real, but only an ethical world, to be derivable from God. It is the metaphysic of Lotze that leads to pantheistic result, for every event is to pantheism only an event of the World-Ground, to which individual event is of no significance. His philosophy of religion, on the other hand, set out theistic representations, and between the two sets of elements the thought of Lotze

oscillates. It should be credited to him, for all that, that he sought to avoid externality, and to secure vitality, not realising sufficiently, however, that for theistic knowledge, God must be set over against the world in its objectivity, as we are wont to set ourselves over against things. In the metaphysic of Lotze, the fundamental position is that the world is a unity: there is for him no severance of the world and the Absolute, which latter is the ground and conditioning power of all things, so that the world and the Absolute come to mean, for him, one and the same thing. This result is not without pantheistic influence on his thought, even in the sphere of the philosophy of religion. The infinite substance or all-embracing essence he, no doubt, endeavours to treat as the highest, investing it with spirituality and the greatest ethical value, but it is impossible to bring a consistent and satisfactory issue out of such an admixture of theistic and pantheistic elements. These he has not succeeded in harmonising, though there can hardly be doubt that his thought and feeling were preponderatingly theistic. The concept of Creation, in some sort, must, in the view of Theistic Idealism, be held against every form of abstract pantheism. Yet for it, too, must remain the question, declared by Schopenhauer to be the oldest and most difficult in philosophy, namely, how can the unity appear in the multiplicity, or the "Manyness"? There must be no treating the apparent manifoldness as though it were in any way non-existent; but neither must there be forgetfulness of the fact that unity spells connectedness; the particularity and independence of individual being, as found in Creation, can only be relative, not absolute. Everything in Creation is inseparably bound to God; everything, in being so bound to the Absolute, is bound to each other; Creation is thus a path that leads to God, the absolute and self-existent Personality Who is its condition and its ground, according to the fundamental postulate of all theistic philosophy. The unitary and organic character of the Cosmos, so grounded in self-existent Personality, is to be maintained, for personality is the only form of organic unity known to us. For the purposes of knowledge, our own personality, though inside

the Cosmos, must be taken as subject, and the universe, in its objectivity and transcendence,—though conceived as an organic and dynamic system,—must be viewed as outside us—as non-ego. It cannot but be a significant fact, for our philosophy of Nature, that, in taking the Originator and Law-giver of the world to be God, we are taking the highest Moral Power to be its Author; for this means that moral reason is not merely in morals, but is in Nature. Nor can it be anything but a significant fact, for our philosophy of Man, that while we take him—Creation's crown and terminal fact—to be the work of God, like the rest of the world, in respect of his bodily being and certain powers, we yet find his *differentia* in the possession of a pneuma, which is as a breath of God, an efflux of the Divinity. Something higher than creationist idea enters in the case of Man as made in the "image" of God. The taproot of pantheism is to be found in man's relation to God, and in these higher considerations we help keep man a true *ens individuum*. I do not here dwell on the subject, to which further reference will be made on the chapter on "Immortality." It is more germane to the subject I have in hand to note that when Dr Wildon Carr, in his finely lucid treatment of the "philosophy of change," talks of the notions of a reality which creates and which is free; of change as the reality of a new creation; and of a crude undeveloped Deity Whose development is only being wrought out in a universe which He has called forth, and of which He is the principle—a Deity of Whose Being we are parts, and of Whose activities we are instruments—he is giving us a representation which is at least quite antithetical to the whole Christian idea of Creation, and which will not be sustained by sound philosophy. The aseity of God is here set aside: the creation of the Cosmos is not here properly determined by the Divine Will, acting in absolute freedom, as its Ultimate Cause: there is present the fallacious and anthropomorphic notion of the Divine Nature as being modified by His objective thought or act relative to the Creation: the infinite is dragged into finite and dependent conditions, without anything being the more accounted for: to Theistic

Idealism this Deity wears too much the cast of a mere universal proliferation, and the creature shares His Being, as a "part" of Him, in a fashion too nearly pantheistic to be satisfactory. Dr Carr inveighs against Calvinism, which I reject as thoroughly as he does in any form in which it means bare unethicised sovereignty; but Calvinism is a small concern, if freedom is only to be nature-freedom—"a formidable impulsion"—or if power and freedom have been all transferred to man and the universe, leaving us with a Deity dependent and unfree. If "the final refutation" of Calvinism has come, it assuredly never came from "the philosophy of change"—which could by no possibility effect it—but from an improved ethical philosophy. To Theistic Idealism, it is quite meaningless for Dr Carr to speak of "a God for Whom all is already made," or "to Whom all is given": no theistic philosopher to-day but holds the universe to be unfinished and progressive, not "already made"; and there is inherent contradiction in supposing "all is given" to One Who is, on the theistic hypothesis, Creator and Giver of all. If Dr Carr supposes that theistic philosophers have not "a God Who acts freely in an open universe," he is grossly self-deluded. And it has been by the philosophy of theism, not by "the philosophy of change," that His free acting in the "open universe" has been most satisfactorily maintained. But God Himself is *actus purissimus*, not potential existence waiting on world-changes or realisations. It might, however, give us a more vital hold on the fact of Creation, if, instead of regarding it as a specific act in some very remote past, we viewed it as the result of our grasp on the perfect causal dependence of the world on the reality of God's presence in it in the living present; for this latter view has in it the vital sense of reality, the former—and traditional—view carries only such distant and unreal and external sense as may belong to a mere hypothetical aspect. Nor is emanational mode at all necessary to such an inward conception. Such a conception crams the world with the presence and working of Deity in such wise that an indefinitely long past causation ceases to be matter of any great interest and significance. But such a

rich and deepened view of the vastness and majestic grandeur of Creation, as in and by God, is not so easily maintained. Such a mode of conceiving Creation, in proceeding from the inner to the outer, allows the Author of creation to put something of Himself into His work. How poor and dead Creation were, if He did not! How lacking in the glow of passion and ideal! Not thus do we degrade the Deity, as Creator, to the level of a cold and soulless mechanician. Creation cleaves to God, as clings the ivy to the oak, though, to hear certain of our modern philosophers, you would think it was the other way about. Theistic idealism has never conceived Him as a motionless Creator, but has found in the world a vast vision of time and motion resulting from His mighty and creative Life therein, with spontaneity and direction in the issues. But it does not, as we have seen, pretend to lay down the precise form in which creation came into being, since that was no historic act or fact; it knows, however, it was no mere emanational or developmental issue, but a result of Divine volition, and of a determination that might not have been. We cannot reach and define Divine activity behind and above the creative existence of the world, for we are creatures, not the Creator, and our inability to do so is, of course, no argument against the reality of the creative act or process. Not only its reality concerns us, but its import, and with that we have had to do, in its bearings upon the unity and intelligibility of the world. In this connection, Theistic Idealism has kept well in mind the saying of Pascal, that God cannot be the end, if He is not the beginning. The old difficulty as to the beginning of the relative has disappeared, since we have come to regard the Absolute as a Being, not out of all relation, but only out of all necessary relation. And the inconceivability of the Creation has been greatly lessened, as we have come to grasp firmly how little the idea of creation—as distinguished from *the* creation—is contradictory, to beings like ourselves who are creators in our way and measure. Further, the creation is not merely theistic, in the senses I have shewn, but is, in its teleological aspects or relations, idealistic

in its purpose, the furtherance of the Creator's righteous ends, and of man's highest weal. It is thus absurd ever to conceive the creation as though it were some independent power over against God, for it is no finished product or *res completa*, but is only the Divine purpose in process of realisation. That accounts for the constancy to be found in its laws or working, although science cannot be expected to know anything of a matter that lies quite beyond the sphere of its observation. But such a theistic view is corrective of the notion of any mere reign of mechanical necessity. It is also corrective of any Becoming, which has taken leave of all Reason, and is such pure movement as represents only instability, contradiction, and caprice. Theistic idealism is not content, Bergson-wise, to find reality in flux upon flux, in change and nothing but change, with a developing, self-differentiating life-force in the midst thereof, but pierces behind and below all this pure mobility to a permanent and underlying theistic World-Ground, as the Ultimate Reality of its metaphysical intuition. For it does not find the new Romantic philosophy of evolution rational enough to be for it a theory of creation, consisting, as it does, merely of a process of continual self-expansion or self-creation. Bergson discounts intellect, and has no cause for complaint if intellect discounts his theory, or finds it not rationally satisfying. I am inclined to agree with a writer who has said that "we shall find it very hard to regard Bergson's evolution theory as anything else than a doctrine that the universe has lost its way, or else that it never had one." "There is no idea of an end implicit in the beginning, in the evolution process" [J. W. Scott, in 'Mind,' 1913]. Theistic Idealism craves a more rational evolution than one which knows nothing of plan, nothing of preconceived end, nothing of final purpose, whether immanent or external, knows only progressive sundering, increasing discord, and such unity of the confused tendencies as is constituted by movement only, disconnected with any "general plan of the whole." I am far from saying there are not points of suggestiveness in the theory as formulated by Bergson, but the utter inade-

quacies and incoherences are such that Theistic Idealism must energetically reject it. Its creation is an extra-logical affair, with no certitude but that of instinct. "The life of the body" is seen "on the way to the life of the spirit," and yet there is no breath or suggestion of teleology. The free, creative life of the "tremendous push" is such, it is rhetorically said, that "the whole of humanity" is "one immense army galloping beside and before and behind each of us in an overwhelming charge able to beat down every resistance and clear the most formidable obstacles, even death." All this without aim, or plan, or guidance, or purpose, or unifying power, except that all life is said to be one. So little is there of any unity beyond the mere original impetus or impulsion. There is no hint of inner check or restraint upon the *élan vital* that might endow it with becoming or appropriate human value, and direct it to some worthy end. It creates everything but its own purpose: that is, I suppose, one of its "constant gushing-forth of novelties." One may well judge, with Plato, that "too many of our modern philosophers" are "always getting dizzy from constantly going round and round"; so that they come, in consequence, to "think that there is nothing stable or permanent, but only flux and motion, and that the world is full of every sort of motion and change." A rational being, whose own life-expression is not devoid of plan and purpose, or direction by reason, and that, too, without abandonment of its freedom, may very well be excused for asking why the cosmic life, to be worthy of intellectual respect, should not also create and realise its own purpose in some like rational or decently intelligible manner. Free us from the dominion of purely intellectualistic philosophy, by all means, but deliver us not into the hands of naturalistic tendencies and Rousseauistic influences, from which both philosophy and literature in Europe have suffered quite too much already. Nothing is further from theistic idealism, even in its attempt to conceive the creative process, than to give its theorisings a mere intellectual cast without quickening influence upon life. Intellectual satisfaction it

does, of course, as a philosophical system, seek, but never for an instant does it know any indifference to the ethical and religious bearings or values involved in the character and purpose of the creative movement. For it is not only theistic, but idealistic or interpretative of experiential bearings or aspects; is not only constructive of theory, as to creative process or reality, which shall satisfy the intellect, but is idealistically critical of any such theory in its moral and religious significance for man's life in the cosmos. That is to say, the nature of the Divine original act or process in creating the world comes to us, is apprehended by us, only through or by means of a corresponding original and world-creative idealistic process found in, and characteristic of man. If you say this apprehensive task is the work of reason, designed to meet the speculative demands of intellect, still is the reason whereof I speak no abstract reason, but a reason so living and concrete, as to be aflame with passion for moral interests no less than for intellectual satisfactions. For, philosophically, we must take account of the experience in the totality of its contents, aspects, and bearings, and, in a large and living reason, the little water-tight compartments into which we vainly seek to separate the parts of mental working, are swept away. I mean to say that our intellectual dissatisfactions with a given creative theory may be so closely interwoven with the moral issues and vital consequences involved in its deficiencies, that only the most arbitrary and artificial and useless threading out of the elements were possible. Bergson, it has been rightly said, is the Rousseau of metaphysics, trying to bring our individual psychic life back to a state of nature, and in his metaphysics of creation, Bergson deliberately excludes intellect, and recalls us, albeit not in uniformly consistent terms, to the primitive, the metaphysical intuition of the immediate. This last is the universal flux, in its instability and contradiction, as we have seen, and as Heraclitus so well foreshadowed. The reality intuited therein is just the blind striving vital "push" of which I have spoken, and the only god glorified in the process is Proteus. The ethical result

of the teaching has, in many instances, been nothing better than a vague, unreasoned, and unreasoning belief in the desirability of change, ceaseless and general, merely for itself, with never a glimmer of the place, fixity, and power, of moral purpose. But Theistic Idealism does not surrender the conception of creative evolution—which did not originate with Bergson, though he has done so much for it—as a cosmological hypothesis, but in a theistic mode of conceiving it, albeit it finds too many irrational elements in the Bergsonian mode of representation for acceptance. When one finds Rousseau, in one of his works, declaring himself almost ready to maintain “that the state of reflection is contrary to nature,” and “that the man who meditates is a depraved animal,” the Bergsonian depreciation of intellect becomes less of a novelty. [The work referred to is the ‘Treatise on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality among Men,’ issued in 1753.] In this connection, I think it might, with advantage, be remembered, in these days of fluxional uncertainty, how much man’s stability and progress owe to idea—idea which is dateless and spaceless. This, although idea is not generally dear to Bergson. As for the Bergsonian stress on intuition, and the reversal of all ordinary modes of thought, I am of those who opine that Bergson has fallen short of a true intellectualism, instead of overpassing it, as he essays to do. None of us would think of denying the intuitive processes involved in our knowledge of reality: that is impossible since Spinoza and Hegel, not to speak of Plato and Aristotle at all; but these two former sanely avoid the overthrow or reversal of the ordinary activities of thought, and rather seek their perfecting or completion. But Bergson pursues the epistemologically ruinous method of asking us completely to immerse or absorb ourselves into the very life of things, to dive back into the flux and install ourselves in its movement; but this would be to lose the distinction between the knower and the known, whereas the known remains distinct from both the knower and the knowing. But even such immediate knowledge is mediated, as Hegel, for all his wealth of intuition, very clearly pointed out, and

you cannot treat the mind as though it were mere instinct, seeing it "essentially involves the tendency to reasoning and meditation."

The creative evolution of Theistic Idealism does not consist of mere change, but of growth or development: it does not consist of blind irrational impulse or mere chaotic movements, but is marked by unity, and definable norm and law; nor is it without end, to which the whole Creation moves. The Bergsonian ruling out of all finalism is being perpetually contradicted by the omnipresent order found in Nature. No evolutionary view, I for my own part freely admit, can now be satisfactory which does not take account both of the epigenetic results in the development of organisms, and of the new and specifically different modes of being, or new chemically formed formations, which arise in the qualitative elaboration of Nature. But not even these latter are in their modes of action and reaction devoid of conformity to the pre-determinations of their own constitution and environment. The new formations rest, of course, foundationally upon the old. I cannot, therefore, admit the phenomena, in either case, to be beyond the reach of the theistic hypothesis, any more than I should admit the unforeseen results of our creative freedom and relative independence to be so. As Huxley said of the teleologist, he has the advantage of being always able to challenge you to shew that things, as they are, were not intended from the outset to be brought about. The loss in directness need not argue a loss either in depth or in that dependence which is of the essence of theistic postulation or requirement. My reference to our own being a moment ago was entirely in order, for we are ourselves the most striking example of necessity being modified, of mechanism being transcended, and of purpose-laden action in relation to environment. There is nothing in the references to nature and science formations and properties now made, which can lessen the need for theistic postulation of a Supreme Intelligence, on Whom the world depends for its being and relations, though there may be something, in the ever-increasing multiplicity of these phenomena, to quicken the energy of theistic thought,

the urgency of its demand. Theistic Idealism, at any rate, enthrones Mind in the universe, and seeks to purge its creative evolution of sheer irrationalism: the underlying—of which Bergson makes so much—is, for it, the Absolute and Eternal Reason: the world of matter exists, for it, on the idealistic presupposition of the logical priority of mind to matter, only for universal and omniscient Mind. It admits no such thing as self-subsistent matter. The ultimate Reality is thus Reason or Mind, and the world of phenomena is one, an intelligible whole, a product or manifestation of this Ultimate Reality. The aspects of Nature and of Science bear out this intimate connection of organic beings, and interrelation and interdependence of the sciences, whose water-tight partitions have been strikingly brought down in chemistry, physics, mechanics, and a host of other instances. The material world is a willed and dependent one. For the Universal Mind or Absolute Reason is also the Absolute Will—Rational Will, and, as such, the causative agency in the origination of the world's being or creative evolution. There can be nothing irrational in such a supposition, be the difficulties of creation for our poor finite comprehension as great as you please; these would be a great deal less if it were duly remembered that some creative possibilities are even ours, and that we are dealing with a Being Who is the Absolute Life—not the empty, stricken Absolute of absolutist philosophy—rich in resources beyond all thought, fertile in potencies beyond all imagination, unfathomably profound in His reserves of wisdom and of power. Omnipresent Will in the creative processes of the world is what theistic idealism postulates, and this holds good, so far as ultimate theistic dependence is concerned, even when the workings of that Will may be mediate. Such a Will, shot through and through with rationality, is sharply differentiated, not only from the impersonal and unconscious will of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, in its strivings to realise itself, but from the vague, characterless, non-explanatory original impetus of Bergson. It appears quite fitting and natural that this Rational Will should, as the World-Will,

have found expression in a world that shews a will to existence, a will to become, to rise to ever greater heights of self-realisation. These are reached along gradually ascending lines of development, including the gradations, and the teleological guidance, of life, and the unconscious purposiveness, as it has been termed, of instinctive action; but with unity in the whole, and a main trend or overplus of order and advance in the totality of the forward movement. But it is no mere process of self-creation, self-expansion, to theistic idealism; for the rudiments of the world, its first potentialities, its latent possibilities and tendencies, are, on the theistic hypothesis, rooted in God as fontal source and origin. This claims to be the most rationally satisfying theory extant, and the one which also best satisfies the demands of the religious consciousness, which, be it said, has more interest in the matter than is sometimes thought. But the Divinely creative interest consists of no mere impetus or impulsion, followed by the unsupported play of self-creative forces—an altogether too Deistic suggestion for this stage of the world's thought, although it is the only religious ray that seems to penetrate some minds. Nor can the notion of end be kept out of the interpretation in its highest phases, where man himself is no longer merely means, but also end. God, the Supreme and Rational Will, is immanent in the universe, gives continuity to its history and experience, and is the goal of its true life and endeavour. Very different is all this from the Bergsonian lack of destined end or way for reality or the world, for there are here well-grounded being, the legitimate creation of values, and a limitless law of increase of spiritual energy. Thus, as said an ancient poet-philosopher, "from the One departing come the Many," and of their interactions we may be sure that—

—"this long interchange shall never end,
Whiles into One do all through Love unite."

[—ταὐτ' ἀλλάσσοντα διαμπερὲς οὐδαμὰ λήγει,
ἄλλοτε μὲν Φιλότητι συνερχόμεν' εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα.

"The Fragments of Empedocles," by
W. E. Leonard, Chicago, 1908].

CHAPTER IV.

THE METAPHYSICS OF TIME AND OF ETERNITY.

THE metaphysics of Time and of Eternity—the question of their reality or unreality—has bulked very largely in recent philosophical thought, and cannot be passed over without specific treatment. The time category has been subjected to this renewed study under the impulse to thought first given by the temporalism of Renouvier, with his phenomenist methods. Apart from time, experience cannot be represented, time being the form or mode of relation which is characteristic of the consciousness-process itself. Renouvier boldly postulated a first beginning for all things, absurdly including God; but his postulation of a world beginning in time is, theistically considered, very unsatisfactory, since, in his finitist temporalism, it figures as coming into existence out of nothing—with no proper antecedent or recognised sufficient reason. Theistic thought, however, can, on its own interpretation, welcome all that Renouvier finely says of the primal spontaneity or energy which wakes into existence at the beginning of time, and starts on the endless path of Becoming. In such connections Renouvier's thought has greatly anticipated that of Bergson, by whom biological applications have been worked out, and to whom we owe the conception of psychological time, with moments qualitatively different. But Renouvier did not succeed in getting away from duration as a continuum, although he tried hard to deliver time from the charge of continuity. Nor did he clear away the Kantian difficulty as to a perception

of succession being not impossibly derived from a succession of perceptions. Royce has pointed out that, were we not capable of overlooking a succession and viewing at once its serially related and mutually exclusive events, we could know nothing about the existence of succession. But it is time to enter upon our own discussion of the subject, leaving aside for the moment the paradoxes of idealistic eternalism. In time-relations to Creation, this latter must not be understood as having taken place in time, seeing that time cannot be posited prior to the world. Time, space, laws of nature, and the law of continuity, are relations of the finite world, and, as such, could not have existed till that world existed. Time and space, the two great forms of what is called externality, are not to be conceived as entities independent of Divine creative action. They are, in their ideality, dependent functions of spirit, not its limiting preconditions. But it will be seen why we yet hardly care absolutely to make them mere forms of thought, after the manner of Kantian relativity, since they are true for the actual world of experience. They are not two different qualities of being or essence, for they are inseparable from each other. Augustine was right when, from the human standpoint, he, like Clement in his own way, said that the world—as Plato, for his own reasons, also said of the beginning—was not made in time, but with time. We may speak of things as “in time,” but the world, as whole, was made with time. Time is itself a creation simultaneous with, and conditioned by, world-creation and movement. Time is real only with and in the world, and it is, therefore, not infinite; it is the form of change in real objects—though I do not treat time simply as the process of finite things, like Bosanquet after Hegel—and always more do we come to recognise it as such. The unity of our present consciousness we call the field of consciousness. We can never surmount the difficulties of the ordinary hypothesis of a Creation in time, so long as we make eternity mean simply indefinitely prolonged time. Already we see in Plotinus eternity identified with the Life that is infinite and complete. In Spinoza, the eternity concept means that which

includes timeless reality: the attribute of Eternity is really, on his view, identical with, or an evident consequence of, self-existence. Space he made, as it is in our thought, a continuum. Schelling makes eternity consist of being that stands not in time, while Hegel assumes for it an absolute timelessness—that which is of the idea, of the spirit, being for him eternal, in a way which the natural is not. Eternity is not, in my view, to be conceived in the merely negative form of the non-temporal — or immeasurable time — but, positively, as the mode of the timeless self-existence of the Absolute Ground of the universe. Bradley has, in a rather unnecessary way, said that the Absolute is a delusion, if time be not unreal, thus unduly marking the opposition between time and the Absolute. Timeless existence, in the senses of being or entity without or above change, is what we mean by eternity, and we discard the notion of mere everlastingness or persistence through time. Though Eternity might be taken as itself exclusive of time, yet eternity is not the annulment of time so much as the ground of its reality. For we may, with Schleiermacher, make God the absolutely timeless causality conditioning time itself. We shall find that some have been content to take eternity in the poor sense of just meaning time no longer measured by the succession of events, from past to future, as in the finite universe. I mean poor only in the sense of the abstract conception, not of the results of simultaneity for the concrete self, which self I am not for the moment considering.

It must be said that eternity, taken as simply a blank and irrelevant negation of temporality, a thing often enough suggested, would not satisfy any sort of ontology. Strictly taken, there is absurdity involved in an eternity that includes time. On the other hand, eternity, apart from or wholly unrelated to time, is a vain and impossible conception. Eternity knows neither past nor future, and is easily distinguishable from Bergson's duration. There is, no doubt, an infinity of time in the sense that, at any particular moment, we conceive time as existing everywhere that space is found: time which had a beginning is involved in contradiction:

empty time is a mere abstraction; it has more forcibly than finely been styled by Bergson a bastard space; it has not time-atoms, but only such divisions as thought makes. The real infinity of the universe has nothing to do with either time or space, just as the real life of the spirit has nothing to do with them. Those philosophers who, like Dr Ward, tell us that past, present, and future are real differences in time, but that what corresponds to these differences is, in presentation, simultaneous, fail to explain why past, present, and future, should be thus taken as simultaneous. Royce actually holds both simultaneity and succession to be present *at once*. If past, present, and future, are, in apprehension, given as one whole, then it behoves us to see whether the time-differences—past, present, and future—are really successive, and not simultaneous as in apprehension. For, says Bergson, their succession exists only for the observer—"do not *succeed* each other except for a consciousness which keeps them in mind." But Bergson's real duration—which makes up reality—is a very self-contradictory affair, with a consciousness of succession in which is no before and after, and which, not being instantaneous, is yet not quantitative. In appearance successive, these time-varieties may yet co-exist, succession being one thing, and the knowledge of succession another. For, in strictness, there is no real present, though, in another sense, the present is the real; the present is only the time-point which divides the past from the future. This "instant" was so treated by Dr Shadworth Hodgson ('Phil. of Reflection'). A veritable and infinitesimal minimum this, albeit Bergson allows, though some do not, time-duration cannot absolutely be denied to it. But Bergson makes the present a certain interval of duration in a way which renders time-distinctions self-contradictory. Nothing in these considerations need make time itself wholly illusory, albeit they may help keep duration a continuum. But one may surely make bold to say that he can conceive the *whatness* or essence of Being, apart from time or duration: say that one does so *in* time, yet the conceiving may not be *of* time: such conceiving of ours is, in the case of the Divine Being, of a metaphysical,

which is also an eternal moral essence. The unities of my consciousness are not really related to space and time. Royce, as we shall see, makes the difference between the human and the Divine Mind, in knowledge of the time-sequence, merely one of span, and takes the temporal sequences to have the same character and reality for the Absolute that they have for us. A strange position for an eternalist. His later expositions of the subject appear to me to accord but little with some of his earlier pronouncements in which small account was made of time. For my own part, I can do nothing with such a metaphysic, reducing the matter merely to one of span, but utterly reject it, as still belonging too much to the attitude of the naïve, unreflective consciousness (see esp. Royce, 'Intern. Jour. of Ethics,' 1910). Those may credit it with the merit of direct attack, who choose to forget how often, in such matters, the truth comes by indirection. I shall return to Royce later. Eternity may not be mere absence of time or timelessness; I have plainly said it is too positive in character for that; but neither is it the infinity of time-duration. The eternal is, then, not to be taken as identical with the timeless in the sense of bare absence of time, for that would be only formal and negative eternity. And as for time, it exists not outside me the subject; it is a conceptual rather than a real or exterior unity; and it is, in its pure successional aspects, non-spatial; but our awareness of succession in time, I hold, already raises us above succession, and points to a timeless self as permanent through empirical change. For it is impossible that there should constantly be only the variable. It is such change which gives to time—as Locke in the absence of any absolute unit of time and space, already in his own way, saw—the only meaning it possesses; but where there is nothing but change, time lacks measure for coming to consciousness. But timeless or absolute Reality I prefer to accept as true, as and when it appears to us in time-forms, rather than, with Bradley, brand such temporal appearances as "false." Time may not be ultimate fact or reality, but the time-forms, under which transcendent Reality is known to us, must be allowed their

relative truth and value, since they are experience-forms, which are rooted in the transcendent Real. Very old experience-forms they are, as we see from references like that of the Latin poet who says—

“Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus,
Singula dum capti circumvectamur amore.”

—Virg. *Georg.* III. 284-285.

Newton finely conceived time as the one absolute and independent variable, “by another name” called, he says, “duration,” and Locke had taken space and time to be, inherently, variables. The Scholastics had, moreover, distinguished time as intrinsic or internal, when the duration of a movement was measured after the parts distinguishable in it; they called time extrinsic or external, when the duration was known or determined so far that it was the measure of another duration. They took time, not as movement, but as its measure. But I cannot dwell on this. No timeless or transcendent Reality can be allowed to transcend all relation and distinction, or to be other than of true, all-inclusive character. There is no reason why the time-world—the phenomenal world—should not be so grounded, as a manifestation of the inner nature of the Real, that it may be taken as real rather than illusory, true rather than false. There is here no “false appearance,” save only false manifestation—that is to say, of a kind that should contradict or belie the true nature of Being. Time may in one sense be real, and yet be no object of pure experience. We have no right to locate the Absolute in regions beyond, and not also as before and around us. Nothing could be more irrational or unwarranted than to take Being as absolute in any sense that would preclude the possibility of true phenomenal manifestation—an Absolute, like that of Bradley, which is simply an abyss for everything, with changed identity. Both Suarez and Kleutgen are, in my judgment, dominated far too largely by the concept of duration, the ordinary notion of time; time being, for them, the duration of created things, eternity the duration of Divine Being. That is pre-

cisely what I have striven to get away from in this chapter, in making time the form of our finite life, and eternity the form of the Divine Life. The difference in the two modes of conception is very much greater than might appear, to a superficial regard. The difference between the Infinite Being and the finite life is not, as these thinkers maintain, a mere difference in time-duration, or the prolongation of time: the difference is, in my view, in the two forms of being or existence, to one of which eternity is the appropriate form of life, to the other, time. That "time is not real as such," as Bradley contends; that time, as the form of our inner sense, is a "spurious concept" to Bergson; that time shews always a tendency to transcend itself; these are considerations which, in the light of all that has been here urged, need not greatly concern us, since we lean to the position that eternity is the ground of time—the reconciliation of its contradictions. But we cannot consent to have finite things, like time, cut off from the realm of reality, by an unnatural and irrational Bradleyan divorce of the phenomenal world from the deeper world of the Absolute, in which it has its Ground. If time or other things phenomenal shew the inveterate tendency to transcend themselves, which Bradley ascribes to them, then clearly the consistent course is, not to negate them as unreal, but to find their higher and completed reality or fulfilment in the transcendent real. Bosanquet does better, when he questions, not the reality, but the ultimateness of time. God, in His internal Being, is raised above time, and is free, as Aquinas noted, of all succession; in His eternal absoluteness, He is throned above temporal development. Nor has He, according to Plato, any need of the shock of non-being or space (*χώρα*). As finite beings, we can form no positive idea of eternity, whose "moving image" time is, according to the spatialised version of non-spatial activity given in the *Timæus* (37 D) of Plato. Time is the measure of motion. Every attempt to translate eternity into terms of time sinks in failure, and the modern need is to recover the hold on

Eternity, grasping all at once, as God does, the fulness or plenitude of being, in such measure as is possible to us. To our dominion over Creation, belongs our subjugation of the realm of ideas. Even Kleutgen points to the difficulty of such a comprehension of things in their totality, or in their eternal essence, but his perfect accord with the best mediæval thought on the point may be doubted [*La Philosophie Scolastique*, vol. ii. pp. 128-129, Paris, 1899]. No such difficulty arises as to time, concerning which Kant has said that "no knowledge of ours is antecedent to experience, but begins with it" (Introd. to *'Critique of Pure Reason,'* ed. Hartenstein, p. 36, Leipzig, 1853). It is to be said, then, that the difficulties which cluster around God's purpose, as externalised in time, have their main root of trouble in the fact that, in attempting to view things as they were when time began, we are really trying to get out of, and beyond, our finite experience, to whose thinking time is an indispensable condition. And the reality of time involves the reality of succession. Eternity, absolutely taken, is really to be regarded as incommensurable with time; as Aquinas puts the matter, *non sunt mensuræ unius generis*. For eternity would lose its character as eternal in the very fact of its entering into relations with the changeful, the becoming. Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian thinkers alike have shewn a disposition to regard time-conceptions as unable, in metaphysics, to yield the ultimate explanation of the universal, and it will be seen that I largely sympathize with that view. On a speculative view, it has been held that the time-relation renders perfect knowledge or absolute truth impossible, and that knowledge always works away from the time-relation, as only empirical. If such an eternal Being as God acts or creates, He may be said to create in eternity; and, in such a sense, we may speak of His creative act as eternal. On the other hand, we must hold His creative work as, from the human standpoint, belonging to time, since the world cannot be taken as a necessary element in the Absolute Life. It is only needless

confusion to call time, as movement and duration, with Bergson, "eternal," but, on the other hand, he has well distinguished duration from eternity.

Time, as a form of consciousness, must be taken as a form of reality. This, although consciousness-states are here put as little in time as in space. For we surely do not propose to deny that consciousness is reality. The conscious subject or experient remains one and self-identical through every time-sequence. It is to be kept in mind that, if we seek to view time as a concept, we cannot, with Bergson, keep succession and irreversibility out of it. If we frame a genetic time-theory, we cannot do so out of non-temporal elements. Nor can we, like Ebbinghaus, make our knowledge of time an effect of memory, when it is a condition of memory. Of our primal experience, time is one of the dimensions, other dimensions being the qualitative connections. Dimension is, of course, an unfortunate term, due to our experience of space, but it cannot be dispensed with. Time is a constructive moment of the continuum of experience, which consists of more than time. Time, or the temporal, is an abstraction from this continuum experience. Nor is time's direction, for penetrative quality, to be overlooked. If we choose, with Bergson, to mark off scientific or static time from ordinary experience time, we may not forget that time is still and always time, despite the higher importance of the present for perception, and that time is not to be constructed out of extra-temporal elements. No unity is to be discovered, when we look at time itself; and the important thing, from the standpoint of Theistic Idealism, is the changeless presence, in all time moments, of the self or subject, whereby unity, continuity, and succession, are imparted to time. The time order, objectively viewed or in abstraction from this self or subject, is a fruit of scientific thought. The content of a scientific knowledge that should be perfect and complete, would appear as timeless. The time concept is, to Ostwald, a form of inner life. Time was no mere abstraction from experience, in the view of Leibniz, but something to which he ascribed a certain ill-defined

ideality and independence. Kant essentially made the temporal order a product of the activity of the subject, and, for the present purpose, Teichmüller did better in making time consist of a perspective order given to objects by a timeless and substantial ego. Duration was to him but an immanent measuring of that order. Of course, his theory had its shortcomings, like every other, and failed to do justice to change, and to time, as the form of change. The view which I am concerned to maintain is, that time, like all experience, is relative to the subject. A view very different from such a theory as that of Herbart, for example, to whom time was a purely objective appearance or *schein*—the “number of change.” Perhaps we should do better, for the avoidance of Bergsonian errors, if we thought of the spatio-temporal system, as not only a comprehensive, but a unitary one, wherein we think of spaced-time and timed-spaced relations, rather than of space *plus* time or time *plus* space. Time, I have already said, is one of the dimensions of the manifoldness of our original experience, and three directions may be claimed for time; two of these have been claimed as lying in one dimension. Duration, whose principle Bergson has unduly strained, has two directions, and can be measured. He has also unduly strained space, which, when homogeneous, as he would have it as the one background of experience, can no more be measured than time. Space and time are distinct parts of one relational system, and are different phases or aspects of one fundamental and finite form of thought. Even time is not without an externality of its own, so to speak. Hence what has been called the objectivity of time has been set forth by Lotze in his *Metaphysics*, and insisted on by Dr Rashdall and others. In this sense, time serves as a kind of measure of activity and becoming, is related to our states as psychical experients, and has real significance for historical values. Time, in Dr Rashdall’s view, “belongs to the very essence of the universe we know”; doubtless it is real at least for our historic world, but it is not, therefore, the ultimately or finally real. As I have shewn elsewhere, even the Eternal Consciousness must have some sort of functional

relation to it, while, of course, not subject to it. But it seems to me that much of the time-difficulty arises from our failure to do justice to the world of consciousness, in relation to the world of space and time. For time, in our united consciousness, is not time in the real successional sense. For our Idealism, it is just the world of consciousness that here matters. The world of consciousness is not bound by the limitations of the mechanical world, with its objects lying about in space and time. The unity of the world-system exists for your thinking consciousness and mine, rather than for the objects or things themselves. And this consciousness is not something completed once for all, but is capable of infinite gradation and indefinite expansion. A particular object in space is "there," and not "here." A particular event or occurrence in time was "then," and is not "now." But, for the world of consciousness, objects can be "here" as well as "there"; and for it, too, events can be "now" as well as "then." There is here none of the mutual exclusiveness in space and time characteristic of the world of mechanical facts and objects. But this superior flexibility of the world of consciousness, spaceless and timeless as that may be, does not alter the fact that, in perceiving objects in the world of space and time, we do so under the constraint of these objects. Of course, the sharp time-contrasts between "now" and "then" are merely relative, and due, as Dr Ward has remarked, to our presentations having "passed through the transitions which ours undergo." It is with time as it exists for the individual subject, or, if you will, subjective time, I am mainly concerned in this chapter, although I have already admitted the objective aspects of time to be not without real significance for theistic idealism. However, I do not mean to dwell on James's "saddle-back" of time, in view of what has been already said in this chapter. I note rather, as to objects in space, that there is a sense in which every "here" is linked with "there," because, as Dr Stout puts it, they are "mediately connected by some intervening stretch of space." Our taking space to be tri-dimensional is linked to the category of spatial unity. Ideal space is an

ultimate quality of the world, but real space is entirely relative. Space is known, objectively, as a certain order in external objects; and, subjectively, as a viewpoint of our experience, or a mere content of consciousness. Experience is conditioned by space and time, but we are not warranted in taking them so to exist prior to, or outside, experience. Space is thus in the mind rather than the mind in space. Time has even been taken as one-dimensional space: it is the conditioning element in the existence of all being in space. It had, so long ago as Lagrange, been spoken of as a fourth dimension of space. Time and space are fundamental conceptions of the human spirit, but they are not so in like manner and degree. Every part of the spatial continuum is, but only the present of the temporal continuum. Time has more need of space, than space has of time. Space is more easily conceived without time, than time can be thought without space. Geometry, as a science, concerns itself with space, but what science could concern itself with time, apart, say, from space conceptions? The like need of temporal explanation does not attach to space. Time, however, is the presupposition, condition, and medium, of the differences found in space. Time exists not but for change; change exists not without time. There is an interchangeableness of relations between them. Our Idealism cannot forget that, in all time measurement, there is, besides the time concept, the presupposed factor of the man—the measurer. Abstract or eliminate him, and the whole temporal succession of events, for which expression is sought in the time measurement, no more exists. There is, of course, another sense in which time exists without him. But he is, to our Idealism, the factor, without which the ideal present were not, since it would not be thought. In all his past experiences, the things or events thought of are pure objects of his thought. But, in his conception of the present, he has thought itself as an object, since he is conscious of the time-conception. We have, of course, in all such experience, to trust the results of perception and understanding in their outworking. The result is of general significance and importance, for all men have like

powers with the individual idealist, for the search into, and expiscation of, the Truth under the conditions of time.

The time conception, after a more concrete view, is due to the consciousness of our own existence; in other words, our conception of the self or ego is the necessary presupposition of the time conception. Man experiences time in himself: he experiences it in every stage of life, in every change of his bodily organism; time is thus to him something lived, something experienced, and not a mere form of intuition. In all his action and environment, he still experiences time. There is, in this aspect, not much left to us of Kant's time as the inner sense, mediated as it so much is from the outside. Time is not, in this aspect, in us, as certain philosophers hold, but has its course outside us: what is thought to be in us is the concept of time, on this view, in virtue of our powers of abstraction. Three dimensional space has only one time relation to me as a knowing subject, namely, the present. One dimensional time, so-called, has the three relations of past, present, and future. Both time and space really exist for us, because they are experienced and comprehended by us, and in both cases there is clearly far less of empty apriorism than Kant imagined. But the point of main concern for our theistic idealism has been the relativity of time for the knowing human subject, who is almost invariably treated as a negligible quantity in the whole matter. That self or subject is certainly not constituted by succession; succession does not even constitute time. There is no solipsism in all this, for we postulate a "manyness" of like unities of consciousness, every one of which is an independent *Individuum*. The meritorious and suggestive character of Bergson's analysis of time is not to be denied. He refused to regard time in the accustomed way, as the analogue of space: he took time to be a different manifold from space: the manifoldness of time is, for him, qualitative, that of space quantitative: time is, for him, a fourth dimension of space, with phenomena sequent, not contiguous: the nature of time is disclosed to us in psychical life, regarded as purely temporal extension. There is obvious error in treating psychical

life as if it were so disposed in some kind of imaginary space, with its experiences scattered about and as detached as perceptual objects in space. Pillon did not fail to point out the erroneous tendencies generated in the mind from this "predominance of the idea of space in our intellectual constitution," being the first indeed to do so. Bergson, like Pillon, regards the non-temporal elements in time-representation to be due to space intrusions, which must be got rid of in order to reach pure irreducible time. But, whereas Pillon, whose priority in the treatment of time has just been noted, takes time, with its two relations of co-existence and succession, to be no continuum, but merely a sequence of discrete states, Bergson, contrariwise, makes the succession as without distinction, and the continuity as due to the projection of time into space. They both agree as to the diverting, or perverting, influence, of spatialized imagination, while so differing as to the question of discreteness. That time is continuous is such an accepted commonplace of experience as to make Pillon's view of time, as a succession of discrete elements, a doctrine not easy of acceptance. But it is susceptible of more rational and satisfactory explanation, under due reflective treatment, than might at first sight appear. Into these matters we are not now called to go, but rather to consider the bearing of these time results on our idealism. One of these is that a postulated objective time, as an ideal construction, must, while retained, be carefully guarded from misleading and fanciful import, from a metaphysical point of view. Concrete experience is our starting-point, and does not lead us to Bergsonian pure time and pure space, for these, without quality or content, are mere ideals with no manner of independent reality. Events may be spatially related, Bergson-wise, but our idealism is concerned with them as they exist *for us*, and in that view they are successive, *i.e.*, conceived under the relation of time. Fouillée properly said that only by pure abstraction and fiction do we represent time as a medium in which events are displayed, and that time does not enclose things like a frame; time is, he maintained, only the indefinite succession

of real or possible successions, and its relative homogeneity springs from our abstracting everything except the fact of succession itself. Past, present, and future, no doubt, co-exist in consciousness, but only under time aspect or relation, not as set together only under space aspect or relation. Bergson's thought is bound to an initially false idea of space, and to an exaggerated notion of temporal dependence upon it.

Time, as we have seen, is not prior to Creation, but is one of the forms under which Creation is thinkable. The protoplasmic cell, at the time-beginning, must have had very real being, quite independent of space and time, one might feel tempted to say. But how little we can speculate on such matters! Why Spencer should find no inconceivability in self-existing ether or in self-existent laws, but only in a self-existent Creator, is logically not very apparent. As if an hypothesis could not have value, because the reality it represents cannot be fully comprehended! The inconceivability of Creation, to Spencer, springs from his vain attempt to formulate universal evolution in purely mechanical terms, so ignoring the immanent and necessary teleology on which all creative evolution depends. The inconceivableness of Creation springs only from its belonging to the sphere of timeless reality, and it is certainly brought no nearer to us by the recent results of progress in logical studies, which seem to shew time and space conceptions to be no such intuitions or *a priori* forms of knowledge, as Kant thought, but only physical concepts derived from experience. Time has been shewn to be based, not merely on intuition, but concretely determined by thought measurements—the time-consciousness arising chiefly in connection with the given. Space and time are real only as things or events are real. Time is known in the concrete realities of actual duration, before we reach the generic concept of Time. But Time is one, though with three tenses. Our thought is largely confined within these time and space limits, of which Bergson takes the former to be the deeper. This, since time is for him the substance of reality, although space is his fundamental datum, and time its mere ghost-haunting consciousness. Bergson

cannot, in our view, be said to have advanced matters much by his appeal to intuition in proof of duration as the fundamental reality. The results of intuition, in respect of the successive heterogeneity which constitutes duration, are too vague, and uncertain, and too little amenable to conceptual interpretation, to lead us to duration as the ultimate reality. But Bergson and Dr Ward both meritoriously elucidated concrete time. So far as the time difficulty in Creation is concerned, we know that time is certainly not the form of God's life, His eternity just meaning freedom from time-categories. Even my essential being is above time, however subject to temporal modifications. Eternity, objectively considered, is a mode of being of God in relation to Himself. It is not to be conceived as something distinct from Himself. For God was eternal, while as yet the world and time were not. The Schoolmen had a maxim that "in eternity is one only instant always present and persistent," although it should be remembered that the conception of an "Eternal Now" is really, in germ at least, as old as Parmenides. And a very abstract mode of conceiving Deity it is. It was an obvious source of trouble to the Middle Ages, which even Hegel thought to traverse in seven-league boots, to have a Deity, Who was not in time at all, supposed to create the world at a particular moment of time. To Dante "*every where and every when*" were focussed in God. By Hegel, too, it has been said that the true present is eternity. But, after all, the conception of an "Eternal Now" is only a mode of describing eternity which is in reality characteristic of succession in time. "If the specious present," says Dr F. B. Jevons in a Paper to which I shall refer presently, "was specious to start with, then expanding it, even *ad infinitum*, will not make it the less specious"; the expanded form will still be "in time": if the specious present "is not in time, it is no *now*, *i.e.*, it is not preceded by a *no longer* or followed by a *not yet*." The very word "present," he adds, "inevitably suggests time," and would be better dropped if it is not in time. It seems to me that it lies beyond reasonable doubt that Eternal Deity, rather than an Eternal Now, is a con-

ception carrying far more meaning or significance for us. And we want more than puzzles or empty abstractions. All times, of course, are present to His Now. To speak of His eternity, for all that, as an "Eternal Now"—a present in the time sense—cannot but involve a contradiction, so far as our mode of conceiving the matter is concerned. For eternal existence is just as little described for us by the notion of a present—the specious present—as by that of a past or a future, though He has been Strength of the one, and is Shield of the other. Such a Now or present obviously presupposes a not-now, and raises once more the old time-troubles, in relation to eternity. Despite Bergson's fine insistences on perceived time, it is still open to say, if one will, that time, viewed purely as psychological process, is no more actual in its momentarily present than in its past or future aspects. In fact, the time treatment of Lotze suffers from vacillation and defective insight in this very connection. As spirit, man is not in time, nor exists for time. Time exists for him. We must, in Kant's fashion, discriminate the experience of succession from the mere fact of succession itself. We cannot know succession unless the successive moments are simultaneously present in our consciousness, and, when we do so know it, we have transcended it. Thus does our supra-temporal ego render time possible—that is to say, by transcending it. But that is a sort of qualitative time, and not of the mere clock-time order. When time is taken as unreal, there must then be no talk, like that of Dr M'Taggart, of taking eternity as future. For, in that event, nothing could, properly speaking, be future, nor could eternity be said to begin, as in common life it is frequently said to do, by those who would so make eternity the tomb of time. But time is not so easily buried, though we can, of course, think ourselves out of relation to time. We may, no doubt, take eternity to span or include, for God's eternal consciousness, the whole of what belongs to time, with all pertaining to past, present, and future, that lies within the temporal succession. These differences, says Dr Ward, have in presentation all that corresponds to them "in consciousness simultaneously." The view of Volkman

is dealt with by Dr F. B. Jevons, who has also criticised Royce's position on the matter, in 'The World and the Individual,' in such a way that there is for me no need now to do so [see 'Proc. Arist. Soc.,' vol. vi. 1905-6]. But I remark that we have no title to say, with Royce, whose treatment seems to me too quantitative, that such "wholeness" or totality of the temporal "constitutes" the eternal. For the eternal belongs to quite a different order, I maintain, to wit, that of timeless reality, and the self-contradictoriness of time is due to its falling short of the whole reality. If we would render to eternity the things that are eternity's, we should not define it in terms of time at all. But this is just what Royce fails to do, so that, besides the difficulties of his use of the "specious present" as set out by Dr Jevons, there is the fact that, from his twofold sense of "present" or "now," you get only what Dr Jevons feels, and is, entitled to call "a temporal (or a temporary) Eternity," but do not reach timelessness. Aquinas, I hold, did better, when he took Eternity as measure of a permanent Being, and made time the measure of motion. Plotinus, however, would not have time identified with movement. To me, Eternity is the form of an eternal existence—to wit, the Absolute Life—to which, in the unity of a single insight, the infinite series of phases or processes are, together-wise, or *tota simul*, present. Eternity is the measure of rest—the rest which, said Boëthius, is in God, nay, is God. But the most we can say of Time—and of it only as found in the world of consciousness—is, after the paradoxical manner of Dr Stirling, that "the one of time never *is* and always *is*; its one is its many, its many its one: time is thus a symbol of the Absolute" ('Secret of Hegel,' p. 514). But, if so, it is an extremely inadequate symbol. Time is really no segment of eternity: time must be held purely relative, which eternity is not. The eternal cannot—ontologically—pass over into the temporal, but it may have functional relation to the temporal process: the temporal presupposes, in some real sort, the eternal, as its positive ground, its perfect pattern, and its perpetual possibility. For the Absolute Consciousness, time, properly speaking, does not

exist; there are no parts, for there is no succession; the future cannot, for it, be thought of as beginning to be, nor the past as having ceased to be. For it, eternity is, as Boëthius said, "a simultaneously full and perfect possession of interminable life." The metaphysics of eternity, and its time-relations, are matters of proverbial difficulty, and not fitting themes for philosophical dogmatism. Both orders—the eternal and the temporal—had better be treated as concretely as possible, and not left merely to abstract reflection.

Again, there are the relations of truth to be considered. There is an objectivity of truth, one cannot but hold, whereby judgments that are true, must be taken to exist, whether our temporal minds apprehend them or not. On the other hand, such truth, as yet unapprehended by any mind, is the merest abstraction. It really exists for us only when, as predicate of a judgment, it subsists for our conscious minds. An eternal Mind is the implicate of truth which shall be really eternal. The Absolute Life must be taken as a concrete whole, in which all temporal and illusory points of view are transcended, and this Absolute has such completeness, in itself, as to have no relation to any beyond; then have we a Being, Whose form or mode is Eternity. The great defect, it seems to me, of the whole metaphysical treatment of time and eternity, alike by Bradley and by Royce, is just the lack of such concrete settings for temporal and for eternal relations. My position, in this whole discussion, has been to emphasise the need to get back to Being—finite being and Absolute Being—Whose forms may become, in the best manner, interpretative of time and eternity forms, and so redeem us from empty and unfruitful metaphysical abstractions. I have taken an even more idealistic view of time than Hegel, to whom the time-category was self-external. If we may, in the midst of time, live in eternity, that can only be as we, freed from externality, are taken up into the life of the Eternal, and, as partakers of the Divine nature, realise a permanence or conservation of value, that may be called eternal, amid all our changeful time-experiences. But even the fact of change were nothing, for our idealism, without

the presupposition of the individual subject or essence, in whom the change is given, and for whom it comes. And, without endorsing Kant's positions as to Time being the form of the inner sense, one may regard Dr J. S. Mackenzie's view of Time as one too much marked by mere exteriority, when he makes it simply "a certain order" or "the aspect of successiveness which the eternal process contains." In me is carried my past in such wise that externality is excluded or lost. I think our previous discussion has shewn it to be needless now to deal with Dr Rashdall's statement that "to talk of God or of the Absolute or of Ultimate Reality as timeless is to use language which can mean nothing to us, or rather language which is certainly false." For our holding the Absolute to be timeless does not involve us in holding time to be unreal, the individuating activity of the Absolute making itself felt in the time spheres of our relative experience. The Absolute is timeless, but this, as we have seen, does not mean that the Absolute is "out of time" either as unrelated to it, or not present in its relative working. But eternity, not time, is the form of His Life, in and for Itself. If the Absolute were timeless in any sense that meant He had no existence in time, this would involve that we could never know Him. Holding, as our Theistic Idealism does, to a Personal Absolute, eternity is a predicate which is present in our conception of His being. The time-order, as applicable to all finite beings and events, seems, in the last resort, to run back for its grounding into the World-Ground—the absolute, eternal, all-comprehending Life. Eternity, in the strictest sense, is predicable of God alone.

It will thus be seen that our Theistic Idealism is quite free to feel a large measure of agreement with Dr Schiller's inveighings, in his "Humanism," against the treatment of the time-process by Bradley and M'Taggart, although Dr Schiller is apt to press his objections to all systems of abstract metaphysics too far. There is not the faintest reason why all these latter should get so far, and so easily, away from living experience and the reality of the time-process, as Dr Schiller seems to suppose. For abstraction has its part to play in all

our thinking, and philosophy by its nature must interpret experience in terms of thought. Thought must lie as close to experience and reality as possible, ever coming back to these as its correctives. Dr Schiller, however, rightly and ably argues for this, and certainly makes good his case against the Hegelian Dialectic of the Absolute Idea. I agree with Dr Schiller that ultimate metaphysic should be ethical, and I admit that such a metaphysic is harmonious with the existence of individuals in time, but I am quite unable to follow him in assuming an ethical metaphysic to be irreconcilable with the timeless and universal. The time-process is, in our theistic idealism, no "inexplicable surd" at the end of our metaphysical treatment, but "an integral part" of the system, though only in the relative sense already explained. It recognises that there can be no proper philosophy of Evolution unless the development of the world in Time be truly recognised, that is, the reality of the time-process must be admitted. Certainly, there is no time without process, and ethical process may be realised in time, but the dread of "transition from means to end" becoming "instantaneous" carries, I think, in such a connection, a rather mechanical cast; for if God, the primary ethical essence, stands above all time, the more my ethical communion with Him advances, the more it shares the timeless character of His absolutely ethical Spirit. Dr Schiller stands for what he regards as ethically necessary: I do the same; but I also stand for the ethically free, in the shape of ethical possibility. Such timelessness does not imply, rightly understood, that time differences have no reality for God. We are not now trenching upon the incommensurability of eternity with time, adverted to earlier in this chapter; we are concerned with the subject, who can be sharer of eternal life, only as he is elevated—*aufgehoben* if you will—into such ethical participation of the life of God as to see things *sub specie aeternitatis*. The time-process can be no such "ultimate datum"—to quote Dr Schiller's words—as to render such elevation an ethical impossibility; if it were, I make bold to say it would be a flat contradiction to the highest experience of the best of our race. Eternity, in its wholeness,

is co-existent with the whole time-process, and with every single moment of it. Eternity I have made the form of God's life, because His eternity is bound up with the bundle of His self-existent being or life. Such a view of time and eternity as we have presented marks conspicuous advances upon the meritorious treatment even of a Krause, who certainly excelled philosophers and theologians generally in this particular point. Krause took the temporal life up into God, however his time treatment might lack, and so did away with the usual abstract eternity, as excluding Divinely temporal and progressive action. That is to say, Krause recognised, in some sort, albeit in a way that lacked real explication, the causality of God in its eternal and its temporal aspects. Krause failed of the distinctions we have drawn, when he made time the eternal and the temporal ground of life; and he still talked of the whole of infinite time in a way which makes our corrections necessary in his case also. In fact, he lapsed back into a view of eternity, which is simply the naïve and uncritical one of infinitely prolonged time, with far more abstractness clinging to the conception than his original insight promised. This is so, although I have earlier shewn that time and eternity, although incommensurable, cannot be so, in any such absolute sense, as would keep them out of all relation to each other, or as would keep time from being grounded in eternity. As shewing how true to experience is the position now taken, I will—without drawing on the many who found life's supreme reality, not in time, like Bergson, but in the transcending of time—close this chapter by referring to the fine passage, too long to transcribe, among the last words of Tolstoi, in which he declared his deepening feeling, in approaching the end, to the effect that one must always more transport the aims of exterior life into the life interior—not before men, but before God; must live, not in view of this life, but of the life eternal. And, he adds, it is not possible so to live save by devoting one's whole energy to interior perfection. One may surely call such life timeless, since it is life in God above time, and above all that belongs to the mere world of sense. It is an actual fulfilment, in some sort, of the word of Augustine,—

"Join thyself to eternity, and thou shalt find rest." For one must hold it perfectly possible thus to rise from our ethical strivings *sub specie temporis* to such theistic, transcendental, and all-determining aims *sub specie aeternitatis*. Rückert so held it, when he counted it no mere counsel of perfection to say,—“Be like the Self Eternal, all moving and unmoved”! So did Renan, when he held that if we should turn from our present experience, and adopt the standpoint of eternity, we should find nothing impossible. 'Twas for that very end we made the time-series an ideal construction in such wise that the constructing mind could be no part of that which was so constructed. We must therefore claim the worth and elevation—the time-superiority—of our free spiritual personality which this implies. We have no right to speak of the Eternal Consciousness, in its time-transcending completeness, knowing the eternal and abiding value of the world, without, at the same time, recognising that such an eternal valuation or abiding outlook is made possible for us also. We may free ourselves from the modern shackles of time, and regain, like Milton for a moment in his Ode on “Time,” the grip on Eternity that marked mediæval thinkers;—

“Then long Eternity shall greet our bliss
With an *individual* kiss.”

Our theistic idealism shares not the vain, uncertain talk of some modern philosophers about final absorption in God in any sense that would annul our individual existence. Not in such a sense do we await indivisible existence. Eternity I have taken to be the form of God's life, and eternity I therefore find in the Being of God. He is the seat of all things; and there is nothing above or behind Him, to theistic idealism. These conceptions ought surely to keep talk of the timeless from becoming, as it can quite easily become, a cant phrase; nothing is really further from cant than to have our lives so far divinised as to escape the tyranny of time, in the fellowship of the Eternal. The only cant is, to talk of ideals while we do anything less. For the world of time and space is a world of facts rather than of ideals, in the lofty sense here

meant at least. One can agree with those who think we do not merely find or accept the real world, that we make or will it, and are here to do so. But I do not care to say, with Royce, that "the temporal not merely implies the eternal; in its wholeness it constitutes the eternal"; for such a mode of conception and expression fails, in the view of theistic idealism, of those discriminations which are a helpful and necessary advance to thought. It is, as already said, purely quantitative, its "eternal" a mere "wholeness" of the "temporal." It is not interminable duration existing all together ("*interminabilis duratio tota simul existens*")—a common conception of eternity, since the days of Boëthius. But even that has the fault of being perfectly abstract, disconnected with the realm of Being, absolute or relative; and we have seen that just this abstractness has wrought most trouble and mischief in discussions of time and eternity. Abstract indifference to actual Being may give us metaphysical jugglery, but cannot do more; hence I have preferred the qualitative differences of the finite or temporal, and the infinite or eternal Life. The qualitative differences are great. Existence, whose form or measure is eternity, has nothing to do with change, whereas our changeful existence is measured by time: time, for our finite existence, has before and after, while eternity exists whole all at once, as Aquinas put the matter, to shew it was no question of parts. God's eternity is His own; but no other being, if eternal, is its own duration or existence. We cannot, therefore, say that any "wholeness" of the temporal "constitutes" the eternal. And if we speak of eternity as the measure of God, we must not forget that a measure applies only to what is finite or enclosed within limits. The incommensurableness of Deity is not to be overlooked in such a connection. But this must not betray us into thinking of a quantitative Infinite, when we consider our relation to God as the Absolute Life, for there it is with an intensive infinity we have to do—with a Life that is eternally realised, or is the realisation of Eternity. Nor must we deny a certain truth to time—or to space—as the forms under which our finite experience is possible, and as psychologically

necessary to us, albeit our time and space determinations are by no means the highest and final findings of reason. For, as Royce, in treating of "The World and the Individual," has finely said, "My true comfort can never lie in my temporal attainment of my goal. For it is my first business, as a moral agent, and as a servant of God, to set before myself a goal that, in time, simply cannot be attained." "Our comfort here lies in knowing that, in all this life, ideals are sought, with incompleteness and with sorrow, but with the assurance of the divine triumph in Eternity lighting up the whole." Yet here, again, we must not let our consciousness be over-weighted with the thought of the future, to the neglect of the uniqueness of the present moment in its possible realisation of communion and oneness with God. That divinely real moment, which transcends and eludes the psychologist, is no "specious present," but a projection into eternal standpoint and ideal comprehension. Why, indeed, should there not be, for the expansive spiritual individuality, such a mode of escape from the sphere of the relative? It is precisely in such a conscious experience as that just described that we gain what real conception of eternity or timeless being as may be ours. A certain consciousness of timelessness is thus a possible attainment. We shall see, in our chapter on "Immortality," what a rich and strong possibility it is. Mind as mind, it should be remembered in this connection, is not subject to space relations, but has the range of the universe. It is a consideration of consciousness, not of space, which has its own field or province. Consciousness is the mind's form of activity. Only materiality is qualified by spatial form. In virtue of all that has now been advanced, we can see how our highest ideals and values are seized and held in higher mode than that of time—in some sort *sub specie aeternitatis*.

But even as to time and space, there is never need to confound these, in their empiric content, with time and space categories as ideal constructions of thought. Thought, of course, cannot furnish a single elemental object of knowledge, but from the ideas of time and space, it has

developed the whole of mathematical science. Of the discreteness of real time, James says, in one work ('Pluralistic Universe'), that "it comes to us in drops"; in another work ('Psychology'), that "we tell it off in pulses." But scientific time or time-perception is not what Bergson means by duration (*la durée réelle*), rather he means by it the value or subjective significance of the time-fact for our continuous and purposive self. That, of course, is a highly suggestive but not very new standpoint for Theistic Idealism, which, as I have throughout emphasised, is deeply concerned with the essential nature and importance of the self, which it makes the necessary presupposition of the time-concept. But it differs from Bergson in not confounding metaphysics, as an intellectual interpretation of life or reality, with life itself or intuition itself. Intuition is but the starting-point of metaphysics as reflection that follows, and is based upon, the appreciative experience. And for the autonomy of spirit I have already claimed more, and other, than Bergson has done. I do not think we ought to allow the value for us which Bergson has read into time to obscure the negative character, metaphysically, of the time and space concepts. Time is only a thought continuum—only the possibility—that something may happen. Space is a possibility also—that something may exist or be. But the space of the geometrician is merely something thought, not intuited, as with the psychologist. Time and space are both negative concepts: neither of them gives either sign or token; but they are not possibilities you can think away. Time, with its one dimensionality, is such that with it coincide morality and quality: three-dimensional space has only one relation to the knowing subject, that of the present. Space, as a form, makes perception a possibility. There are, of course, the senses in which time and space may be called infinite, which I cannot here discuss. But the I, which thinks them, is finite. Although time and space are the negative concepts which I have shewn them to be, yet they—time and space—are, since I comprehend them. They are the conditions, respectively,

that something can exist in limited duration and in determinate form. It must not be overlooked how man in his whole experiential life—which is an unbroken series of changes—comes to feel himself rooted in space, and grounded in time. It is out of such empirical basis and data that he at length abstracts his concept of time, and even invests it with the character of an *à priori* form of intuition. But it is the time order that enables him to understand the rise and objectivity of things, to the ever-changing process-content of his experience. But time, in these empirical aspects and relations, is not to be identified with time in the abstract, but considered as an essential constituent or inseparable element of these empirical data of experience, together with the other co-elements of such data. There are, in abstract time, no time-atoms, but only thought-divisions, pure objects of our thought. But that is another kind of thought from that in which Bergson finds proof of the reality of time, and Bergson's own conception of time is not always one and the same.

It is initial and incontrovertible fact, that, as apprehensible from the sensory side, everything experiencing or experienceable is involved in the time flux. This has been well recognised by and since Kant, who, in taking time to be the form of all inner experience, held its successive moments to be moments of a single, all-comprehending time. But time, viewed as a homogeneous medium, is other than time in its sensible or temporal content, to which Bergson has devoted so much attention. Time, in its homogeneity, is measured only through space relations. Time, as experienced, is another matter, made up of the multiplicity of psychical states or qualitative differences. Bergson, like Kant, allows space an existence separable from its content. He thinks homogeneous time must be coincident with space, a treatment of space, as independent, which cannot be considered quite satisfactory. But it is not with time—or space either—in these abstract or homogeneous senses we are here concerned. We are concerned with time as the form of man's life, but in its inner consciousness aspect; not with that determinate order

of separate things or events which Bergson calls "spatialised" time, but purely with time consciousness. There is, of course, the difficulty of our time-consciousness, to wit, the paradox of the simultaneity of the successive, or the holding together past and present in one act of consciousness, which Prof. Lovejoy has ably dealt with, and on which I do not now dwell (see 'The Philosophical Review,' 1912, pp. 330-335). I am, however, concerned only with the actual nature of our consciousness of time, apart from all outer and spatial considerations, in which the present is an actual datum of consciousness; in which consciousness of the past has been taken up into our consciousness of the present; and in which our present consciousness has a forward-looking aspect towards the future. This view of the present is deliberately taken, in spite of the extreme recourse to denying such a datum in consciousness as the present moment, on the part of James, Hodgson, and others, and also in spite of Bergson's denial of an actual instantaneous present, and his reduction of our present to consciousness of the past and looking towards the future. Holding, as I do, time as the form of the finite life, and maintaining said life to be that of a self-identical, self-persistent ego, I take the successional states of our time-durational experience to be a continuum, the internal stability of these states deriving precisely from the fact that they are strung on the golden cord of such permanent, self-identical being or personality. There seems to me no need to fly so violently in the face of the facts of introspective experience as the thinkers just mentioned have done. For Bergson, "the present moment is constituted by the quasi-instantaneous section effected by our perception" in the course of "that continuity of becoming which is reality itself"; but "the present moment" is not "constituted" for me in any such external manner; without denying the senses and uses of ontologic time—and space—I think the present moment as it occurs within my soul, and I so think it apart or away from Bergson's objectively becoming reality. From this living present the past is distinct, though it is real, and

has been taken up in certain senses into us in such wise as to form part of us in the present. But no past is comparable to the vital and morally active present: the present moment is so unique in its concentrated greatness, power, and splendour, that it acts as though it were alone in the world, with neither a past nor a future in its concern. No doubt, the past, too, has a uniqueness of its own, for no other past could have taught us and toughened us save only the past we have had. It is, then, with the time-progression within the soul or consciousness I am primarily concerned, as earlier shewn in this chapter, not, however, without recognising an externality of time, which is all-important for the reality of history and for other considerations. That, however, is a time-consciousness which feels itself, in Bergson's words, "contemporaneous with a state of the external world," a world with which, for the time being, I have had nothing to do. This, because of the freedom, flexibility, sufficiency, and expansiveness, of the world of consciousness. Consciousness and its states are, of course, not in space, and I have preferred to keep clear of spatial connections, and abide by the time-world of pure consciousness, because thereby, it appears to me, we are best enabled to understand and appreciate the world of eternity. All consciousness, it may be said, is consciousness of time, nor is there any consciousness of the present which is not also, in some real sense, consciousness of the past; but consciousness is one, though having different aspects or characters. We can draw distinctions in consciousness without hypostatising them. Eternity is the form of God's being, which is not at all in time, but is, nevertheless, the origin and the ground of the time-succession. I feel no particular need to dissent when Green says that consciousness *sub specie temporis*—time in its empirical content—and consciousness *sub specie aeternitatis* cannot be comprehended in a single conception. But, though our life here is *sub specie temporis*, what I am concerned to deny is, that we cannot here attain to some appreciation and realisation of what life is *sub specie aeternitatis*. It is to help in this attain-

ment that I segregate the pure consciousness of time in the way I have done, with express relation to the understanding of the timeless or eternal. Say this appreciation of the eternal is only an ideal, but it is an ideal *in*, and not merely *towards*, which we make progress, I deny that "the time-process itself is just what constitutes the timeless content of the Absolute Experience" [H. V. Knox, 'Mind,' 1914]. The content of the Absolute Being is that of eternal consciousness, not "the time-process itself"; as immutable, the Absolute Being stands outside time; if its content were only "the time-process itself," then it were no longer the Absolute and Eternal Being, but merely relative and temporal. I am not to be taken as in any way arguing for Green's "timelessness" or "eternity" of thought; I am presenting my own position on the subject of the relations of time and eternity in total disregard of Green, who has not here influenced me in the slightest, and to whose views I am not to be taken as subscribing. Indeed, his use and interpretation of consciousness are utterly different from mine, and I reject them, though I think he has stimulated discussion. Nor do I, like Green, seek any appreciation of eternity in the interests of a static unity, for to me the eternal is the reverse of the sphere of the empty and the otiose: our appreciation of it must be, not by anything so thin as the "thought" of Green, but by the soul or self, the self that thinks and wills, that feels and loves. This concrete self will seek an appreciation of the eternal in its fulness of concrete eternal content, a very different thing from "the time-process itself," with its merely temporal content. Of course, if our conception is only that of a modern writer who speaks of "a kingdom of God in a problematical eternity which does not interest us," we have raised a psychological barrier to our advance (Loisy). In that case we should have lost our confidence in the Absolute Reason, and have dwarfed ourselves to merely shrunken creatures of time. But, if we have any vision—and philosophy must here greatly depend on religion for that—of the mutual and perpetual commerce of two spirits, the

finite and the Infinite, and of eternal life as, in some measure, real and realisable for man, we shall realise how little such higher life is of the mere clock-time order, and how utterly it is an affair of ever-growing and unspeakably rich concrete spiritual content. It is no longer a matter of the spatialised self, or of bare temporal successions, but of pure and full spiritual activity, of the interpenetration of our Spirit by the Eternal Spirit, of the emancipation of our spirit from the tyrannies of time and sense, of the furtherance of life by fellowship with God, and by such simultaneities as we can, in some sort, comprehend. Thus, in the judgments of reason on final value, we judge *sub specie aeternitatis*, but do not construct an immortality out of the timelessness of abstractions, or out of a static and negative unity of all things, formed by deprivation of quality and non-concreteness of spiritual content. That would be an utter misconception. Nor is there the slightest reason to fear that, in seeking philosophically to glimpse eternity, we shall relax too much our hold on the historical, the external, and the contingent; for still, with Plato, "we must believe that the corporeal is burdensome and heavy and earthly and visible. And such a soul is weighed down by this, and is dragged back into the visible world" ['Phaedo,' 30 C], though for it the ideal abides, in a real sense. Hence we find that even Ritschl, momentarily metaphysical in spite of himself, viewed eternity, in a general sense, as "the power of the spirit over time." But though we may in thought or spirit so raise ourselves as to contemplate all time and existence—or leave the time-world practically behind us—yet, from this vision of, or communion with, the timeless world, we are compelled to return to the sphere in which we can only originate deeds or events, at particular points in space and particular moments of time. Such is our practical life, citizens of eternity though we be, and though, as said Buddha, "the sage is delivered from time." The deliverance is always his ideal, at least partially attained, so that he can appreciate the saying of Michael Angelo, "happy is the soul

in which time no longer courses," as he is raised above the scorn of the hypocritic days. There, things remembered may be viewed or regarded as dissociated from the present, as outside the flux of time; a mystical triumph of eternity, if you will. But if that mystical attainment were complete, it would surely mean the cessation of our natural existence. It haunts the soul, however, as it learns to find in God the source and the sustainer, the inspirer and the goal, of all goodness and true blessedness, even as it haunted the poet of the *Paradiso*, until his spirit found at length its timeless satisfaction in mingling its "looks" with "the Goodness that has no End." Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς, καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος. This timeless life attaches itself always more to the logical than to the temporal order: it derives from the outward and the historical all they can impart or convey as significant and symbolic of eternal truths and absolute values, but it concentrates its attention mainly on the absolute truths and their inner eternal values, to which *sub specie temporis* complete justice can never be done.

CHAPTER V.

HISTORY AND PROVIDENCE IN THEISTIC IDEALISM.

THE question of History—and of Providence as revealed therein—is of grave importance to Theistic Idealism. God has neither forsaken the world He made, nor been absorbed or lost in it. In His Providence, it remains His divinest care. His creative power persists, and is pledged to its maintenance. Aquinas, after Boëthius, viewed Providence as the all-regulating plan (*ipsa divina ratio*) of the Supreme Ruler of the universe; and with this we may be content, if only the idea of plan be linked with that of Divine purpose and end. It is, as Dante said, “La provvidenza, che cotanto assetta”—Providence, that settles so much (*Paradiso*, I. 121). Here, as elsewhere, our idealism sees what it brings the power to see. Insight is the prime requirement. The theistic value of History can be appreciated only by the man whose inner vision of God has left him with a high and exacting moral ideal. One must have found God in his own moral life, in order to perceive the Divine meaning or significance of human history. That fact is strangely overlooked by those who fail to find any satisfactory result for theistic belief, in the appeal to the course of secular history. Such a moral idealist as we have spoken of has a vision of ends, infinite in worth, progressive in realisation. With soul so luminous, his view of history is, so to speak, from the inside. The soul that is barren of spiritual event will have scant penetration into the meaning of the great events of

history. That God is evidenced or revealed in the whole course of human history, is apparent from the spontaneity, persistence, and universality of the belief in His Divinity, everywhere evident in the history of the most highly civilised peoples. In such cases the idea of God has been so little left behind, that there it is most perfected, developed, enriched. The precise and absolute antithesis of theistic idealism is here found in the position of those to whom nothing exists for the State higher than, or beyond, itself in world-history—a theory that leaves the State as little moral grounding as was postulated for it in the days of Guicciardini. Of course such stark historical materialism is wholly inadmissible. Such a theological view of the world and of history, on the other hand, as that of Bossuet, is, in referring all to Providence, impossible to modern philosophy; but that philosophy would have little title to respect if it shared the secularistic narrow-mindedness of a good deal of modern philosophical writing, which makes Providence much less probable than the facts of human history and experience suggest to any mind with the smallest tincture of spirituality. Theistic idealism is not disturbed, much less dismayed, by the many philosophies of history, with their diverse points of view—Augustine and Bossuet, Taine and Littré, Bunsen and Hegel, Comte and Schelling, Vico and Michelet, Flint and the rest: it welcomes every element of truth in each of these, but is mainly concerned to view history for itself, to see it steadily, and to see it whole. It was the boast of Ranke—legitimate enough in its connection—that he was first a historian: it pleased him to discuss how much could be said for both sides of a question, and to leave the rest to Providence. But such an attitude does not become us in this chapter, where one is, first of all, a theistic idealist, with a definite critical and constructive attitude. This does not, however, mean that history is to be shaped by any theory or attitude, for the theory must conform to the history, and be drawn therefrom. Hegel and Fichte, Comte and Cousin, all sinned in this respect, and there is no need for Theistic Idealism

to follow them, when recognising what an essential factor in human civilisation and history, theistic belief has been. Our idealism assumes the unity and significance of Divine agency and purpose as necessary to any real philosophy of history. A philosophy of history that should attempt to dispense with Divine or theistic agency would never reach the unity of a philosophical system at all. The contemplation of a moral Governor of the world is, in the view of some of our greatest historians, the precise presentation of history. Moral life and its development are thus the core of history. At any rate, our function, as Pfleiderer once properly remarked, is not to play the master to history, but to understand it. The spiritual forces of history are our direct but dispassionate concern, for history is, as Leibniz remarked, the true demonstration of religion. No evolutionary view of the world can be satisfactory to theistic idealism, which does not find an ever-present, all-working Divine Reason in the process of the world's history. There is a Power Eternal, which co-ordinates and controls causes and events, so that they make for righteousness, and subserve rational ends. Our idealism postulates rationality and morality in all true and advancing civilisations. The Spencerian philosophy of evolution left us only an Unknown Force as Cause of all things, the unsatisfying result of attempting to explain the world from without, not from within—by the interpreting power of the inner consciousness. This was the nemesis of the lack of idealistic factors or faculty—a fatal and unilluminated lack. How far behind Fichte, when, in his 'Vocation of Man,' he said: "It is this higher World-plan, which we call Nature. . . . Thy Will, O Infinite One! Thy Providence alone, is this higher nature." There can obviously be no philosophy here, if there is no correspondence between the mind and the world, if, that is to say, there are no powers and laws within us answering to the order and laws without us. Behind the endless procession of life and events, there is the Source and Support of all becoming, even the absolute, all-enveloping, and incomprehensible Life, which is summed in the word, God. This, however, is not to be confounded with the arbitrary

a priori character of Hegel's view of historic reality, as it appears in the dialectical movement, without regard or conformableness to actual or empiric reality. In speaking of Schelling, Hegel said that "the concrete content, God, life, or whatever particular form it has, is indeed the content and object of natural consciousness; but the difficulty lies in bringing what is contained in the concrete into concrete thought in accordance with its different determinations, and in laying hold of the unity" ('History of Philosophy,' vol. iii. p. 521). Admirably said, but the difficulty does not really trouble Hegel, for he elaborates the material of history according to his conception of the dialectic movement of the Idea, rather than with respect to actual reality. Thus it was not possible that Hegel should find any passage from the ideal process to the world of history, so that he left a hybrid of history and speculation. Lotze, in his 'Mikrokosmos,' pointed out clearly enough what this treatment of history as the development of an Idea, and of personal life as a logically necessary stage in the development of an impersonal Absolute, meant, and no multiplication of sophistical attempts has been able to gainsay Lotze's main contention. It remains a "superstition," as "calm" and as "frightful" as he said, and its upholders still seek "to cover the imperfection of their ideas with the cloak of a generous putting aside of self."

Our idealism finds, with Lord Acton, the tribute of history to the theory of Divine Providence, in the striking fact of steady progress in the direction of real and assured freedom—intellectual, moral, and social—Carlyle, Newman, and Froude notwithstanding. All that was gained, for example, in the direction of intellectual freedom by Hobbes and Spinoza, by Herder, Locke, and Lessing, by Milton and by Mill, is to be here included, so that the liberty of philosophising is definitely maintained as a theoretic principle. It is not, of course, meant that the progress of freedom has been either constant or uniform. But it is meant that, with the self-activity of spirit as the central category of history, it cannot wear a mechanical or fatalistic aspect. The progress of the

world is no rectilinear movement, but marked by oscillations and rhythmic pulsations; in the system of things progress was perceived by Thucydides, Æschylus, and others, and a compensatory working was discerned so early as Tacitus, who in his 'Annals' (III. 55), remarked: "*Nisi forte rebus cunctis inest quidam, velut orbis, ut quemadmodum temporum vices, ita morum vertantur: nec omnia apud priores meliora; sed nostra quoque aetas multa laudis et artium imitanda posteris tulit.*" But all subsequent world-history has meant the positing of ideal ends, as part of the progressive development of mankind, and of the reducing all things to unity by finding, in some sort, the central One in the Many. In the pursuit of such ideal ends, God is the need and the strength of humanity. Finite being can never be independent of Him. It is, for Theistic Idealism, quite essential to go beyond empirical facts, and find a metaphysical interpretation of the course of history. A fact of history is not a bare fact or mere event, but is, idealistically, a fact to be interpreted by the mental and spiritual life of man. History, as we here view it, is meant in the broadest sense—is concerned with the world and its events, apprehended chiefly from the viewpoint of being in time. There is a constructive principle at work in our interpretation. It is, history as manifesting for us the purposes of Deity. The philosophy of such history rests upon a definite theory of the universe—that of a theistic evolution in its cosmic bearings. But history, as a process in time, yet stands in over-individual time; it finds its meaning, and the justification and support of its personal and moral values, really in the timeless or transcendent, to which, as Eternal Reality, it is here and now related. Though Eternal Deity be raised above time, yet the rationale of the temporal process must be found in postulating His activity therein, and support thereto. And any philosophy of history must, of course, avoid the treatment of time as illusory, which it cannot be, as grounded in the eternal, though it may take it as objective time. For there is a sense in which we may say, with Dr Bosanquet, "that timelessness is an essential constituent of time." We do not, however, like him and

certain other thinkers, think too lightly of time, for if we held to the unreality of time, we should rate History in no high or satisfactory degree. It is, to him, "a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degree of 'being or trueness'" ('Individuality and Value,' pp. 78-79). Again, he takes it as "the doubtful story of successive events," which, as such, cannot be amalgamated with a "complete interpretation" of things. But it seems gratuitously dogmatic and extreme to rob history of any "considerable" value because it must remain approximate, never "complete" or perfect. Would any one think of denying "considerable" value to the scientific study of nature, because it, too, is never "complete" or perfect? It seems to me unfair and even absurd to treat history, and the whole realm of human achievement, as chaotic and incoherent, grounded in no system of order, subject to no reign of law, and shot through with no principle of development. It is just the business of history, philosophically pursued, to get at the true nature of the facts, and their essential relations, so that "the doubtful story of successive events" grows always less "doubtful," and more rich, and reasonable, and scientific, in character. History thus becomes a reasonable whole in itself, and, like such other wholes as science, art, and religion, takes its place in the "complete interpretation" of things. History, though *in* time, need not be merely *for* time; though a whole in itself, it need not be only for such whole, but may also be for the Whole of such relative wholes. History represents a causal and dynamic order, not merely a temporal one, and has, as main concern, the value of the connection of free beings or wills. Our Theistic Idealism is concerned to maintain that the actuality of events, on the broad view here laid down, is always, in some way, conditioned by antecedent action, on the part of God. If the ultimate reality of the universe be not matter but spirit, we may expect to find its orderings in history to be under the laws and ideals of reason, as grounded in God, the Absolute Spirit. God's Providential government of the world must be taken as universal, the

world being thus grounded in rationality and freedom. This does not keep single or particular events from having a providential significance of their own, but that significance is only rightly apprehended in relation to the whole progressive self-revelation of Deity. Divine government as universal must so extend to all particulars. One is tempted to ask, in the words of Swedenborg,—“If it be said that the Divine Providence is a universal government, and still nothing is governed by it, but only held in its connection, and the things belonging to government are disposed by others, can this be called a universal government?” The minutest part must be no less His care than the immeasurable whole, to any rigorous philosophical thinking. Of course, the advances made by the sciences of natural forces and laws make such a confidence in God’s providential agency increasingly hard or difficult in our time. Besides, the spontaneous activity of the world, and the great fact of human freedom, make the direct reference of everything to God’s all-comprehending Providence, no easy or rational affair, when such free forces or causes are properly allowed for. But still, the religious consciousness does not relax its demands in this connection. It insists that, if God is God at all, if He is a God so immanent as science and philosophy suggest, and religious faith affirms, then His presence and agency must really extend to everything—the sparrow’s fall, the silent tear, the sad mischance, the hidden sacrifice. “For God,” as Dr Ward has well remarked, “as its common Creator, the world is one whole: however much differentiated, it never for Him loses its meaning, and therefore never lacks its intuited unity. For God there is no exclusive standpoint, and therefore no need to hurry hither and thither, attending now to this, now to that.” “But to talk of a *Deus ex machina* in such a case is to assume that there is some independent system to get tangled up into knots, to forget that Nature for the theist just is this continuous mediation of the Divine, and not a mechanism independent of it” (‘Realm of Ends,’ pp. 249-250). Strange that the confusions and instability of religious

thinking should have made insistences so pertinent and obvious, extremely necessary and well-directed. Theistic Idealism insists that God must be a living, inworking power in the whole course of nature and history—that His world must, in short, be a living organism through which the Eternal Spirit breathes. All things in it must move, in growth and freedom, towards the ethical consummation of His work. The position of Prof. Carveth Read is as common as it is absurd and contradictory. He says,—"If Theism accepts the scientific postulates of conservation, continuity, and uniformity, the belief in a particular providence and in the objective efficacy of prayer can hardly be maintained" ('Natural and Social Morals,' p. 247). Almost in the same breath he declares that "freewill," in the personal reference, "is in no way incompatible with the scientific postulates." What theistic idealism contends is, that the freedom of Deity is equally compatible with "the scientific postulates"; and it even thinks there is grotesque absurdity in claiming a freedom and immunenness in this connection for ourselves which we deny to Deity. The tendency is purely due, under an unwarranted mechanical conception of law, to defective theistic grasp, since theism, in its hold of a living personal Deity, makes at once possible and real a living Providence. The religious consciousness would even like to know why it may not boldly say that, if not the untutored savage, at least the modern unsophisticated religious mind, seeing "God in clouds" and hearing Him "in the wind," stands nearer actual and essential truth than your sceptical modern philosopher. It would like to know why it must blot out Divine volitional action for laws which are only symbols of a certain stable regularity in that action, and why, in a universe so active, its Deity must be so otiose and impotent in the affairs of actual life as though He were really a superfluity. Theistic idealism does not take Providential laws—founded in infinite freedom and wisdom—to make the world a soulless and unconscious mechanism. It takes the prime condition of historic progress to be the power of freedom, in virtue of our self-

determination, to triumph over mechanical necessity. It regards matter and energy, with their properties and laws, as what they are, because Deity is in and behind them. It does not stumble before the miracles of Providence: even he that hath no historic imagination may see them. It might satisfy Hegel and Mill to bar the admission of new elements into the historic process, in their rooted adhesion to the principle of continuity; but Theistic Idealism retains that principle in the truer form wherein is admitted the influx of new spiritual ideals and energy from the Oversoul or Eternal Spirit in historic individuals. It claims for this truth or principle a much wider application in history and experience than the so-called "Great Man Theory," for prophetic power is by no means so restricted as that theory supposes. Philosophers are straitened in themselves, not in the Eternal Spirit who inspires. "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God"; and even philosophers may miss them, especially if they raise barriers of preconceived theory which make the realisation a psychological impossibility. It is a very blind reading of history that can find nothing of epochal inflow of spiritual force or energy in individual, group, community, or race. What indeed is all this world's actual history, apart from the ideal Providence that makes it no meaningless movement? After every metaphysical theory, the heart, in its hours of great need, refuses to heed those secondary causes which were only dumb expositors, and will have no Helper but One who is Sovereign Lord of all things. A faith, if you will, hard enough to keep—in trackless desert, on surging wave, in battle din, and before cold cosmic process; but no truer philosophy has ever seen the light than that which leads up to confidence in a living Providence which rescues spiritual life from fictional result, and provides assurance that the darker aspects of life are streaked with specific, though hidden, Divine purpose. Of course, science still flings her fleeting agnosticisms athwart our path, but theistic idealism knows that science, too, is providential, and merely instrumental. Its position—in accord

with the most rigorous philosophical conception—is, that God is the living God, present, perceptive, and operative, within and around us. But the Divine operations in the world, however they may be recognised, must, in their mode, be hidden from us. It would be as irrational, as it is impossible, to seek to understand these, from the side of God, rather than from what is possible to us. But we can easily see what difficulties reside in the facts that God will not violate our freedom, and that man, in his dread powers of freedom, may wake all the antagonisms of moral evil, through a bad will and a twisted conscience. These negative and abnormal forces are arrayed against the positive spiritual forces of which we have spoken, which latter condition the developments of the race. But the hampering mechanical forces and conditions are not of any such inflexible and fatalistic character that they cannot be overcome by our spiritual activity. So they are not to be classed or compared with the baleful forces of moral evil, the implacable foe of freedom and progress. Unscared by any pantheistic shadow, theistic idealism exults in a Deity by Whom and in Whom are all things. To it, God is more than all His providences. It opines not only that there is a Divinity that shapes our ends, but that these ends are better defined to Him than we had thought or believed. All the Divine providences must be special—the fruit of new interest, fresh thought, particularised affection—on any thorough theistic theory. Any other Providence would be no Providence at all. Hence the cry of the purest souls of the centuries has been,—“What is it to me to live in a world without a Providence?” Theistic idealism has overpassed the theories, common enough, which resolve Providence into the thinnest and most unreal of abstractions, for it has no mind to be carried along the stream of chance, with a waning sense of freedom, and a lessening feeling of personality. As for the new Providence, which Positivism would construct for us, we do not invoke these good offices, for when we want a Providence at all, we want one of Divine and not merely human making. The religious consciousness,

which craves a present Ground of all things, has here its rights, and, as we have ever found them rational, we cannot suffer it to be robbed of that which is its own. Its consciousness is just that of the inability of our race to be sufficient unto itself in the matter of its spiritual energies, its dependence upon some transcendent, but related, Power for the renewal of its founts of spiritual force. Such a presupposition of theistic idealism is the most rational explanation of the character of the historic spiritual continuity of the most civilised races. Over the broad realm of the world's history, there is the ever-present need of some Co-ordinating Power—a controlling Will at the centre of things; and therein lies the field of Providence, early and late. From those early centuries in which the apologist Aristides began to see in the Christians “a new race” with “something Divine mingled with it”; in which Justin acknowledged “our creation, preservation, the blessings that we derive from things about us”; in which Cyprian sought to mould and dominate human society by his conception of the *Unitas Ecclesiæ*, on which Ambrose was to found, and Augustine to build, his City of God; in which Salvian, too, wrote on the Government of God; in which the immanence of God in the universe, guiding and sustaining it, was emphasised by Clement of Alexandria; in which Origen took the orderings of Providence to be for the bringing of men back to goodness and blessedness; in which Eusebius of Cæsarea proclaimed the majestic unity of history in virtue of Divine purpose running through it; from those times, I say, the conception of Divine Providence—the possibility of a true philosophy of history—could never be lost. The emphasis of the early Fathers on the universal Providence of God was too marked for that, but the elaborate handling of the subject by Aquinas was still to come, and mediæval thought was to move from the Unity or Whole down to individual purpose. He, like Albertus Magnus, assumed the attitude of holding the inclination of the will to be its own, but yet the product of divine agency. Such freedom as there is, in Aquinas, is too verbal merely: Providence is reduced very much to a kind

of fate. Doubtless the influence of Arabian interpreters of Aristotle, such as Avicenna, was here at work. "God in moving the will does not coerce it" (*Deus movendo voluntatem non cogit ipsam*), but, as we have said, gives it its inclination. "To be moved by the will is to be moved by one's self, that is, by internal principle" (*moveri voluntate est moveri ex se, id est, a principio intrinseco*), but that does not, in his view, keep the internal principle from being, from another and extrinsic principle. God is thus the Cause of all the acts of agents, moral evil, as purely negative, excepted. We cannot now dwell on the dissent of the Scotists from this strong theory of Providential agency. But one might very well agree with Swedenborg's remark, in his treatise on "Divine Providence," that "it is a law of the Divine Providence that man should act from freedom according to reason."

Our purpose is not now historical, but critical and constructive, and we are merely making passing reference to the basis and beginnings of that doctrine of Providence now so long current. What I am concerned to point out is, that, instead, as is commonly supposed, of the presence of the God-idea and the Divine agency being something of difficult and doubtful proof, in the history of the most civilised peoples, the real difficulty would be to find any broad tracts of history—such as the history of the Greek race, the history of the Latin races, and the history of the Teutonic races—in which these have not been conspicuously present and potent. In varying degrees, no doubt; since, by idealistic principle, a religion so pliant, adaptable, and universal, as is the Christian religion, must vary according to the nature of the soil on which it falls; and also, since there are nations or peoples who have not allowed theistic idea or principle to work within them as they might. Theistic idealism regards it as quite impossible to recognise "an unmeaning Fate to be the inmost principle of all things," while keenly conscious of the difficulties in the way of setting forth a full and precise theory of a Co-ordinating Power moulding the nations in their free—and, let it be said, unconscious—strivings and movements towards a predestined moral end. But it accepts what

Dr Crozier, in his massive and valuable work on 'The History of Intellectual Development' calls "the belief in a stupendous and overarching Supernaturalism everywhere enfolding and pervading the world and its affairs, and giving scope and exercise to all that is properly religious in thought and feeling." I do not mean this reference to a teleological interpretation of historical development to imply acceptance of every point of Dr Crozier's elucidation of his great theme. But it is much more valuable for our purpose than works which are merely partial and purely historical. I mean such works as Dr White's 'History of the Warfare of Science with Theology,' and 'The History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century' by Dr Merz. Of the former work, it must be said that a "history" it is not, but rather too much of a polemical treatise: its wealth of detail is used in the service of a rather narrow world-view, without sufficient caution and discrimination. Of the latter work, the first two volumes are, in many respects, valuable for the history of science; the third and fourth volumes, on the philosophical development, are, in many places, very restricted and stereotyped, in their knowledge of authorities, so that Dr Merz misses much he had better have known. The work is needlessly voluminous in character, and painfully repetitive of much all too familiar material. The two philosophical portions of it are marked by some lack, both of knowledge and of judgment, in certain spheres, the philosophy of religion, for example; they are "European" only in the narrowest sense, the thought of too many countries being wholly ignored, while the knowledge of the thought of some others, even Italy for example, is not at all intimate; most serious of all, despite much useful treatment of various special problems, there is a great lack of real pre-occupation with the central philosophical problem of the order and connection of things, their universal *Zusammenhang*. The main strength of the work of Merz lies on the German side, in which respect it usefully supplements the third volume of Crozier's 'History,' which deals mainly with British and French developments. It does so all the more, because it concerns itself more in this

connection than does the work of Crozier with abstract thought or philosophical movement. But the work of Crozier is of more general consequence to us in this chapter, since its insistence is that "if the Evolution of Civilization is a definite and not an erratic or chaotic movement, and if the evolution of the human spirit is also definite and not erratic or chaotic, the other factor, namely Fate, which unites with the human mind in the production of this orderly movement of civilisation must be definite also and not erratic or chaotic, that is to say, it must be a Providence and not a blind Fate ('History of Intellectual Development,' vol. iii. p. 137). He rightly sees that, "without circumscribing the domain of Providence," the "freewill of man," and "human judgment or reason," are parts of the "orderly evolution," no less than "the blind precipitancy of the brutes" (Ibid., p. 140). Theistic Idealism rejects, in its theory of a Personal Providence, all pantheistic and naturalistic schemes, so far as these attempt to explain the historic world-development merely by an impersonal reason, or by purely social impulses and products. This applies to certain recent endeavours, no less than to such earlier attempts as that of Dr Draper to write 'The History of the Intellectual Development of Europe' on "physiological principles"—an ingenious but egregiously mistaken and remarkably defective performance. The destiny of the human race is determined, and the course of its history controlled, not by natural laws alone, as Taine, for example, fundamentally supposed, but by Divine Providence. What has just been said applies even to such early—and praiseworthy—attempts at a philosophy of history as that of Herder, who tried to hold to pantheism and individualism at one and the same time, without any proper determining principle of unity. In his work on 'Ideas on the Philosophy of the History of Mankind,' the free process of history—as the march of the nations towards the summit of Humanity—is viewed too much as but the continuation and completion of the nature-process: the concept of development was his mode of connecting nature with history, a concept strangely wanting to Spinoza's substance theory. The stress on nature

is so great throughout, owing to Herder's sympathy with Rousseau's notion of man's perfectibility, that the spiritual evolution cannot be regarded as satisfactory. As for Leibniz, his mathematical preoccupations did not render him, with his profound belief in a moral order, insensible to the notion of philosophical development; he clearly saw the need in the splendid universalism of his entire philosophy, of the imposing idea of final cause—of the meaning and purpose of things—in order to dealing with mechanical causes. To the humanitarian and scientific cosmopolitanism of Leibniz, the present was full of the past, big with the future, and made for unity. But the idea of progress as the organic principle of history was first finely set forth by Turgot, whose contribution to the philosophy of history consisted in shewing history to be, as has been well expressed, "an organic whole with an internal plan progressively realised by internal forces." Turgot's views of progress and development were, in fact, deeper and more comprehensive than philosophical writers of his own country have always perceived or acknowledged. Montesquieu linked social idealism to a deterministic conception of history. Condorcet held fundamentally to the idea of human perfectibility as evidenced in continuous progress in the past, and as presaging indefinite progress in the future. In his own words, he held "that no boundaries have been set to the improvement of the human faculties; that man's perfectibility is really indefinite; and that his progress, now independent of any opposing power, has no limit not coincident with that of the globe on which fate has cast him." But, of course, this idea was rooted in the philosophy of the eighteenth century; our theistic idealism can obviously not rest content with no more reconstructive idea than that of human perfectibility and progress; and there is no room now to show how narrow, unjust, and inconsistent Condorcet's views at times were, amid much that was true and worthy. Of Voltaire, who, earlier, was the negation of Bossuet and Leibniz, I can only now remark, that he was not, in his more serious moods, without belief in a moral order, and a progress for mankind, albeit these

were conjoined with an absurd and unphilosophic anti-Christianism. Faith in the progress of humanity is one of the brighter aspects of Rousseau's philosophical work. Marked advances of French thought on the destinies of mankind, and on the philosophy of history, are registered by Cousin and Jouffroy. Cousin held that "history is the Government of God made visible," but he did not take due account of the visible evils of the world that make up the difficulty of such a position, theistic as it sounds. Less profound than Hegel in his treatment of the philosophy of history, he yet gave a new impulse towards the study of that subject in a philosophical spirit. Cousin's expositions and expressions are, not seldom, brilliant, but his work suffered from lack of systematic outworking or completeness. There is neither need nor room to dwell on Comte's philosophy of history, with its well-known but absurdly mistaken law of the three stages, and its idea of progress as the development of Order. On the idea of progress he had the benefit of the views of Turgot, Condorcet, and Kant. Comte's philosophy—greatest product of French philosophy in the nineteenth century—was meant to be a philosophy of humanity in which love for others was to be the supreme duty or *rôle*, for he would have humankind know its own history. Theistic Idealism can have no very exalted estimate of a system, however, which viewed religious history as only "a long minority of Humanity under the guardianship of God." As for Kant, the merit must be claimed for him to have first laid scientific beginnings for those thoughts on the philosophy of history which were afterwards so fruitfully developed. His views of the philosophy of history were, in no proper or technical sense, discussions of historic method. Positively, the philosophy of history was to him moral teleology: history is to him the history of freedom—practical freedom, autonomy: the doctrine of freedom is the base of his philosophy of history. Morality for him determines in the last analysis the essence of man. His clue to the valuation of things historic was found in the new conception of the destination of mankind—not as individual happiness, but

rather as conflict with hindrances, and the extended rule of ethical freedom among the race. This supplied the thought-impulse in the Kantian philosophy of history: its epistemological roots lay in the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' Allied with the idea of freedom, as emphasised in the 'Critique of Judgment,' the issue is what we find as the leading motive in idealistic philosophies of history, namely, the realisation of the idea of freedom as the task of the human race. Whether his insistences were backed by a satisfactory metaphysical grounding of freedom is another matter. Kant's view of man was, that he is the living essence of history. It is Reason which, for Kant, makes man so. Man's capability of reason makes freedom the object of history, in Kant's view. His thought involved, as a German writer has properly remarked, such a widening of the moral territory that the meaning of history was resolved into no mere vague moralising about history, but meant the real moral advance of humanity. There is a moral whole ("ein moralische Ganze") which, in Kant's view, is the ideal end towards which, under Providence—of which Kant directly speaks as having for its aim a perfect constitution made up of all the States—humanity moves. This, until we are brought by Kant to a higher than merely moral standpoint—a "wise Creator." (See his 'Philosophy of Law,' &c.) The course of freedom in the process cannot now be followed, but, though he held to the one great realisable end of the whole course of human history, his defective and inadequate sense of the place and power of historicity in religion must be noted.

For Fichte, it has sometimes been claimed in Germany that the first real principle of a philosophy of history, and that, too, before Hegel, was embedded in Fichte's writings. He has even been hailed at times as Germany's greatest philosopher of history. To Fichte, the philosopher must conceive the ground-plan of the world in its totality; and, for him, the fundamental Idea, which humanity has to realise, is that of Duty. (See his 'Wissenschaftslehre,' his 'Destination of Man,' his 'Science of Rights,' &c.) But, strong as Fichte's

insistences on a purely moral Order were, these did not quench his deep and deepening religious consciousness, which postulated such a really Providential order that "not a hair falls from my head," he says, "and not a sparrow from the roof," without it. His sense of the unique character of history, however, is by no means striking. The entire life of Humanity Fichte, who was given to historic mysticism, resolved into five periods, which we may roughly class as those of Instinct, Authority, Scepticism, self-conscious Reason, and applied Reason or the epoch of Art. Fichte is thus pioneer of a philosophy of the history of mankind, in the way he points, psychologically and historically, to the freeing of mankind, and to bringing it to the stage of free morality, and, with that, of blessedness. Of the general harmony of this blessed life, Fichte, in the *Anweisung*, with its religious and historic mysticism, says: "In the end—and where is the end?—everything must, after all, cast anchor in the secure harbour of eternal rest and blessedness; in the end the kingdom of God must come forth in its might, in its power, and in its glory." Such an aim and goal is clearly no mere *progressus in infinitum*, despite the subjectivism of Fichte and his spiritualistic idealism. Fichte it was who also said that the true human ruler is one who, "in his estimate of mankind, looks beyond that which they are *in the actual world*, to that which they are *in the Divine Idea*," and that "he is thus filled with reverence for a Race called to so high a destiny." One would have to be critical, for all that, of the cosmopolite teachings of some of his works.

When we turn from Kant and Fichte to Schleiermacher, we find a greatly superior sense of the importance of history. In the *Reden*, he says: "History immediately and especially is for religion the richest source. History is not of value for religion, because it hastens or controls in any way the progress of humanity in its development, but because it is the greatest and most general revelation of the deepest and holiest. In this sense, however, religion begins and ends with history" (Eng. edn. by Oman, p. 80). Again (p. 214), he speaks of religion "as an endlessly progressive work of the Spirit that

reveals Himself in all human history"; says that "religious men are throughout historical" (p. 236); and points out ends in history towards which "all dealings of Divine Providence are calculated" (pp. 241-242). The regrettable thing is, that this teaching was part of a system in which God is still too much merely the infinite essence of the world itself, and too little a theistically conceived Almighty Will outside and above it. Schelling took history to be a continuous self-revelation of the Absolute. He found the trace of a Higher Power amid all the free play of the arbitrary in history. The subjective freedom, which is all we seem to see in history, subjectively viewed, is, in any absolute synthesis, met by objective necessity. Both the free and the arbitrary elements must be made to subserve the development of Divine plan. In the Absolute alone do we find the metaphysical identity of the subjective freedom and the objective necessity in question, and hence arises the system of Providence, whose work history is. Of Krause, I have written elsewhere, as to his making the historic life of humanity reproduce the life-periods of the individual ('Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie,' 1910). Hegel, whose achievement in this department was so brilliant, adopted as the guiding principle of his philosophy of history, the position that he who considers the world as reasonable, also sees it to be reasonable. He believes it possible to see into or comprehend the meaning of history. Historic reality is for him, rational, and in a strict sense, comprehensible. Its developments belonged to the domain of the universal world-reason. In his *Phenomenology*, "comprehended history forms both the memorial and the calvary of the Absolute Spirit." It is that without which it would be "lifeless solitude." From this standpoint, he seeks to extract the moment of the spiritual from the darkest and dreariest places of history. He took history to be the development of the Idea, the motive power lying in the logical necessity immanent in reason; the development he conceived in an objective and necessary manner, not without suggestion from Vico in this connection. Vico, the precursor of modern sociology, had maintained the organic development of certain

epochs to be stronger proof of the world's moral government, and a loftier manifestation of justice and progress, than was to be found in any *à priori* argument. History is for Hegel the exposition of the Absolute Spirit in time, the objectification of the Absolute Reason in history, the historic growth or evolution meaning for him, not the perfection of the moral subject as free but the attainment to full self-consciousness of the Absolute itself. It is a merit of Hegel that, despite the arbitrariness of his treatment of the special sciences in working out the historic development, he yet seeks to recognise what, in the *Phenomenology*, he calls "the seriousness, the pain, the patience, the labour of the Negative." For, justice to the negative is one of the strikingly meritorious features of his work as a philosopher. There is thus no lack of recognition of the significance of history in Hegel; but it must not be assumed that he brings God directly into all its happenings, as they concern us. He does not do justice to the individual ethically. He does, however, regard philosophy as having to do with the recognition, "within the appearances of the temporal and transitory, of the Substance and the Eternal, there immanent and present." But there is no such explication of the immanence, in relation to transcendence, as could be satisfactory to Theistic Idealism; nor could it accept the complete Hegelian identification of the Absolute Consciousness with the merely historical and temporal. The moral is sacrificed to historical and factual elements. Hegel has his own fourfold division of the great movements of history—in the East, in Greece, in Rome, and in the Teutonic nations—on which nothing need now be said. What is important to be affirmed is, that the thoughts of the great representatives of German idealism all converge, in the region of the history of philosophy, towards the one position, that history really means the history of freedom—a result which harmonises with what has been claimed, earlier in this chapter, on another and broader survey. Later, we have, in Italy, the conception of history, under the principles of Positivism, by Villari and Marselli.

In Mill, we have historic progress run back into continuity

with the past, in a quest for mere empiric laws and mechanical causes, an obviously inadequate and unsatisfactory theory. A much higher view was that of Bunsen, who, in his 'Philosophy of Universal History,' stood for moral order, and for progress in the world, on a Christianly theistic basis. Bunsen held that "the very idea of progress originates in the idea of humanity," and that the principle of the progress of humanity "has its root in the law of Divine self-manifestation" ('The Philosophy of Universal History,' vol. ii. p. 161). But he spoiled his treatment considerably by mixing it up so largely with linguistic developments, on which he based religious development. The growth of the religious conscience of mankind figured largely in his philosophy of history. From Carlyle's 'Past and Present'—"the most remarkable piece of historical thinking in the language," according to Lord Acton—God and soul were not left out. Notable contributions to the philosophy of history were those of Tiberghien and Laurent, both representative of the Belgian school of thought. The work of the former is excellent, though extremely Krausean in spirit: the work of the latter is historically very important, but not comprehensive enough in character. But, in his more comprehensive aspects, Laurent shewed, in a most admirable manner, the theistic value of history. The mere fact of historic development, I must insist, is not, as is so often supposed, enough, without a searching out of adequate cause or causes, and without a touchstone of laws, ends, and values. It is absurd to forget that development involves defect, and still more absurd to make all life depend upon defect. The work of Dr F. A. Woods on 'The Influence of Monarchs' (New York, 1913) seeks historic objectivity and emphasises heredity. A conception of "God as the Common Will," such as a transatlantic professor has recently put forward, theistic idealism emphatically rejects. In his view, "the god of the world is a growing God"; "it has been too easily assumed in the past that God the Spirit is the Creator and Sustainer of all"; and "the evolution of the world" is "the evolution of the God-life in and through us all" (H. A. Overstreet, 'Hibbert Journal,' 1914). Such a

clumsy confusion of the God of Theism with "the Common Will," will not be "too easily assumed," at any rate, by theistic idealism, which retains a respect for clear thinking. A "growing God" who is the social will historically determined by individual wills; such a view may be bracketed with that given earlier by Dr E. M'Taggart in his treatment of dogma, where reality is made to consist in "a system of selves," and God is, with conspicuous deficiency of theistic conviction, regarded as "a person of appreciable importance as against the whole universe," albeit non-creative and non-omnipotent. But his artificial system is, in spite of its strong claim for the metaphysical interest, merely a revised and unimproved phase of Deistic thought, and, as such, a retrograde and insupportable movement, with a mere "directing person" from without. Against such attempts, theistic idealism claims an immeasurable superiority and strength for its doctrine of God as the "Sustainer of all," the "darkness" of Whose Providence is "starlit with benign intents." The real difficulties lie in the facts of freedom and of evil. Freedom always carries within it the possibility of arbitrariness, though it has been destined for goodness. Out of freedom, in its arbitrary aspect, springs the possibility of moral evil, whose abnormal or unnatural character must be maintained. The abuse of freedom, and the fact of moral evil, are the tragedy of human life and of the destinies of mankind, and they call for ethical understanding and treatment. Neither individually, nor nationally, can the ideal of humanity be realised at any stage of development, save through ethical effort and attainment. Any external development of progressive life, under the name of Civilization, may lack on this ethical side, and, in so far as it does so, it is pathological, abnormal, unreal, and carries within it the seeds of death. Such is the penalty of the *sensus communis* that esteems not ethical idealism at its proper value. But notwithstanding every permissive Divine agency, it is the power and purpose of Providence, at once righteous and gracious, to secure that the Divine world-plan shall not fail or be overthrown. There is nothing colourless about the Divine world-

plan, and the Providence that secures its fulfilment is living and concrete. Its modes of realisation are absolutely ethical, and clear of any colour of Divine exploitation. These qualities have been brought out more fully or finely by no philosopher, than by Rosmini. But its supreme powers, in a metaphysical or ontological sense, ought to be sufficiently obvious in this connection, as guarantee against failure. "The world is dark with griefs and graves," says the poet—only too truly; but the darkness—ever so much in ourselves—must not keep us from holding to history as the theatre of Providence, and to the world as interpenetrated with active Divine agency.

Theistic Idealism is fully conscious of the diverse and conflicting ideals of progress, and of the varying conceptions or standards of value, but it is not disturbed by these clashes and conflicts of thought or opinion. It carries within itself, as a system, its own distinctive ideal of progress, and its own specific standards of value, both personal and racial. Flint has some pertinent remarks upon the subject. "The idea of human unity is closely connected with that of human progress. Progress implies continuity, and continuity unity." In order to progress, "there must be something which progresses; for progress is an attribute, not an abstraction, and that something must remain itself under all the phases which it assumes." Men could not recognise progress in history "before they recognised that there was unity in history"—"unity of nature, not origin" ('Philosophy of History,' p. 104). When, however, it is occasionally maintained by philosophical writers of a theistic trend that universal history is just the totality of the divine evolution, it seems to me that this mode of putting the case is not quite satisfactory, for, though there may be a theistic evolution in history, yet universal history may contain much, on the part of individuals and nations, that is antagonistic to that evolution, and inimical, within human limits, to its advance. From a philosophical point of view, it is as beings set in the process of historical development that we come to participate in universal reason. Our philosophy of history must be based upon, and drawn from, the history of civilisation, whence its principles of rational

interpretation are in experience, at its fullest and richest, derived. It must, in dealing with the over-individual world of history, read a theistic significance into the words of Spinoza, in his *Politico-Theological Treatise*, that "man advances in perfection in proportion to the perfection of that Object which he loves above all other things, and which loves him in return." The reason is, doubtless, that it is the property of love to assimilate the soul to the object which it loves. That Object here belongs to the sphere of over-individual Reality, and, as loved above all other things, can be no Other than the Being Who is the sum of all conceivable excellence, in Whose fellowship and service the supreme value of life is found. But this is already the entrance of the Eternal into history, and of theistic or metaphysical value into life. Causal inquiry shews the law-conformity of the universe, while inquiry into values and purposes shews history a realm of tendencies, not laws. It is the presence or unfolding of the theistic or eternal element in history which alone makes its chroniclings of change and movement, of men and nations, a thing of philosophic worth and import. A really sceptical mind, of course, will not hold either to a dispensing Providence, or to a pre-established order of things, but no mind with any sense of theistic or eternal values will fail to note the phenomena of spiritual progress, the traces of providential leading, and the signs of wholeness in history. "The historian," M. Loisy has said, "does not remove God from history; he never encounters Him there." But, must the historian be so spiritually unillumined as to be foredoomed, because he is historian, to dwell in the region of crass and literal fact, with never a thought of the dynamic relations or spiritual significance of the facts with which he deals? Theistic Idealism, at any rate, cannot be content with such a positivist reading of history, innocent of all spiritual insight into the presence and intervention of the Eternal Agent or Essence in history. Nor can our Idealism agree with Troeltsch, when he says that monism, even of "the more spiritualistic kind," is, on "the territory of history" an "incredible delusion," contradicting "every unprejudiced im-

pression of the actual working of life." It would be foolish and absurd to deny the difficulties of monism—the sloth and the self-seeking, the passion and the dulness, the malice and the deceit, the brutal facts and the manifold checks—that lie in the way of perfect and complete monistic theory; but it seems to me an "incredible" dogmatism that Theistic Idealism should not be allowed to do more than wander through a medley of pluralistic phenomena, without taking reason's view of the world in whole, with its converging tendencies and results of unified aim and character. Should the reason of Theistic Idealism postulate an eternal supra-mundane Power working in history towards the realisation of a clearly defined goal, in spite of pluralistic hindrances and with due respect for human freedom—that possible spring of irrational element in history—there is in that nothing "incredible." What is a "delusion" is to suppose that, without such an idealistic or spiritualistic interpretation, the real core of history can ever be found. Indeed, it is, as Troeltsch himself elsewhere finely says, this very confidence in the Divine presence and working which "makes the soul strong, throughout its various stages of progression, in the certainty of a last absolute sense and aim for human toil." Troeltsch is in this much more satisfactory than the philosopher Croce, who finds the truth of evolution in history, and the truth of spirit in historical becoming, even God being but in the making. There is, to Croce, an identity of history and philosophy. History is the process of which philosophy is the rationale. Unsatisfactory, however, to Theistic Idealism is Croce's final super-relational Absolute, instead of the supreme and perfect Being Who is the Absolute of living theistic thought, and Whose perfect Being does not, in the least, as Croce absurdly supposes, render our human historical knowledge unreal. Nor can Theistic Idealism descend, either to his apotheosis of man, as all we can know of the Divine, or to his rather fatuous antipathy to ontologies of every hue and colour. Further, in the out-working of the ethical aspects, Croce's formal treatment of the Universal or the Spirit is rather vacuous, and far from tenable or thoroughgoing. Here, as indeed in some

other parts of Croce's philosophy, there is a lack of power or faculty in making and maintaining really sound and proper distinctions, so far as the ethical and the useful, or utilitarian, are concerned.

I come back to say that the historian ought not to be obsessed by the positivistic dogmatism that finds true being only in the factual, nor ought he to shirk the finding of meaning or the making of valuations. Theistic Idealism does not look for rectilinear progress, nor for progress in any preconceived succession of states; it expects progress to be rhythmical or cyclical in character, but, through all the transformations of history, it hopes for, and believes in, a convergence of higher or more spiritual forces towards the realisation of its own ideal, no matter how remote such realisation may seem to be. The necessity of the foregoing remarks is well demonstrated by a statement of Pfeiderer, who, in discussing "Evolution and Theology," says, in the purest spirit of scientific positivism, that "any condition, event, action, or personality" is to be rigidly excluded, which is not explicable out of the preceding conditions and by the laws of genesis in general. Thus the whole sphere of free "action" in history, and the whole freedom of "personality," are, in this absurd and thoroughly unphilosophical piece of *a priori* dogmatism, reduced to the level of mechanical causation. It sinks almost to the level of antiquated nonsense before the new unwonted stress on spontaneity in the best recent philosophical thinking. Pfeiderer's causal law does not hold good in the conscious spontaneity of self-directing "personality"; before it can be supposed to do so, we must first "sophisticate" the facts of consciousness, to use Prof. Ladd's term. As to the other point, it seems too great an enhancement of history for it to be justifiable to forget that historic life, experience, movement, are the soil on which spring up those values which are, in certain aspects, among our most precious creations. Nor may we forget that History, with its concrete happenings in space and time, partakes, no less than nature or science, of the character of revelation, and that only in and through history has man most really and

securely apprehended the things of the Eternal. By what right of *à priori* dogmatism shall we decree that the Spirit of the Eternal must function *in vacuo*, and never bear witness of itself, or manifest itself, in fact, or event, or inspired personality? There is no need to fall into this Charybdis, while avoiding the Scylla of a blind concentration on historic fact, which overpasses not into the all-important sphere of symbolic meaning and ideal significance. The historic facts are not immune from historic criticism; but, emerging therefrom, no incarnation of fact or personality has attained the end of a true religious idealism until it has reached a living and incarnational force in our aims and ideals. It may yet not be very wise, and certainly is not particularly gracious, to describe the facts that have brought us to the sphere of universal and eternal values—to the stature of purely spiritual and completed thought and life—as facts of the dead past, and, indeed, if there had been no vital residue in them, could they have so greatly helped bring us to the height on which we stand? It is, no doubt, very possible to hold by the highest forms of historic fact in a very opaque and dead fashion, but, to awakened or quickened mind, such facts are ever charged with living and ideal significance. It is not for us, who have been nourished on fact and symbol—and have needed it all, as God best knows—in attaining to any spiritual maturity we may have reached, to pour words of scorn on those nourishing founts, albeit, in the universalising of thought, these have been relegated to the subordinate place appropriate to temporal fact and finite form. Nor does it appear to me anything but a misleading and unsatisfying procedure when exponents of modern thought quote the finer sayings of religious mysticism, pagan and Christian—a Seneca or a Tauler—to shew how the religious consciousness can function *in vacuo*, without the support of fact or symbol. Do they wish us to believe that these utterances, if taken up by us to-day, would represent an equality of religious consciousness only, and not carry depths of truth and security, of volume and content, un-

known to the earlier consciousness? The justice, the freedom, the enlargement, of the spiritual consciousness has not the faintest need to lay any embargo on the free self-manifestation of the Eternal in temporal fact or history; and if the desperate wish to be rid of all fact or symbol could be perfectly realised, it is just possible that the impotence and impoverishment of the religious consciousness of the race might prove more appalling than mistaken idealism ever dreamed. Idealism, sane and balanced, demands the idealisation of fact and temporal event, as is most rational; it is not concerned with their abolition and any consequent inanities or vacuities. Something may well be left, even by modern thought, to the wisdom of the Eternal, and disembodied types of revelation have a notorious capacity for proving shadowy and ineffective.

Before passing from this part of our subject I must, while freely admitting the worth and serviceableness, in certain ways, of those values which spring out of historic life, enter a caveat against the disproportionate and exaggerated use of those values. These extreme and ill-considered uses have, in certain Continental thought-manifestations, run up into tendencies to make man, in effect, replace God as the creator of all reality—a result not altogether surprising, since, as a recent able English writer puts it, “the absolute primacy of man is a necessary hypothesis in all systems of values”; to reduce logic, and ethics, and even theology, to mere chapters of psychology; to resolve goodness and beauty into matters of pure sensibility and subjective appreciation; tendencies to subjectivation generally which, in the view of Theistic Idealism, cannot but be baleful and injurious, in the infinite subjectivity already characteristic of our time. These unhelpful tendencies, or disproportionate uses, of value—whose place alongside reason is not in dispute—are present and patent in some of our recent philosophies of religion—especially Dr G. Galloway’s work—and philosophical writing generally, fostering will and feeling subjectivism, and great loss of reason hold on being, reality, existence. The most evasive discussions of

value will be found in our recent philosophy of religion. Among thinkers who, in varying direction and degree, have emphasised value, are Wundt, Höffding, Paulsen, Windelband, Meinong, Simmel, Rickert, Nelson, Krueger, Ehrenfels, James, Münsterberg, Lévy-Bruhl, Orestano, and many others. The nature and rise of value, duly considered, might have saved us from the exaggerations referred to, which do not so much relate to these names. Value is not a quality inherent in things, but an isolating of what seems inherently most justified and important; it is the common form of our multiplex affective or sentimental and volitional attitudes towards objects. As will is personally conditioned, we cannot approve Münsterberg's transmuting it into an "absolute" or unconditioned, merely as over-individual. To this general or common value—this residue of impressions or desires—the individual will is, according to Münsterberg, to submit, as to appreciations of a partial collectivism, which are supposedly authoritative. This presupposition of value as a will Münsterberg has not at all justified. Such, and no more, being the objective character of the values of Münsterberg, it is my judgment that, if we drop our contact with reality for the mere acceptance of such values, our loss is immeasurable. The loss is our penalty for our distrust of reason. Münsterberg does less justice to the rational than Windelband or Rickert. We shall do infinitely better to maintain a closer contact with reality, a more intimate communion with being, thereby reaching richer values for ourselves, and possibly stamping higher values for others. True philosophy of value seeks such a maximization of value, at any rate. To be doomed to mere acquiescence in the accepted or imputed values of some others is to be cut off from first-hand contact with reality and the true founts of inspiration and vital progress. If not sophists, we shall find such values lack both objectivity and universality. No judgments can be valuable save as they agree with the real, the existent, and the increase of values we are bound to seek. Theistic Idealism cannot be satisfied with "absolute" values whose whole absoluteness is based

merely upon valuation as an act of general or common human will, independent though it be of any individual volition. Such values are still relative to the partial collective will that determined them, and lack universal validity: they are not "absolute" in any sense that will satisfy Theistic Idealism. They are man-made, grounded in acts of will, with its arbitrariness, rather than in universal reason and the nature of things. Nor are they, as with Münsterberg, "eternal," since all values are evolutionary, and the common will is always recasting them. The revaluation of all values Nietzsche singly proposed to himself. But truth's value depends not on will, whether single or collective. Varisco does somewhat better when, in finding "absolute" value in the person, he, in some sort, seeks to connect it, in the individual, with "universal reason." But he fails to maintain the usual distinction between will and feeling values and the truth or reality values, and, in consequence, it all comes to nothing, and he leaves us, in spite of his desire to do justice to reason, with the mere assurance that "every valuation presupposes a volition." Apart, however, from feeling or will, there is the *à priori* form or structure of value to be considered. A less historic, more individualistic treatment of value is exemplified by Dr Hocking, in his 'Meaning of God in Human Experience.' "Values vary with the man" (p. 127); "value varies with idea-resource" (p. 129); "values change as life matures" (p. 133); but our "interest in objectivity" he conceives "not in the effortful way of deliberate thinking" (p. 129), but simply of "appreciating" or "enjoying." One may, I think, allow large general worth to theories of value, say, as these are sanely expounded by Prof. W. M. Urban of America, and yet maintain a healthy-minded scepticism as to whether judgments of value, that are professedly drawn from, or based upon, existence or reality—or pure observation of the same—are not more frequently drawn, in truth, from the realms of moral and metaphysical essence. The form of value must be duly considered, not merely its empirical content. In any case, deeper communion with reality is,

I insist, the prime need, and the objective value of reality will for us be found in the constructive power and living activity of our reason. The logical priority of human idealism does not destroy the absolute primacy of God, it may be well to add. How relevant to our subject these insistences are, will be seen when it is remembered that we are not merely the heirs of history, but are bound to make our contribution to the historic whole, and that such contribution can only be worthily made by our new and deeper grasp of reality. We may, of course, rejoice in values that seem ennobling; we may even glean from them principles for our guidance in action; but they are, in the proper and accepted philosophical sense, expressive only of will and feeling interest. They do not exclude reason; they only make her a menial in the hands of their extreme users. But to return. The single life is, in every case, a tiny factor in the contemporary movement of one's generation, and the puzzling problems and baffling incidents of providential guidance are always present to, and in, such life, in so far as it is deep and real; but these considerations only call the more, in the successiveness and dependence of history, to real and direct relations with the Eternal God in His Prevenience and Simultaneity. There lies the deepest field of insight, outlook, conviction, reality, and there our highest values will be realised or attained. These values are lived, not merely accepted or contemplated. One can agree when Lord Acton says that "modern history touches us so nearly, it is so deep a question of life and death, that we are bound to find our own way through it, and to owe our insight to ourselves" (*'The Study of History,'* p. 74). That is the best we can do. Rickert, who has given a significant and, in some respects, valuable, though not logically consistent and satisfying, discussion of value—which I have no call here to traverse—tells us the connection or articulation of the values is to be found in not taking the historical merely as historical, but in critically seeking its "over-historical" content. But clearly we had better find out what value means before we go to

helpless history. And when we ask what is really the absolute value of Rickert's "absolute" values, we shall find them no more able to stand the test than those of Münsterberg, though his discussion, to which I shall return later, is more suggestive. It is, however, with the "over-historical" that Theistic Idealism is concerned: its interest lies in the actualisation of moral ideas and spiritual forces that lie behind the bare actualities, or mere happenings, of history. Its interest penetrates to these ideas and forces in their source and outworking, so that ideas of progress and freedom are not viewed by it in severance from, or indifference to, the hypothesis of an Eternal Providence. Belief in the Providence of God, in some form or other, follows belief in the Being of God; but we have shewn earlier how unjust to the world's freedom and spontaneity—consequently how impossible—is that form of it, which assumes a pre-adjustment so complete as to resolve the world's history into that of a machine, ordered and supervised in every detail from without. Not that such a law as that of gravitation does not belong to Providence, but that the Providence which is to satisfy human history and experience must assume a form inner, immediate, personal. A Supreme Personality can afford the only absolute basis or metaphysical ground for values of every sort in the historic process, since values are without substantive existence apart from selves. That Supreme Personality must be the ultimate foundation of values, if they are to have permanent validity of any sort, in the progressive historic realisations. No other unification of the values seems possible, and this will take us beyond the so-called "absolute" values of merely "over-individual" type, and land us in a true Universal. That, at any rate, I take to be the attitude proper to Theistic Idealism. Piti- less as the logic of the universe may sometimes appear to be, can we conceive this Supreme and Omnipresent Personality as without infinite purpose for, in, and through finite personalities? He is no stagnant Infinity, albeit great are the hidings of His powers of self-manifestation. History or national experience is one of the spheres of His self-

manifestation, and one of His modes of teaching the nations. But national experience or consciousness is, where true and enlightened, never content to fall short of the perception and recognition of universal solidarity. Theistic Idealism discerns and affirms the presence in all history, whether of the nation or of humanity, of a Higher Power that makes for righteousness and goodness and truth on the earth. In that deathless, invisible Presence lies, for it, the possibility, which we sometimes see turned to actuality, that nations should be born again out of very war and world-strife. This, however, while disavowing the Prussianic position that "war must be conceived as an institution ordained by God," or that "war is political science *par excellence*." Exhaustive analysis of the natural concurrence of an historical event is beyond the powers of human reflection; but, even if it were not, Theistic Idealism would hold it inadmissible, on vital religious grounds, that the known natural concurrence of the event excluded any Providential agency. But it is not disposed to controvert the saying of Dr Charles Hodge, that the doctrine of Providence is "confessedly the most comprehensive and difficult in the compass either of theology or of philosophy." But Theistic Idealism takes the ultimate source of motion in the physical universe to be none other than that of God, as the Power that is working through the mechanism of the universe. This universal presence and agency of God in the universe it takes in an ontological and immanent sense. To the continuous energy of His will it attributes the existence of matter, and Nature is, for it, the product of His activity. The course of Nature itself is Providence, and has no right to be treated as outside it—indeed, not the smallest event can be excluded from its compass. For the events around me I am not responsible; my responsibility is only for my volitions. In thus claiming the divineness of the natural, Theistic Idealism also holds the naturalness of the Divine. But, for all that, the greatness of the thought and outlook, by which the universe is ordered, is such that, to the most enlightened finite reason, and that least readily disposed to fall back

on the Divine incomprehensibility, much must remain hidden. But reason will take the last step open to her.

But, if Theistic Idealism stands for a real doctrine of Providence, it also maintains the integrity of History. Without denying a certain aspect of truth and interest to Münsterberg's contentions, it cannot give up the necessity and serviceableness of history, as concerned with a temporal order, and with dynamic and causal aspects. History, to Münsterberg, is a "network of will-relations," and "my whole historical life is just the chain of my attitudes" towards various historic "will-demands." This system of "will-reference" is, in his view, history, and it is yet to be conducted on the principle that the will-attitudes "always" remain "outside of time." The realities with which history deals are themselves "neither things nor temporal"; cannot be "members of a causal chain"; as outside time, "cannot enter into causality"; "the objective things" come into view only "as means and ends of will" (see "The Eternal Life" and "The Eternal Values"). A more artificial, arbitrary, and fantastic treatment of history could scarcely be conceived than that of Münsterberg, with its one-sided voluntaristic abstractionism. His whole system of values is based on Hegel, despite his Fichtean refrain. Man is still a being whose development has a history in time, and an immanent principle of spiritual potency, that is seen to pass out into actuality in the world-series. The character and the conditions of the historic series cannot be ignored or arbitrarily dealt with, after Münsterberg's fashion. The forces and phenomena of growth and organisation must be recognised in the historic evolution, and not arbitrarily brushed aside to make room for subjective will-references and supposititious will-identities. Some thinkers find history significant only for reason, and not for will at all. Theistic Idealism can obviously not allow an excessive and ill-balanced idealism to confine and shrivel history to these, if history is to remain for it, in any proper sense, the theatre of Providence. It must still claim for history and historic experience that their disclosures of the phenomenal world-order are not void of

implications concerning the noumenal World - Ground. It must own that in history God is revealed as—

—“out of evil, still educing good,
And better, thence again, and better still
In infinite progression.”

All this is possible, of course, only because the historical development of man is an organic process, with a genetic development of the spiritual life of the race; whence it follows that the historic process is a living unity, and that, generically, there can only be one science of history. Of that science of history, it is, of course, quite open to us to think in a purely factual manner or positivistic spirit, as exemplified in the following statement. From the historical sciences, says Lévy-Bruhl, “the philosophy of history, the Hegelian conception of progress, the action more or less apparent of a Providence guiding events, all those transcendent elements have gradually disappeared; the methodical and critical effort towards the knowledge of facts, and, if it is possible, of their connection, has alone remained” [*Ethics and Moral Science*, p. 102]. How little the scientific treatment of history has necessitated such elimination of the transcendent, or of all higher reflection or illumination, we shall see presently. Enough for the moment to note that this naturalistic conception of history has been severely handled by Dilthey, Menger, and Wundt.

But from the general scheme of things we cannot exclude effects that wear the character of chance, or seem only fortuitous or accidental, for even these are not exempt from the knowledge and rule of Providence. Foreseen they are and made to subserve the universal end or world-order in whole, even though they be “irregularities, inequalities, new beginnings, faults in the rock.” But no such perfect or complete insight into Providential designs is ours as will enable us in all things to justify the ways of Providence, but we see and know enough to be rationally justified in the presumption that justification there is. There need, therefore, be no shrinking from what Troeltsch calls “a moralised conception

of history," for history, shorn of ethical insight, must greatly lose in scientific value, since dynamic inter-connections can obviously not suffice. If the history of the world is the judgment of the world, the judgment is at least a moral one, though that is not to say that history is only of moral value. But it is by no means easy to get a moralised conception of history fruitful of theistic result. The recent conceptions of history and the philosophy of history by Rickert and by Simmel do not carry us far in this direction. Rickert is one-sided in his idealism, though clear and deep in his thought. He makes much of the logic of history, which, for him, deals with the particular, not the universal, and much of a theoretic relation of value. But in his emphasis on human values, he, while speaking of historic individuals as teleological unities, yet fails to do justice to the concrete fulness of history, and to the new points of view and of value distinctively won by great historians. No doubt, he runs up his values at length into the transcendent, but the net result is indeterminate and unfruitful. Complementary to his method is that of Simmel. History is, for him, idealistically, the transformation of historic happenings, for it is spirit that shapes history. The unity of personality is his presupposition for history. But he adopts the psychological *à priori* method of historical knowledge, and calls into play synthetic categories of spirit—a synthesis, *e.g.*, of the universal and necessary with the merely individual. The sovereignty of spirit over matter is his fundamental thought or contention. The laws and meaning of history are emphasised, and justice done to the reality of the historic contents. For him, too, the historic interest goes out, not only in the tendency to advance in the consciousness of freedom, but, metaphysically, beyond itself into the transcendent. Not even Eucken yields much more definite for theistic idealism, than Rickert or Simmel. Of course, history is not, to him, mere nature impulse or world impulse: there is in it an overlying life of spirit, an eternal over against the temporal: history, as the history of spirit, should know its own depth, and find in religion a new depth of life, without which our existence must lose all meaning and hold.

But it might be doubted whether Hegel has not done better than any of these three, for at least, to Hegel, God was *wirksam* or efficient in the whole of history. That is something; for I cannot but think that one of the chief troubles of modern thought has been inefficient Deities—of its own making. Yet not even the historic development of Hegel was so efficient or satisfactory as was to be desired, partly because it had not sufficient regard to causal mediation, and partly because it was grasped essentially as reason only—the absolute reason, that is to say, in the world, to the neglect of the will-element in the guidance of history. God is Himself the unity of Will and Reason, and history, I should say, must share His will as well as His reason. Hence we have viewed history as the theatre of His Providential actings, from which will and causal action are by no means absent. But any self-revealings of Deity—any efficacious working on His part—in history, can only be of an indirect character. For He works through men, and by means of their ethicised activities. He is but the background; but the insistence of Theistic Idealism is that the background is there; that, inwrought with all the wrongs of history, is the upholding, governing, and directing activity of God, supporting, in His Providential dispensations, the original teleology of the cosmos, and securing the ultimate triumph of goodness and of truth. It is of the essence of Theistic Idealism that the original world-idea be held to embrace the universal upholding activity of Providence, spite of the perversions and transgressions of finite personalities. For these latter, Providence, in its fidelity to original world-plan, is nowise responsible. There can be no antagonism between the will and the reason that created the universe, and the will and the reason that direct its history, even though the methods of Providence may, for the most part, remain inscrutable. The great process of historical development, with which we have been dealing in this chapter, is distinguished from the mere process of change in the physical world, in that the historical development is not a mere factual affair, but is a concept of value. But Driesch rightly says such value is not science of history. Of course,

development is change, only directed to a higher end, under the grounding of its connectedness, according to our idealistic monism. There are laws, too, in history, it is emphasised by Lamprecht, Taine, and others. And there is a sense, of course, in which history belongs to the "given"—that which simply is—but, to the Providential view of the theistic idealist, good is being brought out of the evil which there is, and "all things" not simply are, but are working together "for good." But this, of course, is not to approve the desperate efforts of Leibniz, in his best-world theory, to save evil from appearing to be due to the Divine Will. Ours is a more chastened optimism than his, or that of Krause, who had persuaded himself of the gradual disappearance of evil, as a limitation of individual being, before various forms of progress and culture. Our study of Providence is not drawn simply from the observance of events, but from the light cast upon these by our inmost and interpretative spiritual consciousness, which saves us from the peril of short views, and the illusion of speedy triumph for the good. Theistic Idealism directly negatives, however, every form of pessimism which grounds the universe in unreason, and treats its essence as illusion; it finds that such pessimism essentially leads to an atheistic and absurd conception of the universe. It assumes an historical optimism, not without a deep sense of the dangers, evils, difficulties, to be confronted, but because the possibilities of good, of character, of happiness, are infinite to a race with God in the midst of her. But the ethical value of its optimism lies in no mere hopes of happiness for mankind, but in the fact that the tabernacle of God is with men, that righteousness as an invincible force may grow upon the earth. The universal government of God is over all His works, and the particular Providences in which the individual life is concerned must all be consonant with this universal aspect. The theistic idealist hitches not, with Emerson, his "wagon" to a "star," but to the God who made the stars and appointed all their laws; and, in doing so, he grows strong with the strength of God, and from harmony with Him. I do not mean, by the remark just made, that

Emerson was not a theist, with an idealism, too, of his own; for perfect knowledge and prolonged study of all he wrote has convinced me that Emerson was no pantheist, albeit he was sometimes ambiguous and not over-consistent in his modes of expression; he held, moreover, a strong and real doctrine of Providence, to which, however, he failed to relate the doctrine of prayer in any happy or satisfactory fashion. Theistic idealism takes the call of man to be that of a co-worker with God (*συνεργὸς τῷ θεῷ*), even Plato having declared (*Laws*, 906 A) that "in that conflict the Gods and demi-gods are our allies" (*ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοὶ τε ἄμα καὶ δαίμονες*). Such are the men who work out Providential ends in history, alike in moulding the world's highest thought, and its loftiest action. These great personalities represent the ruling ideas to which their lives have been dedicated. Theistic idealism does not, therefore, overlook the idealistic element or factor in history; it is not betrayed by talk about "direct study" of "historic reality," the presentation of facts "as they are in reality," even when such talk is indulged in by great historians like Ranke; it knows that history is really a logical construction of historical material. The knowing subject it does not separate from the historically "given": it sees the isolated or static facts in the historical material taken up into the dynamic process of the historic evolution: it regards history, not as something merely to be causally understood, but as a field on which ideas and ideals are being realised. Already Faust has uttered some fine words on the subject—

"Mein Freund, die Zeiten der Vergangenheit
Sind uns ein Buch mit sieben Siegeln;
Was Ihr den Geist der Zeiten heisst,
Das ist im Grund der Herren eigener Geist,
In dem die Zeiten sich bespiegeln.
Da ist's denn wahrlich oft ein Jammer!
Man läuft Euch bei dem ersten Blick davon."

Conformably with this, I shall presently have something to say. But first I note how, in history, we strive to reach objective result by introducing order and connection into

the chaotic historical material, with its apparently irrational elements. Then do judgments of value enter, and play a great part; and then do sympathies and antipathies, subjective prejudices and preferences, bring about the distortions suggested by Faust. What correction of these subjective value-judgments and conceptions is needed before we can reach the objective relations and the objective course of history! But so to determine the "given" in this sphere is the business of critical thought, with the necessary historic disillusionments it may bring. Although our conceptions of history as the continuous evolution, of the nation, the state, the religious community, the race, have travelled far since the days when Bacon, in his *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, wrote that "*Historia proprie individuorum est*," yet the study of great individualities has still its historic importance, and is pursued in like manner as a continuous evolution, but varied by the diverse types or kinds of development here possible. The continuous evolution of a great artist, for example, will have points of deep and obvious difference from the evolution of a great philosopher. Progress is no more always a rectilinear advance, or a thing of mathematical regularity, in the individual, than it is in the race. The several moments of history are not to be regarded as insulated wholes: the theistic value of history is found in the observance of how, while men and nations have misused the good, and turned its opportunities to evil account, the overruling sway of Providence has brought good out of evil, and the powers of Heaven have conferred triumphant strength and moral splendour on the men who worked in, under, with, and for God. Even Montaigne was able to say,—"'Tis an effect of the divine Providence to suffer the holy Church to be afflicted, as we see it, with so many storms and troubles, by this opposition to rouse pious souls, and to awaken them from that drowsy lethargy wherein, by so long tranquillity, they had been immersed" [*Essays*, vol. ii. p. 332]. Theistic Idealism is the idealism that it is—the largest of all idealisms—because it is God's idealism; and it finds in Nature, History, and Providence, a constant call for the enlargement

of its ideas and conceptions. In all these spheres, it strives to think God's thoughts after Him, but, though its thought is widened with the process of the suns, it never is complete. The significance of God's eternal thought being archetypal of the universe which we seek to know, lies fundamentally in this, that the universal ideals, principles, and laws, of reason are eternally and immutably to be found in Him. To these our idealism presses behind and beyond all the actualities of Creation, History, and Providence. In His light we see light with what clearness may be ours: we see at least that the eternal laws and principles of reason in Him are regulative of what is right and possible for His power and energy to effect. Theistic idealism, of course, in its quest of the Divine element in history, does not in the least disturb the scientific disinterestedness of history: it retains in full the senses in which history is to be regarded as a self-development, not a mere filling in the contents of an ordered world. But for ever theistic idealism claims for itself the right and the power to transcend any mere scientific positivism—with its abolition both of efficient and of final causes from history—as to actual happenings, and to attempt the spiritualisation of history already referred to. It cannot be hindered in its endeavour to retain and use teleology in historic explanation, nor in its endeavour to find meaning and value in the past, in the light of the idea of development—a development from which, on the theistic hypothesis, Divine or Providential agency has never been shut out. It does not, for all that, treat the world's history as a mere chain of given phenomena, but allows it the inwardness, freedom, spontaneity, of a true self-development. It seeks to know what the recognition of the presence and activity of the Eternal—what the uplifting force of ideals—has done for the higher progress of man; and what the retrogressive effects have been when such spiritual knowledge and recognition have been dim or wanting, in a particular age or nation. It is the conviction—a thousand times justified in the most diverse ways—of theistic idealism that God is the prime need of man's life on all its sides and in its multiplex relations, despite scientific

history having little room for man, the truly human, and less for God; and history must be allowed to play its great rôle in supplying this proof of the need of God on the negative side also. But, for all that, when Croce finds the summit of knowledge in History, as the knowledge of the concrete real, one is tempted to ask, with Emerson,—“What does History yet record of the metaphysical annals of man?” In no anti-historical spirit is this asked, but because history has had much more to do with the outer expression of the past than with its kernel, and has been little more than a sort of visible pledge of the metaphysical. It was Windelband, I think, who remarked that man, as a being of reason, is not psychologically given, but historically delivered. History—even of religion—is more susceptible of objectivisation than psychology. The objectified reason in history—or the energising of the immanent Logos—is of great account to historical philosophy. To this latter, psychology must, of course, render necessary help. But psychology is, from its nature, incapable of critically determining or of grounding the values of reason. The transcendental reason-character of religion in the broad reaches of history will be maintained by theistic idealism, as it has been by Troeltsch, Otto, and other noted religious thinkers. This grounding of religion in connection with reason is in accordance with the emphasis laid in other parts of this work, and is of extreme importance for religious thought in our time. It is sought by Troeltsch along the lines of the transcendental philosophy of Kant; by Otto, with doubtful advantage, along the lines of the universal-psychological apriorism of Friesian thought. In keeping with this, we find Troeltsch speaking of “an irreligious philosophy of history which cannot believe in the spontaneity and originality of religious ideas.” For him, “religion is really derived from religion”; “it always itself remains distinct from” civilisation, however it may become a power “by taking up civilisation into itself and giving it a special direction” (‘Protestantism and Progress,’ Eng. edn., pp. 175-176). Theistic idealism, however, admits a reciprocal working of these two within the loom of time. It accepts the statement of its

thought-movement as one wherein is seen "the transformation of the idea of freedom and grace into the ideas of the self-directing personality and a spiritual fellowship having its roots in history, all on the basis of a theism which has taken up into itself the idea of immanence" (Ibid., p. 183). Touching what has just been said about the reason-character of religion, I may be allowed to remark that even the "feeling" character ascribed to religion by Schleiermacher was more deeply grounded in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason than is almost ever observed, and amounted in reality to no more than a species of reflection moderated by "feeling." Adequate analysis shews that accepted views are wrong both in thinking that Schleiermacher used the term "feeling" in a single or uniform sense, and in supposing that he meant, in using it, to denote something that was purely psychological, and into which no metaphysical moment entered. He held that religious emotions, like other modifications of self-consciousness, became the object of reflection, when they had attained a certain degree of force and determinateness. But it would carry us too far afield now to discuss his attitude on purely speculative activity, having for its object the intuition of being; on revelation, as intellectual element; and on the principles of religion, as, to him, rational in form. It is enough to remark that Schleiermacher's emotional complex was in its value far from independent of the truth or reality value: a purely emotional value would not be self-sustaining. Nor is it with the immediate emotional values of religion that Theistic Idealism is here concerned, but with the fact-values and truth-values of the manifestations of God in History and Providence. Theistic Idealism, as a philosophical system, rejects the poor view of philosophy taken by those who would reduce it to mere analysis and description of values as functions and processes of experience. It admits philosophy to consist in the theory of values, only when the problem of truth-value is taken to be fundamental, and the primary importance of truth-attitudes or theoretic interests is recognised. This primacy of truth-value, or consideration

of fact-in-relation, does not keep us from following on to give due place to the values of will and of emotional experience, to which, however, the intrinsic values of truth and reality are neither subordinated nor sacrificed. Just here lies, for theistic idealism, the importance of values, personal or universal, in the fact that these imperiously demand a Supreme conscious Unity as Ground, Sustainer, Conservator, of all the values that emerge as really values, in the whole range of human and historic experience. For the reality and efficiency of all the values that emerge in the great process of historic evolution, no permanent cosmical Ground of satisfying character can possibly be found short of the Absolute Personality. The processes are there; the values are there, no matter how they came; and nothing will rationally explain the whole in spite of the difficulty of the immanent connection of history and its elusive factors, save the theistic hypothesis of a Power not ourselves making or inworking all the while for personality. This Ground of all being and value is for us the key to the historic meaning and the deepest reality of the world: what we see in the historic world-struggle is the movement of the human spirit to realise the knowledge of, and communion with, this Absolute Life, Whose prevenience, sustenance, and self-restraint, have never, in the view of theistic idealism, been wanting either to History or to Providence. The ontological instinct of theistic idealism does not fail it here, as does that of those philosophers who are able to rest content with empirical psychological analysis of values in experience, without probing problems of the ontology or metaphysics of values. The worst, it seems to me, of our making so much of these subjective values, as *our* values, is, that we so easily pass into that frame of mind, which is in need of Goethe's sharp reminder, "as though a man gets anything from himself except his own awkwardness and stupidity." For these terms I should prefer the single substitute, sterility. What I am concerned, however, now to remark is, that in the plea which I have just put forward for the theistic value of history, its value for God, I can find nothing presump-

tuous, when it is remembered that religion has been the prime magnitude in the life and history of the world—the largest and most ubiquitous fact in history. History, with all the ages of the world in its train, presents one long, solemn, impressive, spiritual pageant, in which the hues are now bright as heaven, and now lurid as the glare of hell; and what the evolution of society would have been without the part played by religion in the history of the race, is beyond all power of imagination. It would be strange indeed if these facts and phenomena carried no spiritual meaning or suggestiveness for theistic idealism: what they do carry depends on our moral and spiritual insight, even if you tell us, in a minatory way, that this insight is not negotiable. The warning might possibly be more wisely turned into a self-reproach for defective insight: it is so much a question of spiritual elevation, and insight is an open possibility. In any case, our prime duty is to see for ourselves, not for others; nor does moral idealism pretend to be other than idealism. With some degree of insight, we can see the historic trend of things to be upward, as we think of the times of Zoroaster, of Alexander, of Cæsar, of Charlemagne, of Luther, of Cromwell, of Victoria the Good; can see that there is a moral Government of the world by God, in which moral growth plays the great part, gaining momentum for individual and racial development, in spite of every set-back or reversion. For, as Mommsen has reminded us, “the highest revelations of humanity are perishable; the religion once true may become a lie; the polity once fraught with blessings may become a curse”; so the need is, not to forget our responsibility as instruments in the lines of historic advance. There will be times of conflict, disorganisation, arrest, but the Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness will again make itself felt: “clouds and darkness are round about Him; but righteousness and judgment are the habitation of His throne.”

“This fine old world of ours is but a child
 Yet in the go-cart. Patience! Give it time
 To learn its limbs; there is a Hand that guides.”

CHAPTER VI.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.

OUR Philosophy of Nature, dealing with the world as mediated by sense and intelligence, will not keep us from dealing separately with the Philosophy of Science. But Nature is for us one vast symbolism; its visible things are emblems. The necessity of Nature to man is freely recognised in our Theistic Idealism: the organic and the inorganic worlds we take as the necessary presupposition of man's life as a spiritual being—necessary to his expression, development, and intercommunication. It is in man that Nature transcends itself; Nature was there before man came into being; he cannot, therefore, be isolated as though he were the sole reality; his mind, however, gives to Nature more than it gets from it; if our transcendentalism plants one foot in the realm of spirit and makes man partaker of the Eternal Consciousness, it yet leaves the other foot in the world of Nature and sensory experience, without desiring to be unjust to all it owes to its connection with them. We are closely linked to Nature by body, and it would be ungrateful not to recognise that the individuality, permanence, and inwardness of the self, which plays so important a part in our Theistic Idealism, owe a certain primary and clearly recognisable debt to body. Mind, however, is not irrelevant to the world of Nature; Nature submits to be idealised, and evokes the spiritual powers and enterprise of man. Nature of herself indeed is nothing,

and owes everything to his developed consciousness. Man, in fact, becomes a microcosm as Nature is mirrored in his consciousness. But Nature is vastly more the object of our thought than of our perception. Berkeley, Hegel, Fichte, Schopenhauer, are among those who have placed the centre of things in the human mind, and viewed the world as the representation of that mind. The principles of reason wake, with guiding light, under the impact of mind on Nature. The universe, alike in its sensible forms and the rational principles that underlie it, becomes idealised in the mind of man. Theistic Idealism holds, with Aquinas, that "the ideas or types of things are God's thoughts,"—Whose archetypal ideas, be it said, are no real plurality in His Mind—progressively realised in the world, and progressively known by us. Divine Idea in the universe was held by Fichte, as it was, later, by Carlyle, in spite of Hamilton's discouraging scholastic dictum to the effect that "Nature conceals God." Nature became a macrocosm, interpreted by the relations found in the microcosm. Nature can never be other, to theistic idealism, than infused and suffused with Deity; the material world is, for it, the garment of the living God, whose hem it would kiss afar off; it knows nothing of a self-contained and self-sufficient universe, with suns and stars, and worlds, inert and dead; for it, Nature, as destined bride of man's soul, is, and must be, spiritual—no corpse or world of "matter"; Nature is, for it, God's present, ceaseless act, for His life and presence are in its radiant fulness. Philosophy proceeds upon the assumption of the reality of the world or of Nature, but it has still to determine the nature of the real. My quest of the real must set out from consciousness and its states, as the most real, certain, and underivable, that I know. External nature exerts its pressure upon me, and makes me dependent upon it for stimuli and impressions from outside, which the activity of consciousness creatively works up into a world of its own. For mind and the object are, be it remembered, reciprocally determining factors in all our experience. The modern philosophy of Nature, which is supposed to rest upon the anti-

thesis of subject and object, may try to eliminate—and it is right it should do so—every subjective factor; that is to say, all anthropomorphism, but it will never succeed in perfectly doing so. The most it can do is, to view the world of Nature, as fully as may be, as an independent, self-contained system. Hence, however, our present day philosophising about Nature views the world as organism rather than mechanism, and lays its stress on objective Nature as an active and organic whole, to the neglect of any naïve anthropomorphic elements involved in such nature-knowledge. For Kant, in his ‘Critique of Judgment,’ held Nature purposive, organising herself in her own products or organic forms. Nature, however, as known in my experience, is never nature as mere reality—Joubert’s *l’affreuse réalité*—as purely physical and *per se*, but nature as already enriched with the characters of the idea, for it is nature as something administered and becoming. Nature, in all its laws, whether of substance, causality, or energy, is a nature which thus suggests or reflects other mind, no less than other things. The world is not an incomprehensible world of matter, standing in alienation or estrangement from spirit: their unity was the aim even of thinkers of the type of Lewes: distinguished from God the world may be, but it is nowise separable from, or unrelated to, Him, Whose life fills its framework, so to speak. Matter is not the solid thing it appears: ’tis but an assemblage of centres of forces, and activity is of its essence; neither granite nor iron is in reality more solid than the air we inhale; nor is the primitive yield of either to the savage what it is to the scientist. The world of matter falls away from us, whenever it is analysed; and so we are left by Berkeley with Infinite Spirit, with a permanent possibility of sensations by Mill, and with Power unknowable by Spencer. Of course, one cannot get outside his own mind, and contemplate the world of nature *ab extra*, but theistic idealism finds a possibility of getting into sufficient and final relations with it *ab intra*, as Nature in the subject. There is a “compresence or togetherness” of nature and mind; and if the world of Nature, as

known, is a mental construction or projection of our perceptual consciousness, this need not mean, and does not in the least mean, that nature and her objects are not prior to our perceptions, and do not act upon us, and determine the nature of our mental constructions. For subjectivism must not be allowed to keep us from recognising that objects are essential elements of experience, and that our knowledge-relations to them must be made intelligible. Our ideal constructions are here, of course, interpretative. Important as were Kant's view that a rational theory of Nature is only realised as its laws are *à priori*, and not to be gained through experience, and Fichte's view that all natural laws might be deduced from first principles, we have other and more modern issues here to consider. Nature is our *prius*, and from her we, as living beings, have come; nor are our minds so independent and self-enclosed as to realise their meaning and functions apart from Nature and her objective system of persons and things. The chasm between Nature and Freedom we, with Kant, find bridged only in ethical teleology.

A word may be said, at this stage, as to Meinong's view of the object, which has points of contact with Husserl's. For him, the object is essential to every psychic fact; there can be no representation which is not the representation of something, no judgment without being the judgment of something. As for the difference between the object and the content, the content is for Meinong the state of knowledge corresponding to the object: the content of the representation is thus very different from the object of the representation. The relation between object and content is, to him, ideal or independent of existence. The concept *has* an object, on his view, but cannot *be* the object. For the object cannot be confounded with psychic fact. The concept is a mere interior event, but the content is always real. But the object of Meinong—and therein his procedure is different from ours—is not the object as real and existent in space and time, but the object of thought, as independent of experience. We prefer to keep close to

experience, whereas the object is, for him, only an idea regarded in its objective moment. The world of objects he frees from the concept of existence, which we have no need to do. His mode of apprehending "objectives," in his *Gegenstandstheorie*, does not further concern us here. Our idealistic constructions are not interpretations of reality that have taken no account of objective considerations on the way, else the world might be an arbitrary creation of our minds. No idealism can be satisfactory which does not allow me to say that, in my cognitive experience, the nature of my mind is expressed in its constructive working, and that the nature of the object also is, in some sort, given expression to in my knowing. I hold, indeed, to so much of epistemological realism as is involved in granting to the object given or perceived, an existence independent of my perception, but I do not think the realist establishes the externality and independence of the object by ignoring the process of knowing. I am content that my subjective idealism should apply at the moment of perception, if I may be allowed so to express the matter. It is enough for me that being or reality, that is not presented, is as good as non-existent for us. My knowledge is real, so far as it goes; it is real, as I lose myself in the object, and find its meaning and essence, by ceasing to treat it as external. Thus arises a certain aspect or relation of identity between my mind and the object, but that the relation is one of such correspondence of thought with the object as to constitute epistemological monism, is my idealistic contention. But I do not accept that idealistic logic which makes the need for the presence of a subject, as a condition of our knowledge of things, a condition of their existence. Nature, as a phenomenon, exists only in our consciousness, in the manner already described, making for our percipient mind a distinct world, in the case of every one of us. This concerns only the *what* of Nature: its *that* is far-reaching, and declares Nature to be antecedent, perdurable, independent reality, whether we are there to perceive it or

not. Hence the *reductio ad absurdum* of idealism, which is sometimes attempted, fails, because, while the being of a sensible object may lie for us in its *being perceived*, there is no reason why the object should not exist prior to the act of perceiving. It is not proved that the object cannot exist except for a mind. One cannot allow that thought or intellect is idle or impotent in our acts of perceiving: the relations of the object, say, to prior time or existence, my intellect may perceive, for it is the very function of intelligence to perceive relations; and, in any case, perception owes a mighty deal of what it carries and signifies to the functioning of thought or intellect. One knows how little pure perception exists in the world of fact, not theory. An awareness, however vague and indistinct, of the object may be mine; its acknowledged existence as an object, prior to my perception, may, through the outrunning of consciousness, be mine; but all this concerns only its *that* as an object, its *what* or quality begins with my perception of it. My perceptions are my acts of perceiving, and are not "in the objects," as Bergson supposes. But my perceptions are of the objects, which are the real things—the things of real importance—in all my acts of perceiving. None the less, their *esse* is *percipi* to our Idealism. That Idealism, resting on the basis of individual consciousness, recognises a common ground of all our experience, and so is capable of taking an universal form or character. I agree with Mr Russell that physical laws determine the character and duration of non-perceived objects. The growth of such an Idealism is even-paced with the increasing complexity of the evolution of Nature. Our idealism cannot approve the action of that fruitful and many-sided philosopher, Krause, in treating nature and reason or mind as co-ordinate, instead of, like Hegel, making nature subserve the ends of reason or mind. This, although Hegel's attempt, in his Philosophy of Nature, was by no means lustrous. Activity was, for him, synonymous with reality (*Wirklichkeit*). Our idealism, in its philosophy of nature, must be purged of mechanism—or mere inorganic matter—as a Nature vitalised and trans-

mented by spirit, whose ideal is flatly contradictory of anything like bare, dead mechanism. Such mechanism has, for us, its valuable aspects everywhere, although it can have no place, in the final analysis of Nature, as living reality. Our problem is the philosophy of Nature, not that of matter—which, analysed, disappears in activities of energy—nor of a material world, for materiality is not reality. Nature, as sensibly perceived, is our study: the matter of mechanical philosophers has been styled an “extension-inertia phantom,” and, as really non-existent—for matter is only a process—claims no particular attention from us. Nature is everything at one and the same time: as Goethe has it—

“Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale,
Alles ist sie mit einem Male.”

Concrete Nature has, of course, its mechanical aspects, of which due account must, for scientific purposes, be taken; but that is no reason for not relegating “matter” to the limbo of pseudo-entities—a fantastic procedure to strongly realistic minds—and for not treating a “material world” as non-existent, except as for actual or possible experience. With such materialisms our idealism can have nothing to do, for it has left “matter” behind as “a pauper denizen of the conceptual world.” This, of course, has nothing to do with the fact that the existence of a real objective world is never seriously questioned in philosophy, for the denial of the reality of the material world would, as Dr E. Caird once said, inevitably lead to the denial of any world at all. The externality of Nature, in its manifoldness, has for us ceased in the unity of spirit. The laws of Nature are, so to speak, only the logical principles of Nature; and by as much as Nature is permeated with such law, she is by so much shot through with spirit or world-reason. It is we who put soul into Nature with our unity, and make her a system, albeit no mechanical one. For mechanism—or mechanical system—is abstract, and merely quantitative, not qualitative. For idealism, Nature is elastic and expansive. The Nature system is

a unity of differences. No doubt, we bring our own thought-forms to our interpretation of Nature, but how much, on the other hand, does organised reason owe to these forms of thought being taken out of Nature? Has not Leibniz, in his metaphysical treatment, said of these ideally apprehended forms of knowledge, that "every true predication has some basis in the nature of things"? The laws of Nature are nature's categories: "spirit borrows from matter the perceptions upon which it feeds," says Bergson. Nature seeks for causes; spirit, according to our idealism, which finds perceptions in the perceiver, seeks for ends and means, according to teleological causal laws. Of Nature, in the inorganic sense, we may certainly say that it is the prelude to mind or spirit (*Vorstufe des Geistes*). But we may press thought further, and say that when mechanism is thoroughly transcended, in the manner aforesaid, Nature is so transfigured that naturalistic and crude materialistic assumptions disappear.

With the recent and able "defence of Idealism" by Prof. Ladd, I am in large agreement; but, as a refutation of Realism, which it seems intended to be—since it seeks to subsume all realism under idealism—I am compelled to think it somewhat futile ('Mind,' 1914). Every form of realism, he claims, is "essentially idealistic"; realism and idealism "cannot properly be opposed as rival schools"; and "most advocates of modern realism" have "little use for any attempt at a rational theory of knowledge," a statement which I cannot regard as just in view of the facts. An irenicon that proceeds by the idealistic lion devouring the realistic lamb is not likely to prove very satisfactory to the latter, nor do I think it quite reasonable to expect that it should. The counter-contention can quite well be made [J. Laird, 'Mind,' 1916, p. 310]. The realist has a perfectly laudable desire to do justice by the object, and its space and time relations in their exteriority, and if it seems good to him to maintain as great independence and reality for the external world as for the mind that perceives it, it does not seem to me that the liberty of philosophising should be denied him, or that the product of his thinking should be illiberally penalised by denying it the name of

“systematic philosophy.” As for the epistemological reproach, it can no more be flung at realism than at modern absolute idealism. Its history entitles Realism to some better treatment. I have preferred, in this chapter, the irenic form of trying to preserve some greater justice to the object than is found in much current idealism, without adopting or approaching the “fallacy of naïve realism” involved in claiming the independent existence of the external object, so far as the form of my idealism is concerned. So doing, I claim that I am only acting in accord with Prof. Ladd’s very proper insistences that true or legitimate idealism must “keep close to reality.” One may do so, while accepting the word of Aquinas—“Omne quod recipitur in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis.”

Again, Cohen and Natorp do not give us a philosophy of Nature, but only deal philosophically with natural science on a mathematical foundation. This means merely a Logic of the exact sciences (as in Natorp’s ‘Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften,’ Leipzig, 1910). The object we are, of course, told is not anything “given” or “absolute,” or aught of that kind: the object is not, but becomes. I have no concern here to traverse the view put forward of existence as itself only a concept of pure thought. I merely refer to the idealistic maintenance of the Marburg School, that thought first produces the object. I have already sufficiently disputed and rectified this contention, and have pointed out that the object considered in itself—and not idealistically viewed as existing for us—must be taken as absolutely existing, must be presupposed as “given.” I would only remark that that does not mean all absence of relation, making knowledge impossible; and would point out that Messer maintains that this presupposition is involved in the very concept of knowledge, and that, without its validity, knowledge would, as he holds, lose its meaning and significance (A. Messer, in *Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 1911). Of course, it can be urged, from this extreme idealistic point of view, that the object, as viewed in itself, is not necessary, but only the thought of it. But the fact remains that, if we are not to be

fantastic or sceptical, we must hold that that, of which we are convinced, is just that which must be presupposed as existing, and that, too, independently of our thought. Our Idealism, less extreme, finds no need to do despite to existence by making it a mere thought, or to deny the existent character of the object, prior to its being taken up by thought, under the incitements of sensation, into our consciousness (For Prof. Aliotta on the *realistic* view, see 'La Cultura Filosofica,' 1915). Matter, or the object, cannot be passively received, as Kant supposed; such things as absolute passivity, simple or unmixed sensation, pure matter, cannot be proven. In our idealistic sense, we may say, no less than the realistic Meinong and others, that the so-called primary qualities of objects or matter are not less subjective than the so-called secondary ones, which does not at all, as some critics have wrongly supposed, subvert the reality of being as perceived. It should be observed that the teleological, and idealistically theistic, view of Nature is one which carries with it, as a constitutive part, a scientific, because a rational explication of nature. Teleology always proceeds from the whole to the parts, thereby differing from causal viewpoints. The causal mode of interpretation does not know whether the result of a long term of mechanical sequences is a purpose or not. But, as Lotze shewed, neither causal explanation nor mechanical interpretation, excludes purpose. The relations of causality and teleology are such that an ideal priority must be claimed for the latter, since its teleologic determination of laws has the already determined laws of causality to found upon, and further, its system of means for the realisation of purpose is not confined to purely mechanical means, but admits of higher types of law than can be mechanically determined. All spiritual life is teleological. All nature-mechanism has purposiveness for implicate. Philosophers of norms, or values, or teleological instruments, like Windelband, Rickert, James, and Münsterberg, equally with immanent teleologists like Ostwald and Driesch, occupy teleological ground as by fundamental conviction. We have here, on our hands, the world, whose nature we seek

to make intelligible, and the working out of this problem involves the binding into a unity, of the highest kind, of the world of laws and the world of values, the kingdom of the must (necessity) and the kingdom of the ought (duty). Windelband is able to speak of "the immanent necessity of the teleological connection"; and no wonder, since, to theistic idealism, an underlying unity is found beneath the whole developmental process. For the theistic hypothesis is just that of God as the purposive ground of the evolutionary process, and the Conservator of its values, no less than He is its originating and sustaining Power. This unity must be steadily kept in view, when, with Hegel, we are inclined to view Nature, in her august independence of us, as a bacchantic god—*ein bacchantischer Gott*—that knows not how to curb and correct herself. For Nature is not, as Münsterberg has it, "only the object of man's will"—his mere "tool." But Hegel has given us an interesting insight, even if too abstract, in imparting to teleology a cosmic character—a character of the whole or of wholeness, although I do not think the significance of finite centres of purpose is thereby transcended. It seems to me we have need to be very jealous of any teleologic whole, which is not rightly inclusive of, and harmonious with, all rightful unities of finite purpose, which latter may be ends in themselves, and have worth in themselves, the while they exist for the whole. The best philosophic thought of our time may be said to have acknowledged that, in the conception of a teleological whole, the notion of purely antecedent plan is quite inadequate, and even the distinction of end and means open to some grave objection. But this does not warrant us to give up immanent finality in a world-system that displays conscious purpose, and evidences so great guidance from within—not *ab extra*. Evolution is itself end, not simply means to end, and development has immediate value. It is the becoming which is the really valuable thing in the doctrine of values. In the same way, under the theistic conception whereby the world is inseparable from indwelling Deity, we cannot accept any Deistic Bergsonian view of creation as going on for ever in virtue of an initial movement. It is to

be said, also, that, though the teleology of the universe may well outrun our finite consciousness, that may only be a stronger reason for our holding fast to such purposive wholes as may be open to the possibilities of finite consciousness. Here we stand, and can do no otherwise, even if you tell us there is an unclaimed teleology of the universe, to which our finite consciousnesses are quite unequal. Royce is on better ground than Bosanquet and others who disregard finite centres of purpose, when he declares that no finite view is wholly illusory, and that every finite intent is taken up and fulfilled in the Absolute.

Behind what we call Nature, men of science find so much intelligence, will, and power or directive force, that they hope never to exhaust her study: these, and the finite organism which, with its creative, self-directing consciousness, studies them, are alike rooted in Deity, on the theistic hypothesis. If we hold the unity of Nature, it is necessarily as the result of judgments of a highly selective character—idealistic and man-made—for it is due to the intrinsic unity of the knowing subject, although the world-unity in its turn conditions the unity of the empirical consciousness. But, absolute idealism notwithstanding, my knowledge can never, in its standpoint, be that of an absolutely completed knowledge; and there cannot even be question or measure of degrees of truth and reality, when the Absolute Mind stands at an infinite remove from my human knowledge and thinking. The direct but partial knowledge or awareness, which we have of Nature's reality or objects, makes for us what we call truth, which thus should, as little as may be, consist of desiccated concepts. A very different position from that of Spir, who takes the world to be an "organized illusion" (*organisierter Täuschung*), simply because he could not make it agree with his interpretation of the norm of reality as in the *a priori* law of identity. Hence he could make no attempt to explain the world, but only condemn it as illusory—an abnormality in his own phraseology. Thus we are left with the manifoldness of the world of nature or appearances, and the rich content

of experience, without the introduction of any unifying principle to effect their harmonious blending or fusion. Reality, our Idealism allows from its own standpoint, is psychical, continuous, and creative, but Nature's processes are never, in strictness, of purely mechanical character. That holds true even of those vast, illimitable reaches of Nature which, while not perceived by me, can yet be thought or conceived by me. "Teleology does not come out of the empty mind," says Dr Bosanquet, which is true enough: purposeless mechanism is the merest abstraction: ends are not found merely in life: they exist in, and throughout, the universe, taken at its largest as an organic whole: Nature would be meaningless without a finalistic interpretation. It is purely gratuitous to depreciate subjective teleology, as Dr Bosanquet does, for it is obviously the inseparable factor of its objective mechanistic analogue, which it finds and interprets. It is a very defective view which supposes an exclusively objective method to be always the surest way of reaching objectivity in our knowledge, as any reflective insight, in various spheres of knowledge, might suffice to show. To miss this insight into the part played by the subjective factor, in the quest of objectivity, would clearly be to miss one of the greatnesses of idealism. It is just the working of reason in our idealistic constructions that gives to objects their objective value. The truth is, that Dr Bosanquet, in his insinuations that "the end" is simply "the whole," has no perception of the fact that a true ontological whole, once gained, has just teleology of an absolute character as its end. Dr Bosanquet is content to seek a "whole" that is merely free from contradiction but our Idealism seeks, beyond that, fulness of life, energy, purpose. Nature is for us process rather than product. Nature has, besides continuity, direction and progressive movement.

When Reality has just now been called psychical, that is as being known only through our psychic powers; but it is not meant to imply Panpsychism, of which theistic idealism has no need, since that could only lead to epis-

temological confusion. It takes the universe or world of nature to be the expression of the Divine Mind or the Absolute Life, without feeling any particular need to invest the atoms or molecules of inert matter with faint supposititious life analogous to that of consciousness. No more does our theistic idealism succumb to the biologic tendencies of those recent vitalistic philosophies, with their postulation of the autonomy and independence of the vital processes, whereby mind is made a helpless cripple, unable to transcend Nature, or embrace and scrutinize life in the whole. This, simply because, on one side, the mind is an evolved object—as Bergson bluntly puts it, “only an emanation or an aspect”—sprung from Nature’s life. As if consciousness, in its higher developments, were not evolved just that it might scrutinize and judge the lower! As if mind or spirit had not reality of its own, independence of, and intrinsic superiority to, Nature, but were merely something derivable and dependent! As if soul or mind had no power to reach the transcendent, to discern the absolute through all the relative, to find the changeless amid all the ceaseless flux! As if we could not carry essential being or rest—with *Operari sequitur esse* for principle—through all our working or becoming! The becoming may yet be the more important interest for philosophical interpretation, since being, if statically conceived, must be sterile or non-constructive. For Neo-Eleaticism, however much the doctrines of the spirit and of knowledge may owe it, might soon land us in a vitiating abstractionism. The truth is, that Mind and Nature are bridged by the conception of life’s evolving process as a rational, and not merely a naturalistic one. This rationality of the natural process—this evolving of Reason—clearly carries us beyond the categories of pure natural science. Not a little that is cogent and important has been urged by those who maintain that teleology is presupposed in vitalism and its phenomena from the outset. They properly assert that vitality is not a principle separately added to chemical substance, but is the result of interaction between organic

substance and its environment. As opposed to purely mechanical interpretation of Nature, it must be maintained that without consciousness—without actual awareness of our needs, whether organic, or intellectual, or affective—there can be for us no intentional or designed purposive activity. Such a consciousness is, of course, a memorized, systematized, and experiential outcome of teleological organization. But when one finds a transatlantic writer, highly intelligent and well versed, both scientifically and philosophically, accusing pure Idealism of being inimical to science, and of having debarred itself “from reaching self-transcendent reality on the perceptual side,” one can only say it must surely be evident how pointless are these charges before the type of Idealism we have described in this and other parts of the present work. I refer to Edmund Montgomery, too little known.

The philosophic significance of natural selection was taken by Weismann, Ziegler, and others, to lie in the aimlessness of the co-operant forces. But the question of the exclusion of purposive character in the forces belongs to philosophy rather than to science, and is of much wider import than natural selection. This was early seen by critics like K. E. von Baer and Albert Wigand, to name no others. Determined variation was strongly maintained by Nägeli and Reinke, while Pauly pressed the principle of discrimination—or intellect—as opposed to accident, and found room for a teleological principle working in Nature. The presence of purpose, and the selection of means, were held by Von Baer to constitute “reason,” and he concluded that “Nature works reasonably,” or is “the emanation of Reason.” That is very much in accord with the philosophy of Nature put forward by Theistic Idealism, which finds man’s action not only teleological, but presupposive of Nature’s subjection to law. The elimination of teleology by the reign of causality cannot succeed. It must be said, at this stage, that it is time to protest against any further impoverishment of man’s higher—his spiritual or his philosophic—life in the name of biologic theory, by those who can give no

proper account of the psychic conditions of knowledge. Modern Biology neither accepts Neo-Vitalism nor rejects spiritual Monism. I cannot here dwell on recent theorisings or experimentings in the direction of modifying the theory of descent, further than to give a passing mention of the significant, but narrowly directed, mutation theory of De Vries, which has excited a good deal of Continental interest, although it is not wholly satisfying. "Unlike the prevailing form of the theory of selection," he says, "the doctrine of mutation lays stress on sudden or discontinuous changes, and regards only these as active in the formation of species" (De Vries, 'The Mutation Theory,' vol. ii. p. 599, Eng. edn.). One writer has said that "mutations are permanent, variations transitory"; and, among mutationists, Bateson has dealt severely with variations. The analysis of variability is not, however, a thing we can take as ended. I return to remark how persistent has been the rather absurd tendency of physiology to resolve psychological concepts into physiological ones, after all that philosophic spiritualism has done in defining the soul. "Mind, so far as it can be in space," says Bosanquet, "is nervous system." One recalls, too, how Flechsig has, with somewhat of this tendency, sought to find in the brain the special correlatives of the psychic process of the association of ideas—structures occupying two-thirds of the substance of our cerebral hemispheres. There is real life, below perception, which Neo-Vitalism has overlooked. It has been remarked by Lasswitz that Neo-Vitalism, in its varying forms, always presents a new and particular form of lawful connection, specifically termed vital power (*Lebenskraft*), for the organic world; and for this power it has the most varied distinctions and conceptions. It is only an unconscious finalism that Neo-Vitalism admits. It is not quite necessary to my purpose here that I should discuss the Weismannian and the Mendelian hypotheses. But I may remark that, in the theorisings of that able investigator, Prof. J. Loeb, there seems to be a one-sided and over-weighted tendency in favour of physico-chemical re-

latedness as a complete and sufficient account of life; for the facts or known laws of physics and chemistry do not warrant us in taking them to afford an adequate explanation of the facts of heredity and development. It has yet to be shewn that there is not a distinctively biological form of relatedness. It is an exaggeration for Loeb to say that in heredity we have "perhaps the most exact and rationalistic part of biology," for the present state of knowledge, as distinguished from the speculative or conjectural, does not warrant any such statement. And when Loeb makes "ideas" cause chemical changes in the body, he is at least in danger of a strange confounding, or identifying, of the mental and the physico-chemical. His domination by mechanism carries metaphysical incapacity and dogmatism. I am, therefore, content to remark that Münsterberg has declared Neo-Vitalism untenable and logically unconscionable. It has, for all that, its relative uses in its saner forms. The more you conceive the world as vital, not mechanical, the more you assimilate it to the world of spirit. It reminds us that life, and the transcendent fact of consciousness, stand on different scientific planes from those inorganic processes, with which they are not commensurable. Not that even matter is inert, for it is constantly emitting force. The right or justification of vitalism, however, as against mechanism, lies just here; for there are psychic factors of inner, invariable, non-mechanical character; and vital processes are not lawless, albeit they possess, beyond the non-living, a determinate tendency of development. It is not in the least necessary to postulate any *Lebenskraft* of a mystical sort for this. What is called for is continuity, and an independent course of development. Neo-Vitalist theories, like those of Driesch, with his Aristotelian "entelechy"; of Reinkes, with his theory of "dominants"; of Verworn, who denies the psychical to be explicable by the physical; of Albrecht, and of Schneider, with his strongly-marked tendency to "psychism"; these, and other like theorisings, are not only negatively destructive of mechanistic theory, but positively point to a deeper mode of interpreting reality, in re-action from the Haeckelian stand-

point. But how could mind or spirit attempt such deeper inquiry into Nature and her realities, if it were not already free, spontaneous, active, independent, and creative? We simply cannot deny ourselves, and turn our backs upon all that experience, in its most direct, primary, and assured forms, has taught us of the vitality, freedom, self-attested worth, and incomparable power, of the spirit, whose instrument and whose stepping-stone Nature is. The whole depth and power of Theistic Idealism are to be found precisely in its experience of, and insight into, the absolute and indefeasible worth and right of spirit, with its still mysterious psychic conditions, over against purely vitalistic and naturalistic representations. It is with the standpoint of consciousness itself—not with any beginnings—Theistic Idealism has to do. Hence it rejects the blunt, unexplicated, naturalistic emphasis in such a passage as the following:—"That nature and man are in some way continuous, that man is what he is only *in virtue* of his ontological relation to the world, that apart from it he can have neither being nor meaning, neither a moral nor a natural life, cannot now be questioned" (H. Jones, in 'Hibbert Journal'). No one questions, certainly, the very obvious truth that "nature and man are in some way continuous," but this Neo-Hegelian mode of putting all reality and effectiveness upon the physical "world," carries so much *suggestio falsi* about it, as may help explain the nemesis in the persistent and amazing ethical defects of that type of Idealism, exemplified elsewhere in this work. In much less vague terms, biologists have taught us man's relation to the world, and the newer embryology has brought its own modifications to the teaching; several able works in constructive biology and biological endeavour to deal with psychic elements and aspects, have appeared in recent years; but, able and interesting as these works are, the results are yet so inappreciable that philosophy would be well advised to stand upon her own feet, and plant herself firmly upon the facts and implications of consciousness, as here and now developed, with diverse forms and values of which it is the business of philosophy to make due count and reckoning. No one doubts man's vital interaction with

the world; his whole development comes of interaction with the cosmic environment, from which he is nowise detachable. But it is none the less a reprehensible thing, in the philosophic sphere, to talk as if spirit had no detachment, independence, autonomy, of its own, for this is just to show how little the problems of the higher life, and the possibilities of spirit, have been grasped. If the zenith of our endowment is to be found in our capacity for the spiritual, spirit has been evolved to little purpose if its consciousness and possibilities are only to be smothered in naturalistic commonplaces. Treat consciousness thus, and you banish every form and vestige of value from the face of the earth. All our values are the creation of consciousness. And, happily, there is still "a piece of divinity in us," as said Sir Thomas Browne, something that "owes no homage unto the Sun." The world to which we belong is the world of the spirit—God's world—as Eucken has finely shewn in his 'Truth of Religion'; from that world we came, and by the forces that emerge from it do we live: any other world shall one day fall or vanish from our consciousness. Man's soul or spirit, as in essence distinct from the world, has relations to God, and lives in Him; our spirit does not, however, function *in vacuo*, but acts upon and transfigures the real sense-world. Morality is for our Idealism a thing of spirit, and the sphere of moral personality, as raised above that of natural phenomena, is for it sharply marked off from the physical world, as in itself a world self-contained and independent. Nature can neither give nor take away that spiritual life which is higher than merely natural being. This independence and underivability of the psychical and moral is, as personality develops, a fact so clear and outstanding that it "cannot now be questioned," either by psychologists or philosophers, who have mastered the relations between the physical and the mental. Such a statement as that already quoted pretty well negates centuries of spiritual advance, and leaves us little improved on Plato's philosophy of Nature, which, in the *Philebus* and elsewhere, takes the idealistic form of the identity of thought and being in a genuinely pantheistic way. But life is less

to be thought of as fact than as capacity to become what it ought to be.

Theistic Idealism no more regards Nature, without God, as Nature, than it regards man, without mind or spirit, as man. Nature is for it, as for Hegel, "only a moment of the divine," and for it, too, the one infinite energy is power spiritual. This does not keep the natural philosophies of great physicists like Mayer, Planck, Helm, Ostwald, and Duhem, from having their value and interest on their own plane. For these tend to present Nature to us in an intelligible form, through the physical theories in logical garb. Ostwald's theory of "energetics"—wherein "energy" is a "real existence, not merely a mathematical abstraction"—makes energy substance, and matter only a "system of energies." But if energy be the sole substance, with an "energetic imperative" as the highest law, that seems to me a significant and suggestive fact for metaphysics, though the perception seems strangely to have escaped Prof. Aliotta, and Prof. A. E. Taylor after him, in their too summary handling of Ostwald's positions ('Mind,' 1912). For his energy is a veritable ontological being or entity. If mind were taken by Ostwald as merely a phenomenal manifestation of this same energy, I should be inclined to postulate qualitative differences in Nature. But Ostwald has been rather more careful than he has always got credit for, and only objects to the mental and the mechanical worlds being opposed to each other, whereas—without, however, clearly relating the two kinds of energy involved—he thinks mental phenomena might at least be connected with the phenomena of life. With this possibility before us, mind might, in its own peculiar and distinctive way, be a system of thinking energies, just as matter is of moving energies, and no really good reason has, I think, been advanced why these two essences or forms of energy, which Ostwald thinks "unconditionally comparable," should remain separate and estranged. But is the energy concept, applied to the psychical, not a mere analogous one? The element of mechanical causality in the one, and the element of teleological self-activity in the other, can, however, perfectly well

be united in the person or ego, as comprehending in himself identity in difference of matter and mind. Of philosophical dogmatism, however, Ostwald is not free, so far as shewing that spirit is energy. Of course, it matters less whether Ostwald's theory of energy appears "extravagant" to philosophical critics, with mechanistic prepossessions, than whether, and how far, it has been scientifically substantiated, making possible a severance of physics from mechanics. I think a more real theory of matter than Ostwald's is still required. The evils of mechanistic hypotheses I should regard as not less obvious than the helps. But the real trouble with Ostwald's natural philosophy is, that spirit seems only to use the physico-chemical occurrences, not to diffuse itself into them. As for mechanistic evils, we know what Berkeley, Malebranche, and Leibniz, had to do to get clear of the mechanistic meshes of Descartes and Spinoza, and we know how mechanism has failed in all studies of organic form. The really significant criticism of the theory of Ostwald seems to be, that, even if substantiated, it gives us no great or real aid in solving the world problem, since it tells us merely the form of the world, but not its contents or upbuilding. It is really rather a doctrine of regular being, than of pure movement, for he will have it that energy is substance. To make the connection of events intelligible, without the help of mechanical figures, will not be easy, that is, if a dynamic basis is to be taken for our interpretation of Nature. And yet, says Mach, it is a prejudice to explain all physical phenomena by mechanical ideas. The truth is, that Ostwald's theory, though continuous, is not so dissimilar to mechanistic interpretation, though discontinuous, as it looks. He retains the conception of development in the shape of the second law of thermo-dynamics. His energy results from work, which means overcoming a resistance in space opposed to a movement—otherwise matter; and it, like mechanism, is the cause of the infinite multiplicity of phenomena. But it may safely be said that, in this sphere of discussion, it has not yet been made clear how the relation of spirit and matter is to be determined, although not a little has been done in pointing

the way. In this, however, Ostwald does not sufficiently probe ultimate philosophical issues. In this connection one may recall how Spencer, in one of his more illumined, less agnostic, strains, has spoken of the energy of the universe as to be conceived somewhat like that of our own personalities—"this necessity in our minds to think of the external energy in terms of the internal energy, gives rather a spiritualistic than a materialistic aspect to the universe." Mach, to whom allusion has been made, has done great injustice both to reality and science, in the excessive and one-sided stress he has laid upon sensation or sense-data, in spite of his recognition of the "so-called attributes" of matter and things. An unfortunate issue of this anti-metaphysical tendency of his phenomenalism. But injustice to reality can never be justified; and if the Theistic Idealism which I here present holds that—

"Man hath all which Nature hath, but more,
And in that *more* lie all his hopes of good,"

it yet holds it with full desire to give Nature all her due. Illusion there may be, but for it illusion is, as Joubert said, an integral part of reality; and it maintains, in face of the phenomenal self and world of Bergsonian flux, a standing-ground for itself in its intuition of the One as against the Many. It maintains, too, against Bergson, the importance of intelligence, not less than of instinct, for the inner life. The philosophy of Nature is really founded upon a logical basis—the pure theory of order. Nature, says Driesch, "is the one mediate object that obeys the postulates of the rational theory of becoming" ('The History and Theory of Vitalism,' p. 193). What endures in nature he calls substance, and causality is the rational connection in nature's changes. But these two concepts are supposed to have had connection, in some sort, with the logical concepts of identity and consequence. Our philosophy of Nature, in its concern with becoming or the evolutionary process, must consider the relations of the organic and the inorganic. In the inorganic processes, the tendency or direction is towards turning potential into kinetic energy, and equally distributing this

kinetic energy throughout the universe. Vital or organic direction, on the other hand, is towards converting kinetic into potential energy — towards securing kinetic energy in forms available for work. Thus the directions are antithetical or opposite. In the sphere of the organic, the energy-transformations are such as raise the energy to a state of high potential, whereas in the inorganic transformations, energy is dissipated, and a tendency towards inertia made evident. As a writer on "the philosophy of biology" has remarked, "this unavailable energy can only become available again if a compensatory energy-transformation is effected. Life is that which effects these compensatory energy-transformations." This latter or inorganic type of becoming is one of mere summation or accretion, and to it Driesch gives the name of "singular or additive causality." To the other or organic type of becoming, as vitalistic, he applies the phrase, "unifying" or "individualising causality." This type, as vitalistic, is, of course, not comprehensible by the laws of physics and of chemistry. But Theistic Idealism treats the metaphysical aspect of the world's becoming—the question of freedom—with a firmer hand than Driesch. For it posits clearly and decisively what Driesch calls "a stream, as it were, of undetermined becoming of a really creative character" running through "the totality of individuals," and it regards the manifoldness of material reality as determined in an immaterial way, by the underlying One, Who gives it reality, and Whose reason is immanent in it. This is in advance of Driesch, who, in treating of metaphysics in his work on 'The Problem of Individuality,' speaks of "the material world as the world of chance," and of "the world of form or order that manifests itself" in it (p. 74). The world of nature is, for him, a phenomenal world, the world of experience; and it is a conceptual construction. Only by inference from the character of this phenomenal world does he think a metaphysical view can be gained. But our idealism more decisively takes this phenomenal world to be the appearance of a changeless Absolute. It also takes the metaphysical implications of vitalism to be distinctly greater than Driesch

supposes. Though I am following a critical and constructive method, and am, consequently, not tied down to a chronological order, yet it may be desirable at this point to make some historical retrospect.

It deserves to be noted how much our modern conceptions of Nature have inherited from the objective idealism of Schelling, whose Nature was already psychical. A true metaphysic of Nature is a thing of such prime philosophic concern, that it cannot but appear strange that Schelling's philosophy of nature has never received the attention it deserves. To him nature, as unconscious expression of spirit, is visible spirit, and spirit is invisible nature. The absolute intelligence is taken by him as not only giving rise to ideal conceptions, but as creative of the real world. Between such a method as Schelling's of constructing reality from an advancing thought-process, and the intuition on which he insists, there is an inherent contradiction. For him, there was the same Absolute in nature as in mind, their harmony being no mere reflection of thought. If you suppose we transfer our idea to nature, then, holds Schelling, you have not even dreamed what nature is and should be for us. Nature is the counterpart of mind, and produced by it, only that mind may, by its agency, attain to self-consciousness or a pure perception of itself.

"The attempt," according to Schelling, "to account for nature as a production adapted to design, that is, realizing a purpose, destroys the character of nature, and, in fact, the very thing which constitutes it nature. For the peculiarity of nature consists in this, that while its mechanism is blind, it is in that mechanism, nevertheless, adapted to a design. If we destroy that mechanism, we also destroy nature itself." From Schelling, however, Bergson varies in the way he holds to the mechanistic conception of inorganic nature, against which, as purely material, the vital *élan* is directed. Bergson's view is vitalism of a sort, with a sharp antagonism between the organic and the inorganic as its not very satisfactory basis, to our Idealism. It was indeed this thought of nature's life and action, as constitutive of existent reason, that Hegel

expanded into the statement that all that is real or actual is rational. The real thing, to Schelling, is the idea; the idea is the substance—the heart of things; finite existence is a merely derived being, and, loosed from the idea, has no reality. Existence must, in his view, be thought of as substance. Schelling derives largely from Spinoza, the net result not being Spinozan substance, with matter and mind as inseparable attributes of one being, but an inconceivable background of real being named the Absolute.

It is, however, one of the fine features of Schelling that the unity of science and the unity of life are focussed in him; for, while he attaches himself to the study of the special sciences, he at the same time seeks to construct, or construe out of their essence, their highest principle, namely, the Absolute. Existence is, to Schelling, self-activity, and nature is already self-activity before she arrives at self-consciousness; for nature, to him, is in herself absolute self-movement. Matter is the root of all things—is existence in its first form; but it is still only the unity, or the polar tension of powers or factors which are active in opposite directions. Nature or the universal essence does not stop short without potentiating itself into life. For an actual ground must be an active one, and the stage of pure potency must be overpassed. But the obscurity and indeterminateness of Schelling's treatment make one ask whether, in all the foregoing processes, identity and indifference are preserved?

God is not God of the dead, but of the living, to this great speculative thinker, from whom we come back rich in ideas, intuitions, and variety of directions in which he has supplied stimuli. Schelling's thought proceeds in no constant and unvarying direction: his world-view is set to changes of severest type; he thinks such changes are the necessary supplementings of all earlier positions. Schelling's view of the world-development is more ideal or formal, however, than that, say, of Bergson, who regards the development rather as of real progressions in time, under certain conditions. Darwin's theory of development had unity at its base, but was limited to organic nature. While Darwin's unity remained mechan-

istic, Schelling's was teleological, and connected with life. The World-soul is to him the principle of life. The acceptance of a conscious, actively purposeful Creator raises philosophy in his view. But in a breaking away, a spring (*Sprung*), or falling away from this Creator, does he find the origin of the sense-world, God himself developing through the world, in its historically claimed independence of Him and return to Him.

Teleology in nature was, however, for him only of an unconscious kind. Every organization seemed to him an unconscious purposive product. Schelling's psychology holds nothing to be real save the will, and regards its own psychological function to be to start from the primal will found in nature, and follow the different stages of knowledge up to the active understanding and the practical reason. 'Tis a merit of his to avoid the mistake of Spinoza and others who make of the universe a fact, or a concatenation of facts, while it is really a life. The living, moving, element in Nature was for him the interest of philosophy. To Schelling, the life of humanity is seen typified or symbolized in nature, wherein spirit has found expression earlier than in man. Schelling, in making man thus an evolution of nature, was reversing the method of Fichte. Schelling's constructive idealism sought to free Fichtean idealism from the arbitrary aspects of the life of finite selves, by providing a theory of the facts of nature, and of the evolution of consciousness, that should be complementary to Fichtean thought. The outer world, then, was a manifestation of spirit, to which outer or natural order the inner world of the ego is inevitably related. These two sciences—mind and nature—Schelling expressly maintains, need and supplement each other, and he declares that a perfect intellectualizing or spiritualizing the laws of nature into laws of thinking or intuition would be "the highest perfecting of the science of nature." For "that theory of nature," he says, "would have attained to perfectness, by virtue of which all nature would resolve itself into intelligence." Man is but nature's last and highest reflection.

The successive stages of phenomenal existence, from

nature's lowest forms up to the highest manifestations of life and thought, where sensibility reigns supreme in man, are set forth by means of Schelling's notable—and, it must be said, suggestive—doctrine of potencies. All three moments of the Absolute are present, in pursuance of the principles of his theory of identity, in every phenomenon, and all are organic in the end. Man is the sum and content of all the potencies. Mechanical and chemical forces are but negative conditions of life: they await vital stimulus that lies exterior to the individual; such is the result of the absolute productivity, which works under the universal law of polarity. "Universal nature" is, for him, common principle of organic and inorganic, and there is unity throughout.

It was here that the defect of Schelling's treatment of the Absolute appeared. Berkeley and Fichte had seen—the former that there is no object without a subject, the latter that, in this sense, the subject makes the object; but Schelling saw that neither can there be a subject without an object—that the objective world equally conditions the existence of the ego. For him, that is to say, the universe has an existence of its own relatively distinct from the thinking subject. This is not to say, however, that the non-ego, in his view, makes the ego—that sense-perception is constitutive of thought, as with Hume, Locke, Condillac.

There is something finely suggestive in the way Schelling asks how the system of nature can be given to us, and does not blindly content himself with the scientific mode of accepting nature as something immediately given. His deeper quest was to know how the system arose for us, and how we are able to perceive it. His dynamic atomism pierced to forces, and was not content with brute facts. Indeed, dynamism, endowed with reason or intelligence to a quiet fantastical degree, was what formed his philosophy of nature. Its forces (*Kräfte*) were expressions of development.

But Schelling leaves nature, with her bi-polar laws, standing like an independent entity over against mind, with her bi-polar categories, in unresolved antagonism. This unresolved task was taken up by Hegel, who identified the

Absolute with the process itself. Schelling's worlds of mind and matter were supported by the Absolute, who seemed—according to the well-known saying of Hegel—in Schelling's system shot out of a pistol. Schelling, that is to say, does not show why it is there, or what it is, when he ought to have gone on to unify his bi-polar aspects of the world, relating them to an Absolute Being as a primal cause, and deducing their different natures as due to necessary consequences of evolving principles that latently inhered in such originaive cause. Schelling's Absolute remains outside things, if only for the reason that they proceed from Him. His absolute reason was to mean an equilibrium or indifference of subject and object. But if these two coincide in such a blank identity, the absolute unity becomes reduced to empty form or nothingness. Such an Absolute can give no substantial unity, neither can it subserve any purposes of real explanation. His Absolute was to be the centre of indifference of the magnet, but the magnet is no magnet at all, for since, by polar logic, subject and object must first be eliminated ere we reach the Absolute as point of indifference, we are reduced to blank nothingness in the process, and never reach a conscious knowledge of the Absolute at all. In evolving mind from Nature, Schelling stood opposed to Hegel, to whom Nature had no existence apart from thought. Mind could not, for Hegel, spring out of anything outside itself, there being nothing beyond it.

In contrast with Hegel here, Schopenhauer has but a secondary place for consciousness [*Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, *Ergänzungen*, Bk. I. ch. xv., where he says,—"Bewusstlosigkeit ist der ursprüngliche und natürliche Zustand aller Dinge."] This marks a defect of this system. Schopenhauer's philosophy of Nature took the substratum of all phenomena—the whole of Nature, in fact—to be nothing else than Supreme Will, as the only original and metaphysical principle of Ultimate Reality. It was for him the root and foundation—or the fundamental and active principle—of all things. Not that Schopenhauer had Schelling's peculiar interest in Nature and her phenomena, but that the former was, in his idealistic and romantic tendencies, led to his volun-

taristic philosophy of Nature, in his attempts to interpret the blind and aimless Will which lurked behind the forces of inorganic Nature. The science of Schopenhauer's time was, of course, not yet freed from *Natur-philosophie*, in the sense of nature-constructions by means of a theoretically conceived first principle. This view of the world as an objectification of Will could not, therefore, be of the nature of a really scientific and verifiable construction of the world. It is obvious, too, that the world which has reason—awakened rational and ethical insight—in it, cannot be explained except as growing out of the Absolute Reason. His speculation wears an arbitrary and unsatisfying cast. And, as for Schopenhauer's life-denouncing theories, they rest on complete misconception of human nature. His pessimisms were the fruit of his apotheosis of will of an irrational character, of his view of the world as held together only by blind impulse or energy and irrational instinct. He has failed to harmonise reality and consciousness. Hartmann, too, treated the problem of Nature, in his philosophy of the Unconscious, when he made this latter a higher consciousness, to be regarded as the common living background of all conscious individuals, and as the active essence, in Windelband's phrase, of all processes whether mental or physical. Logic gives to Will its content, thinks Hartmann; and the different combinations of Will and Logic are his way of explaining development. His thought has the merit to emphasise "the uniting spiritual and living ground of things," but he shares the defect already noticed in Schopenhauer, of putting speculative gains in the place of inductive process or method. Hartmann is of those who think an unconscious Absolute the most rational solution of the world's riddle, such Absolute having attributed to it the two functions of Will and Idea. For him the Unconscious contains the attribute of the idea, but the unconscious teleological activities so pre-supposed are separated by a huge chasm from the teleological designs of conscious human intelligence actively at work, and involve absurdities that have nowise been explained away. The concept of development is not reached through causality.

Wundt abjures every world-conception that follows not from scientific induction, in his recoil from ungrounded speculation. To him the law of ground and inference carries us beyond experience or the immediately given. Wundt does not think metaphysics can give concrete content to the idea of God, although, in his view, God can only be conceived by us as the world-will, in accordance with Wundt's voluntarism. Wundt hopes, by setting out upon bases of experience and science, and making use of the logical process of inference, to construct in the end a rational system of metaphysics, to which neither theology nor cosmogony shall be wanting. He has laid great stress, in his reasonings on Nature, on actuality, but it may be said that his interests have passed from the philosophy of Nature into the problems of mental and moral science. Wundt, it may be added, has ranked the activity of thought higher than the mechanism of associationist thinkers. But, with all his fine justice to the provisional results of the special sciences, and the systematic and mature form of his Idealism, the problem of reality—Nature or the world—is left in need of deeper study and fuller explication, in its connections with the reality of consciousness. Just at this point admissions more significant of idealism than he professes are made by Bergson when he says "Nature itself may be regarded as latent consciousness," and that "every reality has a relation to consciousness." Our idealism leaves behind the mechanical view of Nature as determinate and limited, for Nature is what man, as idealist, makes of her. We come back, in our philosophy of Nature, to say that the self or spirit is not a mere correlative of Nature. It is more than mere correlative. It is the true concrete; it transcends Nature, of which, in the manner previously shown, it is constitutive; hence it must be held logically prior to Nature. But the self or spirit does not hold itself in opposition to Nature or the world, but in relation to it; it fuses and blends itself with Nature. Kant expressed himself with no great degree of correctness when he said that Nature is made by the understanding,—"*Der Verstand macht allererst Natur.*" Of course, the understanding makes Nature by giving form

to the matter which comes through the senses. For Nature becomes revealed in us, but only in our interaction with influences that emanate from her, and, except as idealistically perceived, and somewhat mentally conceived, by us, she remains too much an extra-conscious, unknown, and highly complex body of existents. The soul or self, however, remains, in its qualitative worth, of vastly more account than all cosmic stuff, which, impassive and blind, may inorganically compose suns and stars of the illimitable universe. Its freedom and moral development are conditioned by contingency in Nature, which is no more a cosmos finished and complete, than science takes it to be. Nature is still the mighty anvil on which the self or spirit of man is battered into its moral shape. But the subjugation of physical forces is equally true and striking. We are in this work largely concerned with basal theistic conceptions, but even on pantheistic foundations, the compatibility of Nature and Spirit has been maintained, as by Schleiermacher on the basis of the Schellingian identity already referred to. Theistic Idealism can very well agree with Bosanquet when he says "it is intolerable that Nature, through which alone spirit attains incarnation, should be treated as a directionless material." We are certainly not concerned to deny the long gradations or long evolutionary processes whereby unconscious cerebration or mentality issues in the rise of spirit or conscious mentality. This self-evolution of spirit appears a perfectly natural phenomenon. The thing to be sought and maintained is clearly the union of Nature and Spirit, with respect to the independence of both; their harmonious agreement is made possible by our conception of the Absolute, which represents the unity of the Real and the Ideal; and this union is to be effected by the varied elements of Pluralism being so taken up into the theistic unity that a satisfactory spiritual Monism shall be attained. Nature carries many suggestions of unity in plurality; as, for example, the cube with its more perfect unity than any of its planes, or the triangle than any of its lines. We take it to be a fundamental principle, indeed, that perfect or spiritual unity is realised only in distinction, or possible only

in plurality. For the striving after unity—religiously, after the Eternal One—is a fundamental psychological need, and our knowledge of Nature in her manifoldness is, in its unifying process, a psychological occurrence. The unity of Nature is suggested to science by the unities everywhere perceived—unities of process and development, of organization and expression. Some primal datum, such as the Being of the Absolute, seems necessary for the grounding and regulating of the whole world-connection, whereby order, law, coherence, are imparted to it; and no rational foundation for a philosophy of Nature seems possible without such a primal datum. The dependence of each part of Nature on all the rest is complete, and Nature, taken as whole, is no more a self-sufficient thing than any of its parts. But Nature is real, though not self-sufficing, although, idealistically, Nature is real only because I am real—because, that is to say, of my experience. It is perfectly obvious that no scientific hypothesis—whether primal energy, ether, or electrons—can take us to a beginning of things that is really self-explanatory. The sum of scientific knowledge—the observed and inferred unity of Nature—points to the need of a self-existent First Cause or Ultimate Ground, on Whose transcendent causal energy the world depends, and by Whose power it lives. Nature-necessity calls for Universal Will.

Nor is it to be overlooked, as it invariably is, that there is a unity of races to be considered, as no unimportant part of our unified philosophy of Nature. That unity is found by speculative or absolute psychology in the psychological identity of man, whereby is postulated the same psychological potentiality for the whole human race. This is, of course, in antagonism to the fatalistic theorisings of certain anthropologists and physiologists, who ascribe to different races different psychological potentialities, unaffected by training, time, and climate. Speculative psychology does not admit these psychological limits in races, but allows for each and all of them a possibility of psychical functional identity. It holds, in the words of Prof. D'Alfonso, of Rome, that, "of course within limits," there are "a quali-

tative pre-eminence of the psychical activities over the quantitative cerebral forms, and a qualitative pre-eminence of the cerebral nervous constitution over the quantity and the dimension of forms, in the brain as well as in the rest of the organism." The fact of physical and psychical differences, with which recent race-theories have been concerned, is not one which conflicts with the unity of the human race. Of course, the differentiation of an original unity will have to be explained, with the rise of race-distinctions. Westermarck presupposes an universal homogeneousness of human nature, although he thinks radical differences—in part due to outer relations—are somewhat seen in moral concepts, as these figure in the manifoldness of reality. But I do not dwell on this aspect of our theme.

Royce's recent philosophy of Nature is noteworthy for the way in which it makes Nature a thing of social extraction. Royce's recoil from realism is extreme. In his presentation, the subject is not exclusive of the object, nor the object exclusive of the subject. He takes our belief in man to be logically prior to our interpretation of Nature. The material world is, to him, one of brute facts and senseless accidents of sensation, and, as such, an antiquated superstition. His Nature is really a world of socially related selves. An independent corporeal world is, to him, a realistic dogma to be abandoned. Nothing exists for him, epistemologically, independent of, or external to, the mind. Externality is only apparent, not real. The trend of his thought is clearly pan-egoistic, and the real world, he contends, is just our embodied will. I am not insensible to his fine claim that consciousness is by its very nature such that we can set no limit to it. But, for all that, Royce's world is not the world of concrete reality, but the world of philosophy or of systematized concepts of knowledge. His speculative idealism does no manner of justice to the sciences, and it seems to be chiefly a method of making homuncular omniscience easy. Royce does some injustice to scientific realism, which does not expect knowledge of objects without the co-operation of the knowing subject.

Both the senses and the understanding get very scant justice from Royce. Royce's treatment is of individuals, not universals; his knowledge is, for him, reality. Moreover, all reality is reduced, on his voluntaristic system, to the consciously personal. God is, for him, the Individual of individuals; the world is individual; so is man; everything is individual. Even God is, for him, as for Anselm, *ens realissimum*. But what remnant of realistic dogma underlies all this thought, after all! Dr Schiller has very clearly shewn that this talk of the real as individual, and the individual as real, offers no definition of reality, and does not state its essence ('Humanism,' p. 122). Theistic Idealism can find no manner of justice, on Royce's scheme, to the external world of experience; the divorce from reality is too complete. For the volitional knowledge of his voluntarism does not seek the external world, nor even scientific knowledge or principles; it seeks only the conscious purposes of personal life. But this is clearly inadequate, for however much volitional idealism may tell me that I make my environment of metaphysical reality, there may yet be something other than my will making my world for me, and that to a greater extent than I can know or determine. In any case a philosophy of Nature that so resolves it into a human product, and dispenses with substantiality and causality, as characteristic of, and essential to, Reality, is one which our Idealism must reject as untenable and unsatisfactory to experiential thought, and incapable of sustaining any lasting future. Royce has no real philosophy of Nature any more than he has any real philosophy of History. Instead of such a voluntaristic scheme, our Theistic Idealism prefers to ground the universe in God as absolute and eternal Reason: it grounds the whole system of law, not in the almighty Will, but in the deeper mode of being based in God as such supreme and universal Reason, to which, in strictness, Will is consecutive. Law is for it the constitution of the universe—alike in its physical and its moral order—but it is so as uncreated and eternal in this Absolute Reason, and not in any nature or constitution of

things independent of the same. Immanent in the universe, the Absolute Reason directs its plastic materials towards their being made the expression, in some sort, of His thought. How, then, can our Theistic Idealism at all share the view of those who say that cosmic unity is oppugnant to theistic divinity? Nothing is, in fact, further from the truth. Nor could anything stand at further remove from our theistic idealism than the thought of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, when they find in the world-process no trace of reason, but only what the latter calls the Will to Power as fundamental in the world. Thought Nietzsche was able to despise, for, to him, it is the irrational, the contradictory, that rules. But life is not essentially irrational.

I have indicated, earlier in this chapter, that our knowledge of nature's reality or objects makes what is called Truth, and that this should consist, as little as possible, of mere desiccated concepts. On this relation of truth and reality a word more may now be said. William James has said, in his 'Meaning of Truth' (p. 196), that "realities are not *true*; they *are*"; but is reality ever a reality, one may ask, save in so far as it is true, and not a false appearance? And do "realities" never admit or harbour falsehood? James objects to truth being made to "hinge on a reality so 'independent' that when it comes, truth comes, and when it goes, truth goes with it." Again, he says (p. 160), that "truth is only our subjective relation to realities," and truth, in any objective sense, he rejects. This lack of objective order or reality is a capital defect of Pragmatism. One grants, of course, the truth—vastly important—in this subjective sense, without at all agreeing that it is the only, or the most important, kind of truth. Truth, in this subjective sense savours, I think, more of trueness or truthfulness than of what we have been wont to call truth, for James himself admits that truth has generally been taken as objective. Of this subjective truth I am, of course, the subject; but of the objective truth I am the percipient and the recipient. Truth is consecutive to reality; but if there is no reality, there

can obviously be no ontological truth. I agree with those who, in this connection, hold that the things related together in knowledge are, the mind and the object—not the idea and the object; reality is knowable, and is, for us, potentially true, if we may so speak; the aim of this chapter has been to inquire what is true, or to be thought, about Reality—the reality of Nature. The objective truth, which those of us who are not pragmatists hold to exist, I have elsewhere described in terms which, for certain reasons, I shall substantially retain, but in more extended form. Truth, I then said (in my ‘Psychology of Belief’), represented, is the intellectual equivalent of, the reality of things (thought, too, being real); it was not said, of course, that truth is reality, but that objective truth is concerned with the reality of things. For the objective inter-relations of the real make up the truth we seek. The objective existence of truth, admittedly so difficult to represent, was what I had in hand, obviously an idealistic contention as against the pragmatist claim that reality is only our own objectification. Yet it is, I may remark, near of kin to so moderate a pragmatism as that of Boodin, who takes truth to be agreement with reality. The true is correlative of the real, but truth is not without standing-ground of its own. I said, further, that truth is the correspondence and inter-connectedness of things, deep answering to deep of reality in such wise that harmony and coherence are found in Nature. This was not to say that reality is truth, or depends on truth; it was merely to affirm—as reflective intelligence, to say nothing of philosophical acumen, should quite instantly have perceived—that truth is the expressional, not existential, form of reality. No writer, conversant with the discussions, home and foreign, on Truth, could possibly (unless purposely) confound these two, and I have certainly never done so. But the objective reality of truth is expressly repudiated to-day by the followers of Nietzsche, to name no others. They needlessly talk of such truth as “an entity apart”; it is not apart, it is there expressly for our apprehension. Hence I then pointed out, still in a single, perhaps too pregnant, sen-

tence, that truth, though objectively existent, is not incapable of relation to us, since, in a knowable universe, nothing can exist out of relation; but I said that it is as incapable of deceiving us, as Nature is of betraying us. This was because the category of relation is fundamental in our knowledge of reality. Finally, I averred that, in knowledge, the truth objectively given—be it of nature or reality or anything else truly objective—must be met by subjectively true movement or approach on the part of the human subject. In this sense truth is within ourselves. But the objective truth of the categories, and of the supreme principles of reason, is not to be doubted, there being nothing real which is not rational, and therefore knowable. But in such knowledge, as Lotze in his *Logic* pointed out, the result can neither exhaust, nor be, the thing itself, but can only be a perfectly connected and consistent system of ideas about the thing known. My Idealism, therefore, does not accept the ordinary idealistic identification of truth and reality. The reality of consciousness is, in all this, the presupposition of the reality of Nature, as being its necessary epistemological base or foundation. Whether our philosophy of Nature concerns itself, therefore, with mechanistic conceptions, or with the new theories of energy, one thing is, to our Idealism, certain, that the reality of our concrete thought or experience is to be maintained, made up, as that is, of perceptions, representations, concepts, and the rest. Let these elements of our knowing, constructive activity be cancelled or annulled, and nothing of Nature or the world remains—for us. Knowledge, of course, is not a mere abstract conceiving, and there are infinite aspects of Nature or reality that will not be readily enclosed in any abstract conception; but Being becomes, for our Idealism, a mental category—exists, that is to say, only for our thought. Not that Nature—save in her *what*, not her *that*—exists only in our conscious thought, as has earlier been shewn, or that we must hold an absolute identity of consciousness and the real; but the *rapport* between nature and the

human spirit must be of more than merely accidental character, if knowledge is to be really possible. Purely external relations would not relate anything. If Nature had no real link of connection or community with spirit, it is not easy to see how thought could invest Nature with its own forms in the way it does, and give to Nature her objective values. When one considers how thought or spirit so projects its own forms upon Nature, constructs it with its own universal concepts and principles, one is disposed to agree with the deep insight of Hegel, that spirit is the truth of Nature. For Nature we cannot accept as a fact standing by itself and alone. In the deep, essential, idealistic sense, Nature exists only as it is constituted by spirit. We must regard spirit, then, as its necessary complement. How poor is Mill's Essay on Nature in this connection! Nature, too, it must be remembered, is no closed circle, no static conception, but an unfinished, ever-evolving universe, so that, if you please, the plenitude of absolute reality must be sought before, and not behind us. That reality is thus within our spirit in a way always really potential, so that it is but an approximation—but all-important as such—to which we can ever give expression. Such is the insight of intellect into reality (cf. Aristotle, 'De Anima,' Bk. III.). Nature, in her vast and mighty teleological developments, will not become a reality sufficient unto itself; it will always wait upon the transfiguring results of thought, which last, correctly taken, is the true perfection of reality. Only in human intelligence does the world's evolution reach its highest term, such thought or intelligence meaning the intellectual enrichment of Nature. If we consider the principle that everything which is made exists for something greater than itself, we shall see that if this principle had been clearly grasped, we should have been saved much foolish scientific talk about the exclusion of final causes. These, however, do not cease to exist because thought has chosen to shut them out from its view. Such sciolism is only too easy. Theistic idealism is too virile to be troubled with the squeamishness some-

times evidenced by philosophers when Nature is viewed as, in the old theological sense, existent primarily for the glory of her Creator, a view which freed the world from the ancient Pagan dualism; for that Idealism is too superior to anthropomorphism to think of Deity as a man that He should covet glory—He to Whom nothing can be added. Neither does it shrink from regarding Nature as existing, in a secondary sense, for man—and not man for nature—as thought, of any inspired sort, has done from the earliest. Gregory Nazianzen could speak of man as “the observer of the visible world” and “the pontiff of visible things”; while Gregory of Nyssa called him “the consecrator of the universe.” Lactantius, too, declared that “all things are made for him, as he is made for God.” Nothing could be more unphilosophical than to rule out such thinkers, because they happen to add a superior spiritual enlightenment to that of pagan philosophers. Philosophy has to do with the highest possible reaches of truth and vision, with religious experience not less than other experience, on peril of being itself condemned. But there must be no misconception as to the justice done to Nature or reality in our Idealism. Because we hold there is an idealistic sense in which thought creates reality in the moment of perceiving or positing it, because there is a sense in which being comes to us, or is known by us, only through thought, or the veil of our ideas; it is not yet the case, with our Idealism, that no reality or being exists outside our thought to be recognised; nor is it the case that the actuality of thought is in any wise so complete that potentiality, or the distinction of potency and act, is unrecognised or unfelt, for thought is in an advancing or developing condition. This I say, to guard against any supposed agreement with certain Continental thinkers who take the existential act of thought itself to be the whole of individual reality in such a way that, to seek the essence of the object of thought is no longer regarded as the true possibility of experience. Fatal to knowledge or true science, would such an idealism be, yielding only a half-orbed philosophy of

mentality, subjectivity, and development. Such a thought-world is declared to be actuality, concreteness, and conquest, as being is resolved into thought, and thought made convertible with being. But the logical result of such a line of idealistic thinking would be solipsistic more than anything else. One avoids anything like such an issue by finding, in the objective physical world, the necessary instrument or organ of the life of spirit; and by finding the unification of man with other egos in the objective moment—the sameness of their content—not in subjective activity; in the sameness, that is to say, of what exists for thought, rather than in the act of thinking. This leaves every one free to feel himself a distinct, conscious knower. Our knowing makes us one with the spirit of Nature; spirit is the essential being of Nature; but our idealistic knowledge is, at its highest, symbolic, and sees all things *sub specie aeternitatis*, so that—

“Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichniss.”

But this need not mean, and does not in the least mean, that we take our eyes off Nature, or cease to look intently into the deep things of her vast kingdom; for this concrete justice we can perfectly well render to the things of Nature, while, beyond the veil of their sensible attributes, we discern how vehicular they are of reality unseen and eternal. This, too, is part of our Idealism. But Nature, in her deep reality, and her co-ordinated creative activities—which alone make evolution possible—does not let her fulness of reality be readily grasped by us: our partial apprehension and frustrated longing recall the poet's lines—

“Ter conatus ibi collo dare bracchia circum,
Ter frustra compresa manus effugit imago,
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.”

But if Nature, with her living images, infinitely transcends the subjective moment or factor, my concrete thought may yet attest her reality in some reliable manner and effective

measure, while not reducing being or reality to her own limit. For Nature and Thought are not estranged.

What I have been trying to keep in view in this chapter is, the epistemological relation of Nature or reality to human knowledge or cognition, so that there shall be no confusion or identification of these twain, but a proper correspondence and co-ordination of them be effected. If it be said that the subject creates the object—and the mind is not simply abstractive and responsive, but creative, intuitive, and moulding in character—I have distinguished the senses in which this is idealistically true, and realistically not true, and have held to both as quite compatible. Justice to the object requires this distinction, so that when we grant to Idealism that subject creates the object, we shun the absurdity involved in taking this in the extremest idealistic sense. It is not necessary to a genuine, moderate, and thoroughly logical Idealism that the object—which, in a real sense, is primary, active, and stimulative—be viewed as existent in no sense save as the product purely of the activity of the subject. The full relation of experience to reality is not summed by this reference to the grasp of thought; nor is being or reality exhausted by our thought about it. No more is it necessary that the subject suffer injustice by being regarded as exhausting itself in its knowing *rapport* with the object; for there is no good or sufficient reason why the subject should lose all autonomy in the presence of the object. The very fact of union between subject and object being so realisable, as it is, points to an essential relation between them. The object is for the subject, has a certain cognoscibility which renders it capable of being known, and to it the subject must, in a certain well-defined sense, conform. But the knowable is not yet the known, and the position of those who claim an identity for these two is one which cannot be sustained. The Hegelian identification of experience with thought, of spirit with self-consciousness, has been always more conclusively shown to be rooted in a radically defective and inadequate conception of experience, as it pertains to full-orbed human personality. This failure

to make experience more than a lop-sided intellectualism—due to defective grasp of personality—springs out of injustice to psychic experience, whose every fact, as Ward, Ladd, and others, have plainly set forth, is irreducibly three-fold, intellection, feeling, and conation. This defect has told with baleful result on the relations of mind or knowledge and reality, for a haunting sense of unreality could not but mark a knowledge that chose to ignore feeling and will. The synthesis of the personality, as it grows one with reality, will always be greater than that of thought or knowledge. Perception asserts of reality or the object a relation to the perceiving self. Our idealism has nothing to do with reality or the object as outside or independent of experienced reality, beyond, of course, recognition that it is there, in the manner aforesaid.

The views of Driesch, to whom I have already made a passing reference, on Nature, are interesting and suggestive. He takes the Nature concept to satisfy the postulates of a rational theory of becoming, and so the substance and causality concepts have meaning. To the type of becoming found in the organic world, we saw, he gives the name of "unifying causality," for it is the exaltation of what would be a mere sum to the character of a unity or totality. This is a leading from non-wholeness to wholeness, and, in his view, a justification of vitalism on the basis of logic and ontology. The concept of wholeness he first applies to limited systems in Nature, but proceeds to the universe as one ordered whole—a mere hypothetical ideal, he frankly owns. Nature is to Driesch something that "cannot be entirely comprehended under spatial symbolism." But, if Nature be a sign of something absolute, then the Absolute, he maintains, possesses "properties which at least in part are not symbolised to the human mind by spatial signs" (H. Driesch, 'The Problem of Individuality,' p. 77). It is easy to see how the work of Driesch, marked by great comprehensiveness and constructive power, fits into an idealistic system; but he settles down, in a rather disappointing way, but with a fine and obvious sincerity, to a dualistic

result. Whereas Driesch puts forward the universe as an ordered whole only in a vague, uncertain, hypothetical way, Theistic Idealism, *ex hypothesi*, holds it to be so in the clearest and firmest manner. This is because its "Whole" is not of the logical and abstract character of that of Bosanquet, which seems to satisfy Driesch, who might naturally have been expected to demand something more vital and concrete. Nor does Theistic Idealism fail of doing justice to the subject, as an essential aspect of reality—as that, indeed, by which reality acquires its significance and value. But when it is said, by certain forms of idealism, that Nature to be known must be thought, therefore she does not exist if not as thought, I am unable to acquiesce in reasoning so sophistical. There is a sense in which I admit reality to be known only as thought reality—reality known through the forms of the mind. But I do not say that the real cannot be known—for ever eludes us. Nor do I regard it as idealism to say that reality has no existence—that there is no independence of objects—apart from thought. They do only so exist *for us*, it is true and idealistic to say: to say they do not exist at all, apart from our thought, is, to me, sheer, unwarranted dogmatism. The potency and grandeur of spirit can, I believe, be maintained while it is made the instrument and the receptacle of an objectively valid revelation of Nature.

But our idealism cannot share the view of Nature taken by psycho-monists like Fechner, Paulsen, Heymans, and others, which it regards as insufficient, arbitrary, and inadequate. This without disputing the merit of Fechner's contentions for the primacy of spirit over Nature. Yet in their denial of finite substances or independent reals, we are left with only an overlapping universal consciousness. As against dogmatic naturalism, no doubt, psycho-monism has meritoriously emphasised the priority and sufficiency of spirit, to which all things are reduced. But can we reduce Nature to spirit in this way? No doubt, external nature is known by us, as is insisted, through sensorial perception, which, being taken as phenomenal, means a complex of

appearances, reducible to psychic facts. But are we really to conclude that Nature is so easily reducible to a complex of the contents of consciousness? Rather must one say that the very contents of consciousness are intelligible only through Nature being a system of entities and relations. What were the meaning and significance of all our scientific elaborations, if Nature were only a complex of the contents of our consciousness? Considerations of sensorial quality must not be allowed to make us forgetful of the place and activities of thought in the matter. Reality is not easily resolved, on broad scientific view, into homogeneous elements, in the interests of the psychic quality desired, and of the principle of the knowableness of like by like. Each centre of psychic life is not without particularity of its own, marked by spontaneity, efficiency, and other characteristics. Our idealism cannot be content to regard the physical fact as nothing but a mode of manifesting the psychic, and to resolve the external world into a purely psychic Nature, after the manner of psycho-monism, which fails in its interpretation of the facts. Rather, with Wundt, the opposition between Nature and Spirit may be found in the universal law of the increase of spiritual energy, with which the laws of biology and of psychology may be brought into agreement.

I pause to note here the Nature problem of the One and the Many, in its modern aspects. No one can doubt the primary interest evinced by Locke in "things," and our knowledge of them. It was his strong contention that objects exist in Nature with no "prefixed bounds." In connection with his doctrines of relativity and interdependence of objects, there emerges the problem of the One and the Many, in relation to objects. Science demands that the notion of interdependence be taken to mean that "all change in all terms" finds its cause and explanation in other specific terms. The One and the Many problem, from the interdependence standpoint, is one which thought is not in a position satisfactorily to solve. Neither the term-solution proposed by modern chemistry, nor the claim of modern

physics for the electron, offers, when inquired into, anything like final or satisfactory result. Indeed, I do not think any satisfactory attempt can be made to deal with the problem on the plane of modern realism, and its conception of an object. In view of such idealistic contentions as I have already put forward in this chapter, it has seemed to me better to relegate the question to the chapter on "The God of Theistic Idealism." The same thing would hold good, if, turning from the world of substances, we viewed the processes of the world, and resolved them all into One process, even as Plato's man of knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) was already supposed to do. Only, that we are here brought nearer the problem, inasmuch as we are participators in the Nature-process or world-movement. But the problem of the One and the Many is, I think, more hopefully and inspiringly dealt with in the sphere of persons, than in the realms of processes and of substances. For there we are brought, in the discussion of the relations involved, to a subsuming of substance and process under the One, of Whom, and through Whom, and to Whom, are all things. But the inevitableness of the problem has been apparent since Plato, to whom Reality was neither unqualified unity, nor unrelated multiplicity, and for whom it was a necessary truth of thought, or eternal characteristic of reason, that everything should be conceived as at once One and Many — τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν (*Philebus*, 15 D). And Leibniz, too, may be recalled, in this connection, when he says:—"I perceived, after much meditation, that it is impossible to find *the principles of a real unity* in matter alone, or in that which is only passive, since it is nothing but a collection or aggregation of parts *ad infinitum*" (R. Latta, 'Monadology,' p. 300).

I am inclined to agree with that acute thinker, De Sarlo of Florence, and others who are of opinion that the indissoluble connection of the subject with the object must be taken as having reference to actual knowledge, not to cognoscibility in general. The positions of another distin-

guished Italian philosopher, Varisco, on the problem of reality and knowledge, cannot be taken as quite satisfactory. His monism runs them both back into the depths of the subconscious, where they are rendered identical in an "implicit" treatment of both. A rather extreme procedure, and one not strikingly complimentary to reason, to find the unity of these two only in the subconscious—in forsaking the realm of what is clear and distinct, for the subconscious region, where abide the unclear, uncertain, and unformulated. The fundamental position which Varisco had taken up was,—I cannot know anything other than myself (*che me stesso*); nothing exists which is not "implicit" in me; I am a centre of the universe. There is an idealistic sense in which I do not object to its being said that I am a centre of the universe, for our Idealism holds to the reality of finite centres of experience. But how much does it advance the solution of the problem of reality and knowledge vaguely to assert that nothing exists which is not implicitly in me—though I am not to "identify reality with what is thought" by me—that the whole universe is "implicit" in every ego? My knowledge of it is then only self-knowledge. In the vast and varied unity of knowledge, some power or means must be retained by us of making real and necessary distinctions, and it seems fatal to real knowledge thus to merge the object in the subject. If it is merely meant to claim for me a potential knowledge of all things, it is a fairly idle contention, if and in so far as, I do not make my knowledge actual. For there is no implicitness of things in me which dispenses me from acts of energy and effort in cognition. The whole or totality of the universe Varisco makes "implicit" in me, so far as I think Being. This concept of Being (*Essere*) is, to him, a concept *sui generis*, and is supposed to furnish the clue to the solution of the highest philosophic problems. But such indeterminate Being is, after all, met, on the thought side, by indeterminate thought, which, in its lack of definite thoughts, means no knowledge of real sort at all; Being of so abstract type has not the richness of actual life; Being

is only a thought of the subject, and, as such, relative to it. Varisco holds indeterminate being as character of determinate reality. The difficulty here, as always where indeterminate Being is made the base—as, for example, in Spinoza's *ens absolute indeterminatum* for God—seems to be to find an intelligible way from it to real, concrete, determinate, and particular, being and action. What an unsatisfactory abandonment of science, of all objective knowledge of nature or reality, if, wrapping ourselves round, as Varisco seems to do, with garments of conceptualism, we say we can each know nothing but his own individual and developed self. We must certainly give some better account of the base and reason of our individuation than that, if individuality is not to be reduced to a pale semblance or an empty form. Retaining for it a true and proper independence, our idealistic world-interpretation yet takes the individual to be, teleologically and ethically, for the Whole; in such wise, indeed, that true individuality is beginning rather than end. Our being is so real that we are not a mere *suite* of Bergsonian phenomena. This is the impregnable rock on which our Theistic Idealism rests; and it has been shewn—as urgently needed to-day—to be an Idealism which does real justice to the object or objective reality, and not merely to the knowledge or cognition by which alone such reality exists for us. For if I latently assume some independent consistence and pre-existing character for such object or reality, that does not in the least conflict with the Idealism whereby such reality is confessed to be existent for me only through knowledge or cognition. For our Idealism, it will thus be seen, reality is inseparable from knowledge, which is its correlative; reality, as we have been viewing it in relation to knowledge, is other than ourselves, and, as such, we are able to identify ourselves with it. But the continuous becoming, alike of the real and of experience, is to be recognised; and the reminder of modern philosophy must be kept before us, that experience is not first organised by the unity of conscious-

ness, said unity being itself possible only in and through the knowledge of objective fact. Thus we shall realise, in some sort, the Lotzean dictum that only inquiries conducted in the spirit of realism will satisfy the aspirations of idealism, for realistic aspects have not here been blindly quenched. We shall see, further, both the One and the Many in Nature, which vision was, to Plato, like following a divinity.

Lotze acutely and significantly discussed the world of reality, and the doctrine of things, both in his 'Mikrokosmos' and his 'Metaphysics.' He has dealt with Being, as Being-in-relation, and with the common, everyday notion of things, as if they were individual beings, independent, blind, unconscious; and for Herbartian pluralism he has substituted a monism, in which figures the doctrine of *the thing*, not of *the things*, with the incessantly active Idea as the unique principle of the world. Lotze's objection to the notion of thing, as individual and independent being, is based upon the claim of its being "outside the one Real," while he holds for things "common immanence in the Infinite"; and upon the "notion of a thing without a self," while he holds such thing to have "no consciousness of its own nature and qualities, no feeling of its states," and to be "in no way possessed" of "itself as a self." That is to say, Lotze maintains that only that which is capable of knowing, feeling, and acting, in the fashion of a self, deserves to be regarded as separate or detached from the one universal principle of all things—as in any sense *outside* it. To the objection that Idealism will be accused of denying "that things have realness," Lotze replies that "the more genuine and true realness of *being something for one's self*, or more generally of *self-existence*, is not attained by things by their being made external to God." It is not that a thing "thereby *acquires* an existence external to the Infinite, but that by the very fact it *has* such existence," independent and external to God, in contrast with immanence. In such a way Lotze seeks to justify his making all that is real, mind (*alle Realität ist Geistigkeit*), and to shew that "nothing whatever is gained for selfless uncon-

scious things" by having ascribed to them "that existence external to God," indeed, "they rather lose" by it, in his view. Thus the common conception of a "thing" is to him no metaphysical truth, but something far otherwise. All this, however, does not mean that thing and self are to be identified, in an epistemological sense; they are really unified only in so far as the self yields a valid explanation of the thing, and of the relation subsisting between them. The reality called a thing is really a phenomenon to my mental life: it is a form of mental representation; such is the position of a purely subjective idealism. But this is quite untenable, and contradictory of experience, in which things or objects—while ideas as, of course, appearing in consciousness—are clearly trans-subjective and really existent. This extra-mental existence and independence of things is, epistemologically, beyond all dispute. But this independence of things must not be over-valued, since only in and through the modifications of my consciousness can I reach things at all, and, though things may not be known as *merely* my ideas, yet the important sense remains in which they are known to me as my ideas. These ideas of the self are precisely what must be constructed and validated as reality: in no other way can the ready-made things of the realist be guaranteed, or ontological reality be reached. The ideas are as far as may be from being so ineffective as the realist supposes: the objects are not so otiose and inert as the subjective idealist imagines. The mechanical world, of course, is a world of determinate quantities, but Nature, as idealistically known, has no such fixed and determinate character, but grows and expands with the expansion of ourselves. Reality is made for us by consciousness, which is, of course, not to say that thereby is given to us the whole of Reality. For beyond the limits of our conscious self lies that which has not been reached and grasped; consciousness is thus, as Royce has insisted, illimitable and infinite. It is consciousness that works our philosophic wonders, that gives to the material world—the world of Nature—its unity and its system. And consciousness may grow always more intense, and more enlarged, in presence

of the world before us. An able writer tells us "there is no hypothesis about Empiric Reality: it existed before any conceptual system, has survived the failure of many, and may see the passing of many more" (Carveth Read, 'The Metaphysics of Nature,' p. 77). True as, in a sense, this may be, it does not dispense us from the need and duty of philosophising about Empiric Reality. Empiric Reality cannot be admitted to be such a starting-point and place of return for our thought, that the questions as to the reality of empiric reality, and the relations of consciousness thereto, can be in any way silenced or suppressed. It would be waste of time now to criticise Mill's irredeemably unsatisfactory views of Nature: it is more necessary to notice Green's philosophy of Nature, which (as given in his 'Prolegomena to Ethics') is at least superior to the views of Berkeley and of Mill, with their initial faults of starting with ideas and sensations, respectively, that lacked any principle of unity. Green made Nature a system of relations, which every one can intelligently combine for himself into an ordered whole, but this whole implicates a greater whole beyond and above it, unified by a thought principle which constitutes it the Universal Reason. Of course, this system has the merit to secure the perdurable element wanting to Berkeley and Mill, but it has defects of its own not far to seek. Its doctrine of a whole of consciousness, however, is noteworthy, especially as Green extends his "single system" so as to be inclusive alike of "the experience of a thousand years ago and the experience of to-day." But this would suggest the unity and unalterableness of reality—a large assumption, at any rate, for "the experience of to-day." In considering Nature, viewed as an object of knowledge, Green admits that a spiritual principle would not be natural, or accounted for by natural science. But, in the wider and more inclusive sense, he takes Nature to include the "spiritual principle," as being "necessary to the possibility of a world of phenomena." But, in the self-contained whole which Green sought to build up, there are two very unsatisfactory aspects, to speak of no others. Objection has been taken to the undue

part played by mere thought in Green's, as also in Hegel's, unification of Nature. The objection is well-founded, but not always made with sufficient discrimination. Nature is referred, for its interpretation, to our own thought; reality is treated at times as if it were mere self-consciousness unifying the unalterable system of relations; but, on the other hand, he does not always fail to recognise the insufficiency of "discursive activity" in this connection, nor does he always fail to seek a closer connection with reality than the thought-movement of Hegel. The other unsatisfactory aspect is his treatment of sensation as unrelated. Nature, as a system of relations, must relate something, and the objection which has been raised to Green's not bringing sensations into proper relation to consciousness as relational, is one which must certainly be sustained. It concerns me here to add that, though Green's presentations may not always be satisfactory, Theistic Idealism must do him the justice to remember his express insistences that the Eternal Consciousness must be a Person, or, as he himself puts it, "a Being in Whom we exist; with Whom we are in principle one; with Whom the human spirit is identical" [this, of course, is, I think, unfortunate] "in the sense that He *is* all that the human spirit is capable of becoming." But I regard Green's whole-and-part theory as untenable, being largely in accord with G. E. Moore's views upon the matter [*Principia Ethica*, pp. 33-36].

We have seen how the metaphysics of nature, and the metaphysics of spirit, are alike involved in a complete metaphysic of the world, and how these two can be harmonised. It is spirit that frees the ideal potencies from the superincumbent pressure or overweight of the real, and from the blind impulsions of will and desire, so reducing the world for us to a proper unity. This unity is one of will and intelligence in consciousness, and by this last, reckoning must be made of the one connectedness of nature with the manifold particular movements in nature. Spencer has spoken of "an infinite and eternal energy from which all things proceed," and of "the Reality underlying Appearance" as "totally and for ever inconceivable by us." His one

causality—the energy in question—appears here as Integration and Individualisation, and there as dissolution and disintegration, integration, however, being “the primary process of evolution.” His view of the world-process, in whole, is only mechanistic or dynamic, and the infinity and eternity of the force concerned are an arbitrary postulation. As against his mechanistic-dynamic view, theistic idealism maintains that only a teleological view of the world-development, in whole, can be satisfying. The matter is not without its difficulties. Mechanistic-dynamic Nature may be taken as basis or foundation for purposeful organisation or structure. In order and conformity to law, mind may be read. But when we come to deal with chemistry and physics, the traces of purpose are much more difficult to find. It is the organism that first suggests teleological view. It is as we follow the development from the inorganic to the organic, the ensouled, that we find the teleological moment attain always greater validity. But the serviceable part played by mechanistic-dynamic Nature, as means to what is so conform to purpose, is not to be overlooked. Reverting to Spencer’s one fontal energy, there is also the question in what way we are to conceive the actings of individual objects of Nature in their relation to this one energy. Their endeavours after self-preservation are noticeable and indisputable; but they also stand in relation to one another. Are they to be treated as mere appearance-forms of the one energy, so losing their independence? But not even on inorganic territory, can atomic independence—free, that is, of relation—be claimed for the parts, even though we may admit that “the phenomenon of self-preservation has no true analogue in the inorganic sphere” (Külpe). It carries us but a small way merely to say, with Spencer, that “all things” are related to the one energy, since “all things proceed” from it. The inorganic and the organic stand, of course, in reciprocal relation, and together form one world. And here, as elsewhere, we have seen that mechanism and teleology are supplementary, rather than antagonistic, to each other. But theistic idealism, in introducing a metaphysical transcendence into

its philosophy of Nature, does so only in the sense that its Supreme Intelligence cannot be conceived as so idealess and purposeless a Being as to have no ends for creation, ends which in character, so far as we can conceive or know them, are entirely harmonious with any results or issues that may have transpired in any of the special sciences. Spencer, of course, does not deny that there may be at work in the world that which is higher than intelligence, but his real foundation principle is drawn from physics, as we have seen, and consists of the persistence of force. A totally inadequate meaning and value for a nature-world in which man is found, it need hardly be said. The Spencerian evolution has doubtless brought the world nearer to us, rendered it less alien to us, but theistic idealism runs the "infinite and eternal energy" up to the Absolute Personality Who is for it the Soul and the Oversoul of Nature, and treats as an utterly overpassed standpoint the halting and truncated agnostic philosophy of Spencer.

It was said by Kant, in his teleology of Nature, that the mind would not, on this subject, "suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle speculation," but would tear itself "out of this state of uncertainty, the moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty of the universe, and rises from height to height, from condition to condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned Author of all" [Meiklejohn, 'Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,' p. 383]. It may be doubted whether the mind has not maintained the teleologic power, suggested in these fine words, at times in spite of, rather than by, the teleological discussions of the great Königsberg thinker. A good recent discussion of these has been given, and upon them I therefore do not dwell [see R. A. C. Macmillan, 'The Crowning Phase of the Critical Philosophy,' pp. 229-292]. All I am here concerned with is, Kant's extension of the concept of natural purpose to the whole of Nature as a teleological system, and my own preference for such a system, rather than that of a pure and entire mechanism. Kant himself came in the end so to subordinate

mechanism to teleological reflection. But, for a system of theistic idealism, he substituted the supersensible substrate of Nature, in his theorising on organic evolution. The theory of Epigenesis had his support, as tending not to eliminate, but to limit or reduce, the supernatural. But his supersensible substrate, as a Being who is only a *Grundkraft* or indeterminate Ground, unmotivated by real ideas to creative acts, is a rather unsatisfactory affair. It is Nature we thus get as purposive, but without real intention or purpose—an idealistic naturalism, as it has been termed, or a sort of creative evolution, but, in either case, not very satisfactory, from the standpoint of theistic idealism. Purposive reality without any real purposes, as bestowed upon us in this strange, indeterminate Ground, is a curious terminus into which to run both mechanism and teleology in the end. Still, I think we can take a view of Kant's teaching as at least pointing more in the direction of such free creative Will as theistic idealism desiderates than might at first sight appear. For he speaks, in the 'Critique of Judgment,' of "a ground of the *unity* of the supersensible, which underlies Nature, with that which the notion of freedom practically contains," and though the creative or originative Ground cannot appear, it can yet reveal itself. As Kuno Fischer says, in his critique of Kant, "it becomes manifest, yet remains ever hidden, like character in conduct, the genius of the artist in his work, the will to live or the inherent end of life in the organism, force in its exertion, God in the world." Kant held not only to evolution, but to the unity of the world. But he thought we know, neither the Ground, nor will nor freedom in Nature; but yet he opined that the character of the Ground must be such that the principle of nature can be united with the principle of freedom, and this is precisely what theistic idealism would claim to effect. To elucidate the phenomenon in the state of freedom was, no doubt, reserved for Schiller in pursuance of Kant's teaching. But "the world-development is recognised by Kant as the manifestation and ever-increasing revelation of freedom" (Kuno Fischer), although it must

remain impossible for theistic idealism to acquiesce in such a judgment to any full and satisfying degree. For, in our ground-determination of the Unconditioned Being Who is the World-Creator, we are compelled to conceive of Him as the Absolute Self-Consciousness, grounded, as such, in absolute freedom. Only in such a Being has the question of the Ground reached its end—the last Ground of the unity. Kant's transcendental freedom of an unknown Reality, which he holds to be possible though not actual, can only point, in its own unsatisfactory way, to Divine Freedom. But, though he talks of freedom, in the cosmological sense, or of transcendental freedom, he plainly tells us, all that happens in the phenomenal world must be conceived as "entirely conformed to the law of natural causality." But I do not intend here to follow out the flaws in the symmetry of Kant's complex view; I refer to him in critical, not chronological, connection, because of his bearing on the modern interests of mechanism and the teleology of Nature. Nature is vast, but hers is an ordered vastness. Nature as mechanism can only be a construction of mind. Nature is uniform in order, undeviating in method. She forms one vast concatenated system, pervaded in whole by rational order. This order is, as Romanes remarked, "absolutely universal, eternally enduring, and infinitely exact." Nature's forces are but variant forms of one omnipresent Divine energy. But that energy is better conceived in terms of life than of mechanism. We have earlier taken a position like that of Kant, when he made intellect make Nature, though it did not create it; and we further took Nature as itself teleological, in its cosmic significance. Spirit is, for our idealism, the great reality; but Nature, too, is real, and the nursing mother of spirit. Mind, which is characterised by action as a whole, infects, no doubt, our knowledge of Nature or the universe—as it does everything else—with its own imperfect forms of apprehension, but it is quite equal to leading us, alike on metaphysical and on scientific grounds, to the postulation of an Ultimate Unity, as a logically necessary conclusion. For mind is superior to Nature or the

physical world in that its essence lies in activity as a whole, in a way which cannot be predicated of Nature or the physical world, which has no such centrality, being made up of atomic activities. 'Tis in virtue of this superiority of mind that we can know and interpret Nature, as cosmic in her character, and universal in her forces. I can know God in Nature, but only indirectly, in her order, her connectedness, her beauty, her sublimity, and her conformity to law.

It is scarcely to be wondered at that the eutaxiologist should find the inherent order and adjustments in Nature or the universe so impressive as to be suggestive of Intelligence. He finds the whole universe to be an aggregation of orderly structures; he finds the inorganic and the organic realms teeming with instances of order; he finds form, mathematical relations, co-ordination of parts and conditions, relative adjustments, and the "co-etaneous action of vast numbers of material objects at immense distances asunder," all involved. If you suggest unconscious intelligence in explanation of the orderly results, intelligence is intelligence, whether conscious or unconscious. But if you make unconscious intelligence a more truly wonderful affair than that which is conscious, you may easily go far to stultify reason itself. In any case, the feats of the Intelligence, unconscious or otherwise, are quite good enough for the eutaxiologist. And the universality of the Intelligence he takes to be equal to the universality of the order. If, again, you say the order proceeds from the properties of matter, he will still think, as Kant did, that matter so endowed could only have been issued under the seal or stamp of Intelligence, from the beginning. And the work of the eutaxiologist is ancillary to that of the teleologist, never antagonistic to it, as is sometimes, but always wrongly, supposed. The appeal of eutaxiology, however, is to the savant rather than to the "plain man," as is often claimed for teleology. The latter holds, with Janet, a tendency in phenomena to realise an end, a combining power in parts making for the production of a definite whole. The chief mistakes have arisen in the attempts—aside from the blunders of taking mere results for ends—to make teleology do too much, but the discussion of

what, and how much, teleology should prove, forms a curious chapter in the history of philosophy.

The unity—even what Fiske calls “the dramatic unity” — of Nature is that towards which the great modern discoveries of the special sciences point. The whole trend of evolutionary thought has lain in this direction. The sum-total of Nature was said by Littré to contain three visibly distinct groups, the mathematico-physical group, the chemical group, and the organic group, the vital group presupposing the other two, the chemical group presupposing the physical group, and the physical group presupposing nothing! But there is not a little absurdity in this wiping out of idealism, this assuming that the physical universe, with its properties and forces, does not presuppose a mind able to conceive the whole, joined to power capable of embodying the conception. There is no need to do such violence to mind, in respect of the physical universe as ordered and harmonised. That its manifold elements and diverse factors should be co-ordinated into one vast working whole without any foregoing thought or pre-existing mind, does not seem a very rational supposition. For theistic idealism, at any rate, the continuous operation and vast harmony of the one great system of Nature betokens the existence and the activity of One Mind, possessing complete knowledge of it as a whole, and perfectly free, directive power over it. Of our own minds, it has been said that it is a mark of intelligence to discover or create relational systems or constitutions [F. E. Abbot, ‘Scientific Theism,’ p. 146]. But this in itself is not enough; the relational system of the universe must disclose purpose, and be directed to an end. To find such end and purpose, clear of the merely conjectural, is the great difficulty; and thought has turned from the difficulties of design to the higher and surer notion of eternal purpose running through the universe. But that does not mean that a religious view of Nature is the basis or ground of religion. Theistic idealism emphatically rejects any such view, and grounds religion, not in external Nature, but, theistically, in man. The old view of Nature in abstraction from man’s conscious intelligence we discard; the foundations of religion

are deep within ourselves; only in the free movement and activity of our own spiritual being do we find God in Nature as the soul of all things. The religious significance of Nature has its idealistic form and colour from mind and soul within us. Nature is but process, and her end must be inferred from the character of the nature-processes, which here we know but in part. But that does not mean that we must rest content with our present interpretations and co-ordinations. The power of mind over Nature is always on the increase, and our thought and understanding of the order of Nature should also grow and expand. Nature, as a system, lacks not real unity, any more than it lacks ideal unity: its indwelling Deity is, to theistic idealism, the Unity of the Real and the Ideal. Nature is thus more than any mere multitude of self-existent units: its parts are so correlated as to constitute a rational whole; but Nature, with her relational constitution, is not known, for our idealism, in total independence of human representation, as scientific realism claims. That would be to deny the immanent philosophical creativeness of our idealism in the presence of Nature. God, as the Infinite Subject, eternally objectifies and reveals Himself in Nature, the absolute unity of whose relational constitution is thus made manifest. Nature is one, and Nature, as object, is infinitely intelligible. But the unity of Nature is less a discovery of modern science than it is often represented to be; science has been much more a confirmation of it, and invaluable, as such, from its evolutionary modes of proof. Nor is the unity suggested by science that of mere sameness or identity, but rather that of the correspondence and connectedness subsisting between things that are different. There is no science of Nature which is not teleological; the whole theory of development rests on a teleological basis; in Darwinism utility and purpose came into view as working principles of primary significance. It is the wider teleology, based on evolution, which to-day reigns, and I have already shewn what this implies. The general process of Nature suggests purpose and intelligence, and the uniformity of Nature represents something deeper, to theistic idealism, than

mere passionless expression of law. We speak of the laws of Nature as objective—or in themselves real, and Nature is doubtless an ordered thing; but our idealism cannot forget that when we reduce the laws to specific formulas, there enter into the process elements that pertain to us or our minds, rather than to nature. These laws are, in fact, ideal constructions. Not the veritable laws of Nature do we really know, but only our greater or less approximations to them. The laws of Nature, that is to say, we know only in their *rappports* with our sensation and our intelligence. Our knowledge of Nature or the exterior world has, under the emphasis of modern science, been greatly influenced by the play of mathematical conceptions—considerations of measurement and dimension—so that from qualitative characteristics we are recalled to questions of quantity. But this, not without the idealistic harmony or agreement between Nature and reason, of which we have spoken, the complete rationalisation of the real being our aim. This reduction of the world to pure mathematical conception can be, and has been, carried to an idealistic extreme, wherein hold of reality has been lost. But a more coherent conception of exterior reality remains our need, and cannot come by way of a too utterly abstract idealism. Nature does not lend herself to mere mathematical deduction or bare logical treatment, and a concept of Nature that shall be free of contradictions will not be easily reached. Theistic idealism is not carried away with an abstract mathematical idealism as with a flood, neither does it sink in recoil to a positivist cast of thought. It lets experience come to the aid of our powers of abstraction: it studies Nature and her phenomena, whatever their limitations, variations, contradictions, obscurity: it finds her an intrinsic unity, not the unity of an infinite collection or assemblage of objects. But the realities of Nature are one thing: ideal relations abstractly depicted as mathematical deductions are another thing, and have no real validity beyond the assumed relations with which the analysis sets out. There is abundant reason in recent German philosophical thought for the insistences which have now been made.

The unity and uniformity of Nature, on which I have dwelt, find expression in the principle of continuity. This principle can have no meaning but a primal intelligence. It was championed by Leibniz in the psychical, as well as in the physical realm. *Natura non facit saltum*. Such continuity, or causal relation throughout Nature, is the very meaning of evolution, which extends to inorganic and organic forms, alike. Matter, as endowed with the quality of spontaneous motion, cannot be held as dead or inert. The infinite units forming the world-substance you may, like Leibniz, monadise, if you will, but modern thought will not allow these units or monads to be without relation to one another. The quality whereby they are so bound together, in an integral whole, is that which forms their continuity. For a unitary conception of the world we must have: Nature can only be, for our idealism, one great and living whole, as seen in her regularity of law (*Gesetzmässigkeit*). Kant, in discussing how Nature was possible, thought the thinking subject dictated formal laws to Nature. But certainly such a tractable and pliant attitude of Nature does not harmonise with experience, in which Nature often enough corrects our *à priori* reasonings. Reason can only acquaint us with the forms of existence, with which the forms of thought will be found to agree. Kant himself insists that principles and conceptions, "however high the degree of their *à priori* possibility," must have objects given to them, and must "relate to empirical intuitions." Even mathematical conceptions, he insists, have no significance apart from phenomena or empirical objects. "The pure categories are of no use at all, when separated from sensibility." But, though the exterior world, as simple uncomprehended fact, goes before the finite mind and awakens it to activity, the partially comprehended world of the mind itself is one built up of its own perceptions, and harmonised by its own thought. In this sense the mind is builder of its own universe, in which Nature is reflected under the form of our own ideas. The world is always, and only, given to us under this constructive power of mind. Mathematical idealism, which has been taken to yield an increasing clue to

the interpretation of the physical world, must be held indigenous to the human mind. But the physical world has the notion of causation as its combining or unifying idea, and this idea is a pure product of mind. So we again have the priority of mind to matter. Dig as we may, we always find that mind is already at work on the foundations of the world. But if orderly process, continuity, inner connection or necessity, are marks of the world, why must they never disclose themselves in any guise of logical relation or appeal to mind? Or how otherwise should reason have expressed itself in the world? It is mind which Theistic Idealism enthrones. It is the constructive reason existent in the universe which it seeks to interpret. It finds the laws that govern the world to be constructive. It refers the world, in virtue of its rational and relational system, to God or the Supreme Reason. It finds much to suggest His pervasive presence in Nature, and nothing to exclude it therefrom. The unities of thought and purpose in the world are strong enough to force upon us some recognition of their existence. They make underlying personality no very remote suggestion. Sensible Nature is made up of a whole order of appearances or signs, behind which, as from a background of Mind, or supersensible Reality, order, meaning, purpose, are increasingly made manifest to us. Even the system of causality is not exempt from this course of symbols or appearances, suggesting Power, as well as Intelligence, behind the visible order of things. Is Nature, then, so self-contained and self-sufficing, as some suppose? Is it so easy to keep a spiritual significance out of Nature? But not in bare exterior Nature will you find that significance, but only in it as interpretable, theistically, by man. But our idealism is active in securing this wealth of result. To the working of sensation and perception upon the concrete world or the manifold of sense, it adds the interpretative activity of thought, so building its cosmos of experience. To the unifying activity of the self-determining subject, the world of Nature is a unity or connected whole; but, as the self-activity of the subject increases, the world—though still

unified—becomes a larger and more complex unity. This, because reason in self-conscious beings is such an organic unity, and to the unity of an organic whole must our entire knowledge of Nature be reduced. Nature is immanent in God, and not without this One do any of her forces exist or move or have any being.

“Geheimnissvoll am lichten Tag
Lässt sich Natur des Schleiers nicht berauben,
Und was sie deinem Geist nicht offenbaren mag,
Das zwingst du ihr nicht ab mit Hebeln und mit Schrauben.”

CHAPTER VII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE.

EVERYTHING has its philosophy, and so, too, has science. The plain man—and even the scientific student too often—may regard knowledge or science as the simplest thing in the world; for he has, he thinks, only to open his eyes, and the world is before him. But reflection soon teaches other things, and shows that real knowledge is ours only when we know the nature of the world, the nature of the mind, and the relation that subsists between these two. It shows, further, that the realm of natural science, properly so called, is not to be taken as coextensive with knowable reality, and that philosophy has cognitive field and function of its own, besides the right of logically criticising the categories and methods of science. Hence it must take account of the generating problem of science, of the end of science, and of the method proper to that end. There fall to be considered such questions as—What is science? what is its province? what are its methods? We must not be content, like some, to say that science will lean more and more to idealistic interpretations of its phenomena. We must ask why these things must need be. The transition from physiology to idealism is not difficult nor unnatural. For our perception of the external world is seen to depend on the integrity with which certain bodily structures fulfil their functions, in a normal manner. Science is the conceptualising of what is “given” in perception. We must remember that a philosophy of science

must, in its analysis, try to understand science on its own grounds. So doing, there is no valid reason why philosophy should not come to understand science better than science understands itself, and be able to point out her limitations. But no really progressive science can escape the task of testing the value of its own categories. In the service of Philosophy, metaphysics seeks to integrate the sciences which are concerned with reality, while pure logic studies those sciences which are engaged with ideal entities, such as mathematics, &c. Pure logic seeks concepts, principles, types, that shine with their own light.

We begin by considering the function of science, which is to discover, observe, experiment, and describe. "Exact description" is science, according to Kirchoff, Hertz, and many others. But it is philosophy that interprets and explains, that deals with the *why* of things, and not, like science, merely with their *how*. Each science has a particular province of experience to explore and describe; all the particular sciences are theoretically imperfect; but it is philosophy which essays to understand experience in whole. Science generalises, while speculation philosophises; but neither of them pretends to finality, which is not possible either to human concepts or systems. The former seeks out laws or causes; the latter inquires into reasons. The laws of Nature sought by Science are descriptive formulæ, and carry no governing power. Science is genetic in method; philosophy is reflective, and wants reason and end for all the uniformities set out by science. Science counts, measures, classifies, and gives us the facts; philosophy makes them intelligible—explains them so that they become so. Science provides us with the facts or materials; philosophy criticises and analyses them, and weaves its theory of them in terms of thought. This is far more than the working hypotheses of science, which, needful and useful in their way, are yet restricted to some particular province, and do not take the universal character of philosophical thought. Science, though rigid, reasoned, valuable, and methodical, is yet assumptive, artificial, uncritical, and dogmatic. It does not

see how much it owes to the conceptual, not merely to the perceptual. It does not realise that the immediacy of perceptive knowledge keeps it from being scientific. It does not search into the basal conditions of its own knowledge, nor inquire whether reality is faithfully given to it or not. Science consists in co-ordination: it aims to establish continuities and identities. Science does not always see how much reflection does for it, in showing its inter-relations and in giving it such improved understanding of its facts that fact may be much more *end* than beginning of knowledge. The scientific fact is, says Boutroux, a "constructed symbol, an imaginary objective equivalent" of the original fact. Science would not exist, as we now have it, were it not for the activity of intellect operating upon the data of sense-perception, and *generalizing* the problem of criticism, freed from the limitations of the special sciences. For there is an important sense in which a true theory may be said to be the true fact. But science is not the expression of ultimate reality. Mach, who calls his reflections anti-metaphysical, says that science does not pretend to be a complete view of the world, but a mere working towards such a complete view in the future. He maintains the highest philosophy of the scientist to be the toleration of such an incomplete conception sooner than accept any inadequate one, with a mere appearance of perfection. It is metaphysical thought, for all that, that must show wherein reality as a whole has its final ground. Metaphysics may have a contracting realm before the advances of science, but it has the greater need for deeper, more intensive thought, as its problems grow more defined. It must deal with the relations of the sciences, so that their unity shall form a consistent world-conception; and it must relate the sciences, with their methods, ideas, and laws, to our own existence and experience. But this is not meant to keep science from pursuing its own way, doing its own work, unheeding of metaphysical puzzles, as it accounts them, and enriching the world with the spoils of its own conquest of visible phenomena. All that is meant is, that

our scientific knowledge or enrichment is precisely due to the false abstraction of matter as the sole ultimate reality—an abstraction incalculably useful and obviously necessary, whose falsity yet cannot be forgotten by philosophy. By well-informed scientists, the old theory of impenetrability, as the essence of matter, is regarded as a mere heirloom of Cartesian metaphysics. And even mass has been threatened with a fundamental identification with energy, while inertia is set down to mental indolence. Science, then, deals with the facts, occasions, and processes of nature, but with real origins and true causes science has nothing to do. These belong to philosophy. Causations are, to science, in a sense, only transformations. Science forms her own systems, abstracting, as we have seen, matter from mind, and even one scientific province from another: science is thus a methodical search for truth, but it is evident that these specialties of science all have a philosophical background, which, in the spirit of true science, should never have been lost sight of. That background deals with the vital and prior issue as to what truth is, and how truth can be known by us. Reflection has shown how futile it is to think to escape from ourselves and these issues of scientific truth, by unthinking talk about the testimony of common sense to the external world. A French writer on science says, “we pretend to no knowledge” of “the reality of the external world.” In all scientific knowledge, the purposive activities of thought are present over and above the things known. But science is not chargeable with untruth or unreality, because of the selective character of its concepts, and its inadequate presentation of reality. Scientific truth must be taken as valid for reality, though subject to correction. For the reign of law or the uniformity of Nature is a matter for the authentication of experience, not for an *à priori* dogma, for which last there is no warrant whatever. Science is sometimes called upon to decide problems handed over by philosophy for physical or mathematical solution; thus Dalton and Avogadro did for the atomic theory what phil-

osophic thinkers had not been able to do, and the work did not cease with their parts therein. It appears to me, however, uncritical for scientific writers to assume that philosophy will take scientific knowledge as, for it, initial or historically given fact, rather than regard science as method or tendency to be justified.

It must never be forgotten that, though science may often be ignorant of the fact, and its votaries acknowledge it not, the method of science calls for justification. Idealism contends that only through the mediation of the psychic factor, through consciousness, is the physical world intelligible. Science ought to know that, before receiving the facts of nature from her hand, we pertinently raise the prior question, whether Nature is indeed real. Is the world a real world beyond man? Does Nature put her beauty and order into our mind? Or does our mind lay the order and beauty upon Nature? Or have Nature—as mind without—and man—as mind within—been fashioned for each other? What final value has science until these issues have been settled? How can sane and rational science be content with its devotion to an object whose very reality is the fundamental issue in question? For science is clearly not the first or fundamental thing; the reality of its outward world must first be guaranteed. Then it will be time enough to impose on us the so-called “certainties of science,” which, as matter of fact, do not exist, but are in reality only probabilities. It is, we are told, “because Science is sure of nothing that it is always advancing.” A philosophy of Reality is first necessary. In all science Nature comes to us in the moulds or forms of human thought. Even such an empiricist as Bain said we can only speak of a world presented to our minds. The ether, matter, energy, &c., of science all exist for the mind, not for the senses. Even a realist like Prof. Aliotta, of Padua, makes the significant admission that the scientific concept is an idealised experience, not a mere summary of perceptions, and that its fruitfulness depends on this ideal character. Nature may supply the materials, but mind is the great world-builder.

But the world of experience, so idealistically built up by us, does not mean a rejection of the mighty world of Nature—far from it: it is a world conditioned by that actual universe, which is vaster than we know. We may, while retaining this metaphysical point of view, recognise the reasonableness and necessity of conceptions like Space, Time, and Force, being regarded, from the physical and chemical points of view, as forms of the behaviour of things, and not mere forms or laws of the mind or subject. These insistences are not made in forgetfulness of the impersonal character of scientific progress, whereof the saying, rightly enough, holds: “Il n’y a point d’homme qui est necessaire.” But they are made, because not science, but the *philosophy* of science, is our theme. Philosophy, unlike science, holds man individual to be of paramount importance in the making or determination of reality. Science puts him outside reality, and treats him as a disturbing element or factor. But philosophy knows there would be no sense-qualities without him, and that, in his whole structure and constitution, he contributes to the determination of reality. Science does not pretend to exhaust the inner life and wealth of concrete reality. The thing most sure to us is mind, is spirit: mind or consciousness, not matter, is our ultimate; and why should not nature be to us the expression of cosmic mind? No antagonism exists, in our Idealism, between spirit and science. No doubt, the world of rigid science can only take cognisance of the universe, as self-contained and self-sufficient, but the philosophy of science can transcend this purely scientific view, and apprehend idealistic cosmic Reality as one, and indwelt by immanent Deity. The world of matter and force is for us a world known only as a world thought of by us—a world lying within consciousness; and the facts given to us by science are facts which are objects of thought—facts for mind—that is to say, facts of which mind or thought is an inseparable factor. Mind has been, historically, present in the world, and we may view the world, idealistically, as only mind in travail to realise itself. “Given” reality is not an

unconditioned reality, but an *Erscheinungswelt* to our philosophy of science. We see, then, the priority of thought to nature—a logical priority, not a priority of existence; we see a certain inclusion of the physical in the psychical; and, further, see that no existence is, for us, possible save that which is existence for thought. The limits of the concepts of science have been discussed, with conspicuous ability, by H. Rickert, to whom Nature is a system of universal concepts; it is reality with respect to the universal in opposition to the particular; it is itself, to him, only a result of human cultural work. But his resolution of the sciences into natural and cultural has not always been regarded as successful, so far at least as the mind or cultural sciences are concerned. Somewhere one eternal, all-embracing thought, we are more concerned to say, must be, of which all nature's forms, with their beauty and order, must, as we have hinted, be the cosmic expression. For any consistent materialism would fail to give any real criterion of the ideal and the true, and would undermine the objective existence of science. But the philosophy of science is based upon the objectivity of scientific truth, only after scrutiny of the basis and methods by which said objectivity has been reached. Thus we have seen how *two* elements are involved in our study of nature—the mind of the observer as well as nature itself. By this mind the facts are modified or conditioned. 'Tis from the mind we account for nature or the world. Nature and the mind are correlatives—correspond with each other, are formed for each other. The laws *within* us answer to the laws *without*. Man is thus the world's epitome. 'Tis an interesting fact that the grounding of the universal laws of nature passed through three stages—the metaphysical, the *à priori* logical, and the empirical, in the last of which metaphysics and science came each to recognise its own peculiar limits. Science rests upon objectively assured facts, and, ontologically considered, leaves room only for an impersonal physical pantheism. But, in the philosophy of science, we need not only the reality of nature, but also its rationality. The world is real to the scientist,

because it is rational. He seeks the relations between things: he finds things to be really constituted by relations. He finds nature to be concrete reason. Its rational laws invite his study. Its rationality as a system—and not a mere complex of phenomena—founds for him objective science. The findings of his science are the findings of reason—reason exercised on nature. Science has tried to deal only with a phenomenal, external world, abstracted from the knower. But that cannot keep a metaphysic from being the demand of physics. Such a metaphysic, science cannot provide: as science, it has nothing to do with theistic implications. These tasks belong to philosophy. Vast as nature in her continuity may be, and virtually unlimited as may be the province of science, it is the business of science to keep clearly in view, however, the intelligible character of nature, rather than the mysteriousness of the forms and aspects under which it is presented to us. But we cannot here avoid psychological approach to the world, as we know it in science, wherein it is not merely manifested to our sense-organs, but subjected to the powers and processes of our own minds, whose action is characteristically guided by purpose. When scientific thought comprehends Nature as a unity, we must, nevertheless, distinguish the two senses of Nature—the generating nature (*natura naturans*), and the nature which is generated (*natura naturata*). This last material world stands sharply distinguished from the active, immaterial, creative agency that fashions it. If there is to be a philosophy of science, we must surely reach some intelligible and satisfying conception of Nature, as that whereon Science expends its energies. Yet so stout a defender of the substance problem as Haeckel modestly admits that “the innermost character of Nature,” or the cosmic substance, still lies beyond our reach. When Rickert, in our time, makes nature signify reality with respect to the universal, and Kant earlier denotes, by nature, the order and regularity present in appearances—or the being of things as determined by universal laws—they are both thinking of nature on its creative or generating side. But

there are thinkers—Hartmann, for example, not to speak of realists and materialists many—who lean to the other side, treating nature as objectively real and independent manifestation of the world essence, in space and time. This double signification of the term Nature was clearly recognised by Mill, but the two sides or aspects must be taken as strictly related to each other, and passing the one into the other. Science may choose to deal with Nature on its natural or material side, rather than with its ideal or immaterial aspects, but the philosophy of science finds these aspects of vital importance. It cannot, like positivist and realistic thought, deal with nature objectively and in entire independence of any perceiving consciousness. Even Hartmann found it impossible to neglect this subjective side of the matter. It is only when both sides have been thoroughly grasped together, that we know the world in such wise that its active and ideal elements have justice done to them. This is where thinkers like Cohen and Natorp fail, since they attempt to exclude the “given” from science and to deduce its matter from its form in transcendental fashion. But datum is not less necessary to science than is constructive thought. Our world knowledge is not fruit of mere perception, however, but is wrought of the insights of thought. A world of reality given us only of sense-perception, working upon the materials of chaotic and brute fact, would be a world so limited and decrepit, as to be utterly lacking in correspondence with the working of the principles of law and force. The physicist who cannot transcend naturalistic method, may have to do with such a *natura naturata*, but the philosopher must have the insight which the invisible creative activity in Nature gives expression to only in a thinking consciousness or subject. The scientist, of course, will have this insight into the *natura naturans*, too, so far as he is philosopher, his abstract generalisations corresponding to real qualities of things objective.

In Hegel's philosophy of nature, the idea is made to externalise itself, and nature and spirit are the unconscious

and the conscious sides, respectively, of one and the self-same thing, namely, the Idea. 'Twas thus he sought to improve upon the Schellingian philosophy of nature to which, despite its unresolved antagonism of nature and spirit, he was so greatly indebted. But the becoming of nature is—in Hegel's impossible attempt at an absolute psychology—in order to the rise of spirit, for Hegel who finds reason in the object itself. Others, like Hartmann and Wundt, also make nature such a stage (*Vorstufe*) in the rise or development of spirit. We may, at any rate, take the activity of spirit, metaphysically considered, as the conscious subjective correlate of the unconscious evolution of nature, and may recognise that the philosophy of science has to do with the possibility of science as strictly necessary, and universally valid, world-knowledge. As such, science has no values, and no ideals of its own. So doing, the philosophy of science must recognise the insufficiency of purely natural science methods, whereby causal connections are given us, but not the concept of causality itself, nor any justification of its essence; and whereby nature is treated as first generated as object of our knowledge, an order of appearances which such scientific method is unable to justify.

Science is justified, however, when it takes our sensations to stand for reality that lies beyond. Science, of course, only aims at a scheme or construction of phenomena and their relations—one which will prove consistent in itself and with Nature's appearances as scientifically studied. It needs no saying that Metaphysics goes deeper, aiming at the nature of ultimate reality, and this led Hegel wrongly to treat science by the method of metaphysics. The scientific unity just spoken of is by no means attained in science: it may not come through the conception of a luminiferous ether, but possibly along the lines of recent investigation in the domain of electro-magnetic energy. Matter has, at any rate, in the theory put forward by Lorentz and Larmor, been resolved into electrons, with which the ultra-atomic "corpuscles" of Thomson have been identified. The views of

Lorentz, J. J. Thomson, and Einstein, to name no others, on such matters as mass, time, and gravitation, have completely modified scientific theory, and also metaphysical reflection. And as for energy, constant in all known conditions, science has not probed the universe so deeply as to be able to speak of all possible cases or conditions. The limitations of scientific knowledge are unescapable: the categories of science are quantitative, and deal with what is measurable; but scientific knowledge, perfect after its kind, yields no direct knowledge of reality. For intelligence, of course, never gets to actual or direct reality, being but an outward view of things. Still, as Aliotta justly contends, thought does not stop short at the external model, but rather goes on to the mental construction and idea, seeking its own ideal nature in the perceptions, and a growing approximation to that type of unity which is its supreme law. Scientific theory does, no doubt, transcend experience, as he contends. But there has been a science of our time, which, disregarding the limitations of scientific method, has claimed to deal with consciousness, sensation, life and social phenomena, and has sought to oust philosophy from her rightful place and distinctive sphere. But this is only science overleaping itself; philosophy is still and always the work of reason, attaining self-realisation by working upon the data of science and of life. Reason fuses intuitions and concepts into what is called objectivity, and even for science reason's ideal is never realised. No final synthesis of the real, or of the results of the special sciences, can be reached, as Spencer supposed, by abstractly falling back on the most general conceptions underlying the sciences. Rather is it, on the other hand, the concrete process which is required, whereby philosophy, entering into the methods and results of the special sciences, shall determine their places and values in the light of consciousness, that is to say, as functions or determinations of consciousness. For this particular purpose, philosophy waits upon Science, that, armed with the results or data furnished by science, philosophy may interpret these in terms of conscious experience, if haply she may frame a consistent con-

ception of all the world-wealth of concrete reality and knowledge. So doing, she keeps in harmony with the thought-conditions brought in by science. This "synoptic vision of the whole," as it has been termed, will not fail, in its concreteness, to do justice to each component part of the sum of the sciences, without undervaluing its body of objectively verified knowledge. The point of view of the sciences must be transcended, if certain problems, immanent in these sciences themselves, are to be investigated. Objects, as given in consciousness, call for such study as is involved in a phenomenology of consciousness. Hence Hegel retained the metempirical elements which science aims to exclude. Science has based itself always more upon the immanent rationality of Nature, its unity and coherence, but this scientific confidence is at bottom a faith in the objective validity of reason. Scientific progress has the double need of intelligibility and of objectivity. The rationality of Nature imports an Absolute Mind that so renders the universal order intelligible. Of course, Science can treat that thought-purpose as just something to be explained through causes. Though natural science may lack pure purpose, it sometimes stumbles on practical purpose. Science despises teleology, but there is, for all that, no development without it. Let a single instance suffice of the working of the scientific mind in respect of this rationality of nature. Darwin, in speaking of the various contrivances by which British and foreign orchids are fertilised by insects, says: "The strange position of the Labellum, perched on the summit of the column, ought to have shewn me that here was the place for experiment. I ought to have scorned the notion that the Labellum was thus placed for no good purpose. I neglected this plain guide, and, for a long time, completely failed to understand the flower." So cheerfully does science assume purposiveness, rationality, ideas which are really end-forming, in nature. It finds relations of fitness in nature which are so wonderful as to be beyond expression, and so intricate as to be almost beyond thought's power to unravel. It tries, however, to deduce everything from causes

which are effective, apart from aim or purpose. Still, in practice, Science bases all its theorisings on end and purpose, and takes Order and Unity for its watchwords, gigantically assumptive as the procedure may be. Not even Haeckel has got away from "purposive natural forces"; Darwin "scorned the notion" that parts of phenomena subserved "no good purpose"; Romanes thought that organic nature, wherever tapped, flowed "with purpose"; Huxley fancied he had nearly come in sight of "the hidden artist"; and Lord Kelvin was not delivered from "directivity." When man becomes included in our consideration, how teleological then becomes the character of the development. For consciousness, in its essence, is really a system of ends. All science is, obviously, built up by teleological powers of observation. But this teleological interpretation neither supersedes nor impairs the strictly causal interpretations of science, which are really enhanced in value, when viewed as a vast system of means. But it is not the business of science to seek aims or purpose. It treats purposiveness as a mere instrument towards causal knowledge. The unity of science is a unity of method. It is scientific method which gives unity and symmetry to its materials. But this must be critically done, and the scientist must not become the slave of his own methods. A synthetic method must, as Kant insisted, weave together conceptions *à priori* or formal cognitions, and sense-experience, so that there shall be a satisfactory resultant whole. Fichte conspicuously failed to take this account of experience when treating of the doctrine of science; and there was too much of the same tendency both in Hegel and Schelling. Science has rightly planted firm foot upon nature, but need not, for all that, forget that the truth about reality is not wholly a matter of sense-perception. Reason is both interpreter and judge, and corrects the mistakes of sense-impressions. The supreme arbiter in science, whether as to inferences, observations, or experiments, is reason or intellect, not sense. The unity of nature is axiomatic in science, but it is so as a postulation of reason. It is to reason that the laws of science make their appeal.

The aim or goal of science is a rational one—a complete interpretation, so far as its material and its method will allow, of the universe. But the unity of the universe, and the uniformity of nature, on which science rests as pre-suppositions, have been much more the gift of Christian conception than is commonly supposed by those who have not studied the deficiencies, in these respects, of the ancient pagan philosophers, Aristotle included. The major part of what is called science is theory, not fact, and no new fact is final, but only the opening of a new vista. But science—barring, of course, agnostic and positivist positions in science—also calls for the exercise of disciplined and creative imagination. The mere observer of facts, useful in his way as a dweller in the valleys of science, comes far short of this glory. It is this exalted power which reduces phenomena to terms of scientific law, and the history of science has been shaped by the personality of its masters. The mighty inductions of science are near of kin to the highest inspiration, or the boldest imagination, as we see in examples like Newton, Laplace, Faraday, and Darwin. The highest examples in this connection are afforded by Newton and Darwin, since they represent processes observed within a narrow range turned to explanations of the highest scientific generality. Lagrange regretfully said that Newton's discovery could not be repeated because we had only one solar system. Scientific genius is sometimes seen, not thus in respect of a particular formula or law, but in the creation of a science itself, as, for instance, Descartes originated the science of Analytical Geometry, Virchow the science of Cellular Pathology, and Pasteur the science of Bacteriology. It is only by a severe selection of ideas that truth is extricated in science.

Philosophy, for all that has just been said, is keenly alive to the limitations and difficulties of scientific method. And the real concern of science is with method, not with meaning, as we see in the case of final causes. The very fulness of nature has constituted an embarrassment for science, whose methods can hardly cope with the copiousness, complexity,

and magnitude of the issues involved. Hence science has settled down rather too contentedly to deal with quantitative problems and relations, so that its votaries do not even perceive and recognise the fact that, in the endless gyration of masses and molecules and the ceaseless actings of reciprocal influences, its precise quantitative results and issues are simply ruled out on theoretic view. Of course, the theoretic difficulty, or rather impossibility, has not hindered science from much that is so exact as to be practically very useful and interesting. Instead of an empty abstraction like Spinoza's "*Omnis determinatio est negatio*," science yields us the study of being in the manifoldness of its concrete qualities, so building up its world of real and positive knowledge in growing likeness to the world of real existence. In all which knowledge Science persists in claiming for Space and Time some sort of ontological validity. Time, in the geometrical sense, is quantitative, but in the durational sense of psychical life, qualitative. The reality of the self, of the observer, gives continuity to all, as determined from the self as centre. But the limitations within which these results can alone be accepted are necessary to be kept in mind by any attempt at the philosophy of science. Theoretically, not a single physical proposition is beyond doubt; and the ancient category of substance, in the material sense, chased through many modern forms of kinetic and atomistic theory, has not yet been able to be dispensed with. It is impossible to ignore the fact that in Haeckel, Huxley, and not a few other representatives of science, fundamental considerations of an epistemological character are not understood, and their vital bearings not realised. When the representatives of science speak of matter as something external to the percipient, one cannot forget how uncritically — however scientifically necessary — they speak, since no matter can exist, for us, as merely external to the percipient. Neither matter, nor space, nor time, can, on the principle of relativity, be absolute, but each of them relative or particular to the observer. This is in line with the theistic importance of the self. Science may, as Bergson contends, confine itself to simultaneities, and denude time of

its essential quality of duration, but philosophy cannot afford to neglect the psychology of the matter. Science must be allowed freely to move on her own objective way, but that is no reason why the philosophy of science should not stop to see how subjectively conditioned all science is. This, while we allow the beneficent correctiveness of science to hold practical sway in rectifying or checking the individuality and infinite variety of our subjective experiences. Its view is different or apart from us, and it may be useful for us to be made to feel the difference—to see movement and process where we only saw life, to see succession where we thought only of activity, and so forth, as science pursues her deterministic way. But the Scientist, with his Principle of Causation, ought not to forget or exclude the Element of Personality, as belonging to the realm of real being. Not even the extreme utility of the principle of causation, as an abstract methodological convention in the mind's effort to understand Nature, should lead him to forget this. Philosophies of science that attempt to explain things for us by physical laws alone, without cognisance of mind, are doomed to remain partial, inadequate, unsatisfying. What lies behind phenomena is just mind and its concepts, say what some scientists will. Substance, cause, force, persistence, conservation—these are not perceived by outward observation: they are concepts, not percepts. It is, in fact, in these transcendent elements of science that metaphysics finds its point of departure, and dynamic and kinetic elements must have justice.

The progress of science surely calls for corresponding advance in the philosophy of science, which is more difficult to-day than ever before. Herschel, Comte, Mill, Helmholtz, Whewell, Jevons, Maxwell, Spencer, Bain, Wundt, C. W. Shields, Pearson, Flint, Fiske, Mach, Ostwald, and others, have done much to advance the philosophy of science. What has marked the classificatory attempts, generally, from Aristotle onwards, has been the attempt to give logical system or form to what already existed, but the inability to provide for the further or future development of truth has persisted,

in spite of the claim of science to divine the unknown or future. The wide application of inductive processes was set forth by Whewell, who, catching up the spirit of Kant, sought, in his *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, to reach the fundamental ideas underlying all scientific facts and reasoning. Whewell was clear and strong in recognising the "speculative tendency" in man, the "speculative reason" being to him "only the reason satisfying itself of its own consistency." His work is the counterpart of Comte's, but tends to magnify the subjective. Comte was bolder in the generalisations of his positivistic system, and rendered valuable service towards the philosophy of science. The unification of the sciences, the oneness of all science, were his great insistences. His was the aphorism—"Savoir pour prévoir, prévoir pour pourvoir," but the rational ground of the unity of science he saw not. But he was, though not without defects that paved the way for the work of Spencer, far from sanctioning empiricism: his demand was that observations be explained by theory and combined into effective laws. His stress lay on the objectivity of truth. The unity of all Science was brought out with great power by Shields. Mill's extended applications of empiric methods have proved of more enduring worth than the work of Comte or of Whewell, to both of whom, however, he owed, as he owned, much. Maxwell did significantly for scientific first principles by his use of physical analogy, and his exhibition of the constancy and continuity of motion in connection with the concept of matter. Spencer opposed the logical treatment of the sciences by Comte, but his own treatment of the relations and principles of the sciences has not always been accepted as an advance upon that of Comte. He profoundly grasped the unity of nature and of science, and the working of the law of development. Spencer, by working out his vast evolutionary scheme, with all its serial implications for the sciences, rendered a more signal service than has always been allowed in recent criticism. Karl Pearson attempted a criticism of the fundamental concepts of science, in order to deliver them from the nightmare of metaphysics and superstition. His

facts of science were limited to the data of self-impressions. His theorisings amounted to a confusion of psychology—of a rather antiquated and discredited sort—with epistemology. Bergson, in the train of Rousseau, de Biran, Ravaisson, Lachelier, and Boutroux, thinks to reach a higher science by means of the immediate given, by spontaneous life and perception, rather than by reflection, but such a goal will never be reached save by greater justice to thought and concepts than is exemplified by Bergson. Wundt has enforced the view that philosophy is an universal science, whose aim is to bring the knowledge of the special sciences into a coherent system, but this was urged, long before, by Shields. For, though the science of to-day strives to obtain a harmonious view of the world, Wundt thinks the requirements of the special sciences are not met by any existing system. Wundt also declines to acquiesce in the Neo-Kantian separation of science from metaphysics, but the latter he would base upon the results of the former. He seeks a completion of empirical thought as required by unity. Wundt has proposed a threefold scheme, obviating many of the Spencerian difficulties by dividing the sciences into the formal or mathematical, the real, and the philosophical, whose harmony he seeks. One thing certain, in my judgment, is, that any philosophy of science must make fullest reckoning with science itself, and its manifold developments. Among these is the failure of theoretical physics to find a basis of absolute reference within the sphere of observed physical fact or reality, even with the aid of Chemistry as a new, significant ally. The materialistic theory of development has been stoutly denied by Driesch in his important researches into organic regulations, and he has rejected Kant's treatment of the causal and teleological modes as different ways of looking at things: to Driesch the teleological mode is itself a factor in the chain of causes, so rendering it teleological. On the other hand, the critical materialism, or idealistic naturalism, of the Neo-Kantists seems too uncritical of the mind's part in relation to the knowledge given in science. To suppose that the objective and the impersonal suffice,

apart from the subjective in experience, is, as Boutroux has remarked, pure Scholastic realism. Mach, for example, does not fail to recognise this subjective or mental factor in all our knowledge of things or objects, in a way. The difficulty of a philosophy of science, which shall be a synthesis of rational insights into the nature and relations of the sciences, is great, if only for the reason that the system of nature, on which these sciences are founded, is never a closed and completed system. Hence the philosophy of science has to do with science in the making, and not as already made. The qualities of things are not to be regarded as static entities, to be abstractly intuited, as in the older Realism. Things taken by themselves, are without properties; their perception—even in respect of their very existence—must be taken in the context of the energies of sense. But, of course, their qualities are not constituted by the reckoning we so make of them. The reality and persistence of qualities are a necessity of science, be the fate of atoms, or electrons, or other ultimates, what it may. But the philosophy of science knows that the qualities of things are only the responses of our own consciousness to stimuli, such being the creative power and activity of consciousness that it is never a passive mirror of the outer world. It also knows what dismal failure has attended the philosophic aspirations of materialism to solve our problems by the aid of biology, and how impossible a philosophic world-view is to materialism. But the world of matter cannot be excluded, as by Ostwald (to whom I have referred in the chapter on "The Philosophy of Nature"), in favour of the concept of energy—a concept so comprehensive that under it are subsumed both substantiality and causality. His conception of energy, as basis at once of the physical and the psychical, will not bear scrutiny, metaphysically. The philosophy of science is nowise inimical to science, but supervenes in the interests of what appears to be the final truth. It points out the true place and function of nature in entity, and teaches that *ens est quod percipitur*, the objective value of what is so perceived lying in what is common to different perceiving minds. It accepts the meta-

physical import of Science, though science can only construct a self-consistent conceptual model of nature. Science is, after all, only a part of the total universe of being; there is, besides, the region of the transcendent; this is not to speak of those spheres of man's cultural life—his *geistiges Gesamt-leben*, as the Germans call it—where science does not reign. The world of Appearance (*Erscheinung*) is that with which science has to do; but, so much appearance (*Schein*), said Herbart, so much reality (*Seyn*); and it is with the reality—the real being—behind all the phenomena of science, that philosophy—even the philosophy of science—has to do, even if we have to say, with Bradley, that science is a poor affair, compared with the wealth of the real universe. Hence science cannot be considered simply as a whole in itself; its true philosophy must be reached by study of it in relation to the totality of being—this larger whole of which it forms a part. However complex and difficult, the task is one which intellect can never lay down or relinquish, for a philosophy of science will always be necessary to us.

The danger and trouble lie, on the scientific side, in the Scientist being so hypnotised by scientific training and habit as to be unable to think of any exact thought save that which is quantitative—concerned with measurement. Hence that sort of Neo-Pythagoreanism which, it has been observed, may be seen in many scientific demands for accuracy in Knowledge, which latently means an unthinking sway of number. But there are other elements than number or measurement—all-important as these are in science—to be taken into account in framing a *philosophy* of science. The Order which marks Nature in whole may be allowed to suggest a Supreme Intelligence behind Nature. But the impact of ideas, the power of thought, do not trouble writers like Karl Pearson, who easily perpetrates the grotesque absurdity of treating “the scientific method” as the “sole gateway to the whole range of knowledge”! Lewes, of course, exemplified the same tendency, from which even Spencer and Huxley were not exempt. But nothing can be more intellectually narrow than the failure to see

that scientific truth can be no type or measure of all truth: reason, in its scientific workings, must still have philosophy as judge, and from this there is no escape. But the view in question is not merely narrow or limited: it is grossly and patently erroneous. For no forms of truth are more real than some of those which are deemed non-scientific. The investigation of precisely given conditions and their consequents; the inquiry into the interdependence of particular parts; these are the quests of science as common-sense knowledge; but they are obviously far enough from rendering philosophy with its affirmations about the universe as Whole, less indispensable. To treat philosophy, therefore, with Spencer and Wundt, as mere unification or systematisation of science, is one-sided and unsatisfactory, since there can be no such universal knowledge of reality, which is not a knowledge of the ideal principles of the real—the real seen in and through the light of the Spirit, in which the real is mirrored. It is in the study of the spirit, in its diverse manifestations, that the universality of philosophy consists. No conceptual synthesis or elaboration can be satisfactorily made, even in a provisional scientific way, without due account being taken of the laws of energy in the inorganic world, no less than of the laws of evolution in the organic realm, for such an elaboration demands that all the scientific relations conceivable be reckoned with. Nature demands that Science be one, as she herself is; but this unity is still far from perfected in synthetic thought. It is in the multiplicity of Nature that the unity of spirit determines itself, and shews itself in the profound unity of knowledge. The Ciceronian *inquisitio atque investigatio* of Science must, however, be made from the love of truth rather than for the ends of system. The most scientific ideas are, as Mach has said, those that hold good throughout the widest domains of research, and are supplementary to the greatest amount of experience. The world system, in whole, grows more intelligible to us, as the phenomena of experience are capable of being reduced to manifestations of law. The mechanical

theory of the universe is not adequate even to inorganic nature, for processes that are apparently purely mechanical possess other features as well, so that the mechanical is only one aspect of the world. The mechanical theory obviously needs to be supplemented by the principle of development, needs it so much that, in the view of Mach, the mechanical aspect may be as superficial, as it certainly is artificial. The laws that govern matter, heat, magnetism, are being used by Geology, in her bold endeavours to reconstitute the history of our globe, and determine the constitution of its deepest strata. But our unified scientific knowledge shews the world so insufficient as an end to itself, when regarded as a whole, and in all its relations, that the postulation of a real Ground for it grows in its reasonableness, necessity, and acceptability, to rational mind. That postulation is the final significance of science for our Theistic Idealism, to which the world is a world willed, purposed, dependent, contingent. For, to Science the universe is an all-embracing, unified whole, and the last demand of Science, grown rational and reflective, is for a Cause of all causes, which shall be a real World-Ground. In other words, the demand presses up from scientific causation towards metaphysical causation, as containing the underlying reason or ultimate Ground. This demand seems the more urgent when it is considered how little settled are scientific conclusions as to the constitution of the world. Some, like Whetham, explain matter in terms of ether; others, like Sir Oliver Lodge, make ether and motion fundamental; others, in terms of atoms or, further down, electrons; others, like Ostwald, who takes science to mean the construction of "arbitrary concepts," in terms of energy; not to speak of other theorists and theories. To such an insistent demand, the product of metaphysical thought known as the concept of substance, comes almost as a great and welcome relief, all the more that no rest is found for the mind in any stage of the scientific process. When Gustave Le Bon tells us that the ether is "the substratum of worlds," we are back to a metaphysical

concept. In recent physics, gravitation figures as the fundamental cause of all motion, under perfectly determinate laws, and its universality is solidly established. Gravitation has become a pressing problem to Astronomy, in its study of celestial spaces. But the cause of gravitation itself is not settled, some distinguished physicists holding gravity to be due to no intrinsic force, but to the pressure of the medium—such as ether—in which bodies are submerged. On the other hand, we have arguments for the abolition of ether. But the solving of the problem as to the cause of gravitation, which some regard as a mere hypothetical relation describing certain changes, would by no means end the reign of mystery for science. In all this flux of thought and opinion, we recall that the concept of thing, of being, is necessary to science. For science is nothing if not ontological. What we do have is a dynamic system or world of transmuting energy, which furnishes our criterion of reality and the constituents of our knowledge. Our logical and epistemological theories are nowise antagonistic, but supplementary to the work of the special sciences in their fragmentariness. But it is admitted, even from the side of science, that, should science become able fully to explain man, “regarded from without,” the “consciousness” of man “would to himself remain an unconquered citadel” [W. and C. Whetham, ‘Science and the Human Mind,’ p. 285].

The philosophy of science must concern itself with the developed and orderly cosmos, wherein the whole fundamental concepts of science—whether self, substance, cause, force, matter, time, space, law, purpose, order, relation, unity, identity, continuity, and so forth—are, without exception, really metaphysical concepts or ideas. Their figurings in the various sciences must receive some integration, in order to a consistent and coherent system or whole, far as such system must be from finality. There is thus a sense in which all science rests upon metaphysics. This, without any wish to subscribe to Sir Oliver Lodge’s large, uncritical, *en bloc* creed of “modern science,” which is

really as far as possible from having reached absolute certainties. For it is not, as is often supposed, mere fact with which Science is concerned, but rather law, or the relatedness, the interdependence, the connectedness, of things, even though the world is, to the scientist, unfinished and for ever incomplete. This connectedness of things is for him always more the crowning fact of experience, as, scientifically, systematised. It is vital to his scientific view-point, which takes the world, as thus causally connected, to be a whole. For the aim of his science is what has been termed "the reasoned wholeness of experienced fact," and this ought to take us nearer the higher realities of reason. Positive science has to do with Nature, conceived as a block-universe of mechanical determinism, and it classifies her physical phenomena under laws. The philosophy of such science is comparatively free from perplexity; for its determination is that of scientific law, in its absolute and unvarying regularity. But great danger attends the thought movements of hypothetical or speculative science, which, in its reasoning on underlying forces or causes, has always been too prone to carry over the spirit and conclusions of positive science into the realm of life and spontaneity. That danger was clearly enough demonstrated in Huxley and some other exponents of the science of last century. But the scientific—and romantic—evolutionary philosophy of our century, with its theories of a continuous process of self-creation, or the sufficiency of the universe through its own expansive forces, is in grave danger of yielding a philosophy of science that shall be very dreary, fatalistic, and unilluminated, in its results, from the standpoint of an exalted system like Theistic Idealism. This I say, while granting that science, as science, is logically agnostic. Theistic Idealism does not say, with Newton, "*Hypotheses non fingo*," for it is not only itself an hypothesis, but it knows, as reflective science itself knows, how impossible any real physics must be, which should not overpass the limits of mere perception. Poincaré has suggestively dealt with the *rôle* of hypothesis

in science, and opposed the nominalism of Le Roy. He holds the rules of science to be determined by the facts. Science is, for him, true, objective, intellectualistic. Our idealism is in accord with him rather than with the pragmatic science of Wilbois. It finds the spiritual significance of science in the end to which the unconscious activity of all things—in their rational unity—seems, to our spirit, to tend. For it has seen how little positive science can escape the supplementary activity of thought, and restrict itself to the mere facts of reality. Our idealism, however, regards the resolution of philosophy purely into the special discipline of the spirit, by Cohen, Windelband, Rickert, and Croce, as somewhat one-sided and unsatisfactory, in so far as it fails to take due account of the real as reflected in the spirit. There must be no aloofness from, and no injustice to, that real, in our analysis of knowledge. An idealistic philosophy of science, it seems to me, can, with Wundt, take Will and Idea as ultimates of reality, but will, theistically, prefer to give the primacy to Idea rather than Will; and it will make the spiritual community the goal of evolution, with the Divine and Absolutely Perfect Ethical Being as the base or hypothesis of the entire realisation. This is Theistic Idealism, which, in its philosophy of science, forgets not the place and primacy of spirit, but still duly follows scientific method, scrutinizes all presuppositions, takes full account and reckoning of all the special sciences, makes a systematic correlation of their results, and binds the whole into a unified world-theory, so far at least as science is concerned. It may be true that European thought has come as far short of providing a Philosophy of Science as Mr Balfour has recently said, but, though I doubt whether he has been quite just to all that has been done in this direction on the European scale, yet there is certainly room for further progress along the lines which our Idealism has just indicated. But no philosophy of science can be more than approximate, science having to do with an agency not itself calculable, and evolution, in the sense of epigenesis, bringing forth always

the new and incalculable. The philosophy of science, having to do with the flux of phenomena, cannot help being modified by that. But this does not mean endorsement of Bergson's unsatisfying attitude that "movement is the reality itself," for if there is nothing which changes, we are not likely to extract much science, or philosophy, out of the intangible, disembodied, unsupported movement itself. As Enriques has, more wisely, said, "In the advance of science an uninterrupted but progressive series of mental constructions gives us an approximate, but only approximate, idea of the inter-connected system of Reality." Granted, Bergson-wise, that the reality is in flux, and that change permeates the world to its inmost core, yet Bergson himself is elsewhere so little content with "movement" as "the reality itself," that he is compelled to say that "in principle positive science bears on reality itself," and has for its domain "inert matter." Isolated "movement" as the sole "reality" will not readily yield us an universe of order, with special "positive" sciences springing therefrom. But this oscillation between "matter," as pure position, and pure "movement," is quite characteristic of Bergson's mode. A "movement" has more in it than the immobile, and is not without need of cause or mover. A similar thing occurs when Bergson tries to harmonise matter and spirit, for then matter is so far waked from its inertness, that Bergson is sore beset to know whether their difference is one of kind, or of degree. I come back to note that, despite the instability of scientific values, thought must find such an approach to constancy that science, and a philosophy of science, must be possible. For the world of change is no aimless and unmeaning flux: the lines of the changing real are marked by comparative regularities, relatively invariable *rappports*, and general meaningfulness. Hence the possibility of science, and the direction to be found in it. It is the task of philosophy to co-ordinate the results of the special sciences, and provide a higher synthesis of science and common knowledge. It is obviously only philosophy, viewed as objective, that can under-

take, or accomplish, this vast and difficult task, and reduce the manifold scientific generalisations to ultimate metaphysical unity. This ultimate issue can only be reached by taking full account of the proximate of the scientist. Theistic Idealism has great sympathy with the position that "a theistic theory of the world is scientifically probable"; "explains the universe better than any other hypothesis"; holds its ground against them "with increasing evidence"; alone makes the world "fully cognizable or intelligible." "The very course of science must logically end in a theistic ontology" [C. W. Shields, 'Philosophia Ultima,' vol. ii. pp. 355, 356]. These are among the issues to which our discussion in this chapter has tended, and such a philosophy of science, imperfectly drawn as it may be, will be the crown of science.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART.

ANYTHING like a Philosophy of Art must be taken to be a late product. Egyptian Art had subtlety, realism, and restraint, of its own. The evolution of beauty and ideality in Greece was finally arrested in its development, only that it might overspread, long after, other lands where admiration should be born. Ancient Art was inspired by its beautiful Mythology, but Greek Art, mighty as it was, lacked great human qualities, such as pity. It lacked idealism, and was too realistic in tendency. Long and strange was the sleep of the beautiful after the time of Longinus: Mediæval Art had its sublime Hagiology: the Renaissance had its rich Humanism, its new spirit seen in Verrocchio, Perugino, Bellini, da Vinci, Angelo, Titian, and Raphael, to name no others; but not, indeed, until the eighteenth century did the architectonic skill of Baumgarten wake the science of the beautiful by the not very pleasing name of "æsthetics." For it remains the great merit of Baumgarten to have been the first, among modern philosophers, to give systematic treatment to the beautiful in connection with the general conceptions of philosophy. Hence followed, in due course, such great contributions to the philosophy of art as those of Lessing, and others to be presently considered. But from the end of the seventeenth century right into the nineteenth, too many thinkers in the artistic countries of Europe had really no better idea of Art than that of imi-

tation, pure or idealised. If any justification were required for such a treatment here, it might be found in the consideration that the Art of every time reflects the world-conception then prevalent, so that Art is in some sort the expression of a philosophy. For Art in its wholeness belongs to the purpose of the world. Our Theistic Idealism would be truncated if it took no cognisance of Art: it views Art as having given new utterance to religion, even as Art independent and free.

So far as early attention had been at all bestowed on art, Plato had tended to lose the beautiful in the good, and to confine art to representation of the good. Plato's efforts towards the purifying of erotic sentiment were of a very mild character. He had not a clear enough realization of the fact that the beautiful and the good belong to different categories—the former emotional, the latter volitional. Plato took the reduced view of art as mere imitation, thus raising what is, no doubt, the first form of art impulse, to the unmerited place of representing the essential nature of art. It is, of course, impossible, as Bosanquet rightly remarks, to “imitate” a “non-sensuous principle in a sensuous medium.” But Plato had the merit to do great things for the theory of form, especially in the ‘*Philebus*’ and the ‘*Timæus*,’ where colour in space, and tone in time, are taken to be beautiful as sensuous presentations of unity. The object, it should be said, was supposed by Plato to exist as an “imitation” of the Idea: the Idea was the intelligible reality of which the object was the appearance. The manifestation of the Platonic idea—the incarnation of the Ideal—is Art. The hardness of attaining beauty, and the need of discipline, were not absent from the Platonic æsthetics. He had, on occasion, at least enough Puritanic austerity to regard the preference of beauty to virtue as nothing short of the real and utter dishonour of the soul—a sentiment that did him lasting honour, Walter Pater notwithstanding. Plato held matter and form to be combined in all things, and that “measure and symmetry” always mark any such combination that is of value. In

his theory of form, every species is taken to have a definite normal type—certainly a valid and valuable working hypothesis. Plato further made the provisional conjecture—it can hardly have been more—that the form of a species is determined by law of its own, not by blind or accidental forces. And such a conjectural generalization is proof of the illuminated character of Plato's mind, rough conjecture only though we take it to be.

In Aristotle's 'Poetics,' his fragmentary theory of the art of poetry sets out from principles of art in general, and he follows in the path of Plato, only that his view of the function of imitation was a higher one. Aristotle still keeps the theory of art in essential relation to the ethical effects of beauty. Plotinus has great honour by his early attempt to frame a metaphysical æsthetic, which he does in his treatise on beauty. He makes the soul know beauty by a special faculty. The conception of the beautiful—divine "intelligible" beauty—Plotinus first in any real way made independent of the good and the perfect. The originality of the Plotinian æsthetic is seen in the way Plotinus makes objective beauty consist in the realisation of the archetype in the object, and at the same time, emphasises the subjective elements in our perception of the object conformably with our subjective ideal, and the consequent specific emotion. In the Renaissance we see Italian genius, idealistically, aiming at an ideal of beauty that should prove a creation of the type, in which it stood contrasted with the realism of Northern Art, due in part to the influence of Protestant thought. Mediæval Art led up to Raphael and Angelo, its supreme products. Catholicism stood much nearer to Renaissance art than did Protestantism. Baumgarten laid stress on the intellectual content, rather than on æsthetic apprehension. Æsthetic was to him the art of beautiful thinking. Early Protestant thought was not equal to the recognition of Art as an end in itself, or a distinctive mode of viewing the world.

But we hasten at once to remark that, since Baumgarten, philosophies of art have been legion—German, British,

French, Italian, and Dutch. The celebrated work of Winckelmann freed art from ethical aims, and declared its sole aim to be beauty—beauty of form, idea, and expression. He took the creation of ideal forms to be the highest aim of Art. He would have modern art imitate ancient art. Lessing, who strongly stood for the rights of the artistic view of things, subordinated expression to beauty. A new philosophy of art was struck out by Kant, when he made beauty, objectively, the form of an object, perceived apart from thought of its utility; and beauty, subjectively, that which, without use or reasoning, pleases. Schiller, with his ethical concept of the “beautiful soul,” closely followed Kant in æsthetic matters. The basis of our æsthetic feeling Kant lays in our capacity for judging where pleasure obtains without desire. Kant, however, comes short of realizing the sort of constitutive intelligence he is always seeking, with creative, and not merely representative, activities. But Kant’s reservation of the term Art for the productions of liberty—that is, “of a volition which founds itself upon reason”—was notable. In the æsthetic of his ‘Critique of Judgment,’ he views Art as rising into “something different which surpasses Nature.” Beauty is, in this work, for Kant the expression (*Ausdruck*) of æsthetical ideas. And it was his great enunciation that such beauty exists in our minds, and is not a quality that we perceive in the object. “In judging beauty,” he says, “we invariably seek its gauge in ourselves *à priori*.” In such an act of judging, the important point is, “how we take it.” But Kant’s type of beauty was too artificial, formal, abstract—too lacking in content and vital character to be satisfactory. Schelling exalts art so as to make it the true organon of philosophy, and holds reason to reach its highest only in the activity of the artistic genius. Æsthetic reason is thus the crown of his idealism. Artistic creation reaches, in Schelling’s view, beyond the reproductive and schematising imagination, and nature and mind find an æsthetic reconciliation to which Schelling ascribes an ontological value. The value power of Art was recognised by Fichte, who said that “Art converts

the transcendental standpoint into the general standpoint." Hegel improves on Kant by regarding Art as the manifestation of absolute spirit in the sensuous sphere. The sensuous manifestation—the perfect unity of spirit and form—is only *Schein* or appearance. Such appearance is the sole reality of the beautiful. The beautiful is the external manifestation of the Idea: it is the Idea shining in sensuous form. But the Idea is, for him, not limited to individual consciousness, but taken as universal. Beauty, inherent in nature, exists only for perception—is purely subjective. The unity of form and content as essence of perfect art-work is the fundamental thought of Hegel's Philosophy of Art. Beauty was, to him, the Idea expressed in form. But he had not learned that beauty and form mean, ultimately, the same thing.

It cannot be said that æsthetical theory, even in our own time, has done much more than maintain, in more critical fashion, what is already essentially present in Hegel's æsthetics. The three general forms of art, the symbolic, the classic, and the romantic, are by Hegel connected with the three essential stages through which the spirit of man must pass in its development. In this is noteworthy how Hegel here inwardly connects such concrete thought with the dialectic method. In such a threefold division, there is more of living reality than of the abstract schematism of the dialectic. But Hegel, like Plato long before, fails to perceive how little the manifestation of the absolute in sensuous form can be unmediated—in other words, does not perceive and provide for the absolute and the relative spheres and aspects of art. This, without meaning to say that Hegel does not, in his own way, set the universal conception in immediate connection with its individual or particular appearance. More than one outstanding critic, it must yet be said, have pronounced Hegel's lectures on æsthetics to be the dirge of Art. Still, he at times approximates the Nietzschean standpoint, and would "strip the outer world of its stubborn foreignness," and "make the world his own in spirit and concepts." Hartmann ascribed

genuine art to the inspiration of genius, and held such art to be incommensurable with any rationalistic standard. Hartmann made a fundamental opposition between feelings of appearance (*Scheingefühle*), and "real" feelings: "sympathetic" and "reactive" æsthetic feelings belonged to the former, while the desire of the beautiful pertained to the latter—the "real" feelings. This distinction of feeling, to the object or to the æsthetically moved ego, was an important one, in my view, for æsthetics. H. Cohen, in his recent system, gives an æsthetic treatment in which sublimity is located too largely and arbitrarily in theoretic work as an expression of mind. The whole significance of Art, in his view, consists in communication, a thesis, however, which he does not demonstrate. He rather absurdly doubts the influence of religion on Art. Richard Wagner, on the contrary, went so far as to say that the religious mind is better conserved in art than in religious cults; and another writer on æsthetic (J. Müller) says, "the religious need is the mother of Art." True philosophy of art must take the idea of absolute being as its point of departure. The concept of being is here of primary importance. The ideas of absolute creativeness and absolute beauty immediately follow, however little, as we have just said, they can be carried over in any unmodified form into the relative sphere. Essential or transcendent beauty was, for Plotinus (Enn. VI.), the formative principle in beautiful objects, and superior, as such, to all determinate form. But the concretely beautiful always expresses, in my view, some sort of ideal perfection, and is manifested only to reason. The soul of art lies, doubtless, in its creative spirit—its inventive faculty: joined to this, in art proper, is imitative power. But Art is Nature illuminated. It is the creativeness and depth of spirit that invest everything by an Angelo or a Rembrandt with so great interest. Art is concerned with greatness as well as with beauty, yet this immense and majestic concern is often overlooked in the basic intention of Art. Art, in its free creations, is most often motivated by the sense of beauty. It then aims, one may surely say, to master the essence of

beauty, not from without, but by continuous study of nature itself in its most perfect forms and its inner mysterious spirit. Hence a Watteau, for example, quite dominated by beauty. The artist—be he a strong and mighty Angelo, a beautiful Raphael or an original Rembrandt, a perfect Titian or a truthful Velasquez, an opulent Rubens or a graceful Correggio, or only a modern apostle of light and atmosphere and movement—opens for us the gates of imaginative charm, of mystery, of power, of illusiveness—above all, of elusive beauty. The true artist's work possesses an interior rhythm, yields an impulsion, and begets an inexpressible enthusiasm. The artist must create with joy; the beauty in his work—when it is one of beauty—must be an expression of life, of whose immense vitality he is nowise fearful. For beauty is life's perfect flower. And withal, a magical truthfulness must belong to his beauty. Absolute beauty is the most pleasing ideal in art, but it is an ideal never perfectly attained in human and relative forms of art. Its unrealized ideal is that of the unity of a whole.

Art is sharply distinguished from science by its ideal: science aims to make experience intelligible, art to make it pleasurable: science is abstract, and deals with relations; art is concrete, and requires phenomenal forms. While science leans on such categories as causality and necessity, art depends rather on purposiveness and freedom. Art is, in the view of science, illusory: science is, to art, imperfect or incomplete. Art is synthetic, and means unity of conception: this unity of Art we see sought in men like Leighton, Watts, and Whistler. Art selects and chooses, under ethical principles—but without any whelming moral intention—and artistic instincts, whereas science takes all facts whatsoever, and deals with them. Art is more opaque, in respect of meaning, than science, which tends to be clear. Art freely chooses what is felt, and is in nowise bound to what will give pleasure. Art is, moreover, not confined to that which is, like science, but may freely represent what ought to be. Art is not, like science, common to all, but may serve as

vehicle for the transmission of individual character. Art, not less than scientific experience, is a sphere of conscious reality, and its data are therefore to be taken up into any philosophical conception of the world. Art is a spontaneous and necessary product: it evolves. Art is free from the laws of nature: it is not bound by the connections of history. It is the symbol of a nameless something that lies deep in the human heart, ready to be waked into life by beauty's touch when lighted by genius. In what has just been said, it is, of course, not meant that æsthetic enjoyment is independent of knowledge, since the pleasure is the precise result of intelligent knowledge and appreciation. But I agree with those who think that æsthetic perception has in it, from the outset, feeling as well as cognition. It was the view of Schiller, as expressed in his 'Philosophical Letters,' that, when and so long as we are occupied with beauty, there is no cognition—not even of beauty itself. But it seems quite a mistake to set knowledge or reflection into any kind of antithesis to appreciation. For appreciation must surely have content of some sort, and why should it not be known or described? To know or describe what we appreciate will not rob us of the appreciation, but rather tend to increase it. For only the most perfect appreciation will enable us to approximate perfect knowledge or description. To Schiller belongs the merit to have made higher estimation of the worth of the artistic feeling for the development of humanity, art being for him a means toward the true and the good. He found an imperative in beauty—"a duty of appearances"—beauty was for him our "second creator."

Artistic subjects have been dealt with, in some respects, by Schopenhauer perhaps as finely as by any one in modern times. He follows Plato's conceptions in the main, the ideal theory of the 'Philebus' and the 'Timæus' finding in Schopenhauer a new form. The world of Schopenhauer consists of matter and form, the blind "will to live" being the ultimate matter. Will—this ultimate matter—objectivizes itself in the world of appearance or "presentation"; it

objectifies itself in an ascending series of forms which are just, in reality, the ideas of Plato. Will thus objectivizes itself on various planes, each having a beauty of its own. The revelational character of Art is the fundamental idea of his æsthetics. Things are, to him, more beautiful as they evoke objective contemplation. He lays stress on the opposition between conceptual and intuitive thought. The artistic genius, by his gift of intuition, knows things in their very essence. The strange, Nihilistic value of Art is, for him, that it quenches, for the time being, the desire of life. The spiritual image, in which that which is eternal is reflected, he calls Idea. The cosmos in whole is the Idea to which other ideas are related as single notes are in music to the chord. A higher Idea springs out of the conflict between two lower ideas in their desire for a given matter. The Idea is just the immediate objectivity of the Will on a particular plane: the perception of beauty is ours, as we renounce our individuality and contemplate some one of these planes of manifestation of Will. For Art is a revelation: æsthetics is essentially a theory of knowledge: knowledge is so little absent from artistic contemplation that "*Kunst ist eine Erkenntnissart.*" What is most noticeably absent from these positions of Schopenhauer is any explicit equivalent to Plato's insistences on "Measure" and "Symmetry," as features of any combination of matter and form that carries any worth. The abiding merit of Plato, and, with him, of Schopenhauer and Lotze, has been the real—for Plato, the original and profound—recognition of the Idea as law, not thing. For Lotze has well said that it remains a profoundly mysterious fact that there should be universal laws—anciently "Ideas"—which do not themselves exist as, or like, things, and which yet rule the operations of things. And beauty is, as Goethe said, a manifestation of secret laws of Nature, which else were hid from us. In connection with the ideas of Plato and Schopenhauer just referred to, it may be remarked how, more recently, Pater declared the ideal of all art to be the perfect identity of form and matter, wherein the end is not

distinct from the means, the form from the matter, the subject from the expression, but "inhere in and completely saturate each other." Art means, for us, the ideal in the actual. In Nietzsche, the conception of Art is primary in importance or value; it is "the only task of life"; and, in contrast to, and correction of, Schopenhauer, he thinks Art the great stimulant of life, conferring on it meaning and value. "Art is the will to overcome Becoming; it is a process of eternalising." "The primitive force of Art" is, for Nietzsche, "the tyranny of inner riches." The essential feature of Art, for him, is its power to perfect, even to deify, existence. But it is man alone who has endowed the world with beauty. Suffering and cruelty are, for Nietzsche, essential to Art, without which beauty could not be perfected or completed.

But the complete saturation just spoken of does not keep reflection from having its own perfect work to do in giving such art its exceeding great value for us. It is philosophy that yields the import of art, revealing beauty as the sunlight of truth, even in forms that transcend the visibly real. We cannot agree with Bergson, who confounds the standpoint of the philosopher with that of the artist: it is his error that one must *be* a thing, in order to know it: philosophy, in its universality, seeks the *philosophy* of Art, not to be confounded with art itself. In the realm of ends, Art seeks to set the manifold of feeling in harmonious relation to the unity of consciousness in a form both individualised and concrete. That which foredated art's protean forms, that which was first to the great artist, was not any combination of form and colour, but the spiritual idea—the ideal conception or construction—and these divine ideas or spiritual conceptions are the last and highest gift which the study of art brings to us. The artist of genius communes directly with the spiritual—with the soul of things, whence the *rappor*t between the religious sense and the artistic sense may be held to be due to the fact that, in a sense, they proceed from one and the same movement of mind. Therefore do we find Schiller, whose

definition of beauty was freedom-in-the-appearance, saying, in his 'Philosophical Letters' (No. IX.), that the true artist "will take his material, indeed, from the present, but borrow his form from a nobler time, nay, from beyond all time, from the absolute, unchangeable unity of his being. Here, from the pure ether of his divine nature, runs down the fountain of beauty, undefiled by the corruption of races and times, which fret far beneath him in troubled whirlpools." In the æstheticism, however, of Rossetti, Burne-Jones, and Wm. Morris, we have a return to pure sensuousness, by way of the mediæval past, and under the dominating Romantic ideal of artificial beauty.

Taine, in treating of the philosophy of Art, made its end consist in the manifestation of some salient character, or important and essential idea, beyond what is attainable from real objects. Art employs for this end a group or *ensemble* of connected parts, whose relationships she systematically modifies. "The whole of Art lies in two words, *concentration in manifestation*." Superior art, in Taine's view, is that wherein character of the greatest possible worth or force in nature receives from Art all possible increase in value. Taine's æsthetic is not free of arbitrary and irrelevant elements, and his threefold scale of values is not, I think, capable of being sustained in whole, its chief worth residing in the third scale, with its suggestion of perfect art-work as the completely successful expression of an impression. Ruskin teaches in the most emphatic manner that the greatest Art is just that which conveys the greatest number of the greatest ideas, and that nothing can here atone for the want of truth. This insistence has its force and value, but when Ruskin says "Art is nothing but a noble and expressive language, invaluable as the vehicle of thought, but in itself nothing," he appears to me to give a too purely intellectual cast to his mode of conceiving and expressing the matter. To Ruskin, truth and loveliness rest on underlying principles, and the principles are none other than those which are found at the root of virtue and noble character. Frankly, I do not like Ruskin's quantitative

standard as to the number of ideas: art is surely a qualitative thing, and the depth of the ideas counts far more than any quantitative enumeration of them. It is a poor claim to make for Art that it shall "produce something which shall look as like Nature as possible," as if the beauty of Nature had no dependence on Art. But the idealistic lack of Constable, earlier, found nothing too ugly for Art to copy. But Ruskin's real concern was with the philosophy of Art, or, more strictly, its ethics; and its moral idealism was what he really pursued, while he fancied himself an art critic, much more than he really was. Hence his view of Art was apt to be sentimental, and at times even shallow, one might almost say. Alike in religion and in art, appeal is to immediacy of feeling, not to abstract conceptions. The ideality of the æsthetic feeling was finely brought out by Schiller, and has, in fact, since his time been the customary expression of the effect of Art. And yet, Schiller too far followed Rousseau's type of feeling for the Romantic. 'Tis this ideal feeling which Art, as representation of life, liberates in us in opposition to the real or actual feeling of life itself. *Einfühlung*, as the Germans have it, is the proper psychological expression for those feelings which, in art study, we ascribe to another or project into him: it is sympathy, the sympathetic identification of one's self with the inner life of the objects presented. Such is the theory developed by Lipps in his psychological æsthetics, and held also by Volkelt; anticipated they both were by Herder. The term or theory is, however, still too vague, and not distinctively æsthetic to a sufficient degree. It is thus very obvious how far short pure imitation or realistic reproduction falls of the ideality of true art, for "the painter, in order to imitate, transforms." It falls short of the imaginative or creative possibilities of art, and both the imitative, and the imaginative or constructive, aspects belong to the essential unity of Art. We must pass, from mere sensation or emotion, under the refining influence of reflection, to always more highly purified ideals of beauty—a refining process that must not, however, get divorced from life.

'Tis as true of all Art, as Aristotle said it was true of all Poetry, that it is more significant and universal than any copy of matter of fact can be. In Art, of course, where the feeling or passions, in the play of imagination, are not acted out, there is need to guard against possible enervation of the will. But the purification of passion by Art has long ago been taken to prepare the way for virtue. An æsthetic founded on feeling would be foredoomed to failure, as a like ethic also would. Bain was a conspicuous example of such æsthetic failure.

I have been saying that the spiritual life is creative of the highest art, with its ideal beauty, freedom, unity, and power. And it is, no doubt, true in a sense that art is but the shadow of man. Art peoples for us the realm of the ideal with living forms. Art cannot create life, nor can it represent its perpetual development. But it can seize its living moments, and hold them fast. Things beautiful exist, for our Idealism, only as being experienced. Internal psychological process there must first be, then outward projection in virtue of combined psychological and physiological activities; this exteriorization or elaboration is the natural outcome of the psychic-spiritual life; such trained experience in the artistic subject is presupposed in all Art. Without it, Art would not be Art. Taine, treating of the philosophy of art, pointed out the need of *original sensation* to the artist, and showed how the faculty of quick and delicate perceptions takes him to the very heart of things, and makes him more clear-sighted than other men. But, of psychic conditions, I emphasise the value of idea or spiritual content in all great Art. Not the whole of the case is it to say that spiritual life is creative of art: it must be added, as Ruskin would insist, that the revelations of the spiritual world—the world of spiritual beauty—are given to us precisely through the forms and life of the natural world. For art is no lawless thing, but rather, as was once said, the faculty of making imagination productive, according to law. But that does not mean Art is not to reflect or bestow beauty on reality, to give to it

as well as take. If we take, as significant, the saying of Keats that—

“Beauty is truth, truth beauty,”

it is not that truth and beauty are identical in this rough world; we must remember that the beauty stands for something which is ideal, as Keats himself said that he had loved the *principle* of beauty in all things, while the truth is representative of real life, dark or bright. Truth is always demanded in the Idealism of Art. The truth is held in an ideal self, and hence it is idealistically true to say, with Angelo, that a great artist paints with his brain, not with his hands—so much does the result depend on his creative intuition. Besides which, there must be no undue or set subordination of art—the expression of truth in sensuous form—to interests of morality, in which connection Ruskin was apt to fail of doing justice to beauty. Enough surely to say that beauty is immeasurably deepened by the presence of ethical spirit. Art may still be allowed to have worth in itself, form and matter being here inseparable. The harmony of matter and form is what constitutes the æsthetic value, and this value is based on the living, intuitive, concrete mode, in which the spiritual content has been embodied or represented. Such æsthetic worth or value is, as such, not an object of thought. But this is not to say that Art is to be independent of every other human activity, whether morality, or philosophy, or human experience in general. For beauty is, as Stendhal remarked, “a promise of happiness.” Art must do something to increase the beauty and cultural happiness of life and prove conducive to moral and social progress, Oscar Wilde’s aphorism to the contrary notwithstanding. That is precisely what a criterion of taste hopes for. The didactic theory of Art is often the result of moral extremes, and its shortcomings lie in the fact that it is rather a deduction of what Art should be, than an analysis of facts as they are. Early Christian Art was, however, quite naturally didactic. Looked at in its historical developments, Art was, when at its highest, of too disinterested

a character to be either distinctively moral, or intentionally didactic, or specifically hedonistic, pleasurable or even rapturous as such Art may have been. Disinterested as Art may have thus become, it has yet not ceased to be, in some sort, purposive in form. It is still a teleological determination of Nature. The "interior bond" which "unites art and religion," according to Schelling, may, perhaps, be said to be now so far recognized as to make scientific knowledge of art, if not more needful to a truly religious mind, at least more consonant with it. Beauty is finding equal place with goodness and with truth, for no great Art can live without them. Goodness, indeed, was, in Joubert's view, the beginning of beauty. I have seen it repeatedly asserted, in very recent times, that Theism was no more favourable to Art than pantheism or materialism. I have only room for a remark or two on the subject. This view appears to me no deep reading either of the History of Art or of the character of Theism. It does not appear to me, for example, that the theistic conception of a Supreme and Living Will, that endures "when all that seems shall suffer shock," could be anything but favourable to such a mighty manifestation of will as Gothic Art in its best representations. I grant the repressive character of Christian ideal on the development of voluptuous forms of beauty, but those writers who, in the name of Art idealism, press this objection so far, seem to me to fall from their own idealistic heights, and end in pure naturalism. Never but for Christianly theistic conception would Art, from the seventh century, have performed the feat of unexampled daring in representing the Crucifixion—the God upon a cross—undreamed symbol, as I account it, of the union of strength and beauty, in a spiritual sense. Nor would the transcendental God-idea have been represented, later, in the Sistine Madonna—in the God in the arms of a human mother—child-symbol, as in the former case we had man-symbol, of the Infinite. Theism has been perfectly unique among philosophies in jealously guarding or fostering human individuality, and it is out of superb artistic individuality that great Art is born. So much I say by way of personal view, as against pantheism,

materialism is too much of an overcome standpoint to be worth discussion. Art is, to our late thought, "the path of the Creator to his work," as Emerson put the matter. If we take the æsthetic synthesis, whose offspring is beauty, to be in origin theistic, it is not meant, in our idealism, that the synthesis is not objectively conditioned. This already points the way to that "mystical supplement" to the theory of beauty, which Mr A. J. Balfour has desired, and of which more will presently be said. Hence the truth of what Athenagoras anciently expressed, that beauty on earth is not self-made, but sent hither by the hand and will of God.

Artistic discipline is a very distinct, positive, and necessary thing, for the beauties of nature are not revealed to us unsought. Hence Sully Prudhomme declared Art to be, by its very nature, aristocratic—a principle of superior intelligence, raised beyond the possibility of ever becoming common. For all that, an Israël or a Millet may suffuse the common with poetry and power. Art, as social, may teach and elevate, not merely amuse, bewilder, and fascinate; but it does this by no form of continual restraint, effecting its end rather by its own peculiar discipline in the most natural and gracious of ways. Art is, in its appeal, universal. But the appreciative point of view, and the need for artistic education, are rightly urged by Souriau. Art judgments, even where the art is national, tend to become universal—no doubt, from the universality of artistic practice. From being universal, such art-judgments easily come to be taken or felt as necessary. Beauty, it is true, is not a thing to be decided by any and every sort of referendum, but neither is it a thing to be left to pure subjectivity, even of a Croce. Beauty is not "given" in Nature in any visible, compelling sense; but it is absolutely there, when confronted by "the intuitive absoluteness of the imagination," that wakes it into life and energy. The idealism of Art is seen in our awareness of the shaping impulse, and in the appeal of the æsthetic product to us as a unity. Tolstoï makes much of art as means of communion among men united by like sentiments. The advocacy of what is simple and universal in art, forms what is valuable in the insistences

of Tolstōi in art, amid much that was mistaken. Unlike Kant, beauty was not the subject-matter of Art for him, in his absurd Rousseauism, which subordinated beauty to expression. The elevating power of art is greatest just when it is most simple and grand. For all that, the spiritual synthesis, of which beauty is the resultant, is a more active and selective process of construction than is generally supposed. It may be, as was said by Goethe, that art is called art simply because it is not nature ; but that does not keep it from being a most natural activity. Art, however, is never to be confused with craftsmanship or technique, nor is its beauty to be fenced within æsthetic formalism. Art has ever in view—no matter how unconsciously—the steep of moral ascent. The divinations of great art seem to come forth under the unconscious sway of the highest ethical spirit. The necessity for some special cultivation, in order to art appreciation, lies in the fact already insisted upon, that the artist has ideal thoughts which his keener sensibility and deeper insight would lay open to other men. Art, said Browning, “may tell a truth obliquely,” and true art will always be suggestive—indeed, infinitely so. Hence the æsthetical theories of the Italian philosopher, Croce, lay stress on the spirit of the artist as that which gives to his art-work its value. An Italian critic remarks that, in his system, there is a *cliché* of form, and one of content. Croce regards æsthetics as a special philosophical discipline: language is, in his view, the primary spiritual expression, under which all forms of expression can be comprehended: æsthetics means, for Croce, the science of expression and of universal linguistics, in his own sense. Art is, to him, concerned with the possible, and the intuition is the thing of primary importance, on which the concept depends. Croce’s philosophy of the spirit finds freedom in ethical conditions, not merely in those which are economic. Beauty is, for him, the child of spiritual synthesis; but that we cannot allow to blind our idealism into thinking externalisation, of some sort, to be unnecessary. Such externalisation we regard as the necessary presupposition and the exterior complement of the spiritual synthesis. Holding, then, the theory of art, fundamentally conceived, to be pure intuition, Croce maintains

this simplicity of art to be its strength. Expression is the actuality of the intuition. His mode of slumping the artistic and the non-artistic is unsatisfactory. The pure intuition is concerned only with states of mind. All expression, in this ill-defined theory, is art, when unsuccessful expression, even, takes æsthetic form. J. Volkelt takes æsthetic values to be closely connected with metaphysics; indeed, the metaphysic of æsthetics is, to him, an essential part of æsthetic itself. But even Jonas Cohn, who keeps his theory free of metaphysic, allows — more satisfactorily than H. Cohen—a self-value, an intensive value to æsthetics. The beautiful, the sublime, the tragic, the comic, have æsthetic worth for Cohn.

Our own position is, then, that the free creative spirit—and it is the spirit that is here our philosophical concern—is the very soul of the artist's work, motivated as that is by the sense of æsthetic beauty. His distinctive work is that of creation: he adds some new reality to the universe, and makes it richer. The higher movement is instinctive, and there is no absurd compelling of art for morality's sake. There is, so to speak, a background of moral consciousness which, while leaving Art free, insures that the good shall not be sacrificed to beauty. Ideal art never is, but always is to be, and æsthetic satisfaction is so framed as at once to reflect and to minister towards the developmental whole of personality. There is, indeed, no ideal world but that which is built up through personality; there is no personality but has, for its function, to be sharer, according to capacity, of the creativeness of the ideal; and there is no personality but has the possibility to enrich the world with beauty unforeseen. This complete development of the free conscious life, as the ideal end of Art, has been very well brought out in recent years by Souriau and some other French writers on æsthetics. The aim or purpose of Art is to attain the insight, so necessary, of the harmony of nature and spirit, of the thinking and the sensuous consciousness. But if, in æsthetics, we are concerned with the real sense-world, that involves, in some sort, an ontological striving. We may surely say that it is the right and the duty of artistic genius to be true, not only to Nature, but

to itself—to its own nature—and, in this double faithfulness, to bring forth and to justify types of art that may be true and universal. Hence we see, for example, that the development in Russian Art has been, from depicting the deeds of the great, to representing the sadness of the oppressed. But if there is to be æsthetic pleasure, we must then, in general, require such objective conditions as natural perfection, a certain largeness or amplitude, and a due sense of proportion. Even Kant blindly failed to recognise such objective factors, which Aquinas so long before him, did not. We cannot agree with the æsthetic of Guyau, when, in his psychological analysis, he resolves the individual into a purely socialized form. The individual consciousness is, for him, already social, and for him the *I* might as well be *We*. Now, it is surely the office of the highest art to raise the individual above all that pertains to mere particularity, to raise him to the universal, but it would be a fatuous mistake to blur and efface all the lineaments of individuality, and leave us with nothing but a vague, unsifted, undefined sociability. For there is still a sense in which individuality is the keystone of all true Art, not to be dissolved into the flux of vague social forces. This, in spite of the disinterestedness of its character, and because of the fact that, in Art, the principles of freedom and of order must be reconciled. Guyau is, no doubt, right so far as he takes Art to be a personifying or vivifying of what else were not. It may even introduce higher types of psychic life. But some centre of reference, or standard of value, must be retained, and, for that reason, the self, in some sort, must be preserved from sociological elimination. It has a central value for Theistic Idealism, to which Art is a revelation of the Absolute in the spirit of man.

Deeper than our human personality we, in our judgments of beauty, cannot get; and it is to be freely admitted that, just because this is a subjective criterion, and a very relative standard, the objectivity of beauty waits for, and depends upon, the universality of human appreciation. For the problem of æsthetics is one of value, and it seems not only desirable but imperative—for there would be no values if ap-

preciation remained individual and subjective—to broaden out the individual values into this impersonal and objective form. Measure as man may be of all values, his valuations may yet be true or false. That depends on the way these express the immanent laws of value. This does not keep a community of values from being presupposed in æsthetic culture, quantitative as they are apt to be. But there are Continental writers who would make æsthetic values solely technical, though they cannot define what this means, in any satisfactory manner. These values are, however, generally taken in broader, more general sense, and those art-critics are doubtless right who would concentrate attention on the product, not the process of production. The development of æsthetic perception is often tardy enough, and the universal acclaim of what is beautiful is accordingly delayed. But objective, unchangeable laws of the beautiful there must be, else such universal acclaim were not possible. There is truth in what Balfour has said, that even “in those periods when the movement of Art is most striking, it is dangerous to assume that movement implies progress, if by progress be meant increase in the power to excite æsthetic emotion.” That emotion can be excited only as the imagination of the art beholder is active upon the synthesis of manifold elements under some unifying idea. It is dangerous also to give way to the one-sided stress often laid by modern æstheticism on the purely subjective aspects of art or beauty as a psychological phenomenon. At least we must remember that philosophy has the independent problem of value to deal with, while a pure psychology of Art only collects, describes, and explains facts, so far as it may. Æsthetic values are too richly and widely variant to admit of illustration here. We may agree with Croce and others—Kant and Hegel among them—that beauty is no psychic fact, belongs not to things, but rather to man’s spiritual energy or activity, but we cannot, for all that, hold to that position in any sense which would render the objectivity of beauty or art a thing of no account—or without real place. Art means concrete expression, and the positive value of its beauty is bound up with the reality value of the objects.

There must be qualities or properties metaphysically or ontologically present in things which render art or beauty objectively existent to our æsthetic perceptions; æsthetical ideals must have their Ground; but this objectivity of beauty or art is not, for our Idealism, to be conceived in any absolute way, but as relative to a perceiving subject. Even so redoubtable a realist as Prof. S. Alexander admits, in his valuable British Academy Paper on "the basis of Realism," that, in the case of the æsthetic object, there are "qualities which are imputed to it by the mind and are *not* in itself." This is true, though art be immortal, and its quality unchangeable. For we cannot find satisfaction in any theory of that mediate thing of Hartmann and Groos, called semblance or æsthetic appearance, for we do not love self-conscious illusions. No more can we rest in any modern tendency to take feeling as the basal æsthetic category, without also, like Kant, taking account of the intellectual elements, or atmosphere, or factors, involved in our æsthetic judgments, even if pleasure be taken as the end of art. There is need of "artistic reason" in Art, which latter has its place between pure intellectuality and mere emotionality. Æsthetics must rest on universal and necessary truths of reason. Entirely to banish Reason, as "outside the art of the vision," seems to me distinctly unwarranted and extreme, as I cannot admit any province of life or feeling to be so cut off from reason—or, irrational. Art knows while it creates, and—we may as well say it—there is no knowing and Creating here, more than anywhere else, but by the grace of God. A significant fact for Theistic Idealism is that the full idea of Beauty plays its part in disclosing the idea of God. Such æsthetical pleasure as Art carries may be "the subjective concomitant of the normal amount of activity" in us, but the essence of beauty or art is not thereby defined for us, or left in anything but what is vague, if not unsweet. There will still be the call, sounded in Pater's romantic æstheticism, to moderation and severe self-discipline, with which latter, moderation, as here meant, is not incompatible. There will still be need and scope for synthetic imagination in order to the constituting of a community of life and sympathy between the

object and the percipient mind in art study, for the æsthetic Ideal is never fully attained, any more than is any other ideal. To all artistic instinct, the Ideal of Art must, in the end, be an unattained ideal, in the spirit of Dante's words:—

“Ma or convien, che il mio seguir desista
Più dietro a sua bellezza poetando,
Come all' ultimo suo ciascuno artista.”

(Paradiso, XXX. 31-33).

But the true synthetic result is not reached in the recent one-sided and overweighted claims for æstheticism put forward by J. M. Baldwin, to the neglect of theoretic modes of experience. There is not a little absurdity in holding a thing good and true *because* it is beautiful. Beauty has truth or reason behind it: by the reason it is known. Æsthetic experience can have fuller justice without Baldwin's excessive claims. But it must be said that we can lend no countenance to his conclusion for the philosophic ultimacy of the æsthetic experience, or to any philosophic tendencies that would exalt æsthetic values above values that are religious and ethical. We have seen how little the freedom of Art requires such a thing. Art-activity is purposive without need of determinate end, in the unconscious and harmonious working of understanding and imagination. It is enough that its freedom is vested in a moral subject. Nor is there any need to merge religion in æsthetics, as was done by Fries, since that would be to fail to realise the distinctive character of the religious consciousness. We have said enough to shew how little alien these two are, but they are by no means identical. Religion seeks truth and redemption, not beautiful forms merely; but Art, as religious, conducts to the divine, and reaches the highest point of its perfection. Intuitive perception or beholding we have seen to be a sort of heirloom of art philosophers, from Plato to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Æsthetic feeling or appreciation we have, moreover, seen to exist in fashion that is not devoid of intellectual spirit or elements; and such æsthetic feeling or appreciation has been shown implicitly to involve the world's being a system of objective values, based, as such, upon an ultimate and theistic World-Ground.

CHAPTER IX.

FREEDOM IN THEISTIC IDEALISM.

THE problem of Freedom is of palmary importance for Theistic Idealism, for its emphasis on personality or the subject makes questions like efficiency and spontaneity or individual activity matters of vital moment. It was a saying of Dr Johnson, as happy as true, that all theory is against the freedom of the will, and all experience is in its favour. The lines of sheer determinism, or of pure indeterminism, are perhaps better to be avoided, for both sides of the antithesis were only too easily susceptible of some misunderstanding as to the terms employed in the discussion. When Determinism has done its work, however, and shewn, in its logical way, that an undetermined action is not to be thought of, Reason will still come along, and point out that Freewill has been latently present in the process. For, if all action and thought are predetermined, so that no room remains for choice or alternative, then is Reason reduced to the category of the meaningless. Hence indeterminism has lived, from Epicurus even, on to Berkeley and Lotze and James. It is difficult to conceive any man of theistic grasp, really doubting the reality of our freedom: after all that has been written on the subject—and no subject is less worn out, says James—the appeal is still to experience. Philosophical determinists have shewn a curious incapacity to appreciate the fact that their tenet has never had the slightest appreciable influence on practical affairs, in which freewill still, as always, holds the

field. If the testimony of our deepest conscious experience is not to be taken, that, when, before the assault of temptation—be it to vileness or only to vanity—we fail, we feel and know that we could, and ought to, have triumphed—I say, if this appeal to the testimony of our deepest conscious experience is not to be taken as valid, we may as well abandon philosophy as an altogether illusive quest. Hence I reject the arguments of Spinoza and others, as to our consciousness of freedom being illusory, as quite untenable. Even the philosopher who persuades himself that he has got rid of freewill as a superannuated belief, is in the position of retaining, and habitually acting on, the feeling of freedom, as part of his organic outfit. The feeling has obviously a teleological significance: we are made for freedom. “If God be for us”—the postulation of theistic idealism—“who can be against us,” or our all-conquering freedom of will? This possibility of the triumph of liberty and the good is banished from a deterministic world, which carries in it irremediable defect, or represents the world as organically suffering from an incurable infection. But, even on lower ground than the postulation just made, the claim of freedom is bound up with the substantial reality of spirit. Hence I hold, with Ladd as against Höffding, that psychology has no right to a deterministic assumptiveness, wherein the causal law holds good in the life of the will: the facts of consciousness—among them freedom—have to be accepted, explained if possible, but at any rate not sophisticated nor asphyxiated: no recognition of the continuity of our personal life can be of such a character as to override, or exclude, the psychologic fact of our conscious spontaneity. For the psychic continuity of life does not properly mean an identity of character or action such that no more free and transcendent results shall spring forth in unforeseen or unexpected ways, out of the deeps of personality, than the past has witnessed. Every act of my will, as ultimate determinant, initiates a new series of events.

Theistic Idealism concentrates attention on the self or

subject—as free—rather than even on what we call the will or the character; for the reality of the self or subject is here its primary datum. It has the best psychology of the time on its side, in treating the philosophic attempts of certain philosophers to resolve the self into a bundle of perceptions or a stream of sensations, as utterly discredited doctrines. The self or subject is marked by freedom—the activity of self-determination. Theistic idealism knows for the self no necessity—no determination from without, or by a not-self. In the self-affirmation of the subject as existent ego, under the active working of reason and the free energy of will, it finds the fact of Freedom. For there will always be, in human action, an incalculable element, so that such action never can be brought under any determinate laws drawn from analysis of the past. Granted that, from the psychological point of view, dispositions or tendencies grow more defined, it is yet to be maintained that, in the sphere of moral personality, an incalculable element, however many the motives present, exists in our future adjustments to experience. Circumstances and events, that may enter as elements into my individual experience, depend, in every case, upon me as a self-conscious subject, for any power they may carry as determinants of action. My character, as internally determining my conduct, cannot be fundamentally marked off from external determinants, since that character is itself always being shaped by external forces. My will is no link in the chain of empirical causation; my powers of self-direction are to be referred to the self; and the self gives, by its causal influence, their peculiar cast or colour to circumstances and to character. I am the master of my fate: I am the captain of my soul. The reality of the ego is not exhausted in mere knowledge, for it assumes a central position in the world, and claims a certain power of self-creation. The ego remains, in spite of every relativity, the centre of the real, the world in its totality converging towards it. That, I mean, is the view which the ego takes of itself, confronted with the non-ego. There is no more ultimate fact, in our interior experiences, than the freedom and spontaneity of this ego: its

spontaneity means freedom from natural or mechanical law. Spontaneity is not denied in our time even to nature processes—as witness the observed facts of comparative anatomy and embryology—and still less can it be denied to the human ego. Varisco treats interestingly of spontaneity, which he yet regards as due to intrinsic necessity. “Though produced by necessity,” he says, “spontaneity does not cease to be true spontaneity.” To him a subject is a monad, and the monads are centres of spontaneity, whose unity of consciousness “includes potentially the infinite variety of content implicit in Being.” Elsewhere Varisco plainly declares that “spontaneity is the condition or fundamental constituent of the reality of subjects,” and that knowledge is “a product of the spontaneity of the subject who knows” (*The Great Problems*, Eng. edn., pp. 218-19, 235-42). What a contrast, in advance of view, from the days in which Huxley wrote of the mechanical conception of the universe at the dead level of matter in motion, and conceived the progress of science to consist in “the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity.” I shall take some of the less philosophical arguments first.

Neither the theory of the Divine foreknowledge nor the theory of predestination, interferes in the least with genuine freedom, as has often been supposed. Not the former, for the Divine foreknowledge as to how I shall act or choose impugns not my freedom in the very least. It can only appear strange that Dr Martineau admitted a self-limitation of God’s prescience, and somewhat surprising that a thinker like Royce should have made a preposterous denial of the possibility of such Divine foreknowledge. There is no need to confound contingency with uncertainty. To foreknow is, as Aquinas pointed out, not to pre-determine. Weisse held God’s foreknowledge to involve glaring Determinism, and Rothe did the same but in a different and, it must be said, not very logical manner. Both of them, together with Martensen, opined that foreknowledge could only be of the necessary. But their objections are really

groundless, and based on the misconception that such foreknowledge carries with it causal efficiency and will-determination. Reid, however, saw that no such causal relation is involved. Origen, too, much earlier, had a better perception when he declared that God's foreknowledge was not the cause of things future, but their being future was the cause of His foreknowledge. We must here banish all theological treatments, and view the question in strictly philosophical manner, that is, from the standpoint of pure reason, when the issue becomes no longer doubtful. This does not keep us, however, from considering theological distinctions upon the subject, and disposing of them from reason's standpoint. There could be no more unwarranted assumption than that God's foreknowledge could, simply as knowledge, abridge or annul my freedom as an agent. Not any more than if it were "a kind of reversed memory." We have no right to harbour any theory of the will which precludes the logical possibility of such foreknowledge. Such Divine foresight need not influence us any more than vision does an object. The relation of God to us is not worthily conceived after such a merely external and imaginative fashion, wherein anthropomorphic elements are so apt to enter into thought. Such foreknowledge clearly carries no predestinarian character, foreknowledge being prior to, and distinct from, foreordination, as we shall see. Lotze has well said that it cannot be meant "that the images of different worlds were present to and known by God as being *in themselves* possible or impossible in the same way as many combinations of our ideas"; and that "for God there was no reality *within which* He had to realise His Creation, nor laws which, prior to Him, *of themselves* determined what was possible and what was impossible" ('Mikrokosmos,' Eng. edn., vol. ii. p. 705). No, the world can only be regarded as theistically dependent upon God, and fashioned by principles which are eternal in Him as the Absolute Reason. It is thus that, in harmony with this dependence, freedom of will is yet essential to our constitution as rational and moral beings. But it has always been difficult to get

dependence and liberty properly reconciled, as we see right onwards from the unhappy attempt at their reconciliation made by Descartes. But when it is still said that freedom of the will is incompatible with "an omnipotent, omniscient, and well-disposed God," we can only note the defective grasp of ethical theism on the part of modern thinkers who so speak: the position is one to be overpassed, not refuted.

Not the latter, I have said, for Predestination impugns not the fact of Freedom. Much of our modern thinking fails to perceive that predestination is a category of fundamental significance for religious thought. No category certainly could go deeper, for it reaches down to the supremacy of the Infinite Will in relation to the universe of finite wills, and it lays stress on will as, in one sense, the core of reality. But as to freewill the fact is not without significance that the Greek Fathers, the Early Apologists, and the Alexandrian theologians, claimed autonomy for the human soul, the last-named thinkers laying the greatest stress on Freewill. But, not to speak of Augustine, we find a rigorous predestination held by Thomas Bradwardine and John Wyclif prior to the Reformation. In the Middle Ages, Anselm, Peter Lombard, and Aquinas followed the views of Augustine only to a limited extent, the last-named thinker saying that Predestination takes effect not as from necessity, but under the working of contingency. But Paulsen was wrong in making freewill only a whim of Scholastic metaphysics. The doctrine, no doubt, in its older forms of presentation, was often marked by historic inconsistencies, and fatal illogicalities, and the human elements or factors, as seen in natural capacity, disposition, and development, in the co-operation under grace, were often neglected or obscured. Calvin did but carry the theory of Augustine to its logical and necessary conclusion; but his doctrine of predestination was at least not absolute, being mediated by Christ and conditioned by faith. He sharply distinguished between the prescience of God and predestination, in which latter he strongly asserted predetermination for man.

It may be observed that Zwingli was, even before Calvin's positions were taken, of consistent philosophical determinism in his tendencies or leanings; this was a feature of his large speculative views. Not from their conception of God did the predestination of Luther and Melanchthon spring, but rather from the doctrines they held as to sin and grace. Less disposed than Luther was Melanchthon, "the teacher of Germany," to press the doctrine of absolute predestination. Melanchthon, indeed, in his synergistic tendencies, laid such growing stress on human freedom, that he at last repudiated the doctrine of absolute predestination. Arminian view admitted the foreknowledge of God, but denied foreordination, and, of course, foreknowledge in God, purely as knowledge, should not be held to carry causal agency or efficiency with it. It does not impose an ostrich policy on the Divine Being in relation to the world, but that is not to say that it gives a satisfactory account of the Divine activity in relation to human activity. In this connection one may recall what the late Prof. Sidgwick said of the Divine knowledge in relation to time,—“I follow these theologians in conceiving the past and the future as simultaneously present in knowledge to the Divine Mind; but I am forced to conceive this presence of all the known to the Infinite Knower as perpetual, if I would avoid conceiving it at a point of time” [*Mind*, 1894, p. 446]. In laying his great stress on God's unconditioned Will, Calvin had feeble recourse to saying that God is law to Himself, whereas, to our theistic idealism, God is eternal reason no less than supreme will, and both of these in the one indivisible and absolute Personality. Theistic idealism discards an abstract predestinationism for free, living, ethical relations between God and the world, the freedom of man preserved inviolate in these relations. It recognises that the spontaneity is a spontaneity of response, a significant fact that was too often overlooked in the freewill controversy. It is well content to leave the metaphysical doctrine of unconditional decree in the background, and to rest in the thought of a purely ethical sovereignty of God. In its view, the great need of our time is to seek views of Freedom that

are real, and not merely formal. Neither thought nor life to-day has the least contentedness to remain with the unreality of Kant's formal treatment of the subject, wherein we are to act merely as though we were free. Of the formal type, it seems to me, are the conceptions of freedom put forward by Dr Bosanquet. One readily agrees with him that thought is an element—and an important one—in every form of finite experience, freedom included. Not only so, but one may freely grant that, in a pre-eminent sense, freedom means freedom of thought—not only the power to think, but the desire so to think as to reach the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Such freedom of thought must rest upon an idealistic basis of some sort, naturalism being the victim of self-deception in this connection. But Dr Bosanquet's system of thought is far too intellectualised, and marked by characteristic shortcoming in the direction of inappreciation of ethical elements or values, when we come to practical freedom. Hegel says, in his *History of Philosophy*, that "he who talks of freedom, and excludes thought, knows not what he says." But does any noticeable thinker do so to-day? It is quite another thing, however, to make "freedom" and "thought" interchangeable terms, and to speak "the identity of the two conceptions," as Dr Bosanquet does. "Thought" may be free enough to pass beyond itself to "ideality, adjustment, or the universal," but there is an astounding lack of ethical depth in claiming, for the free movement of mere thought, freedom in the deep, ethical, and real sense. Such a mode of treating freedom may do very well for a "logical" scheme, but it is utterly discredited in the school of volitional experience. Ethical truth is that which frees us: it both declares and demonstrates our freedom. Cognition is, of course, a conation, but the disastrous effects of following a mere "logical universal" are seen in the way Dr Bosanquet attempts to resolve the life of feeling and of free action into mere thought. Such a treatment of freedom may do well enough for sheltered lives, with "arbitrary refuges or timid withdrawals from the movement of the world"—though I should dispute its efficiency even for

these—but it is a thoroughly inefficient theory of freedom for general experience, in which it would utterly snap and prove worthless before the temptations, remorse, tribulations, and crises, of life. In this way Dr Bosanquet appears to me to be the victim of what he calls “the evasiveness which shrinks from all” really “concrete [synthesis]”: in the man of his “logical” system, there emerges no blind impulse to be checked, no oscillation between conflicting motives; he appears as though his will acted *in vacuo*, and he were swiftly determined by the bare “logical” necessities of thought. Besides its untruthfulness to life or experience, the theory carries in it much conspicuously faulty psychology. But this should perhaps cause no surprise, in view of Hegel’s own sublime disregard of psychological considerations. Dr Bosanquet says that “freedom is the logic of individuality, and as remote as possible from contingency.” The first half of the sentence is true and accepted, the second member is demonstrably false. It would be true if the cosmos of experience were a perfectly articulated system, with every element as necessary, as it is in Dr Bosanquet’s merely “logical” system. Not even Hegel denied an element of contingency in nature, though to him it might be only evanescent. Leibniz held that the contingent may have a rational source, that all contingent truths had a final sufficient reason outside the serial detail of contingencies. In view of Lotze, Lachelier, Renouvier, Boutroux, Bergson, and Ward, having dealt with the aspect of contingency, I exempt myself from much attempt at further elaboration. I remark, however, that contingency is not to be excluded from science, nor from history. It is perhaps to French philosophic thought that Theistic Idealism stands most indebted for the “philosophy of contingency,” in its maintenance of Freedom. It was the merit of Maine de Biran already to have regarded the self, in his psychological suggestiveness, as a free first cause, so making freedom a fact of fundamental importance. Cousin held the ego free in its inmost essence, and put spontaneity above reflection. Ravaisson held the infinite and the absolute, presented by nature only in im-

perfect fashion, to consist in spiritual liberty, and he viewed liberty as the ultimate foundation of things. Lachelier's refined idealism held that final causes substituted force for inertia, and liberty for fatalism. The free activity of will was held by Renouvier, who, however, opined that neither freedom nor necessity was logically demonstrable. He took freedom to be a necessity even to the determinist in his choice of necessity. The balance of probability, in his view, inclined to liberty, in which certainty was grounded. He held contingency compatible with the nature-order, and found room for both liberty and contingency in the world of phenomena. His indeterminism was stoutly opposed by Fouillée, who made a determining causal factor of the force of the idea, and anticipated the action psychology in France. Of great interest and importance for Theistic Idealism is the treatment of contingency by Boutroux, whether his scheme of thought can be approved in its entirety or not. His doctrine of contingency is founded on the opposition of "determinism" and "necessity." Deduction is implied in necessity: necessity is not the equivalent of determination. To our minds, he thinks, an absolutely rigorous necessity is something inconceivable. Experimental laws cannot be reduced to the same sort of abstract logical formulation as necessary laws. In his view, the laws of science do not wear the absolutely necessitated character put forward at times for them. Leibniz had, of course, already held truths of reasoning to be necessary, and those of fact to be contingent. But Boutroux denies necessity, and maintains the reality of contingency, in the interests of science and its free possibilities. Even if contingency cannot be held assured by the foregoing insistences, yet from the side of contingency as essentially involving free efficient activity in all grades of being, and of like sort with our own causal efficiency, Boutroux seeks to evolve, from all the grades of being, a principle which, in its highest form or manifestation, we call liberty. The degree of contingency allowed by the laws of phenomena grows always more apparent, until liberty at length appears in the human consciousness.

But he thinks being is not known down to its base or foundation by any of the sciences, for it is not known by them in its creative source, which is God. The necessity which exists along his line of argumentation is moral, not physical. The necessity involved is of a practical character, implying the activity exerted by God upon His creatures. The contingency doctrine of Boutroux seems to have lost a good deal of its speculative character, but remains valuable and suggestive, though its inherent difficulties are manifest. For my own part, I cannot agree with those who, admitting the self to be a real factor in the world, yet regard it as wholly continuous with it, for Theistic Idealism views the freedom of the self—or the self in its freedom—as, *ipso facto*, transcending the world. But I utterly reject the notion of chance, in admitting the element of contingency in freedom's choices, for the activity of will is rational, not blind. I take freedom to be grounded in the principle of personality, which I do not regard as subject to mere logical determination. It is absurd, because thoroughly false to life and experience, to ignore the possibility of discontinuity in men's ethical determinations. True, that is, achieved freedom, is reached as of rational necessity, for it is attained under the light and guidance of reason. But such reason is living and spiritual, not abstract, formal, empty. Theistic Idealism resolutely refuses to lend any countenance to those Neo-Hegelian theories wherein it is attempted to resolve the self, as free, into a product of conditions, social or other. It retains for man power on his own act and on the world, and will not suffer the self to be speciously explained away. So expert a psychologist as the late Prof. Sidgwick said, in spite of his leanings to determinism,—“I find it impossible not to think that I can now choose to do what I so conceive, however strong may be my inclination to act unreasonably, and however uniformly I may have yielded to such inclination in the past.” If Dr Bosanquet finds such experiences “as remote as possible from contingency,” no more need be said, except perhaps that there is more room for contingency in his system than he sees. Sidgwick's consistency,

however, cannot be accounted very great or thoroughgoing, when again he allows that there obtains "completeness of the causal dependence of any volition upon the state of things at the preceding instant, whether called character or circumstances, or brain and environing forces." This is even worse than the Neo-Hegelian denial of "real possibilities" of freedom, but it does not help Dr Bosanquet in his inability to understand contingency. Notwithstanding his oftentimes wise knowledge of life, he has no perception of the fact that it is precisely through such triumphant ethical choices that the real freedom of the self is achieved. Achieved it must be, for our capacity for freedom is not without a "difficulty of good"—*difficultas boni*, as Augustine termed it. It is precisely out of such ethical difficulties or stresses that strength, intensity, and power are born within the soul, as it makes for the largeness of freedom—a largeness that may be expressed in the poet's line—

"The soul of man is larger than the sky."

(Hartley Coleridge, "Sonnet on Shakespeare.")

Dr Bosanquet says that what "the ordinary advocate of freedom at bottom demands as 'the power to have acted otherwise,' is in the same breath to act and not to act, or, acting, yet not to act. It is to repudiate, not to accept, responsibility." I entirely fail to find the novelty in this attempt at criticism, with which Dr M'Taggart was pleased to credit it in 'Mind,' and am struck rather with its non-percipient character. Dr M'Taggart did not know the novelty was an express position of Jesuit theologians. Dr Bosanquet ought to have seen, surely, that it is not the "power," so much as the possibility, of acting otherwise, upwards or downwards, for which the freedom advocate contends; and this is just that element of contingency which Dr Bosanquet's merely "logical determination" is so helpless to explain against the logic of fact and life in any broad study of human nature and experience. It is the selective power of the will or the self that gives to one motive victory over another, to one choice preference over another. If the

choice is good, that is because the reason-directed will is good, siding with conscience as umpire.

Theistic Idealism can only regard it as a grave defect that some, theologians as well as philosophers, have assumed an attitude of indifference on the question of freedom. Certainly, the problem does not impose itself equally on all minds. But I hold that a lack of interest here is a lack of aggressiveness on the part of mind, and where there is no aggressiveness of intellect, there is not likely to be much philosophy. In justification of this attitude, it is surely enough to say that the question of freedom has a bearing on our doctrinal convictions, on our practical initiatives, indeed, on our whole life. Windelband has had the insight and the courage to affirm that the question is not one for the schools, but is a question of life. As such, I must regard it as the unescapable problem of human nature. Even in the speculative region, Fouillée was able to go so far as to say that it is not *a* problem, but *the* problem, of philosophy. It cannot be denied that the bearings of the principle of causality in this problem give it a central place of significance. There is a sense in which all our cosmological syntheses must be overshadowed by it. For all our judgments of value, whether of men or of things, will be affected by this question; their worth or relative importance, in the world's great unitary system, will be determined very differently, according as we hold to a theory of freedom, or to one of metaphysical determinism. When we are told, therefore, that "the unity of the world is incompatible with the freedom of the will," we can only flatly deny anything of the sort. The "unity of the world" is no such closed, static, necessary, and mechanical development of an impersonal world-essence as to preclude the human will, in its ethical freedom, from having power on its own act and on the world. The true "unity of the world" is not one which has shut out the ideal world, and made it impossible to free ourselves from the blind mechanism of nature: it is still the world of higher laws, wherein—

"Das Gesetz soll nur uns Freiheit geben."

This determines our attitude, therefore, towards such pronouncements as that of Schopenhauer, who was already in the modern fashion when he said that "all that happens is firmly linked together in the causal nexus, and occurs therefore with rigorous necessity. What is to happen in the future is obviously altogether positively, certainly, and exactly determined, and can no more be changed than what has occurred in the past." We have grown very familiar with these forms of necessitated psychical causation in recent times, even from the side of what calls itself Idealism. But what has become of all our vaunted progressive development, if it never brings to humankind newer forces, powers, and modes of action, "than what has occurred in the past"? If we are volitionally so passive and impotent, our guidance in action by rational ideal and insight, and our ethical responsibility, are the merest make-believe and pretence. It is in self-determination that our freedom finds explanation, and the self-determination is, in its turn, explained by the great fact of self-development, with its teeming possibilities. It cannot be too thoroughly realised how clear we are here of all physiological considerations, else we should have Münsterberg telling us that *there* every act, including the acts of free volition, is nothing but a reflex. This, of course, is not to deny the physiological conditions of that complex or many-sided phenomenon called consciousness, but without necessarily accepting all the results of Richet, Herten, and other investigators in regard to its genesis and nature. Not there, however, is to be sought the soul's free volitional activity, but in that specifically ethical sphere which lies within the domain of reason. It is scarcely worth while to fall back on the feats of Kant's intelligible or noumenal ego, capable of morally coercing the mechanism of nature, from its impotently formal supposed plane of superiority to space and time limitations. Spontaneity and identity of self-consciousness were supposed in Kant's transcendental ego, the former implying apperception as an organic function, and the latter a merely abstract and numerical unity—a not very consistent or

harmonious amalgam of psychology and logic. The freedom which we seek must be of that high ethical character, wherein the will or self is the final determinant, be the determining influence of the motive what you will. For the motive has really no force of its own, being in reality a product of the mind as much as the volition itself, though it is so often spoken of as moving the will—as in some external mode. Our determinations are through reasons, rather than motives. More truly the man is his own motive, and freely chooses from within. Such a will is as free and right and sound as Dante declared, and it would be ethical failure not to act according to it—

“Libero dritto e sano è tuo arbitrio
E fallo fora non fare a suo senno.”

—(*Purg.*, XXVII. 140-141).

Such freedom does not follow, determinedly, from so many antecedents. It is not to be denied, of course, that the play of the will, under the working of psychological laws, is such that the results are, in a certain sense, determined: freedom, that is to say, is no arbitrary affair, but conform to psychological law and true natural impulse; but it is a truism to say that the question of freedom is, for all that, the question of personality, and that personality is as thoroughly antithetical to mechanistic causation as it is to shackled possibilities forged out of our own past character. What is therefore denied is, that there is not, in our voluntary choices, our free ethical determinations, a factor or element of higher than empirical character, resident in the will or self, which marks the ethical value or ultimate worth of such determination. You may call this the transcendental self, or what you will; all that our Theistic Idealism cares for is, that it is the real self, the self which *is*, and, in every such determination, *makes itself* still more, free. In other words, the self is, for us, the transcendental determinant of the whole phenomena of volitional action. Whether the motive exerts any causal influence does not really touch

the question: the question for us is really as to what is the determining power in the case of conflicting motives. The postulation of the permanent, transcendental causality of the self—its projection as the willing self—is the important thing in our position, lying, as it does, above and beyond the merely empirical or scientific factors so far involved. It is this free, original, and transcendent energy of ethical choice that must be held fast. For it should be remembered that, after all, and even in this connection, so far as causal influence is concerned, causality is not at all the pure scientific concept it is so often taken to be, but is really the term for expressing the mode in which a will, human or Divine, acts. The defects of so distinguished a thinker as Höffding must here be noticed. The Danish philosopher takes Freedom to mean that the will is held to be not subject to the law of causality, and he contends that Indeterminism makes man something incoherent and accidental, in breaking the bond between the individual and the rest of being or existence. But Höffding is wrong in supposing the claim of freedom to be made on ethico-practical, and not on pure theoretic grounds, for there is no such disharmony between these as he supposes. He is wrong, too, in supposing that freedom's claim cuts the individual off from the totality of being, for it does so only as against the pantheistic conception of such total existence; but in that sense there could obviously be no talk of individuality, in any real form. There is really nothing of strength or cogency in the contentions of Höffding against the immediate consciousness of our freewill activity, under the guiding valuations of reason. It is thus impossible to agree with that distinguished realist, Prof. Alexander, that the sense of freedom is a sheer delusion. He and others hold that the will is determined by character, but character, invested with such determining power, is vaguely left to mean the principle of volition, or to denote disposition. We may have to take men according to their character, as, so to speak, a kind of face-value, but this refuge in character—which is not given to us, but is

something we make — seems to me far from a deep and thorough mode of dealing with freewill. Theistic Idealism goes from the working (*operari*), as Schopenhauer demands, down to the essence (*esse*) or the real self, to find freedom rooted in the constitution of personal being; but it goes there not for its character, but for its decision, as the discussion requires. It is not a question of tree and fruit, as some suppose, but of man and freedom. The sense of freedom is, to Prof. Alexander, only the sense of choice between two motives, but the motive chosen is fixed and dependent upon character, in his view. Not so, say I, but upon the free decision of the self or essence. The motive he makes the great causality, but there is in all this too much of existence without essence. The determination is by the man, not by the motive; this was contended by Reid long ago. Actions so determined by the character and the motive, instead of by the free decision of the self for the morally good, are shorn of all ethical value. The man is treated by the deterministic tendency as hopelessly mortgaged by his own past. There is no need to deny the causal connection between will and motive, but only to reject the adequacy of the motive, and to maintain, high above all, the need for our resolutions, of the concurrent action of our free will. Even Wundt has lent his support, and in a very self-contradictory fashion, largely to this theory of the determining causality of character. He thinks we are ethically free, if we follow only inner causality, which is partly made up of our original power or stock, and partly through the development of character. Acting otherwise, we are, in his view, the mere playball of impulse, and not free. If the causality of character does not determine us, our decision is merely accidental. Every individual would, on indeterminist theory, set himself up for a god, he thinks. It is obviously absurd that Wundt should make the impenitent freewiller a god, and yet the mere playball of accidental impulses, at one and the same time. If I am the playball of my character, then I am robbed of all power to train or cultivate my character: I must remain

a will-less creature, determined by my character, in any choice I make! And yet, even for Wundt, the "individual will" is the means in ethics.

Wilbois has recently attempted to show the compatibility of social determinism with human freedom, and, in doing so, makes an irreducible difference between the phenomena of the physical world and those of the social world, the facts of the latter here presenting, on his view, greater difficulty than those of the physical world. We belong to a "social creation," in which we are limited by the continuity of the collective phenomena. A creation absolutely free thus becomes unthinkable. If there is liberty, it is only as a caprice of nature, of which scientific knowledge can take no cognisance. Wilbois regards the laws and concepts of the physical world as more or less arbitrary creations of the human spirit, and its practical and cognitive needs. But it does not seem a satisfactory thing to leave the objectively real world in space and time, in this fashion, on one side, thus neglecting its quantitative bearings—made so much of by theorists of universal determinism—on the formal aspects of liberty, and to view only its content or quality as a purely subjective valuation. The prime and fontal origin of our deeds and determinations is to be found in ourselves, and not in any social determinism. It is just the business of freedom, on our view, to transcend any necessitarian influences that might be exerted upon us by what is called the social organism—to mould it, in short, instead of being determined by it. In this ethical mode is the creative elevation of man attained. In the indeterminateness of the confluence of multiple elements the determining self finds its ethical call and opportunity. Hence the futility of the ideal aspired to by the social sciences, that, namely, of making an objective science of the purely human world. The whole philosophy of freedom lies, for us, in the true nature and function of the self.

One of the best things in Bergson is his place for freedom in the individual, who, as a living being, is, for him, a "centre of indetermination" or a "centre of action," albeit

Bergson's philosophical interpretation is apt to be too biologicistic in character. Freedom is to Bergson a datum of consciousness, and of free volition he has no proper theory. Theistic Idealism can here accept many of Bergson's positions on the freedom of the self, as that of which "the self alone is the author," and as that which, in its "free decision," springs from "the whole soul" or "our whole personality," and so forth. I am also inclined to endorse Bergson's position as to our deeper freedom choosing in defiance of what is conventionally called a motive, but this is because of my emphasis on the free self, and not for any irrationalism in our choice. Such choice or decision must, to Bergson, be continuous, inwardly, with the whole psychical life. But his liberty, which, like that of Spinoza, is not really opposed to necessity, is hardly that of our idealism. It cannot be said that Bergson has done justice to the essential self. His growing ego is a dualistic blend of an ego subject to psychological determinism, and an ego shewing free volition, these two being unified by the principle of duration. No self can be satisfactory which is merely an organic unity of psychic states that permeate each other, and are supposed, without clear and explicit postulation of an agent, to manifest themselves in free will. Bergson, of course, on occasion, speaks of the ego of the depths, or the basal ego, finding self-expression, but, though action truly free is the work of this ego, he does not, with clearness or sufficient explicitness, set forth the working of this ego in general relation to the states, and the numerous grades of freedom. The dynamic content of consciousness demands a self-conscious ego, not mere states of becoming. This self can be no heterogeneous succession of states, but must be a fundamental, self-identical ego through all diversity or change. But to this self Bergson fails to do justice, and with this result mainly are we now concerned, without being called upon to traverse all his theories or arguments. He fails to make man, in the interests of freedom, sufficiently an end in himself. Continuity, perfect if you will, there is in the world's events; but, though his

action is in some ways connected with antecedent conditions, that does not keep man from being able to insert, or assert, his free initiatives for the direction of the events; man can do so, because, at his highest, he is essentially free, and ought, in practice, to be actually free. He has a real choice of alternatives, and when he acts, the unique character of action is to be remembered, as not to be described in terms of anything else, and its connection with antecedent conditions is not to be taken as a necessary connection. Reason is the guide and guarantee of his choices, and the notion of a deterministic reason is arbitrary. Freedom is no merely formal or intellectualistic affair: it is a thing of spirit. The trouble is, we are naturally prone to think in static modes, which means, of course, the exclusion of indetermination; intelligence, at bidding of the whole inner life, must be requisitioned to make the dynamic synthesis. The indetermination is too opulent to be an abstract and imaginative affair; it is something in which the active principle of the real self, freeing itself from terrene bonds, is concerned; we have no right to invest indetermination with a halo of abstractness, because it happens to mean that which has not the totality of its being determined. The evolution of human activity is not absolute: it is set in the larger whole of the Absolute Liberty as its transcendent end; but this is a very different issue from its disappearance in Bergson's cosmic *élan*. Not enough is it, in order to freedom, to withdraw man, as in Buddhism, from the life of sense; the pathway to freedom lies not in proclaiming man to be determined by the will of God, as in Islamism; to be free is to be unconditioned, and we are nearer the unconditioned the closer we approach to God, Whose service is perfect freedom. Hence Prof. Wenley properly remarks that "the central and dominating fact in religion is its imperious call for a new way of life; and this seeks freedom as its indispensable condition" ('Modern Thought and the Crisis in Belief,' p. 37).

My contentions hitherto, of course, have had to do with inner freedom; but even as to freedom, in the exterior

sense, where State encroachments have tended to the curtailment of individual liberty, it is worth while to remember what Mill has said in his classic essay on the subject, that "the worth of a State in the long run is the worth of the individuals composing it," and that "a State which dwarfs its men in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands, even for beneficent purposes, will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished, and that the perfection of machinery, to which it has sacrificed everything, will in the end avail it nothing for want of the vital power which it has preferred to banish." Man's obligation to realise the highest ends and fulfil the greatest possibilities of life, is such that no needless infringement, restriction, or deduction should be allowed to interfere with his presupposed freedom of action. This, of course, without claiming that such objective freedom should, or can, be absolute. But such freedom, or absence of restraint, is of prime importance to life, even though psychological freedom can persist in spite of every form of restraint. For the will is free in a sense, in which our acts are not. The will is no act or event, but the subject of volitions. But that does not make external stimulus unimportant to it. The subject, however, has velleity, or the power of alternative choice, in spite of external influences or conditions. On the other hand, velleity signifies the capacity for conscious and voluntary adjustment to our changing environment. The foregoing insistences are by no means unnecessary when we find a writer, professing to deal with the moral consciousness, saying that "the possibility of real choice" is an "inherent absurdity" (J. W. Scott on "Post-Kantian Idealism," in 'Inter. Jour. of Ethics,' 1910). This writer does not see the "inherent absurdity" and grotesque irrelevance of an appeal to the moral consciousness, which never probes the moral consciousness at all, but skims about "intelligent action," the "intelligent and rational self," and so forth, after the usual purely intellectualistic manner, which has made "the Whole" type of idealism such a discredited philosophy to-day. Its intellectualistic merits

can never atone for a crying lack of ethical depth. The article just referred to has none of Dr Bosanquet's fine candour as to the unethical character of the Whole, but rather has recourse to a desperate acosmism, whereby "*we are the ultimate whole*"! And yet, in the same breath, we are told we are free because we are "identified" with the "universe" or the "world"! No wonder he says it will be asked, "is it really freedom?" It is the veriest simulacrum of the freedom of the moral consciousness. This leads me to say that the conception of nature, or of natural law, need not prove inimical to a true theory of freedom. For if we conceive Nature, as in our "Philosophy of Nature" we have done, and as in Theistic Idealism we must conceive it, as the manifestation or expression of Infinite Mind and Will, nature is then the expression of freedom, and cannot properly be held to conflict with it. Kant's distressingly formal freedom had its breakdown when, coming short here, he declared that there is no real freedom, but everything happens in the world according to the laws of nature. But these laws are only the regular workings of freedom, and the illusion of necessity springs from the unwarranted endeavour to reduce the unique initiatives of will to mechanical categories of law and order. Science can, of course, confine its view to the case as seen from below; theistic idealism is concerned to view it from above. It does not, like Kant, fail to realise how the law of moral freedom distinguishes the life of man's spirit from that of nature, as viewed by mechanistic science. Nor does it, like Bosanquet, in treating of "The Value and Destiny of the Individual," make each "appear as a member of a mechanism pointing beyond itself and unintelligible apart from others," so rendering personality meaningless by sheer mechanistic conception. For Fichte, the sense-world was material created by the free, rational, moral ego, to the end of its own adequate will-realisation. He taught the primacy of the deed, of course, and the duty to achieve freedom through moral self-assertion—in other words, the duty to win freedom by action in accord with reason. That was much more nearly

in keeping with Theistic Idealism, which takes freedom, under the law of increase of spiritual energy, to be an ever-increasing product or power in a sound moral development. Moral character, developed personality—these are the ends of freedom, real not formal. The essence of freedom is spirit, and in this grounding lies the metaphysic of freedom. Spirit is, for our idealism, the *prius* of any mechanistic determinism. Such spirit-filled experience can yield no precedence to any principle of an absolute mechanism. For spirit is living, and the world is, as shewn in our chapter on “The Philosophy of Nature,” shot through with spirit. Freedom is the ideal, but it is as far as may be from any merely formal or superfluous affair: it is freedom of a living sort, full of contents: it is spiritual self-determination. Whatever the energy of freedom, it is energy of the spirit. The free, self-determining spirit knows and is conscious of its own self-determination. For such freedom is a responsible affair. The home or abode of freedom is not to be found solely in the *esse*, as Schopenhauer supposed, but also in the *operari*: the former, one must hold, depends on many causes, of which it is the result; the latter depends on ourselves [see his ‘*Preisschrift über die Freiheit des Willens*,’ pp. 177, 178]. We are ourselves, I maintain, the original source of our acts; our freedom lies in our power; our power is that of reason or intelligence—shot through will—as supreme guide of life. The power just claimed for the “I” is no quantitative affair, but of purely qualitative significance; it differentiates man from the animal creation; it expresses a value, rather than suggests ontological significance. It is otherwise in Determinism, where the will is made dependent upon motive. Freedom is not the purely ontological affair Kant was prone to think it, but neither is it the purely axiological affair Fichte was wont to regard it. It cannot be resolved either by causality alone, or by value alone: the full problem of freedom involves both. It involves the element of necessity in the shape of real being. It requires the element of value to complete the solution. There is no contradiction between such element of necessity and the lordship of reason, on which I have insisted: the bridging influence of

development is not to be forgotten. Freedom is not the work of the motive, but of the conscious willing of the "I," in the view of our Theistic Idealism. Although I have spoken of the qualitative significance of our power of will, yet this may, of course, be viewed as *quantum*, when regard is had to the varying intensity of the act of will, its greater or less degree of energy. It cannot be said, however, that the experimental endeavours to measure the force of motives, as illustrated, for example, in Dr E. Boyd Barrett's work on 'Motive-Force and Motivation-Tracks,' are very impressive, although there is no need to deny what may be done in the way of motive-strengthening. This is not surprising, in view of the difficulties which the study of the will, in its nature, activities, laws, elements, manifestations, has presented to psychology. We have not greatly advanced on the pronouncements of Duns Scotus and Schopenhauer, on the will, and the most extraordinary diversity consequently exists among European psychologists on the subject. Dr Boyd Barrett, however, properly notes that the results of experimental psychology have by no means furthered deterministic psychology. The power of choice persists in the concrete ego, whose right willing depends on the insights of reason or thought. His motives you cannot arbitrarily and abstractly remove from their setting, and view them apart. It must be kept in view how vital, immanent; dynamic, is the entire will-process. But the concrete act of will is a synthesis, with moments and unity of its own. The final question is not one of value, but a theoretic one: the question is as to the reality, or the non-reality of freedom. The difference, as Fichte put the matter, "lies between Freedom and not-Freedom." Freedom, in the formal sense, says Kroeger, is "itself *not free*." "The ego can only *be* free; but the moment it reflects upon its freedom, its freedom is again thought under the laws of reflection—that is, under the causality-relation,—and hence as not freedom" [Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre,' tr. by A. E. Kroeger, pp. 46 and 162 of Kroeger's Appendix]. "No one can require anything more," Kroeger says in the appended Kant exposition, "than to experience the fact in himself, and cannot ask for a theo-

retical proof without stultifying himself." Notwithstanding much that is interesting and stimulating in Kroeger's discussion, Theistic Idealism, as I conceive it, cannot quite accept these views. For his exposition takes man to be fundamentally an acting power, rather than a thinking one, and "not theoretical, but moral." Theistic Idealism, on the other hand, regards freedom as inherent in rationality, views man as energizing reason, and treats him as capable of rational motivation, because he is so endowed with reason. Our freedom means our capacity of choice in the light of reason. Notwithstanding certain errors into which Kant fell respecting freedom, he, in his own way, recognised freedom as inherent in rationality. Fichte, too, is rational enough to say of freedom that it is "only a thought, and only within him, of course, who is himself the result of freedom" ('Wissenschaftslehre,' tr. by Kroeger, p. 151). For Fichte held that only that life which is moulded by the idea is truly a life of freedom. But "my freedom," he says, "is to be the ground of a *real* acting" [Ibid., 135]. This is the more to be observed, as Fichte's principles have been deemed artificial. The reality of freedom is the thoroughgoing maintenance of Theistic Idealism, but it is the freedom of the real self: it is, in this connection, the metaphysical fact of freedom, wherein we will according to reason, intelligence. This does not in the least involve any neglect of the influence of conscience-elements on the will that acts. Will without end we do not recognise: the end is an object known, and is already something in the idea. The ideal light of reason makes us see that we ought to be, or to do, this or that, and in recognising the metaphysical fact of freedom, we do not blind ourselves to the feeling or sense of moral necessity involved. There must be, as Fichte said, "real acting" in freedom, else the theory of reason or the ideal would remain a monstrosity. Only thus can speculative freedom become justified in the philosophy of action. Because we accord metaphysical recognition to the will, acting in freedom as the will of the self, we are nowise debarred from recognising also the value of the will, which lies in what it wills. Action has

value, in our Idealism, only in and by the idea. The unity which results is obvious and important, for inner harmony and unity are the aim of freedom. The will, conform to the Ideal of reason, becomes the reasonable causality of the "I." There must be no dualism between our theoretic and our practical knowledge: the "I" must be brought into harmony with itself and with the world, as result of the concrete psychological development of the will. The "I" is an unified force of constantly increasing independence, under the demand of reason and its ideal. Even in its freedom of choice, this independence of the "I" in its willing, abstractly considered, is to be maintained. But it is then an independence that can only be arbitrarily exercised, and for it we cannot claim moral value: it is an independence supposedly free, in its power of choice, from either reason or impulse. Value enters only as the moral ideal begins to come to consciousness, bringing with it the sense of the opposition between reason and impulse. Moral will cannot be indifferent to values, of course. With the ideal of the Good, we pass to something much more inward in contentual character than anything involved in mere formal freedom, properly regarded, by which I mean the severe or thorough view of what is involved in the abstract freedom of choice already indicated. This was the old so-called "liberty of indifference." A less rigid view of freedom of choice is, however, universally taken by freewill advocates, whereby it means, in actual life, the power of alternative moral choices. This is a more real and inward view, postulating a power of preference, a power to choose between moral alternatives, amid the solicitations of desire. Here again, and rightly, is claimed an independence of the self as a free causal self, making ultimate decisions. Conflicting motives, however, have often played a needlessly large part in discussions of the subject, giving it at times a too external cast, and obscuring the decisive issue as resting with the free causal self. Bradley is by no means the only modern thinker who has shewn a profound lack of appreciation of the depth of the foundations of moral freedom. But one significant fact is enough to give pause to such argumen-

tation, or, more correctly, dogmatism. It is that arguments change, and view-points vary: the arguments of Lotze, Ed. Zeller, Renouvier, Martineau, William James, and many other philosophic Libertarians, may need re-casting, or be in form overpassed, in time, just as the views of religious thinkers on freewill like Edwards, Upham, Tappan, Whedon, and the rest, have needed revision, or been found no longer adequate in their forms of presentation; but the great fact of freedom abides, and is not less profoundly grasped and cherished by Libertarians to-day than it ever was. A perennial and substantial "chimera" indeed! Freedom is rooted in our personality, lies deep-based in the constitution of personal being, and must be considered in the light of the essential quality and working of self-determination. In the remark which I made above on the overdone emphasis on motives, it was not, of course, meant that our determinations were to be without motives, or in face of all motives, as Bergson urges, since such action would be irrational. The will is not any such pure power unenergised by reason. It is of the essence of will to be rational power. The motives influence, incite, impel, but they do not determine: only the will or the self does that. The self is a free agent, its freedom being of the essence of personality. The internal character of motives is to be carefully noted; they are not "external and foreign," as Diderot declared. The older mode of speech about "liberty of indifference," in this connection, is to be shunned as indefensible, being contrary to reason, fact, and consciousness. I have already spoken of the will, supposititiously, in such a formal aspect, while the will is as yet undetermined or characterless. But it has no place, and no defence, in the sphere of actual moral choice, with which we are now dealing. Freedom is, as said Kant in his 'Critique of the Practical Reason,' "freedom from and independence of all the mechanism of nature; and this implies that man himself, considered as belonging to the world of sense, is subjected to his own personality so far as he belongs to the rational system." Even Schopenhauer has to find the world idea as well as will, and the needs of consciousness such that will must be guided

by motives. He acknowledges the rise of that unity of consciousness which means the theoretic ego, the bearer or supporter of consciousness in its entirety (*des ganzen Bewusstseins*), "in which," he says, "it presents itself as identical with the willing ego, whose mere function of knowledge it is" ('Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung,' Supp. to Bk. II., ch. 20). What Theistic Idealism, in my view, objects to is the tendency of Schopenhauer to make the idea only an expression of the will, rather than will the expression of the idea. He certainly failed to do justice to the idea, and to the intellect, but there need be no disharmony between intellect and will. Reason or intellect posits the ideal, and makes us conscious of the need of volitional effort, in which latter Schopenhauer seems to me to take a somewhat too external view of motives, even using the term "objective." In his determinism, no other causality for the free decision is known than that of the motive. Responsibility lies in what he is, not what he does. Our idealism, on the other hand, fulfils much more truly the principle to which he appeals,—*Operari sequitur esse*. It recognises no opposition or contradiction between being and action. It posits a free acting in our outgoing towards all Good, not a necessary action determined by a motive. But it is open-eyed enough to perceive that even such a position as *Operari sequitur esse*, is not one that can be applied to reasonable beings—whom Schopenhauer treats as nature-beings under inherent law of necessity—in any way that savours of mechanical necessity or even of metaphysical universality, and dispenses with the need of careful verification. In the discussion of freedom, we are, I have maintained, partly concerned with the *operari*, but freedom, as I have earlier indicated, lies also in the *esse*. But Schopenhauer holds that the *operari* falls to necessity, which I reject. We are determined, in our action, by our essence or being, I maintain, as well as by motive; and what we are, we are through ourselves, though the result is more difficult and complex in the case of the *esse*. But it is not with our individuality or character, so far as we have not given to ourselves these, that we reproach ourselves, as might be wrung from what Schopenhauer says

('Grundprobleme,' p. 177), but with the decision in the *operari*. But if the reproach should run back into the realm where conscience stings, and if it should be because we have not made ourselves other than we are, we are then in the region of the *esse*, and Schopenhauer's contention would then have some force. Schopenhauer's pre-occupation with the problem of freedom did not keep him from being the subject of many misconceptions, perversions, and mistakes, notwithstanding the opinion of Jodl, who thought so highly of the clearness with which he imagined Schopenhauer to have set out the illusion of the consciousness of freedom. This is not to say that his treatment is not able and ingenious. Schopenhauer's argumentation is really a *petitio principii*, for all that, in which what is in question is really presupposed, namely, that free decisions are not possible. Later, we have a thorough begging of the question in Spencer's psychological treatment of freewill also, with perverse and arrogant assertiveness quite worthy to rank with any limitations of view to be found in Schopenhauer.

There is no such question-begging in Martineau's keen and searching dealing with the real issues of freedom. Martineau, in rightly refusing to surrender a free personal power, did not dispute the influence either of formed character or of motives. But he denied that the character is identical with the self, and held the moral issue or decision to rest with the self which has the character. This is the "causal self," not the self "left as a deposit from previous behaviour": it is, too, a "judging self" that "weighs the competing motives." It would be very absurd to call "the self which has the character," and has already determined, "a characterless self," in connection with Martineau and actual moral alternatives; in another connection we have already seen the bare non-historical place of such an idea of characterless will, as a bare presupposition of formal and empty freedom; such a "characterless self" or "abstraction" should never have been confounded with the real self of Martineau. What the Libertarian view does really contend for is the element of contingency in our freedom of moral choice, whereby, in

any given case, the self, acting in freedom, may actually realise the possibility presented in following the ideal of reason, or may fall short of such a realisation. James is thoroughly correct in his perception that it is really this question of possibility that lies at the root of the matter; and I cannot but think that, in view of the place occupied by the ideal of reason in the process, the deterministic antipathy to any idea of contingency is misplaced and unnecessary. At any rate, Theistic Idealism regards it more needful to be true to experience than to any exigencies of theory, which latter have played an altogether too large part in the matter. The issue, even as put by Martineau, was of a character too living and real, as a freedom problem, and too vital, in its consequences, for regret, remorse, repentance, responsibility, to be in the least affected by mere verbal quibbling. Martineau not only saw the seriousness of the consequences of our mode of resolving the problem, for religion and morality, but he felt the serious and even sublime issues involved in the problem for the theistic philosopher himself. This perception gives not a little of his strength and elevation to the theistic philosopher in his advocacy of freedom. I say, quite frankly, that it is in this inner fascination of the ideal of freewill that determinisms of every sort, whether "hard" or "soft," suffer loss, in my view, since it is, for them, no open possibility. In saying these things, I have not meant to suggest that Martineau's presentation suffices, in all points, for thought to-day, or that no aspects of his treatment are susceptible of improvement in the way of adaptation to the needs of our time. Such adjustments of thought and emphasis must have free place, and I have given them free course in my own thinking. I should be inclined to cease contention about the character, and concentrate on the present real self: this self has already determined, no doubt, in its past acts, but the real issue, for freewill, is that the will is not mortgaged thereby, but the self still thinks itself free, knows itself free, and posits its own freedom in every issue or decision to which it may be called. I should also soften the emphasis on the principle

of causality in connection with the free causal self, and lay increased stress on the reason, as tending to justify the belief in freedom. But this stress on the ideal of reason must not be absurdly interpreted as meaning only a clear idea, which might be attended with sheer will impotence. The mere idea or thought of willing is obviously very different from volition itself. Moral demand or requirement does not seem to me an adequate grounding for freedom, hence I have taken the position of grounding it, metaphysically, in the constitution of personal being. Certainly, we have to take account of mechanical antecedents—relations of body and mind—but, when we have done so, the spontaneous sense of mankind, and the spirituality of the human soul, demand freewill. The appeal to reason was, no doubt, that which kept the great idealistic philosophers from falling into determinism, as did Schopenhauer, whose idea was swallowed up of will. I think reason should concern itself with possibility, which, as potency of a real determination, is no empty abstraction: it seems to me precisely the demand of reason that such a reasonable possibility shall be realised. The possibility is a real one, on the freewill contention, for it maintains our positive capability of realising a free decision. It is precisely because the possibility is so real, that we have the force or energy necessary for its realisation. But we must not, in thinking of this force or causal energy of the ego, lose sight of the lordship of reason in the process, in its ideal-positing or ideal-forming functions. Nor must we concentrate on the freedom result in such a way as to forget that the "I" is no closed or determined fact, but is itself a real possibility ever passing over into the reality of freedom. The "I" is self-conscious lord over itself and its determinations, in the working out of those ideals of freedom which are a necessity of reason, and above mere blind pressure of will. The insistences which I have made on reason, in this connection, are of cardinal importance for Theistic Idealism, as I conceive it. Notwithstanding the contentions for freedom which I have made, I am inclined to think too much emphasis has often been made on freedom of choice: there is such freedom

—I have strongly contended for it—but the phrase takes an unfortunate arbitrary cast or character, and must not be pressed in a too absolute sense. I have already recognised the hampering effects of antecedent incentives, feelings, sensations, desires, which in past determinations of the self, may have created a preponderating tendency in a particular direction. But the self may seek to restore balance or harmony, under the ideal of reason, making this its end in a teleological manner, without anything of the nature of freedom of choice appearing necessary. The crises of life can only be few and rare; but the self-determinations of life are many, and need not of necessity be marked by any particular forms of what is termed freedom of choice. Still, even where the conditions, outer and inner, of freedom, have been impaired, restricted, or limited, the power of free self-determination may remain to an unwonted degree. For there are abysmal deeps in personality, which consists in self-determination. But, just as I maintained, earlier in this chapter, a progressive independence or development of the ego, so here I maintain the possibility that the individual may, on the other hand, impair, diminish, and crush, his power of freedom. Freedom has its dangers alike to the harmony of the self and of the world. No universe can be perfect with such liability to discord and defection. There has been far too great blindness as to how much its perfection must be determined by the creature. What, however, I have been concerned for the moment to urge is, the need that the freewill position be presented as free as may be from arbitrary and capricious elements, which are not quite wanting in Reid, Bergson, and some others; also, that antecedent causes, conditions, influences, are not to be unduly minimised, even while the quality of freedom is maintained. The man does not cease to be a rational free agent, self-determining and responsible, in spite of inimical habits and passions. The essential and central contention of freewill is, to Theistic Idealism, the maintenance of real contingency in the voluntary decision. This means that the will, in making its choice or decision, acts in freedom, and from no necessity, either external or internal. This possi-

bility obtains because we are here in another domain than that of physical law with its absolute uniformities. We are in a world that is ruled by Personal Will, not impersonal fate, and in which the human will is a free cause, not a necessary one. This last fact Höffding, in the extremely one-sided and not very logical statement of his psychological determinism, is quite unable to grasp, or do any manner of justice to. The free causal self entirely escapes him, because his mind is dominated by causal law carried over from the physical sciences (see his 'Psychology,' pp. 346-348). Dr Stout does a little better: he thinks it "difficult or impossible" psychologically to disprove the libertarian hypothesis, and says the decision is frequently reached in a manner "unaccountably abrupt." But he does not represent the case well, when he chooses to speak of unaccountable abruptness, instead of the imprevisibility of the actual result. It would be obviously unjust and absurd to suppose that the state of moral freedom, for which libertarians contend, consisted only of unaccountable abruptnesses, instead of a state in which the free will has, through acts of determination, overpassed the struggling elements in its realisation of freedom. Further, it is not putting the case well to talk of "the intervention of a new factor," for which the *onus probandi* rests with the libertarian: the case is that of a new decision by the free self or person, who has all along been behind the process, though utterly lost sight of in Dr Stout's statement. The Libertarian hypothesis does not treat this self as a mere product of "development," or a sum of "previous conditions," but as a free self-determining ego (see his 'Manual of Psychology,' p. 712). James does better, frankly recognising the trouble to spring, as it manifestly does, from the exigencies of psychologists who desire to make their subject a science, "like every other science," as Höffding, none too reflectively, puts it. Psychology would then have to conceive existents after the analogy of physical entities. Psychology, as science, can only deal with the general laws of volition, insists James, and can never, by any prevision, so follow the freewill decision as to "foretell" the result of "each individual emer-

gency." James has the merit not to sacrifice an interest of such momentous importance as freewill on the shrine of psychological "science" ('Text-Book of Psychology,' pp. 456-458). The absolute uniformity which determinism requires does not, in fact and experience, exist; and psychology, as science, can only reach such approximate results as fact and experience will allow. It is not seen that acts of freewill cannot be regarded as objects of science, both because they are, strictly taken, new, and because they are not causal in the physically uniform sense. They spring from the creative activity of consciousness, wherein the will asserts itself in its own free and peculiar vigour, in spite of every external circumstance and every internal or psychical condition. They are the result of our being such centres of spontaneity as we are, whence the outgoings of will, enlightened by cognition, consciously make for the self-proposed ends, which are so natural to us. So long ago as Malebranche, freewill was held to be altogether real and irreducible to mechanism, albeit in a form not in all respects free from criticism: to-day we equally—under new light and conditions—hold the same belief, and maintain—as Malebranche also did—the right use of freewill to make us collaborators with Deity. Later, we find Rothe, among others, holding the essence of spirit to consist in freedom and reason; but no one has found so much of the presence of God in reason as did Malebranche. That is his distinction, and it could not fail to have its influence on his postulation of freewill, over against mechanistic ideas. To-day our besetments are biological, but there is the same need to stand for the freedom of consciousness, which cannot be impugned. For we have studied the significance of consciousness too well to be greatly disturbed by scientific talk about the search being vain "for any indication of an origin independent of the rest of the animal world." Spencer was much more correct than Comte, Höffding, and many modern psychologists when he contended that psychology "under its subjective aspect" is a "totally unique science," independent of, and antithetical to, physiology and "all the sciences whatever": this, because of the "psychical factor," which "no

physical research whatever can disclose or identify." Green was right in holding that animal impulse is left behind in the determinations of self-consciousness: he understood the significance of a self-conscious subject, in his stand for freedom. It has been our complaint against determinism that it utterly fails to give any proper account of the phenomena of consciousness, though these form the very subject in question. But I do not agree with those who think that this, nevertheless, leaves the freewill position only one of negative superiority. Such a view appears to me to overlook the positive claims made for freedom, under the guidance and implications of reason, whereby our decisions, however free, are delivered from arbitrary, capricious, irrational cast. It is, as achieved, our freedom is moral freedom: it is the quality of will which, in being true to reason's ideals, makes it moral. There is always call for deeper moral insight, under the positive process of rational selection. Our ideals would be meaningless but for conscious choice. Our freedom spells opportunity to enter into the spiritual heritage that has fallen to us, to make the most of it, and to grow beyond it. Such free activity may result, as Varisco maintains, in satisfaction; but I am concerned rather with it as the imperious demand of our rational and spiritual nature or being. There is an anti-theistic pantheism which does not so preserve it in its integrity, though professing to harmonise the absoluteness of God with the reality of man.

But this endeavour, as in Von Hartmann, for example, requires that the Absolute be grasped as unconscious, as winning selfhood or personality first in man. God is held to be free, as the Absolute or the All in All; man, too, is free, but is so only in the sense of being a particularity or a limitation of the absolute Being. The Divine Will is held identical with the will of man—indeed, is only real as the will of determinate man. Man is only an appearance of God, God is only the innermost being of man. In this way the human will is free, only because it is the Divine Will. For God and man belong together, and are not to be separated: in this identity of God and man, concrete monism thinks freedom

and necessity are harmonised. It needs no pointing out how, in such a system, the theistic independence and relative separability of man are unwarrantably dissipated. Such a purely ontological unity of being, as has just been described, could by no possibility satisfy theistic idealism, since it is devoid of the necessary ethical bonds. Such a pantheistic freedom is no true freedom; and it brings us no nearer real freedom, when it is said that the God concerned stands beyond good and evil, is neither moral nor unmoral, but exists absolutely above both. With such a Deity, theistic idealism has really no concern. In spite of the identity of God and man, this deft Deity eludes responsibility, which belongs only to the finite subject, in this identity theory. Fatal to freedom, to our personal autonomy, is such a pantheistic mode of regarding us as mere elements in the all-embracing unitary consciousness of God, as we have already shewn in our chapter on "The God of Theistic Idealism." But the self is itself a unitary organism, a personal unity of experience, and, as such, distinct from, and, in certain senses, exclusive of, all other unities. Its moral reality is such as to secure its freedom, not merely in respect of the world of sense, but even as fronting the Creator, in its ethical independence and moral responsibility. If there were only such an identity of God and man as that just spoken of, the destruction of real freedom would be the result, since there would be no manifold of real selves: these two terms would be but two poles of one reality, reduced, as such, to utter lack of moral significance and effectiveness.

The appeal to self-consciousness has been objected to by certain thinkers, Spinoza, Clifford, Riehl, and others, on the ground that there may be causes of action which are not in consciousness. Well, this recourse to ignorance seems rather a poor mode of escape or evasion. No doubt, there is the difficulty of rendering introspection perfect and finding consciousness omniscient, in the matter of freedom, but, for all that, the libertarian appeal is much more valid and effective, applying, as it does, to the distinctive aspects of the ethical life of which we are profoundly conscious, than

can be the deterministic appeal to what is unknown or outwith the range of self-consciousness. The determinist may be prone to fall back on subconsciousness, but this avails him not, since it is unscientific to do so, nothing being known of it, and it may equally be claimed in the opposite interest. It is with the world of consciousness ethics has to do: the moral world is grounded in freedom. You may proclaim freedom illusory, if you like, from the cosmic standpoint; it will still be pronounced essential, from the ethical viewpoint. For the ethical life has its own postulates and its own certainties, which latter it does not put behind or after any other certainties that may be. But freedom is not arbitrary, and does not signify non-determination by law, psychological and moral. It was the contention of Sidgwick that freedom is, metaphysically, the same in the case of freely and deliberately chosen irrational conduct, as it is in the case of free rational action. This is important, even though he says "it does not seem to me relevant to ethical deliberation to determine the metaphysical validity of my consciousness of freedom to choose whatever I may conclude to be reasonable," unless the view "of what it would be reasonable to choose" should thereby be modified ['The Methods of Ethics,' 5th edn., p. 68]. I do not propose to raise much objection to Sidgwick's claim of metaphysical freedom for irrational choices, but I think the reasons for the superiority of rational choice and action as, *par excellence*, free, are far more clear and distinctive than some philosophical writers imagine. Irrational conduct, it should be remembered, is, just because it is irrational, bound to emphasise the aspect of power or efficient causation, even though it be metaphysically free, which leads to an inadequate conception of that wherein freedom really consists. True freedom is not only metaphysical, but moral, and, in the latter aspect, the thought of Sidgwick appears to me to dwell too much in the region of abstract ideas. But that is to fail to realise that the realm of personal beings constitutes the unity of an universal and relational rational-moral system. The man of irrational choice does not merely

choose wrong object or end, but chooses himself, and himself only, in utter abrogation or denial of the moral-system relations to God and his fellows. Formal, abstract ideas of freedom are totally inadequate to the concrete universe of being. You may claim metaphysical freedom for the free, supreme choice of self, but it is not moral freedom, which involves the consent of will to law. Freewill stands above mechanism, but, in its essence, carries the power to disobey moral law. Yet freewill is a foundation of uniformity in human action, for character itself is choice. Not in Green's sense, however, of the action being as necessarily related to the character and circumstances as any event to the sum of its conditions. For Green's freedom really means determinism. All the talk of certain philosophers concerning chaotic and unaccountable aspects of freedom falls to the ground when it is remembered that freewill is of the essence of that eminently rational thing called personality. Hamilton made this mistake when he talked of a determination of freewill as an event without a cause. As if I were not the agent in my own determinations! Every action of human freewill may be as great a miracle to physical, chemical, and mathematical science, as Lord Kelvin thought, but it is no result of mere caprice, any more than it is a product of necessity. And "freedom cannot be a product of necessity, though necessity is a product of freedom" [H. W. Rankin, 'Princeton Theol. Rev.,' 1916, p. 300]. It was held by Hegel that freedom is the truth of necessity. Our freedom is a derived absoluteness, but it is from the Absolute Reason it is derived. It is no unconditioned freedom, it is true, since it is limited by that determinate circle of possibilities called the man's individuality. Say that he will always be bound by this nature-determination, but beware that you hamper not his development. For you are not dealing with something ready and finished, but with a swelling germ, or a mere first-fruits, and you know not whereunto these may grow. His individuality is not mere limit and hindrance, but seal of his character and nobility. For he is no mere drop in the pantheistic ocean of humanity, but an original

and determinate being, with declared peculiarities or properties of his own. Every man, it has been remarked, is thus a new thought of God. He forms with conscious will his own character. He is lord of his own acts of will.

With these results, the discussion, lately given on "Freedom," by Dr D'Arcy in his 'God and Freedom in Human Experience,' entirely accords. But I think it is a pity he has invoked Bergson's theorisings in support of the position in the way he has done, for I have said enough, earlier in this chapter, to shew how ill-judged much of this supposed support is. Dr D'Arcy had already treated the subject in his excellent book on Ethics, and I cannot find that his present discussion, which is on no wide basis of reference, has added anything of material value to what he had already given. It is surprising that it has not seemed to occur to him, that, although Bergson professedly stands for freedom, it is yet necessary to inquire whether his positions are, in strict logical consequence, such as really will provide a satisfactory basis for a theory of ethical freedom. Good as Dr D'Arcy's presentation is, it would have been better and stronger, if he had maintained a more detached or controlled mind in the presence of Bergsonism, and had allowed the ethical argument for freedom to present itself in its own strength and sufficiency. This, all the more since his conclusion was to be that "the real inner nature of a person always remains inaccessible. It is indeed in every case unique and incomparable" (p. 137). "Every act of will is intrinsically a unique event" (p. 138). These, and other like contentions, had no need to wait on anything in Bergsonism, either of help or of hindrance: a full, free ethical consciousness could always make them on its own account. Dr D'Arcy is, of course, right in fixing freedom as founded on the self, not, as by Dr M'Taggart and others, on the vague thing called "character." For the character is but "the self regarded as continuous and dynamic." "It is not a set of fixed dispositions. It is the man as possessing certain dispositions or tendencies, not dispositions or

tendencies as making the man. Character is always in the making" (p. 131). Though the character of the self, most subtle product of spiritual chemistry, may become of relatively stable quality, yet our real concern is with the self, in its freedom, as a transcendental personality. It can make a new rise—or a fall. Of course, this self, as a connecting principle, is something which science has not been able to discover. For there are values in the world which science cannot appraise, taking science in the conventional sense of the nature-sciences. We have a consciousness of freedom which finds expression in the will; that consciousness is conscious spontaneity, however inexplicable, when taken up into velleity, it may appear to psychology in its decisions. What, to my mind, would make the matter wear a less inexplicable or less irrational cast would be a more explicit recognition than one finds, in much current psychology, of the all-important part played by reason, in deliberation. It does not appear to me to suffice for psychology to say that deliberation is "will preliminary to choice," or that, in the presence of motives, "we will our way to a decision"; we need some more explicit recognition of the presence and enlightening influence of reason—or cognition if you prefer it,—on will, in the deliberative process. Otherwise, the will-decision is left too open to suspicion of arbitrary and irrational character. True willing must be redeemed as much as possible, in its choices or decisions, from the character of mere impulse, mere "willing our way" to decision, right reason or none. The vagueness of talk of the "weighing of values" does not at all appear to me to make these insistences less necessary. Defects in the psychological presentation are not matters of unimportance, even though psychology be held not to settle the question of the will's freedom. That belongs to the domain of metaphysics, but ethical and psychological presentations have their points and aspects of importance. Psychology has much to do with the questions that cluster around our consciousness of freedom, but it does not seem to me necessary, or justified that it should ignore the dependence of volition on reason

or thought. If free will means that we can will to act as we see it reasonable to act, then there is such dependence on reason or thought, even though the volition is, of course, not caused by thought. But the volition is free, if it harmonises with such thought-judgment. For reason is guide or regulator of action. Ethics often does better than psychology in its presentations of the matter, being less frequently content to treat of our rational-moral choices with every rational element or reference left out, whether idea, reason, thought, reflection, knowledge, or cognition. Such rationality is obviously essential to responsibility, at any rate. In respect of the absolute character of moral responsibility, Theistic Idealism can be second to no other system, in virtue of its transcendental theistic basis. The theistic idealist is no mere hapless adventurer in the speculative realm, but a man who, knowing in part, seeks the whole truth of that God, Who is, for him, the transcendent and ultimate One, his accountableness to Whom is a primary fact of his inner life. But this sense of responsibility or accountableness rests too utterly and too obviously upon the freedom of his will to call for any laboured argument. The sense of responsibility is, as Dr D'Arcy has elsewhere well remarked, "simply the recognition of freedom" [*Short Study of Ethics*, p. 145].

I have laid stress on reason and its ideals in this chapter, because it seems to me important to effect the rationalisation of the freewill experience, and not to leave it in a misleading form as necessarily abrupt, unaccountable, irrational. If there are sudden triumphs of freewill, it will surely not be denied that reason may assert and obtain a sudden mastery. But I am convinced that freewill has no greater triumphs than in those instances where deliberation has been protracted or prolonged, and where the result is neither sudden nor unaccountable. It must be kept in mind that, in freewill, the validity of reason obtains in a sphere where it is in full contact with experience. In science, it is otherwise, for reason is there dealing with a sphere in which its contact with experience is not direct and absolutely immediate. The

rationalisation of experience is, of course, what reason always seeks to effect, and is, in such a case as that of freewill, pre-eminently fitted to realise. For we must be rid of externalism even in respect of the motive, which is implicit in the act, is part of it, and is nothing without the will or self which makes it avail. The truth is, the idea of freedom lies deeply ingrained in the human spirit, and it is curious to note how it haunts the thought of those who deny its objective validity, like Spinoza, Fouillée, Spencer, and others. But let there be no illusion on the subject. Though we seek to rationalise the freewill experience, we are in a sphere where no such prevision is possible as that whereby we can foretell meteorological effects or astronomical eclipses. No, when you make such a search for freedom, you are making a search into being which lies beyond the limits of knowledge: such is the simplicity and irreducibility of the power or faculty of freedom. Indeed, such an attempt can only have deterministic tendency or direction, a fact which is strangely unperceived or unrecognised. The inmost essence of personality is opposed to analysis by means of universal categories, as Windelband has remarked, and this disallowance takes in our consciousness the form of a feeling of the freedom from causality of our being—in other words, of our individual freedom. The self or ego is so little exhausted in mere knowledge, that it has power to reflect reality, and to assume a central position in the world, and to these ends it must summon all the powers of will acting in freedom. The concept of freedom is implied in the concept of person. There is something inadequate, and even absurd, in the suggestion that the pretended consciousness of freedom is merely an unconsciousness of necessity. An illusion of freedom is just what the facts of the case do not give. How can you get the will to figure as the independent force which it appears in freedom, when the will is represented as torn between conflicting motives? You will not get the illusion of freedom out of such contrariety. No, in all this state the self is steadily conscious of being the determiner of its own acts, lord of its own decisions. The presence of

subconscious and semi-conscious factors is, of course, not denied; but if the influences of biologicistic determinism had been what they are sometimes represented to be, we should not have the consciousness of freedom which now is ours, but a sense of utter impotence and complete passivity. If there is illusion, it is that of biologicistic determinism as an explanation of the facts, when every allowance is made for temperament, heredity, *milieu*, and the rest. Another reason why I have laid the stress on reason which I have done is, that there is here displayed at times a tendency to treat reason and will as though they were two hypostases facing each other in the problem. That is clearly not the case. Anything like metaphysical determinism does not here exist. The will may be said to hold in itself the reason of its free determination, for in the free act the will follows so swiftly and entirely the positings of reason, that one might say there is an intellectual pre-existence of the issue in the higher integration of the personality. The determination is by the will, but rationality is the core and essence of the process by which the will's determination is reached. For will is, in result, nothing else than action corresponding to intellectual being, and the principle which obtains is that of which I have already spoken, "*Operari sequitur esse.*" The will is the original motive force of the spirit; but volition is not simply spontaneity, as certain philosophers tend to make it. Nor is spontaneity to be confounded with freedom, any more than one would confound swelling germ with finished fruit. Some of Croce's insistences in this connection do not merit acceptance.

Ethical conduct is, no doubt, a positive and incontestable fact, but that is no reason for giving way to the positivist spirit which has so largely pervaded sociological inquiry in France, and in which freedom has been swamped by social determinism. I have already referred to Wilbois in the chapter, but there are too many others for notice here. Regarding this positivist and socially deterministic teaching, which Lévy-Bruhl advocates, he himself asks,—“Can that earthy realism occupy the place of the idealism which

under a religious or philosophical form has so far nourished the spiritual life of humanity, and inspired everything great that it has done, even the science in the name of which it is now to be banished?" ['Ethics and Moral Science,' Eng. edn., p. 125]. Theistic idealism would not hesitate a moment for its answer, but Lévy-Bruhl himself says that the sentiments that gather here are "irrefutable." There need be no illusion on the subject. If our psychical science is to be haunted and dominated, like our physical science, by the notion of causative necessity—including the species of social determinism—then out and out determinism is the pure undiluted result. But in this result thought will never acquiesce, but ever seek to break those fatalistic fetters. One must even hold that not one of the great ontological systems of the modern period, despite their profuse professions of freedom, ever succeeded either in refuting, or in wholly freeing itself from, the necessitarian contentions of science, and that is a sufficient reason for Theistic Idealism not attaching itself to any one of them. I do not say that theism has known how to use it, but the key is in the hands of Theistic Idealism, and nowhere else. It has at least posited a power of free, ethical self-determination in man, and has denied, in his freedom, the reign of causative sequence or necessity: this it has done in the face of mechanically-dominated scientists, philosophical determinists, and theological necessitarians. There would not have been much of ethics left, if it had not done so, after the causal surrenders of Sidgwick and others. Psychical necessitation would have left us a mere species of spiritual automata. Theistic idealism has also found Nature, in her progressive development, possessed of a means of extruding mechanical necessitation in the introduction of new life forces, potencies, modifications, and changes, all connected with, and characteristic of, the evolutionary process, as no dependent result of mere mechanical means. I have not meant, of course, in my references to social determinism, to imply that deterministic insistence is any necessary part of sociological inquiry, and I shall select a single example in

illustration of the contrary: "It is here that the conception of Free-Will finds its grounds: in the actions of men—whether viewed in groups or individually—there must always be an incalculable element, one which can never be brought within any laws found by an analysis of the Past; and this is equivalent to the assertion of Freedom" [G. C. Wheeler, 'Festskrift Tillegnad Ed. Westermarck,' Helsingfors, 1912, p. 186]. But if there has been something to suggest on the theistic side, there is also something to suggest on the idealistic side. It would be a serious mistake for our idealism to wrap itself up closely in the ideal or inner facts of its own experience as though devoid of all implications. It were anything but wise, or just to experience, to render our idealism so pure and isolated as to make it impotent to account for reality. It obviously cannot so function *in vacuo*. Modes of awareness are, of course, all that is consciously revealed to us. But our idealism does not deny extra-mental physical existents or their sensorial influences upon us. It can agree, with opponents of idealism, that it is "the perceptually revealed organism that, as a living, relatively permanent, extra-conscious, power-endowed being, feels, craves, desires, perceives, thinks, and wills, and this always in relation to a world of outside existents perceptually revealed" [E. Montgomery, 'Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organization,' New York, 1907, p. 155]. There is nothing solipsistic here; the content of our individual consciousness is drawn or derived from the all-embracing, extra-mental matrix of reality, the reality of persons and things. Idealism neither could nor does detach the living self or thinking ego from his natural environment; in vital interaction with it he has his being. But the fact abides that he has no lack of power on his own act and on the world. There are thinkers, like Rauh, who even regard Nature as so far from being absolutely determined, that it is, for them, no more than an *ensemble* of possibilities, tendencies, actualised only by their will. These thinkers hold they can insert their effects into the course of events, in the face of deterministic science. This point of view, that of action, is, they say, all

they are concerned with, and they refuse to regard the universe and themselves as a spectacle. Their position is interesting, but I cannot dwell upon it here: I only remark that it need not be a satisfactory triumph of our will if, in its preferences, it should be found to have confounded its values with existence itself. Our use of values need never blind us to what I shall apply the phrase *la vraie vérité*.

On the whole question, the deterministic reading of our all-revealing consciousness, which testifies to our freedom, appears to me a curious, unsatisfactory, and unhopeful one, when it regards that consciousness as making us centres of the permanent possibility of deception or hallucination on the subject. It is not the freedom of an abstract indeterminism for which I have pleaded, but the conscious freedom of the concrete self in its creative activity. The experience of this self is a living and continuous movement, and its states must not be regarded merely in the discrete or separate fashion found in some discussions. It will be evident, from what has already been advanced as to the real inner character of this self, how little force attaches to talk of action as predictable, because founded upon character, although there is a limited and superficial sense in which this holds good. You cannot predict of psychical factors which only obtain free play and full stature and character in somebody else's coming and untried experience. Anything of the nature of psychical causation here is out of the question. My action, in a new experience, must be allowed to be free: it is free as it expresses the whole of "me." Yet I cannot admit my freest action to be, in any wise, irrational. It may be true to say that "to act without a reason is often the best reason," but I should certainly not care to say so, for I hold that, in freedom, reason is the compass by which we steer, and not the primitive, the instinctive. My free action is always the expression of a consciously willing, reason-directed, being or person, for I am the *Träger* or bearer of my own states, and reject a subjectless psychology, which would reduce me to a series of psychic occurrences, or a process of absolute becoming.

That, of course, is not to say that the living continuum of experience is not to be brought to an arrest, for the purposes of knowledge, and analysed into discrete moments, to which factors order and fixity are given. My rational choice of ends takes place in the wide sphere of values, theoretic and practical, and the freedom by which such choice is marked is the measure of my achieved personality. Our personalities are thus the highest manifestations, found in the world, of the Supreme Personality—the Super-Personality if you will. For the highest freedom is, to theistic idealism, realisable by us only as in Him we live, and move, and have our being. I have, in this discussion, admitted the desirability of departing from some of the older insistences, such as the so-called “liberty of indifference” (*libertas indifferentiæ*), the too external and deterministic use of motive, and the unrestricted, too arbitrary, claims of freedom of choice. On the other hand, there were things found in the older philosophers at times, which it is not just, or good, to forget. For instance, it is expressly said by Stöckl that there must be no talk of freedom of choice in respect of good in the general or universal sense, or of the highest end of our striving, or of a highest good in general [A. Stöckl, ‘Lehrbuch der Philosophie,’ Mainz, 1876, vol. i. p. 131]. These are, of course, only negative moments in the process, but they are not unimportant for a presentation like my own, in which the whole process is taken to be ruled or guided by reason, and purged of irrational and capricious elements. Again, although the intellectualistic air of the “indifference” discussions contrasts strongly with the ethical atmosphere of to-day, yet it is interesting to recall that Descartes rated “indifference” as only the lowest form of liberty (“*infimus gradus libertatis*”), and declared that, if the good could only be clearly seen, free he might be, but would never be indifferent (“*numquam tamen indifferens esse possem*”), while Leibniz held “liberty of indifference” impossible, because there is always a prevailing (“*une raison prévalente*”) or inclining reason (“*quia semper datur ratio inclinans*”). Once more,

many of our modern value-discussions in their increased stress on the mere will element—the mere willing our way to the objects we desire—are certainly no advance, in height or elevation, on many of the older philosophic presentations, in which the idea of reasonable will was so steadily maintained that man, as a reasonable being, was held to be unthinkable save as possessed of freewill. This aprioristic claim for freedom as, so to speak, the necessary consequence of reason in man, had in it something too fine to be simply lost without rebuke from stalwart intellectualism. For in the practical relation it meant much more than many narrow “value” votaries care to admit. It meant the guidance of the will in its action by reason, and the holding before it the norm by which such action should be directed: it raised man above the rule of necessity, and snatched him from the sway of mere instinct. True value, however, has no need to depreciate reason, the bright consummate flower of our psychic nature. The testimony of self-consciousness to the free self-determination of the will is still to be maintained, such freedom of the will meaning simply man’s lordship over himself, his activities all under the *Machtgebot* of reason. We must still, with Hamilton [‘Metaphysics,’ vol. i. p. 265], hold by the pronouncement of Leibniz, that “if our immediate internal experience could possibly deceive us, there could no longer be for us any truth of fact (*vérité de fait*), nay, nor any truth of reason (*vérité de raison*).” It is in consciousness, at any rate, we have the only evidence of our freedom, taking consciousness in its realising activity. The freedom which is ours can hardly be considered, however, as an absolute and unrestricted freedom, since there are forces and sources without us that tend to lay the repressive hand of passivity upon us, so making prediction impossible; but, for all that, the core of the freedom-experience lies in the fact that we do retain, above and beyond all, the power of free, individual choice and initiative, and are purely self-determined. But suppose I say that my experience is not of freedom, but of necessity, have I reached any greater security or certainty? If the freedom-

consciousness can be an illusion, the necessity-consciousness can just as well be an illusion. For this latter, or logical necessity, is only a subjective necessity as an immediate fact of consciousness—for in no more objective sense can we take it as matter of real experience—and, as such, can be just as well regarded as illusion. The only difference that is likely to obtain is the greater clearness of the freedom-consciousness, as probably deeper and more inward in character. Consciousness, no doubt, concentrates upon the inner facts of experience, rather than upon the outer stimuli supplied by nature or reality, but it is not correct to suppose that consciousness most surely guides only in respect of the former, and not at all in respect of the latter. But we may yet undergo some illusion, or make a false interpretation, in the case of facts that have not come clearly or fully into our consciousness. It would be absurd, on that account, to reduce all consciousness to incompetence. Freedom is a quality of my act or deed, and one of which I am fully conscious, so immediately is it given in the fact of my act or deed. Theistic Idealism sees and maintains, on the whole question, the fundamental significance of freedom for our whole world-conception, and for the rebutting of pantheism, to say nothing of materialism. The denial of freedom tends more surely towards universal scepticism than is often perceived: its effects or consequences on moral, and even on intellectual life are more subtle and far-reaching than is often realised. If we are to be asked to brand consciousness as a deep deceiver or an habitual liar, we shall be entitled to ask some weightier substantiation of these asseverations than has been forthcoming. That is what the position really comes to. The *onus probandi* lies with the adversaries of freedom, which is the inexpugnable conviction of the human race. So we refuse to quit the "sanctuary of consciousness," though it be without form, part, or dimension, for it is the abode of freedom, and inviolable to deterministic attack. Thus freedom is, as Hegel maintained, and as I have insisted throughout, given as a fact of consciousness, under direct appeal to inner experience.

In this connection, one may note that it is not infrequent to find dissatisfaction expressed with the notion of Deity being faced with the possibility of evil as a necessary consequence of this freewill in man. But those who have done so have never done anything in the way of propounding more satisfying theory, and this attitude has, in my view, been noticeably accompanied by a defective appreciation of the grandeur of the ethical achievement opened up by the immense possibilities of such freedom. This, of course, is not to say that the theory is without difficulties, but it is to say that it is very easy to underestimate ethical efforts and values. I do not think they can, in this connection, be overestimated. It is obvious that the creation of beings who were incapable of sinning would have excluded the possibility of evil, but would, at the same time, have kept away the possibility of ethical good. To do away with moral freedom would be to rob man of his highest crown. To invoke sheer Divine Omnipotence in the manner sometimes adopted is to intimate that we have moved away from the sphere of moral freedom altogether, and have entered the region of the metaphysical. Even Sidgwick, with his deterministic leanings, held the conception of freedom to be the hidden pivot on which the moral sentiments revolve, and the unsophisticated moral consciousness of mankind acclaims moral freedom as, in every sense, justified. Any thoroughgoing theory of determinism makes our moral judgments irrational. In fact, says Sidgwick, "'responsibility,' 'desert,' and similar terms have to be used, if at all, in new significations by determinists" [*Methods of Ethics*, pp. 71, 72]. But will, in its free exercise, must be maintained as will illuminated by reason, and not identified with desire, or indifference, and still less with caprice. The freedom of the will has been far too much associated with power, especially by theological thinkers, to the neglect of its essential connection with, and enlightenment by, reason. But freedom does not, for Theistic Idealism, usurp the functions of will and feeling in the freedom-experience: that is only the fault of systems

of absolute idealism, where the freedom consequently remains merely intellectualistic and formal. If you say that I am but a fragment torn from its social context, I reply, first, that I am a free fragment, and indeed in another, a real though relative sense, no fragment but a whole and an end to myself; and second, that my concrete freedom is creative of new value, uniquely characteristic of my individuality. That is the achievement of my individuality, and unique as such, for individuality is not something merely given, but also achieved—and achieved through freedom. My freedom I retain, where necessary, in the face of established or accepted values, of any institutional sort whatsoever, for such values are never final, never incapable of improvement, never above the need of revision. But this may be much more a theoretic than a practical attitude. Only, the creation of new value must not be hindered, or repressed, or ignored, for the claims of freedom, where new or higher ideas are concerned, are paramount. If we love freedom, we shall not feel that we are in the world simply to follow the line of least resistance, since that way true self-expression could never lie. When I am told, as by Bosanquet, that freedom is a *nisus* to the whole, that it is ideality or adjustment, the passage of a being beyond itself, I grant it in the sense that my freedom, as creative, unites me more closely to the *Idealwelt*, and in that sense raises me beyond myself; but that ideal world is the only “whole” which I seek, not one of mere mechanical inclusion, nor the abstract one of a mere logical universal. For to me the *Idealwelt* is the real world, and the goal of all our striving. And freedom must, above all, be real, and not formal, as it is so apt to appear in a system which makes everything of totality, yet itself acknowledges that “the totality is never actually achieved at all.” Bosanquet’s “necessary act,” “but not a necessary agent,” can be no satisfactory mode of treating freedom, since it places act and agent in psychologically clumsy and unreal opposition, instead of making the act free as the logical and natural outcome of a free agent. The rational unity of the agent

and his act is precisely what our idealism seeks. No sophistry or special pleading can make the lurking determinism of a "necessary act" an integral part of any tenable theory of freedom. It can be no part of any idealistic-spiritual monism such as our theistic idealism presents. Indeed, I do not find much idealism in speaking, in this connection, as Bosanquet actually does, of "an act which must be what it is," "in the sense that everything is what it is." Ethical freedom is concerned with what ought to be, not what is. Theistic Idealism is not content to give men only such freedom as is implied in the intellectualising of the impulses, the rationalising of the passions, but seeks to impart a freedom truly moral. It sees the futility of certain mundane philosophies telling men that their freedom depends upon their power, while impotently doing nothing to aid them to the needed power. Its superiority, as a *theistic* idealism, is thus clearly seen in the fact that, in spiritualising the nature of the individual, it effects the restoration of spirit and power. For it relates the finite spirit to the Absolute Spirit in ethically harmonious ways, so that accessions of moral strength are available for the reinforcement of the will, making freedom a real and ever-increasing ethical achievement.

CHAPTER X.

THE MORAL ORDER, AND THE SPIRITUAL WORLD, IN
THEISTIC IDEALISM.

THE world carries nothing more certain for us than the existence of values, unless it be the existence, reality, being, from which the values spring. Take moral values first, not forgetting, however, that the moral and the spiritual orders interpenetrate each other, and supplement or mutually invoke each other. Moral values are, it is said, the fundamental postulate of the moral life, and are fruits of our experience of value. In science, on the other hand, things are said to be only known or understood. In the moral order, however, the claim must be made for intelligence, which forms ideals, depending on knowledge of the objective nature of things, whereas the values are only subjective. The rise of the Moral Order is viewed, by Theistic Idealism, in the light of Evolution, and of psychological, moral, and religious teachings as to developmental processes. Philosophical theologians have pointed to the fact that, given the Being of God, as theistically apprehended, the character of the universe then becomes changed. It then rests on a spiritual or supernatural basis, and "the whole visible order of things rests on another, unseen, supernatural order, of which latter it is the symbol or revelation." In that sphere, the values of ethics become supplemented and reinforced by the superimposed values of religion. That is the moral order, or the *moralische Weltordnung*, in its highest reach and richest form, as taken up into religion, in the view of

Wundt. Presently, however, we take it in some of its more distinctively moral aspects, as emphasised or exhibited by writers like Hobhouse, Westermarck, and others, by whom the moral order is viewed as superposed on the natural order of things, in virtue of man's permanent moral consciousness. These moral aspects were already emphasised by Fichte, who made our whole experience-world rest on man's moral nature, and the system of values, when he laid fundamental stress on an eternal and transcendent *Sollen* (what ought to be) as behind all *Sein* (what is). Our Idealism, however, posits an unconditional ideal for the will through reason. The ideal must be glowing: its dynamic force is everything.

It is only through that self-determination, of which I have spoken when treating of Freedom, that our action becomes moral. As Rosmini observed, "we here call moral that liberty which is necessary to constitute an act as morally good." When Huxley said—"The only freedom I care about is the freedom to do right," he failed, as the context shewed, to appreciate the fact that such freedom is only possible in, and already presupposes, a moral world—not one of mere automatism. He failed to appreciate how evolutionary values are. Say that the moral life has its rise in instinct, yet intelligence is its need. The emergence of conscience is inward and self-attested fact, not to be gainsaid. What some try to gainsay, and may certainly for themselves weaken, is the authority of conscience. The guiding rôle is played, in all this, by reason or intelligence. Passing beyond conscience as a psychological fact, theistic idealism is concerned to maintain that its authority is not really self-sufficient and self-supported. Hence we find Flint saying that conscience neither rules, nor pretends to rule, as an autocratic authority, but unequivocally declares itself a delegated authority. Martineau, in like manner, urges that the authority which man owns in the law of duty is so far from being of his own setting up, that his whole personality bows in homage before it. Lévy-Bruhl admits the strength of the position in his 'Ethics and Moral Science' [ch. vii.].

We may do well, with Pfeiderer, to recognise in conscience an inner, if not innate, factor, giving it its self-identical, unconditional, and abiding character, and also an empirical factor, whereby are rendered intelligible its diverse and variable forms or appearances. Moral ideas are really no more innate than rational ideas; they are formed by the mind, however, and are not merely adventitious. This is not to say that the mind has given them to itself, for the conscience is not autonomous, in the sense of having its base or foundation in itself. The attempt to give it an existence of its own, however, independently of God, is at least as old as the *Euthyphro* of Plato, to which I refer later. Conscience is subjective, but the ultimate source of its authority is objective; its demand is marked by absoluteness, in our will-decisions. The autonomy of our moral and spiritual nature, says Pfeiderer, finds in "theonomy" its "firmest stay and final foundation." Morality, in its earliest stage, may, no doubt, be called pre-rational, but with an aspiration after the rational. In its pre-Christian stage, conscience was to Augustine a wisdom-conferring "natural judicial power"; in another of his works, he calls it "a certain noble judicial power that God hath inserted in us." Conscience is, no doubt, a fact universal in human nature, and hence, in a rational time like our own, there is, without impugning the fact of collective moral life, not a little absurd and fallacious talk of what is termed the collective conscience—a precarious and shifting phenomenon. But I do not mean to deny an historic empiricism in the matter. In a recent important work on elementary forms of the religious life, Durkheim says the collective conscience is a synthesis *sui generis* of particular consciences; and it is his position that society itself is a synthesis of human consciences. But the matter is not so easy as it looks. For the synthesis is not simply a result, but is also used as a condition. The individual elements are then regarded only as parts in the totality or social whole. Each individual has to learn to appreciate the worth of this whole, but equally this whole must allow proper autonomy to the

individual while related to the whole. You must not allow your collective conscience to treat the individual elements as abstract or negligible factors: you must not rank them as secondary or subordinate in importance: your society depends, for its cohesion and strength, on individual will and conviction. It is too relative to the individual for this latter to be lightly overborne by it: it owes too much to his thought, belief, conviction, for that; but, on the other hand, the individual is formed only in and by society, so that reciprocity, not opposition, should exist between the two. It is, however, with individual conscience we are now concerned. Whatever the origin of conscience, it is, as Mr Shand says, unique among sentiments in that it has no private object or end ('Foundations of Character,' p. 119). It is, nevertheless, about the most pronounced fact of personal life. Conscience is the power in us that would harmonise action with conviction. It may exist in us in a certain blind, instinctive, and irrational way, but the day dawns when reason demands its authority and credentials. Theistic Idealism knows the sorrow and the loss of that day, should faith in God, Freedom, and Immortality have faded or fled, through any contempt of conscience and its laws. For it also knows how little the moral order is founded upon custom, circumstance, or environment, rather than an unconditional basis of morality. Not, of course, but what conscience has in us its limitations, due to our age and surroundings; its laws, however, are above us, and other than our individual wills. There are in our time philosophers who make God "the creation of our own conscience," but our idealism is more impelled to make God the source and final support of our conscience, for it has the insight to perceive that conscience must be interpreted or explained in its highest reaches or levels, not its lowest. These reaches of the moral order run up, as we shall see, into the world to come, and they suggest a governing Agency in the universe not lacking the essential attributes of personality. Hence conscience remains the "universal legislator in the kingdom of ends." Rosmini properly remarked that the

moral order does not denote "a tendency which can find rest in the finite and the temporal; it must attain to the infinite and the everlasting, and there alone has birth and life" ('*Teodicea*,' Napoli, 1847, *in loco*; Eng. edn., vol. ii. p. 130). Of the Infinite Essence of Being, he elsewhere observes, we partake only in a finite manner, but "in the respect due to this Infinite Essence," it is maintained, "lies the ultimate ground of every moral law, of every moral obligation" (*Ibid.*, p. 220). To secure this respect our spiritual anthropocentrism exists. To make God "the creation of our own conscience," is to make conscience a god, and render God superfluous. But if conscience is a god, then it is not we, but other than we. In that case it can only be God, and, if this would carry us too far, we must at least cede that it is God's vicegerent in us. It is our consciousness of the Ideal, at any rate, and the Ideal is of Reason, of which God, the Absolute Reason, is Creator.

When Dr Schiller, in his '*Humanism*,' says that Pragmatism "at a blow" awards "supreme authority" to the Good over the True and the Real, the "blow" appears to me too hasty, and I am unable to approve it, as appearing to me part of "irrationalism." A sorry Good it would be, if there were already no True and no Right. Dr Schiller's defect here is in metaphysical grasp of ultimate being. I admire, however, his high regard for ethical values. Of such values, evolution, which consists of growth, is the determinant. Ethical inquiry may, in one sense, be nothing but the philosophy of values; but this need not lead us to forget that ethical ideals are the product of developed reason, and that evil is in the intelligence as it is in the will. In this connection may be noted the great service rendered to ethical thought by Dr Rashdall's admirable discussions on the rational character of morality, with whose main contentions I strongly sympathise. He plants himself, as I should certainly do, upon "the actual contents of the moral consciousness" ('*Theory of Good and Evil*,' vol. ii. p. 359), about which "we know a great deal more" than we do about "the moral consciousness or pre-moral con-

sciousness of savages and animals." Inquiries into social psychology, and the origin and development of moral ideas, have their interest, place, and value, and should be accorded due welcome, but they cannot be allowed to prevent the free formation of ethical theory securely based on study of the developed moral consciousness. Yet that is what a somewhat one-sided critic seeks to prevent, in favour of a purely evolutionary treatment, with a chaotic and conjectural psychology in which reason shall be "quite as much conative and affective in its tone as it is cognitive" ['The Philosophical Rev.', Sept. 1916]. That critic forgets, in his evolutionary engrossments, that as soon as the moral ideal is set up in consciousness, reason must be differentiated from will, precisely as Dr Rashdall has done, and he also shows a strange lack of sense of the unconditioned character of the moral demand, in its conformity to the ideal and necessity of reason.

The moral consciousness does not, under law, reach stable or permanent result or ground, and hence we are carried on to that firm positing of good and of evil, which we find in the spiritual or religious order, of which we have to speak. The highest Ideal must in its principle be absolute. The absolute Ideal of virtue is, for our Idealism, found in God. As Leibniz said—"Qui Deum amat, amat omnes." The moral progress of man will lead him to an habitual and instinctive virtue, in which the weight of obligation will be always less conspicuously present. But no idealism can shut its eyes to the fact of generic sin—the universality of moral evil—whereby human nature has separated itself from ideal virtue—from God. Such moral evil is an integral feature of human life, one whose reality has been recognised by all the great religious systems, however diversely they may have regarded or interpreted it. For we must be true to the great facts of moral experience, and to the call from the manifoldness of sense to ideal-building reason. Dr Schiller speaks of Lotze as identifying God with an Absolute which is simply the totality of existence, and then points to the problem of evil as it presents itself in that case. But,

though Dr Schiller may be ignorant of it, or acknowledge it not, the personal Absolute of our theistic idealism is neither "evil as well as good," nor "non-moral and indifferent," as Dr Schiller absurdly supposes every form of monistic argument must suggest or require. Our Idealism does not entertain the crude superstition of evil as an original principle or quality with any independent being: it does not seek a reason for evil as the irrational: evil is to it only a perversion or disordering of the good, and appertains only to persons; it is a wrong relation of the self to the universal Ideal; to treat evil as a force in eternal conflict with good is to harbour a discarded myth, which has nothing to do with our personal Absolute. When Dr Ward and others put aside, with the customary wave of the evolutionary hand, the theories of a fall and of original sin, one cannot but feel that the problem is a far deeper one than our modern theorizers have realised, in their easy and assumptive modes of treatment. I have no call here to go into the much-canvassed questions or hypothetical discussions as to moral origins, but it is necessary to express one's convictions as to modern interpretations of the moral experience of mankind. I only premise that the theistic hypothesis does not admit an exclusion of Divine operation from the sphere or process of human origins, lying beyond knowledge. I even doubt whether the modern writers already referred to have ever stayed to consider either how far even the Mosaic account—allegorise or mythicise it as we may—may be said to contain data enough for a true fall from pristine innocence, not from the "fiction" of perfection, or the related questions that would arise therefrom. Goodness—so far as we may talk of such—of the Adamic type, is absolutely non-cultural, and of the most rudimentary nature. Our idealism postulates only, for such a type, that there shall be within the nature, as at first created, no predetermined necessity to any sinful or abnormal development, the more so that the race was, by hypothesis, incorporate, physically and juridically, in him. It has yet to be shown that there is anything unnatural in the possibility of spontaneous and instinctive

obedience or loyalty, on the part of so immature a creature, to the Author of all being. If defection, in such a case, seems to us strange or even inexplicable, we must not forget that it is so because it is irrational, arbitrary, and abnormal—a “bad miracle,” as Bushnell said. That is to say, the first man must be taken as distinctly amoral, not, creatively, a moral essence: he bore within him the moral idea, no doubt, the organic bond between him and the creative Deity; not with the world creation, however, but only with the racial knowledge, consequent upon the appearance of woman as his mate, begins morality, as the knowledge of good and evil. Bearers they both were of the moral idea hitherto, but that moral idea now descended into the arena of practice. Their aim was to be as gods—Godhead, in fact—and, in their development, the most original morality appears as the racial morality of their joint humanity. But I recall myself from these tentative and undogmatic remarks to the fact that I have already eschewed the bootless quest of origins as beyond our present scope. If, with Kant, we hold a doctrine of the positive and radical evil of human nature—a doctrine constituting the ugly necessity of human redemption—then we may very justifiably prefer a non-committal to Pfleiderer’s easy and dogmatic pronouncement of any Fall theory as inconceivable and incredible. The original moral order of the world is only too easily confounded with its present disorganisation. The unity and the solidarity of the race call for a deeper treatment in this connection than they seem to me ever to get, and there is certainly nothing “incredible” in temptation taking a form that might appeal to man in his crudest and most immature state. Kittel, as an Old Testament critic and scholar, pronounces the Genesis account of the Fall the work of “a philosopher, a religious genius of the first rank,” who tells “in poetic language” of a “revolt” of the human will which “caused an irreparable flaw in our nature.” But Theistic Idealism, as it concerns our present purpose, takes its stand upon the experiential fact of the patent and profound liability to evil of universal human nature. It

views moral evil as contra-ideal — not mere illusion or vanishing factor. It is justly impressed with the persistent and universal craving for redemption and deliverance. It finds the possibility of moral evil a necessity of such an evolved moral world, but in strict propriety divinely permitted only in a negative sense. For it holds no theory of inherited or racial sinfulness which would preclude human responsibility and freedom. Virtue, for it, must be chosen, not created, and chosen for its own sake, as the one good of transcendent value. The moral order deepens in its hold, as the moralisation of mankind proceeds. But the moral evil, which retards this progress, theistic idealism seeks faithfully to understand. Such evil is not itself an end; it has not a final cause. To say, with Leibniz, that such moral evil is mere privation, the inevitable outcome of human finiteness or original imperfection; to make it, with Spinoza, mere finite defect or limitation of being; to resolve it, with Julius Müller, in a sweeping fashion, into essential selfishness; to treat it, with Schleiermacher, as positive opposition of the flesh to the spirit; to regard it, with Pfleiderer and others, as good in the making, an incomplete stage or inevitable incident, in the process whereby the Divine ideal and purpose for men are being realised; to say, with Dr Rashdall and others, that evil is due to an intrinsic original limitation of power, on the part of Deity, Who causes evil as a means to the greatest possible good on the whole; these all are, in varying degrees, unsatisfactory modes of dealing with moral evil, in the view of theistic idealism. It sets down evil, as moral, primarily to a rooted lack of faith in God, and lack of loyalty to His will and moral purpose for us: it regards evil as no positive entity, but yet as concentered in a positive subject; it remedies it by no abstract and formal principle or method, but by restoring man to the most ideal and yet concrete of relations, that of loyal obedience to God. In the ethical consciousness of man, his spiritualised reason, standing in midst of the fallings from us, vanishings of sense and earthly things, yet feels immediate certainty of its own universal

validity; and his soul has an indubitable experience of transcending the particularity of his own empiric nature, as he wills and acts *sub specie aeternitatis*. This, of course, in virtue of the universal character of moral law, as found in the ethical consciousness, the sense of obligation being no merely personal, subjective, and contingent thing. This universality of the fundamental ethical values is a primary insistence of theistic idealism. The moral sense so far from conflicts with Reason as to evoke in Reason a consciousness of new potentialities, and to sustain and strengthen her, while these potentialities are in course of development. In that development—within the ethical sphere—it must be said that the vaunted Bergsonian conception of “creative evolution” cuts a rather poor figure. For ethical advance is through no mere capricious changes or adventitious results, but rather through what the Italian philosopher Gioberti was pleased to call the second creative cycle. Ontology was to Gioberti the first, although in my view the Absolute Being is not mere Actuality, but already the active Unity of the Ideal and the Real. In this second cycle, ethical activity securely effects virtuous transformations by a successive creation of moral acts, its ideal limit being found only in God Himself. For God, it must be said, is the archetype of the principles, laws, and ideals of ethical Reason, so far as our idealism is concerned. Dr Rashdall, in his very able treatment of the problem of moral evil, from his valuable two-volumed work down to his Deansgate Lecture at Manchester, seems to me to come short in the following way. It is a quite incommensurable form of solution to trace a *moral* problem to a limitation of *physical* power in Deity; and his treatment remains metaphysical, with an ominous ignoring of ethical factors—freedom, responsibility, and ethical possibility being strangely unconsidered, though, in the view of theistic idealism, these lead to the determination of the whole matter. Our ideal of the good develops with the development of reason. The treatment offered by Leibniz was unsatisfactory enough, when he traced evil to an original

imperfection in the creature, prior to sin, the creature being in his view essentially limited. Dr Ward, in his 'Realm of Ends,' seems to find much more satisfaction in the philosophy of evil offered by Leibniz, than is easy to extract from it. Leibniz strangely failed to see the contradictions involved in his identification of metaphysical evil—from which physical and moral evil are derived—with imperfection. As if, because developing being must be imperfect, it must needs be evil! As if liability to evil were evil itself! His mode of identifying evil with the unreal was thus a blind procedure. If evil is limitation, good is then illimitableness, infinitude, absolute liberty. No one could have more completely failed to grasp evil as real, as the antithesis of good, as the absence of a good which was due, and ought to have been present. Its abnormal character was quite veiled from his ill-grounded optimism. But Leibniz hesitated openly to say that original metaphysical evil or limitation was the source of sin and sorrow. But Dr Rashdall's ascription of it to an intrinsic original limitation of power, on the part of the Creator, is a position which one would much more hesitate to adopt. In both Leibniz and Rashdall, the former putting the original limitation in the creature and the latter putting it in the Creator, there is clearly wanting a true conception of evil, *plus* a proper harmonisation or correlation of the free and the determinate, the limited and the illimitable, the individual and the Absolute, wherein both terms shall have justice done to them. God's relation to moral evil in His free and intelligent action is a purely permissive one. Ours depends on the development of the Ideal of Reason. The problem of so-called natural evil, on which Rothe, Pfleiderer, Martineau, and many others have dwelt, has been entirely dwarfed by the graver and more mysterious problem of moral evil. But in Dr Rashdall, Mr Clement Webb, and certain others, there is some lack of sufficiently discriminating moral from natural evil, intimately related as the two forms of evil may be. We may say, perhaps, with Lotze, that it is by no means evident why the natural evils or physical suffering of the world

should be, in any way, the result of moral evil or of the abuse of freedom. But I think "earth felt the wound" (Milton) in deeper ways than we know. The philosophical outlook on natural evil takes now a more hopeful turn, as increasing good is found to spring from the development of Nature. This lightening of the problem of natural evil has been largely due to the discussions of Wallace, Martineau, Fiske, Drummond, and others. God is more nearly related to natural than to moral evil.

Theistic Idealism does not forget the weakness of a postulated moral order, like that of Fichte, which, under the cardinal Fichtean principle of the primacy of the practical reason, or the central concept of *sollen*—central for the whole of philosophy—is regarded as a truly spiritual order, and as the only sort of divinity in which we need believe. In our time, Rickert has placed stress one-sidedly on duty, not being, as the object of knowledge. Theistic idealism perceives all too clearly the weakness of such a faith as Fichte's in the moral order of the universe, in so far as its moral basis does not rest on God, but on merely human ends. Ends that are moral, but purely human, are still lacking in guarantee for stability and fulfilment; they are this-world ends, and fail to satisfy the deepest requirements of man; not so the moral ends blended with those which, as religious, are of God's ordering. These carry in and with them the pledge of His power and aid towards their realisation or accomplishment. No idealistic morality, which does not draw upon these moral resources and incentives of theistic idealism, can reasonably compare with it in exalted character, inspiration, and effective energy. The moral harmony and equilibrium, which such an idealism creates, leave the soul, so brought to the Supreme Source of being and perfection, fit and free to pursue the great end of moralistic virtue. The stress of the moral order is on universality, while religion has power for duty and the realisation of perfection. Religion or the spiritual order has its own specific oughtness, as we shall see. For that plurality of moral ends, or tendency to manifoldness of aim, so often found in us as men, Theistic Idealism seeks, from the side of

ethico-religious idea, the unification which it alone can properly effect. It does not, like Indian philosophy, fundamentally err by ignoring the will. Such an unitary, all-embracing, and objective value as the spirit of man at its deepest craves, theistic idealism offers in its disclosure of ideal perfection and necessary existence—the Unconditioned Being or Absolute Personality. In this Infinite Personality finds the soul the final end and meaning of all things, the grounding of all values. It is, of course, not forgotten, in speaking of the moral order and the spiritual order as we have done, that a different sort of mediation has been sought by William James, in which dogmatic naturalism and dogmatic supernaturalism are both avoided to make room, not for any kind of objective or rational order, but for the free play of the individual, as affecting the spiritual life, in the Will-to-Believe philosophy. Valuable as personal spontaneity and practical beliefs and activity may be, it cannot be at all philosophically satisfactory to rest in such an absence of world-order or system. Pragmatism concerns itself far too little, in its ethical theorisings, with eternal distinctions of right and wrong to be satisfying. There is too little of the unconditional and authoritative, in its ethical insistences on the merely useful, relative, and fruitful, for personal behaviour. We prefer to ground more deeply our *inébranlable* certitude of moral obligation.

The moralistic approach to the foundational religious position seems to me finely illustrated in the *Euthyphro* of Plato, where the law-fulfilling, and religious loyalty of *δσιόρης* fall at least within the scope of the generic conception of sanctity, and virtue is viewed as of kin with the Divine by reason of its own eternal and immutable essence (*Euthy.*, 5 D, 9 E, and 12 E). The end of such religious fealty was, says the *Apology*, to be found in care for the perfection of their souls (*Apol.*, 30 A). Plato's soul was a trinity—of the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational—in unity. The cardinal Greek virtues were, in the view of Aquinas, acquired, while the theological virtues (faith, hope, and love) were inspired. But we have come to know that morality, so soon as its ends rise above a this-world character, has, for its specific need, these

latter or religious virtues of faith, hope, and love, by which it is ever pressed up more closely towards that final union of ideal perfection and necessary existence which is summed in God. Aristotle had, however, already pointed out very clearly that moral theory exists only for the sake of practice, saying that "we study ethics not that we may know what virtue is, but that we may become good men; otherwise there could be no advantage in it whatsoever." Plato had declared, in the *Republic*, that ethical virtues "are like qualities of the body, which, not being in us at first, are put into us by training and habit"; and, in the tenth book of the *Laws*, that "there are in us certain virtues; therefore God possesses fully all virtue" (*Leg.*, 900 D). The so-called theological virtues are very often supposed to make the ancient contemplation of moral excellences or *ἀρεταί* no longer needful. It is not seen that this is to have fallen from Christianity itself, as may be seen in Pauline virtue, which is not one of *right doing* merely, such as Aristotle inculcated, but a virtue so idealistic and interior as to consist in *right thinking*. Our right thinking will issue in our virtue being, in terms of a true Aristotelian idea, a good "habit of choice." To Aristotle, virtue was the most natural of all things, yet finely does he discriminate between being virtuous by nature and becoming virtuous, through self-determination and conformity to the true law of our nature. Thus nature has only made us *for* virtue, but we ourselves must make ourselves virtuous. The wellbeing or welfare signified in *εὐδαιμονία* comes clearly short of that character of necessity and universality which marks the life of virtue as we to-day understand it. The life of virtue is, in Aristotle's view, the life of right reason or *ὀρθὸς λόγος*. It is his conscious accord with this *λόγος* or law that makes the virtuous man's actions right. These, as virtuous, are free from excess or defect; they can neither be added to, nor subtracted from, without spoliation; they conform to a law of symmetry. They are, further, the outcome of a free and rational choice, which loves the right for the right's sake. The chief of virtues, to Aristotle, is "higher justice," which is not a part, but the whole of virtue; complete, in an absolute sense, it

is not, but in relation to one's neighbour; so ideal a virtue is such justice, that neither evening nor morning star is so lovely as this supreme quality of personal life. No wonder, these thoughts of Aristotle being true, Hesiod should have declared that "Justice is the virgin daughter of Zeus," or that Plotinus should have pronounced virtue to be without a master (*ἀρετὴ ἀδέσποτος*). Virtue, conformity to moral idea, was, to Plotinus, the prime good of the soul, but virtue was to him of the nature of form—vehicle or basis of beauty. It is in the Stoic theory of virtue, as represented, say, in Aurelius, that we find the inwardness of virtue really brought out, and its self-sufficing character set forth. Prof. E. V. Arnold has carefully discussed the subject in his 'Roman Stoicism' (chap. xii.), showing how the ideal of virtue was held "as alike single and complete in itself." Primarily cosmic was virtue to Aurelius; it is something due to the universe or God. We are free to be moved only from within: the good man, as lord of his own life, is such a king among men as had not been dreamed. But I do not dwell on this, having devoted a chapter to the philosophic aspects of Aurelius in my 'Studies in European Philosophy.' Boëthius, later, enjoined on the Middle Ages "the consolations of Philosophy," which consisted in "the superlative worth of conscience and virtue." So, too, Pomponazzi, the last of the Schoolmen, set forth Virtue as an end in itself—the moral law as the one universal rule in human life—three hundred years before Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. To-day, after every attack, man remains the ethical centre of the universe.

What we have seen to be true of moralism is not less true of spiritualism. The spiritualism, for which we have been made, is ours only through the obedience of faith, faith in and of reason. This spirituality may be reached by the path of moral feeling and apprehension, for the ethical holds within its reach ultimate spiritual reality. Wallace has bidden us "accept the spiritual nature of man, as not in any way inconsistent with the theory of evolution," and Romanes has shewn the path of scientific thought to lead

to spiritual faith. So incurable is man's faith in the Unseen. Virtue, said Malebranche, is "a habitual, free, and dominating love of the immutable order." But the full and effective moralism of Christianity rests upon a spiritual and theistic basis not always remembered or provided for. No finer insistences on moralistic virtue have been made in modern times than by Emerson. But his weakness is that he "averts his ken from half of human fate." This "unfallen" man has too much overlooked the fact that his "cathartic virtue" will be fully realised only where spiritual cleansing and renewal have been known. This, for the reason that the prior consciousness of moral failure must be relieved, before true and perfect freedom for the attainment of moral virtue can be gained. The heart, transformed by such experiences, will emerge from the deeps of regret, to make, with mighty passion and sublime hope, for the steeps of virtue. For it has sustaining power, as ethical idealism demands, behind it to make its aims at virtue effectual. The path to moral rectitude thus securely laid, we may then go on to point out that man's deepest need and greatest beatitude is to walk in this way. "It makes him," says Emerson, "illimitable." There is no greater mistake than to suppose the practice of moral virtue to be an unillumined result of power of will—will unlighted by faith. We are such natural believers as Montaigne declared. Faith is an essential factor in our moral development, for it is faith in right and in reason; foredoomed to failure is every philosophy that does not recognise the fact. There is no philosopher whatsoever who is wholly without faith of some sort. The universe in which we are set is so framed as to make demand on our rational faith, but there is in that no turning of the back on reason. Spiritual religion rests on rational faith, but there is no proper faith which finds not its whole warrant in reason. Faith is the flower of insight. It is not the fruit of any arbitrary will to believe. No sufficient basis for moral obligation can be found in the data of positive science: there remains always the need for moral or reasonable faith in the binding character of the moral Ideal. No unpsychological

misconceptions of such a faith of reason must keep us from having the insight to perceive, and the courage to maintain, its reasonableness and necessity. It is not to be confounded with the blind faith of some theological writers. Always upon such a necessary and rational faith must the practice of moral virtue very largely depend, and we do well to remember, with Plato, that the risks in the ventures of such a faith are noble. For these moral transfigurations are but a noble hope—the *ἐλπίς μεγάλη* of Plato. We needs must have a wellnigh boundless faith in the rightness and worth of moral virtue, and the untold possibilities of its attainment, ere its practice shall become for us the psychological possibility and the imperative necessity it should be. It is the virtuous *mind* we idealistically need, even before the virtuous *will*: philosophy should be a philosophy of insight: when we have learned to “think on these things” and to love them, we shall certainly do them. Therefore, says the author of “Comus”—

“Love Virtue ; she alone is free.
 She can teach you how to climb
 Higher than the sphery chime ;
 Or, if Virtue feeble were,
 Heaven itself would stoop to her.”

There is just the trouble ; Heaven seems all unheeding of the troubles of virtue ; Nature seems blindly indifferent to her tramplings and defeats. But this moral indifference of Nature, Bagehot used to argue, was a necessity to such a being as man, affording the only fair field for morality, with no bribes to virtue. Maeterlinck reminds us that the indifference of Nature to our moral actions does not prove that she has no morality or equity of her own, or that there is no morality but ours. Rightly enough, and more relevantly, he insists on the need to let our consciousness—with its certitudes as to virtue—speak, howsoever force may seem to belong to the immensities and destinies of the universe. By these, within ourselves, we must abide ; to these, theistically interpreted, we must be loyal ; these alone are for us con-

sistent, coherent, and fruitful. It is this absolute and indefeasible worth of moral virtue, we are now concerned to maintain. It will do an infinite deal more for us, in the practical outworking of life, than Royce's rather formal and futile maxim of "loyalty to loyalty," which may only too easily leave men mere loyal partisans. Not so with a theistic or spiritual loyalty to Virtue; she is no shade; she is neither a half-god nor a half-good; her worth is beyond question; her value beyond compute; her credentials are complete; her assurances of the highest; "*intaminatis fulget honoribus.*" For her viewpoint is no one-sidedly intellectual one, but experiential, with an elevation of life, and an influx of spiritual force and energy, that can by no reasonable possibility give way to mere theoretic proof of truth. For the idea of God is the ground of her moral world-order. With insight Varisco has made her the determiner of value, but it must be conscious virtue.

Turn we now to the spiritual order and its values. There the sense of the infinite prevails in a way that transcends definitions, and eludes the classifications of scientific psychology. There the life supernatural is not less real, as fact, than the natural life. I will venture to give to a metaphysical poet's couplet a new application in this connection—

"O pure of heart! thou need'st not ask of me
What this strong music in the soul may be!"
(Coleridge, "Ode on Dejection.")

It would be grossly illogical and absurd, however, to suppose that this overpowering and uplifting influence of the Divine or Absolute Life makes truth other than of capital importance for the soul. There is a harmony of the spiritual order, which carries to the inner life its own sense of the truth, an "invisible harmony" which, as Heraclitus said, "surpasses the visible" (*ἁρμονίῃ ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων*). Religious life is thus related to God, and is not simply a sense of human need. Spiritual experience, as we have spoken of it, is expressive of a psychological need, but it must be courageously remembered that such experience is at the same time

knowledge. If I live, and move, and have my conscious being in God, this consciousness is no mere subjective experience of mine, but has metaphysical significance, namely, the unity of my consciousness with God as living and real. Clearly, a certain knowledge of the truth of God's being and reality must come to me in such a trans-subjective experience. Even in mysticism the claim is still to knowledge, deeper in source or kind. One may venture to say, therefore, that the stress of the New Testament upon knowledge in such a connection is, rightly understood, justified—is philosophically correct. It is the glorious *terminus ad quem* of faith's quest or the inward concentration of the spiritual consciousness. Yet it has lately been affirmed that the God of metaphysics "must lie outside experience properly so called." Why? A more monstrous and unreasonable claim than that metaphysics, as a metaphysic of experience, shall take no account of, nor allow any metaphysical value to, religious experience, could not well be conceived. It is a narrow and illogical prejudice, grounded in lack of any deep analysis of the metaphysical basis of religious experience. It is most absurd to suppose that metaphysics cannot maintain its own distinctiveness intact, while doing metaphysical justice to religious, to æsthetic, and other forms of experience. The metaphysic of Theistic Idealism claims the whole world of experience, welcomes all the revelations of Nature and of Grace; not even in the realm of the so-called supernatural does it abandon the appeal to experience, for the transcendent, too, is known, in some sort, in, and as, experience. Theistic Idealism co-ordinates theological knowledge with all other knowledge, because it finds no valid reason why religiously experiential knowledge should not rise into the embrace of metaphysic: it distinguishes the God of metaphysics, certainly, from the God of theology, but denies, as a needless confusion of thought, that they are inharmonious or antagonistic. Religious acts or experiences and metaphysical elements are, of course, disparate, but to say that the former are devoid of metaphysical significance is a shallow and prejudiced conclusion, involving the ruling out of the spiritual sense (*sensus numinis*) from

the realm of experience and the treatment of reason. Is it meant to deny that such religious communion with God is realised content of my actual consciousness? But such realised content must be, metaphysically, knowledge of the real. There is no real of any metaphysical value save the real which is such a content of actual, and further possible, experience. There is nothing illusory in the knowledge so gained, for it is knowledge, with due qualification, of Reality at its highest. Nor is there any really good or valid reason why the transcendent Other, basic and primary to religious experience, should not eventually prove to be identical with the God of metaphysics, reached as the Deity of the latter is in other and distinctively metaphysical methods or ways. It may even be said that the mystical element of religion has here proved of great philosophical service, in recalling men's minds to the immediate unity of God and man—the immediate knowledge of God. Hence an Eckhart could say that his eye and God's eye were one eye, signalling the immediate unity of his experience—and the saying was caught up by Hegel. But the truth is clearly manifest and easily traceable, whereby Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher also, have all tended towards this spiritual goal, wherein separation from God is transcended, and the unity of God and man is established as the reasonable ideal of religion. But Theistic Idealism finds no confounding of metaphysics with theology, or of man with God, in all this; man is not yet God, but distinguishes his own personality from that of God. But it would be easy to name leading philosophers in various countries who, ignoring the fact that mystical experience has ceased to be the rarity it once was, have not got beyond the stale and antiquated objection that the mystical aspect is valid for the individual, but not for scientific treatment, as if any illumined philosophy to-day would exclude from its purview enlightened mystical experience any more than it would æsthetic experience! It will have its critical philosophy of mysticism without ceasing to appreciate the mystic, or do him justice. Such God-united man is free in this unity with ethical Deity—

free to judge all things and be judged of none. An idealism, indeed, worthy the name, which so refers man directly to God—philosophically, the most universal, and mystically, the most individual, of spiritual perceptions—and frees him of all insecure forms of mediation. This emphasis on individual personality is, in principle, of universal validity. That notion of individuality whereby we might, like Dr Bosanquet, make the Absolute the only real individual, seems to me an extremely unhelpful one; for, admitting its formal correctness, just like the one only perfect Personality of Lotze, it does not philosophically advance us in the very least. The only persons to whom the conception might be useful are those philosophers who regard personality in the Divine Being as a difficulty, because of the trite repetition that personality is individuation, and individuation is limitation, and who opine, further, that personality means opposition and relation, things not to be supposed in Deity. But this is utterly to fail to comprehend personality in Deity, which Theistic Idealism always takes as personality stripped of its human accidents and limitations. The other Absolute, taken as absolute Divine transcendence, could only land us in the morass of agnosticism. The conception of Dr Bosanquet does not tell us anything about the relation of the one real Individual to man's relatively real individuality, which is what philosophy wants to know, nor does it give us any serviceable conception of individuality for this purpose. It leaves us with the dreary and futile iterations of certain Neo-Hegelians anent "impervious and isolated" selves, as if there could be such a thing in any absolute sense. The individual has obvious need of the system of individuals for its own self-fulfilment as an activity, although it has being-for-itself. But one has yet to learn that Hegelians doubt that "our wills are ours" to "make them" God's, in ethical union by voluntary self-surrender. That is to grant the real, the theistic issue, in the matter, and it should have been obvious to certain airy dogmatists that a man cannot "make" his "will" or inner self God's in voluntary surrender, unless it be, in some real and independent sense, his own. This is

part of "the obvious which is neglected," in Dr Bosanquet's own words. Another part is, the illogicality, in the strict sense, of calling God an Individual, since an individual is supposed to be included in a genus. God, the absolutely One, is the Source of all the manifoldness found in the world, but always with respect for man's inviolable freedom. Dr Bosanquet speaks of "a systematic identity" which "subordinates diversity to itself," and in which "identity and difference are distinguishable but inseparable points of view." This is but the old vice of Neo-Hegelianism, whereby the diverse interests of the ethical individual are sacrificed on the "systematic" shrine, under the exigencies of an abstract "unity of the whole," to which the individual elements or moments are all too thoroughly "subordinated." There never has been, and never will be, much room or scope for the essence of individuality, "as the being oneself," under the bare "systematic" unity and "subordinating" identity shadowed forth by Dr Bosanquet and those who share this standpoint. A couple of decades ago, the sacrifice was wont to be made upon the shrine of "organic" metaphor, but, if the name is changed, the sacrifice abides, and human individuality is immolated upon a theory of the actual which is purely abstract, wholly unreal, and entirely unilluminating. It is satisfactory that even Dr J. E. M'Taggart has said in 'Mind' that "organic unity is an inadequate category," which it undoubtedly is, if only as related to the idea of environment. The attractive Hegelian phrase, "the concrete universal," is, notwithstanding its pregnant and figuratively suggestive character, one which, as a theory of the actual, only hypnotises Hegelian reason, and hides from its intelligence the absence of any defensible or comprehensible account of the actual and true relations of finite selves to the ultimate unity. We are too deeply enmeshed in the sphere of the conditioned to be able to judge of "the Whole" as if we were spectatorial in some Deific way, in our attitude. The phrase about "the concrete universal" is, in my judgment, too purely ontological to serve by any possibility as an explication, where the relations of man's free ethical individuality are concerned, and so the chasm between

the individual and the universal remains as unbridged as it was before Dr Bosanquet's book, with its fine *anregend* quality, was written. But that is serious enough failure, if it be the case that the true logical analysis, and correlation of the individual essence, is the key of the world. This is all the unifying conception or *Aufhebung* or incorporation has been able to effect. It is interesting to find Dr Bosanquet frankly saying that ethics "cannot be" a "character" of "a whole or world, but only of its finite members" ('Individuality and Value,' p. 16). For this frank acknowledgment of the utterly non-ethical character of "the Whole," in which we are to find truth and philosophical salvation, we are grateful, since it puts the seal on our own contentions. The very soul of Theistic Idealism revolts against such a conception. Its moral sense and its metaphysical instincts alike are outraged by such an unethical supremacy as the all-controlling factor in thought and life. What a back-set to metaphysical progress, which has been fighting its way to an ethicised Supreme for years! What a reversion to worse than the most unblushingly unethical Calvinism that any theologian was ever accused of! A strange philosophy of the universe that attempts "the arduousness of reality" by expunging all ethical "characters" from it! Imagine a "world" or self - confessed non - ethical "whole," whose ethical "finite members" are to be permitted the soul-uplifting experience of communing with this august non-ethical totality! So doing, they, with their ethical "characters," are to "undergo expansion and correction, obeying the necessity imposed by the real"—this "real" being the non-ethical! It is to me a grave and unredeemed defect that Dr Bosanquet's "whole" is given purely by the logical consciousness, and is destitute of any expression of the ontological "whole" so gained, in terms of the absolute Ought. It is, in fact, empty, lifeless, and blind, a fiction or pure abstraction. It seems very poor light, as to the place and relation of the self, to have no more to say than, with Bosanquet, that there is "in all approach to reality an adjustment of the self," taking various or

"different forms." Of course there is, but is this to tell us anything? Dr Bosanquet's philosophical use of "the whole" reminds me of nothing so much as what Hobbes once quaintly, but none too reverently, said of the mysteries of religion, that it is with them "as with wholesome pills for the sick, which, swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure, but, chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect." One may surely be allowed to doubt the "wholesome" effectiveness of the philosophical pill so easily "swallowed," when the "whole" is discoverably a pithless abstraction, that will bear no concrete moral analysis. Dr Bosanquet inveighs against every form of immediateness, whether of factual apprehension or life or self. But any careful study of the history of philosophy shews how the hold of immediateness—the certainty of immediate experience—runs back to Plato, not to speak of Empedocles of Acragas. Such a persistent tendency no wise and cautious thinker would lightly dismiss. But, if all forms of immediatism are to be rejected, why not, to begin with, the more than suspect Hegelian immediate of thought—absolutely simple and unrelated? Hegel's pure thought has grown out of experience, of course, but the grave thing about it is, that it is no longer experience: its truth depends upon itself, and no longer upon corrective reality outside itself. Easy for such pure thought to grow unitary and systematic, universal and necessary, for it is its own object, and owns no other; so unlike poor, helpless, striving experience. Such pure thought is, from its own nature, obviously *à priori* to experience, since its compelling power is laid on experience to make it conform to it. The theistic philosopher can do nothing with such pure and arbitrary thought; he only claims and craves what Bagehot called an "experiencing nature," in which thought acts both analytically and synthetically, both perceptually and conceptually, on the materials furnished by a first-rate experience. Dr Bosanquet says "the modern tendency" to find "intelligence" or thought of the pure Hegelian type, "inadequate to life and reality," is shared by Dr Ward, to

whom "reality is richer than thought," but that is really nothing new, since Lotze had already, in his 'Metaphysics,' said that "reality is infinitely richer than thought." One can therefore only reply that Lotze, Ward, and this "modern tendency" are unquestionably right. For they meet the concrete whole or universal in the only way in which it can be adequately met, by a concrete self, and not by the attenuated form of pure or *à priori* thought. The principle of intelligence is, on such views, says Dr Bosanquet, "naturally conceived to have no grasp or purchase on vital and purposive reality." Precisely, and despite Dr Bosanquet's inconsistent disclaimer of abstract discursive thought as "one-sidedly sovereign"; for he has been "pursuing the conception of the logical universal" in all the *schwankend* movement of his thought, and nothing more rich or true to experience. Reality is richer than thought, especially Neo-Hegelian thought, which is content with a logical whole which has certainly not the richness of the universe of reason, will, and feeling. God, the Ultimate Reality, must always be more than He appears under the limiting character of "thought." Quite appropriately Dr Bosanquet brushes aside the troublesome self which, in its refractory manner, dares claim value and validity for its experience beyond a place in a "logical" universal. It is not surprising that Dr Bosanquet displays a grotesque sense of spiritual values when he comes to declare that "no ascription of ultimate value to a particular class of creatures," such as man, "can be justified as an ultimate conception." Small wonder that Dr McTaggart felt impelled to write concerning this position,— "It appears to me self-evident that every conscious self has ultimate value, and that nothing which is not a conscious self—whether the universe or part of the universe—has any ultimate value" ('Mind,' 1912). It is "self-evident" to theistic idealism, for it is a central insistence in that philosophy. But what a commentary on our vaunted philosophical progress that Pascal, so long ago, should so sublimely tower above Dr Bosanquet's sense of spiritual values as to write: "Mais quand l'univers

l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, parce qu'il sait qu'il meurt; et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui, l'univers n'en sait rien"! (*Pensées*, Paris, Locquin, 1842, p. 39). It is just this "particular class of creature," the free human spirit, which, in its spiritual freedom, vitality, dignity, and power, invests "the Whole" with the deepest value it ever has. But the visible or corporeal world has, for all that, a great and unalterable significance for the spiritual life, and any schism or severance between man and the world must be clearly overcome. Our life is not a pure self-unfolding of spirit, but reaches its full reality out of severe labours and stern oppositions. For our hold on the spiritual order or the invisible world has by no means cut us loose from the natural, but only infused into natural impulses and human relations something of the spiritual. A world-character is thus retained for the spiritual life, things and objects, no less than persons, falling within the circle of its interest and embrace. In all this there is, as Boutroux has insisted, and as I have uniformly maintained throughout this work, not merely a compatibility, but a solidarity, of reason and religion (E. Boutroux, in '*Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*,' 1914). When Pascal, to whom I have just alluded, says that God can never be the end, if He is not the beginning, he states a contention that is nowhere so firmly grasped and consistently held, as in Theistic Idealism as ultimately theo-centric. There is no beginning or end of God Himself, albeit He is the beginner of our being or nature, which is that of a rational moral consciousness. And reason, as Boutroux remarks, is the intermediary between nature and God, between science and being. Reason is not antithetic to reality. Reason it is which traces or discovers the order existing in the world; and upon the insights of our developing moral experience, there may, and should, supervene a spiritualised reason, capable of discerning, and communing with, a spiritual order perfectly distinct from, and infinitely higher than, the merely natural one. Reason thus becomes our

final court of appeal, and of reason's reasonableness we can admit no doubt. Though reason still rules, the spiritual is yet another sphere than that in which pure logic bears sway, with its laws of identity and contradiction referred to in our first chapter. Only a radical incapacity for such higher thought can fail to appreciate this sphere, its truth and its reality, equally with the logical domain. Between the spheres is no conflict: the spheres of reason and of truth are many, but truth is one, and reason one, in the last synthetic unity. Reason has an absolute value for us, since all things are included in the One, however distinguished from it, and it is by virtue of reason that we perceive the rationality inherent in them and in their unity. There is in all this no stultifying or superseding of reason, but a lifting up of reason to its highest level of capacity or illuminating power. Though Theistic Idealism is a spiritual philosophy, as fully recognising and including the elements of the spiritual order as already described, it is yet not to be confounded with a mere spiritualism which restricts itself to the immediate content of subjective experience, or confines itself to the knowledge of ourselves and our conscious states. For Theistic Idealism is an universal philosophy, claiming a real knowledge of things in every sphere, relative as such knowledge may be to our idealistic powers: it claims, that is to say, a knowledge, in general, of all existing things in their qualities, conditions, and connections. But it remains more true to historic reality than to rear an aprioristic construction of the world's evolution. Its centre of reason rests in the Divine Mind, whence it derives its rest in motion, and its power to see and understand all things. The spiritual order means, for it, life which, as spiritual, takes to itself all life, and harmonises it within itself. It thus becomes the true inner force for the quickening of that naturalism which, in its own way, represents the continuity and the omnipresence of Divine method: amid the visible forms of things, it is the unfolding of the spirit of the invisible world. The spirit that is so unfolded is a spirit all luminous with

God, as made known in His theistic manifestations; and these, if we are not of dwarfed imagination and insight, will suggest for us an unrevealable fulness and splendour behind all we have been able to discern. Thought must, at all costs, be kept vital, even as life is vital: reason must not be reduced to a sterile and immutable form—an abstract scholastic rationalism: it must be susceptible of change, even as nature changes, and capable of penetrating, under its thought-forms, the meaning of the creations of the external world. Essentially rational as man is, he can find no rest except in the exercise of reason. But reason, in so trying to realise itself, feels impelled to seek in God a *point d'appui*, as the fontal source of all cause or activity, of all wisdom and light, of all power and grace. For reason is instinct with personal life, and, rightly conceived, is never an abstract and isolating agency: rooted in personality, it thus seeks Diviner confidence, more valid security, than is to be found in itself. Its confidence in itself is most securely grounded in its faith in God, as the Absolute Reason. The weakness of reason in man lies precisely in his failure to replenish it from the refreshing founts of Divinity, to fortify it, by means of proffered power, into an invincible position. Reason is self-conscious, and should stand open to the influence of the Infinite Reason, out of Whose strength and resource it ought forever to re-create itself. In this way we might reasonably hope for the coming of the time when the presentation of religion would be such as, Emerson hoped, would make "all scepticism absurd." Meantime, you will be philosophically just, though Mill was not, and not regard my consciousness of God as merely my self-consciousness. The God-consciousness is clearly enough distinguished from world-consciousness and self-consciousness, and you have no more right to resolve it merely into my self-consciousness, than I should have to say that there was merely self-consciousness in your consciousness of an agate or a hyacinth. It is a question of personal relation to God. No certitude whatsoever takes precedence, for theistic idealism, of our God-consciousness, in the developed soul of the spiritual order, the timidity of

Butler notwithstanding. Such souls, to adopt and adapt words of Emerson, do see that God "is there, next and within"; that He is "the thought" of their "thought"; that He is "the affair of affairs"; "that He is existence, and take Him from them, and they would not be." Thus it is in God I realise my true self, but it is still *my* soul that is so realised in "The Oversoul." If it were not so, if there were only one infinite and all-inclusive Self, then talk of a Moral Order would be vain. But reason, theoretic, practical, and religious, is no mere nature-product, but has an independence of its own; it rises above Nature, and carries a content of its own. This unified thinking reason is postulated in us by theistic idealism, just as we saw, in our chapter on "The Philosophy of Nature," it postulated in Nature, as realised mind, a unified intelligible order, which made 'it no unredeemed chaos. In both we now find the organic life of reason to be present. In this way we gained the inseparable and fundamental unity of spirit and nature, and found the work of construction to proceed under the activity of living reason. Distinct as the moral order and the spiritual world may be, there is here no room for mutual exclusiveness: without sacrifice of the distinctiveness of either, there are senses in which they must be allowed to fuse, to interpenetrate, to co-operate, and to reinforce, each other. Their relations are intimate and flexible, though their separateness and distinctness can be most clearly presented or defined; but the differences of the two orders in character and contents are not such that their conjunction can be dispensed with, where the highest efficacy of life is sought or secured. The moral order leads not up to Deity as a bare abstraction, but as the perfect Ideal in which are embodied our highest moral aspirations. But it is in the spiritual order that the moral spirit and life find due sustenance and completion. That is the all-important world of the soul as deed, and it imports a subjective self-continuity, a high and self-identical persistence of the will, in utter disregard of the bonds of the temporal. Therefore, "to thine own self be true," as says our great dramatist, who,

foremost of psychologists among poets, identifies psychology with human life and art [cf. Prof. N. R. D'Alfonso in 'Nuovo Convito,' Pescara, 1916]. This self-loyalty is what it is, has its worth and value, because it is loyalty to the moral order and the spiritual world. For the self does not maintain its selfhood only for itself: it lives for the over-self and for the Absolute Self. Therein, and thereby, do we find and grasp our own true and ultimate reality. To Haeckel, of course, the soul and the spiritual world are mere hypothetical products of poetic fancy, but it will suffice now to say that the philosophers of his own country have crushingly exposed his ignorance of modern psychology. But the fanciful might more appropriately be ascribed to Fechner's ingenious and interesting presentation of the earth-soul, so greatly lauded by James in his 'Pluralistic Universe.' There is, in truth, nothing we more surely come to know than the reality of the spiritual world, as "we lie open on that side of our nature which is directed to the deeps of spiritual nature, to the attributes of God" [Emerson in 'The Oversoul']. The moral sense in us may not thus gain a full conception of God, but it will gain a sense of its relationship to the moral Reality that lies above us, and is the One absolutely Perfect Being or Ethical Spirit—the One absolutely God. In the unity of our spiritual nature, we shall, on that side of our being which is turned towards spiritual Reality, receive the influences of supersensible character which proceed from the self-revealing Deity, and bring us into living communion with Him. There is a great deal to be said for the view of those thinkers who hold that the fact of man's having been so organised for God has important consequences, not only for religion, but for science or man's knowledge of the creation. The spiritualism so engendered and developed means the entrance of a new and ever-increasing force into the world, of untold significance and reach. For it constitutes a world-movement in which both God and man actively participate: religion does not bring us a solipsistic world. The environment which modern astronomy, geology, and biology, disclose to us is appalling enough, but we refuse to consider any

whole of things, from which our own personalities, with their reason and consciousness, are excluded. It would be utterly unidealistic to regard physical laws as more real than these personalities. No spatial or physical considerations can decentralise man. Nor can we forget that God, the Absolute Personality, is the true home and environment of the soul. In Him it lives and moves and has its being, as One Whom it did not invent, but Who, as its objective spiritual environment, antedated and evoked its experience. For that experience He has founded fit sphere and kingdom, of which you shall not say, lo! here, or lo! there, for the Kingdom is "within you." No sphere of mere molecular vibrations or physiological processes, but a world-order, unseen and spiritual, within and behind that which is visible and material—a world-order which forms the true, eternal reality, peopled with an infinity of free spiritual intelligences. In all this, the unity of being—a concrete unity—is, for Theistic Idealism as a philosophical system, the unity of an all-inclusive Spirit, in a realised ontological sense, and a growing ethical tendency. The knowledge or intelligence of this true, objective content is a flame in which the "gnats of subjectivity" may be truly said to be singed. The supreme fact and reality of God's existence, as the Absolute Spirit, is thus seen, and the purely subjective character of value-judgments concerning Him is duly recognised. His existence is not guaranteed by our valuation, but is the reality which supports value. The value may be as "independent" of the existence as certain thinkers have claimed, but the more "independent" it is, the less worth it has for sane, sound thought. The objective existence of God has even been held by some extreme exponents of value to be irrelevant to religion. The exponent of value need not, of course, reject the reality of the Divine existence, but may merely hold that his conviction of its reality does not rest on theoretic grounds. But if any judgment of existence should happen to enter into his judgment of value, then it is no pure judgment of value, but also a judgment of being. Philosophically, nothing could be more unsatisfactory than

such a treatment of knowledge, under the pure dominance of the religious interest, with the involved practical abjuration of everything metaphysical. That, of course, is not to say that values have not high place and worth in religion: it is merely to repudiate extremisms and absurdities in religious uses of value-theory. The philosophy of values well knows how arbitrary, conventional, and artificial, values can be, and it charges itself with guiding and correcting them, and ridding them of needless antagonisms, fictitious dualisms, and non-exhaustive pronouncements. Theistic idealism, at any rate, is not so enmeshed in subjectivism that God exists for it only because it has postulated Him for the satisfaction of its spiritual needs: God does not, for it, begin to exist at the end of either our arguments or our needs. It refuses to quit the realm of objective spiritual reality, with the knowledge, certainty, and enrichment, it can yield: it declines to abandon direct and living relation of the soul to God. It maintains ontology—an ontological Absolutism of its own—but holds an ethical philosophy to be the only true goal of philosophy. Theistic idealism is no mere intellectualistic system, with the ethical transcended in the cognitive. But it agrees, for all that, with Royce, that “all reality must be present to the Unity of the Infinite Thought” or the all-comprehending Eternal Consciousness [‘The Religious Aspect of Philosophy,’ p. 433]. But this All-Knower is, at the same time, an Infinite Will, His thought and His Will blended in the unity of His own life. My feeling and experience are all known to Him, but I should not care to adopt the language of Prof. Calkins and say that these exist “only by virtue of being experienced by the Absolute Self” [In ‘The Philosophical Review,’ 1916, p. 285]. Genuinely theistic thought avoids such a pantheistic tinge as unnecessary and undesirable. My experience is mine, and I am responsible for it: it does not “exist only” because the Absolute Self has made it *His*. He has a consciousness of His own, with which my consciousness or experience has no need to be identified or confounded. Hence it is theistically objectionable to say

that I am "identically a part" of Him, and it is the merest sophistry to pretend that there is no pantheistic flavour in such language. Prof. Calkins says "the world, inclusive of this my dastard sin or blinding grief, is expression of the will of an all-wise chooser Who is Himself suffering every grief and stung by every sin" [Ibid., p. 290]. So it seems that even "my dastard sin" "exists only by virtue of being experienced by the Absolute Self"! Theistic idealism makes no apology for utterly repudiating, in the name of sound philosophy, such modes of thought and expression. "My dastard sin" stands at an infinite remove from being "expression of the will of an all-wise Chooser," and only the exigencies of philosophical apologetics could have suggested otherwise. Such a view belongs to the class that must be sent to the metaphysical home for incurables. To that class must also be assigned the declaration of "strength and comfort" which another writer has found in Royce's "identification of the Good with the Whole," because "it compels us to assume that even now the world is better or richer because of the presence of vice, crime, poverty, disease, and all the horrors of war." If this were the last word of philosophy, the theistic idealist might well be excused if he turned from the study to cultivate his garden [Morris R. Cohen in 'The Philosophical Review,' 1916, p. 382]. It is quite possible, and logically justifiable, to hold God to be, in ontological sense, an all-inclusive Spirit, without resort to these pantheistic tendencies, which are the result of confounding ontological with ethical modes of conception. God, as the personal Absolute, must not have His knowledge of us interpreted after the misleading analogy of our knowledge of persons, in which, as we say, they are mutually exclusive. God's knowledge of finite spirits is *sui generis*, and cannot at all rank on the same level with the knowledge which finite personalities have of each other. This distinction is too often lost sight of in discussions of Personality as being-for-itself. Not even the relative or delegated freedom or independence of finite spirits can be allowed to destroy or annul every unity of being. The totality of being is, for

me, an ontological unity, a unity of all things in God, such ontological unity being a transcendental attribute of being. It meets the demand of consciousness for Whole-Being. But if the world is not yet an ethical unity, that is still an open possibility which it is the duty of the world to realise: it is not realised because the world contains conditions in which the contingency of evil resides; but for the moral evil which is actually in the world, the free will of the creature, in spite of everything that has been written or said to the contrary, remains alone responsible. We have no right to ask that we should be perfect and immutable beings, and we have no right to aver that the developmental law of relative being cannot be good. Even if the contingency of evil should actually happen in the system, the idea of the Absolute in the teleological process must not be lost sight of, and may outweigh the negative result so introduced. Our idealistic or spiritualistic monism is what it is, because it recognises that God, in actually creating man, not only gave him natural end and powers, but, in His self-revealings, has given him higher spiritual end, that ethical unity may be more fully and conspicuously attained. There are senses in which mankind is already in God, and its moral consciousness does not lie alien and apart from God, so, with the ontological unity which I already find realised in Him, and with the ethical oneness which I already find possible in Him, it is not possible for my idealistic or spiritualistic monism to do otherwise than await the ethical unity of the moral consciousness of mankind, with such Divine possibilities existing in and for the race. But not even my dependence upon, and intimate relation to, the Deity, ever make me simply a "part" of the Divine consciousness: I have still and always a distinct consciousness of my own, and the Absolute Being has a distinct consciousness all His own. The very essence of my ethical union with Him lies in its being a voluntary union, and it is union, not absorption. The activity of my spirit may be through the Divine Activity, but my consciousness is, for all that, a spontaneous magnitude, with a reasonable power of willing, and with the power of positing

and realising purpose, and it is known to the Divine consciousness to be such. This autonomy of the human spirit, in its active, free, creative consciousness, Theistic Idealism stoutly maintains against extreme idealisms and naturalistic attacks. It maintains that such autonomy is not incompatible with theonomy, for these do not here exclude each other. The autonomy is realised by reason forming for itself a positive ideal, whose necessity it recognises and upholds. It is an ideal sprung from our self-activity, but not without basis and inspiration in the Divine. Because our idealism has such a positive and exalted ideal for the self, it is not possible that it should take a pessimistic view for the race, all the irrationality and blind irrational impulse in the world notwithstanding. But from its optimism God is not left out, and cannot be, just because it is theistic idealism. Its monism is not the Eleatic monism of Hartmann, which is shattered upon the rock of inability to find proper place for individual or separate being. His doctrine of *Alleinheit* allows only a relative unity, made up like that from parts of an organism. His hierarchy of relative units is unsatisfactory, as might be expected from his failure to recognise the independent unity of the human consciousness. Consciousness he relegates to a secondary position, although he thinks "all progress consists in the enlargement and deepening of the sphere unfolded in consciousness." His pessimism is largely theoretic and speculative; he has some valid criticism of Leibniz; and it is not the only aspect or instance in which one might call him an optimist when, in his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious,' he declares that when consciousness has reached its highest possible development, "it is in a position to hurl volition into nothingness, and with this the *process* and the *world* cease." Hartmann, however, thinks he has shewn that, at no stage of the process, is happiness, but only misery, obtainable, but he shares the illogical assumption that happiness, as he means it, is man's highest interest, which theistic idealism would, of course, not admit. He lies nearer the Christian scheme than Schopenhauer, even though the insight into the vanity of endeavour which, for him, comes

of the progress of intelligence, issues in the termination of the world-tragedy of existence, as we have just seen. Theistic idealism rejects the position of those who talk of a calculus of pleasure and pains of a quantitative and qualitative character, for the impracticableness and unsatisfactoriness of any such attempts have been sufficiently proved. Although Schopenhauer, for example, holds it is "quite superfluous to dispute whether there is more good or evil in the world," the mere existence of evil being, for him, enough, yet his thought is infected with the quantitative tendency when he goes on to quote the Italian poet who says a thousand pleasures cannot compensate a single pain ("Mille piacer' non vagliono un tormento"), and that the fact of thousands having lived in felicity can never "annul the anguish and death-torment of a single creature." But the pleasure and pain calculus can never be other than subsidiary, and the subjective difficulties make any satisfactory commensuration impossible. Nor can any hedonist calculus furnish a criterion of right and wrong. While theistic idealism rejects utilitarian hedonism as founding on pleasure alone, yet it admits happiness to be a concomitant of virtue, and seeks to avoid needless religious prejudice against hedonist quest of a rational order. Mill, of course, sought to found upon the difference, not in quantity, but in the quality, of pleasure, but his plausible attempt was an abandonment of the principles of utilitarianism. We must see, as Martineau pointed out, that we do not seek for every sort of pleasure an extra-hedonist quality, for until you get "beyond the pleasurable, as such, quality does not exist." Pleasure may be present in the ideal, but not as its sole or its most essential constituent. There has been, I think, much needless, and even grossly mistaken, repression of happiness in this connection, but, for all that, the utter incompatibility or non-identification of the purely quantitative differences of feeling with the qualitative distinctions of morality is to be maintained. Mill, Sidgwick, and Spencer, all took up the absurd and anomalous position that happiness, though the ultimate end, is not to be directly sought. But, if it be the highest good, in things moral the highest good should be

directly aimed at. I agree with them that happiness does most surely come by indirection, but dissent from its being made man's highest interest. Hobbes, of course, had the fine but futile courage to make private pleasure his sole criterion, as Epicurus of old dared choose a refined egoism for his ethical philosophy. But the hedonistic mistake is clearly the confounding of self-satisfaction—which may be a true enough end—with pleasure, which latter is no key or index to the value of the particular satisfaction obtained. Even the “universalistic” hedonism of Sidgwick has been abundantly shewn to be no real hedonism at all. I turn from these defects and inconsistencies of hedonistic philosophers to say that the root-fallacy of the philosophers of pessimism whom we have been considering lies, without doubt, in their view and treatment of the will. They have taken will in an unwholesome sense; have viewed it as, in its series of volitions, expressive of unsatisfied desire, privation, want, discontent; but they have forgotten that will is the spring of activity, that we exist as we energize, that will is the source of happiness, and that “pleasure is the reflex of unimpeded energy.” Theistic Idealism, however, maintains a chastened optimism, which does by no means slur over the gloomy, grim, disconcerting facts of the world's pain and evil, but holds to an ideal of ultimate good and objective end for human kind. In that ideal, as synthetic, both happiness and relative perfection are taken up, and one-sidedness is transcended. The exaggerations of pessimism are practical rather than theoretic, but pessimism as a theory can only be transcended by theistic idealism. But this latter has no absurd claims for the world, such as is found in the optimism of Leibniz, which, to do him justice, was an *à priori* necessity of his system, and not due to a denial of evil, though these considerations are too often overlooked. It is enough for a finite system that it be good. That it should be the best possible is an absurdity, since, in the case of a finite system, it is always possible to think of one better or higher. If we will have a best possible, all we can ask is, that, of the system actually given us, the outcome be the best possible to it. There has been a

good deal of not very wise talk of the possible and the impossible in this connection, as if these formed, in some sort, objective norms or limits for God, instead of having their very ground in God, and in what He is. But theistic idealism is concerned with the world of fact, not of abstract possibility, and its aim is to reconcile the fact of evil with the infinite goodness and power of God. In so doing, it notes that the physical evils, of which pessimism makes so much, are not evils at all in the profound sense attaching to moral evil. They may be instrumental in the realisation of the moral good of mankind, and are certainly subordinate to it. And when it turns to moral evil, it notes that, though God has permitted evil in the universe, the evil is here as incidental to the universe, and due to deliberate and responsible failure of finite, but free, creatures to conform to His benevolent intentions in respect of them. I claim that, in no other philosophical system, can the difficulties presented in the fact of evil be better explained, or more satisfactorily dealt with, than they are in the system of Theistic Idealism. But it would take much separate treatment to set out the full grounds in justification of that position; and not a little has been done by various thinkers in that direction for those who are willing to weigh and study these cogent considerations. I am too untried in the experience of pain and its moral benefits to be able to grow dithyrambic over the value of pain, but I will say this, that, writing at a time when men of the British Empire have, in million-fold manner, voluntarily shewn the most splendid and heroic contempt of the direst physical evils, the excessive and abnormal wailings of a few pessimistic philosophers over the fact of physical evil never seemed so incredibly pitiful, and it is on the side of pessimism that, by comparison, moral grandeur is wholly wanting. Plainly the place and uses of pain in organic development ought not to be ignored, and even the "utilities" of death have been so far glimpsed that it has been found possible to speak of "the method of positive benevolence in the law of death," greatest of natural evils [Newman Smyth, 'The Place of Death in Evolution,' 1897]. As for moral evil,

its connection with human freedom does not keep us from viewing it in its relations to evolutionary or developmental process, for these have their place and importance, albeit they are often unduly magnified. Moral evil or sin is not, to theistic idealism, a necessary stage or legitimate phase in the development of the spiritual life, or a venial failure to subordinate the lower instincts to the higher. For evil is everywhere and always the foe of good, and cannot be regarded as good in the making. Development is the law of finite or created being. A developing being is, of course, imperfect. The root of the possibility of evil was therefore laid by Augustine deep in the mutability of the creature. But he did not take the mutability to be itself evil, but merely to carry the contingency of evil. Theistic idealism, in its philosophy of evil, prefers to keep, as it should, closely to the principle of evil, though the tendency to-day is to dwell much in the region of its manifestations. It takes the good for a developing being in a teleological sense or reference, and evil is, for it, a departure from this. If moral evil were so entirely inevitable a result of man's being finite and limited, as Leibniz thought, it would no longer be moral evil or sin. The parabolic curve of man's spiritual nature which we term moral evil represents active perversion of the moral nature, not constitutional infirmity. The mutable may be good, said Augustine, and however difficult of realisation that may be, I do not think we can theoretically dispute his contention. If evil were a necessary consequence of finiteness, we should be landed in the contradiction that God had willed the very thing He is supposed to hate. Evolutionary thought does not deny moral evil, and the pathological conditions it has brought about; it emphasises the law of continuity, and the law of the multiplication of effects, and tells us that all our want of correspondence with spiritual environment, all our violations of the laws of spiritual progress, must issue in baneful and lasting results. I am speaking, of course, of theistic evolutionism; with the evolution which is pure naturalism we have here nothing to do. Not to Spencer,

Darwin, and Haeckel, does theistic idealism go for derivation and interpretation of the moral consciousness.

In treating of the connection of moral evil with natural evil, rather more care is needed than is always exercised that natural evil be not presented as furnishing the conditions of moral evil in such wise that the distinctive character and will-responsibility of moral evil shall be obscured or weakened. Moral evil, in the distinctively religious sense of sin, must have due seat found for it in the will, not in pain, want, or deformity. A moral evil is thus, as Coleridge said, an evil which has its origin in the will. Evil, in the strict sense, lies in wrong moral choice. Evil is always failure. The question of the use of freedom, which is responsible for moral evil, has no need to be so sharply severed from the question of such evil being involved in finite or limited being, as is sometimes done, for the exercise of freedom, which gives rise to moral evil, is already and always understood to be the exercise of freedom by a being who is limited and imperfect. What theistic idealism denies is that such evil is implicated in finite or relative being; what it asserts is, that the evil springs from the misuse of finite will. It prefers to keep in view that both finitude and freedom are present in its treatment of the principle of evil as resultant of the freewill responsibility. Without wavering or vacillation, it utterly rejects making God responsible for moral evil, in any real or proper sense, at all. It holds God, of course, to be responsible for the world He has made, but thinks we know enough of the higher uses or ends subserved by natural evil to keep our finite ignorance from ascribing inexplicable reproach to the Deity, or anything that would conflict with any of His attributes. Already we have come to know and understand much in connection with the worst natural evils that makes former doubts respecting these look foolish. Theistic idealism forgets nothing here, but is not content to learn nothing. There is, beyond doubt, more rationality yet to be disclosed to us. At any rate, theistic idealism, being what it is, refuses to admit any necessary and eternal unreasonableness in the

whole of things, or to relax its hold on ultimate or eventual prevalence of goodness over evil. I may remark also that it might be well for writers on the philosophy of religion, who, like Dr G. Galloway, confidently lay down the priority of natural evil to moral evil, to remember that that is not the only possible view; that another, and perhaps deeper, view is sometimes taken, may be seen from the following by no mean theological thinker (T. B. Strong in his 'Manual of Theology'): "Moral evil is prior both in time and in importance to physical evil: in time, for the sin of Satan is prior to the existence of the physical world; in importance, for physical evil is, we believe, one of the results of moral disorder." Nor should it be forgotten that thought to-day is infected with many tendencies to Manichæistic view, which denies that "evil lies entirely in the moral region." The writer just quoted is one of those who have had something worth saying to put forward on the uses of pain and suffering in nature.

I will close this discussion by some reflections of a speculative but not irrelevant character. Let the spiritual imagination of the modern mind suppose for a moment that mankind suddenly availed itself of all the spiritual resources which have been provided for the moral restoration of man. Can we imagine how manifold and far-reaching the effects would be? Do we imagine the effects would be confined to man, physically and socially? Do we suppose there would be no changed results in our relations to Nature? Recall the remark of Lotze to which I referred at the beginning of this chapter. In modification of it, I do not hesitate to hazard the opinion that there are deeper sympathies and more intimate connections possible between man and nature than are, or can be, at present well understood. The outward would then correspond to the inward, the objective to the subjective, to a degree we cannot at present know. I am unable to regard it as a mere religious dogmatism, rather than a profound spiritual insight, that speaks of an "earnest expectation" of the creature in this direction, and of "creation groaning and travailing in pain" for some

such realisation. For Nature, too, has her pessimisms: she has been "subject to vanity"—the alternations and flux of a world of the unfulfilled; but her travail-pangs are suggestive of some new and higher birth. Can we dogmatically say that her "groans" and her "expectation" are dissociate from all moral connection or result? Not, of course, that there is, or can be, any substantialising of the principle of evil, or any suggestion of evil as a quality in the creation, but that a world expressly designed for man's lordship and dominion could not but suffer loss—the loss of its "unwithered countenance"—and lowering through the profound lapse of its master from the lordship of spirit, with consequent enslavement to his environment. If the laws of the universe have their seat and home in God, can we suppose that the full regained sway of moral law would mean nothing to the universe? Or that our intelligence of nature-laws would have no augmentation? Nature never yielded herself to man as she is doing now, but can we suppose that the submissiveness of physical forces, which is so great to-day, would not assume the form of new and more willing homage? There is nothing fanciful in all this, to any one who reflects that every system has a unity—a harmony and correspondence of existence, which may be greater or less. Not even to the "loving worm" beneath his feet would man's relation be the same. Man is head of the earth-system; the lower parts of creation, in its material and its sentient forms, tend to find their unity and their completion in man; it can be no matter of indifference that his relations of harmony with these have been affected or disturbed by his lapses from moral law. It may, as Lotze said, not be evident that the natural evil or physical suffering of the world is in any way the result of moral evil, but it is open to speculative doubt whether this may be the whole truth of the matter. Speculative insight cannot always wait on what is evident: the world of thought and knowledge would have been greatly impoverished if it had always done so. It is, at any rate, not difficult for the speculative reason to see that natural

evil and suffering may possibly have deeper relation to, and connection with, the world's moral evil, than Lotze thought, for the facts seem always deeper than their treatment. You cannot rid the religious consciousness of its hold on the sinfulness of the world, whether that be fully explicable or not; it at least takes us beyond a merely personal or individual relation to moral evil. But that may probably be most correctly taken to relate, not to our physical environment, but to that spiritual environment which is ours in virtue of the solidarity of the race, to personal and social influences, that is to say, which make for evil. In a realised spiritual world-harmony, these would cease, and the physical world would be the pure organ or instrument of spirit it was destined to be.

CHAPTER XI.

IMMORTALITY IN THEISTIC IDEALISM.

THEISTIC Idealism's postulation of Immortality takes the form of confidence in the continuity of our personal life, its unbroken continuity as part of universal development; in the persistence of the soul, but, more, its perpetual development; and in the completion of the moral incompleteness of the present life, so that some sort of absolute effect shall be given to the unconditional worth of conscience, goodness, and truth. In the upbuilding of these does the soul find its immortality. The hope of immortality is a confidence that, whatsoever form of spiritual body or embodiment may await us beyond the grave, our personal identity — with all-comprehending ego, so near of kin to the Eternal — shall be preserved, and our personality shall not be dismembered. My self-identity is not rigid and absolute, but grows, by continuity and inclusion, towards its fuller and more universal life. The difficulty as to continuity of life in the future without continuity of organism is not so very great, despite our enlarged scientific knowledge, as is sometimes thought, to minds that have shed materialistic notions, and become spiritualised or idealistic. It is obvious enough how little is possible to Naturalism in this connection. It is really our low-bowed lack of spiritual imagination which makes it a difficulty for us, as Sir W. Osler and others represent from the scientific standpoint, to conceive the continuity of the soul's life in-

dependently of any physical basis or quasi-material organism. The scientific position, as really offering no hindrance to the possibility of the life immortal, is still expressed in the clear words of Mill: "The relation of thought to a material brain is no metaphysical necessity, but simply a constant co-existence within the limits of observation." And further: "Experience furnishes us with no examples of any series of states of consciousness without this group of contingent sensations attached to it; but it is as easy to imagine such a series of states without, as with, this accompaniment, and we know of no reason in the nature of things against the possibility of its being disjoined." The self-conscious mind of man, though set in his body, is still the form of the body, philosophically speaking, and it (the mind) knows no dissolution, according to any proved scientific considerations, supervenient to the physical fact of death. No "objections deduced from merely physical data," as Huxley explicitly said, can prevent the possibility of such a conclusion. Immortality is the postulate of our spiritual being. The "objective term" cannot be "non-existent," says Fiske ('From Nature to God,' p. 189). No one can adequately contemplate the sweep of man's powers of reason, his wealth of spiritual and intellectual experience, without feeling that, if there is here an illusion to be extinguished, it is the illusion that such a being or entity could be dissolved with the body. But we must be human enough to acknowledge the weight or heaviness still created by the fact of death to be wellnigh universal; and they who, like Socrates and Paul and many another since, bring assuagement to the tried human spirit, can do so only by investing the dread article of death with new and august moral grandeur, terrible withal in the humanness of its appeal. It is a most impressive testimony to the irresistible buoyancy, and inherent elasticity of the human mind or soul, that it dares to cherish, as it does, the hope of immortality, in face of the fact of that dissolution. The secret lies open: man

"thinks he was not made to die,
And Thou hast made him: Thou art just."

Death is for us only a material change, but no changes in matter can possibly be for us a change of soul or personality, for it has been the position of our Idealism, all through, that matter only exists through, and for, mind or personality. A really idealistic metaphysic cannot escape that conclusion. The soul or ego carries within it an inexpugnable conviction that its end or goal cannot simply be to fall back or be re-absorbed into that very Nature, over which it has wielded a splendid dominance, and to which, in its high self-conscious thrills, it has always accounted itself superior. The reason may best be found in the suggestion of Emerson that when the Master of the universe has "points to carry in His government," He lays the impress of them in the "structure of minds." The impress, idealistically, seems to be that the world must be interpreted in terms of spirit, as world-Spirit, spirit or self being the highest category known to us. For the roots of Idealism lie in the Eternal. The soul or self feels itself destined to an integration and culmination of its activities and fellowship, wherein all limiting conditions shall be done away. It is to idealistic or spiritualised minds the problem makes most appeal, for their purity and elevation of personal life put them in the most favourable position to attain to some insight, or "inside" knowledge, of the problem. Thus the philosopher of the 'Phaedo' already thought that only the pure may approach the pure, in seeking the pure essence of the truth of Immortality ('Phaedo,' 67 B). It is the highest our Idealism must follow; the minds that matter are those which have most pursued the possibilities open to our nature. Martineau justly said that "the great essential to this belief is a sufficiently elevated estimate of human nature; no man will ever deny its Immortality who has a deep impression of its capacity for so great a destiny." The minds in question are those that have felt the need of God; have felt that of Him, and in Him, and to Him, they, with all things, are; and are assured that, because God lives, they shall live also. Could such a bond be broken, it has been truly said that humanity would be landed in "ethical bankruptcy and religious

nihilism." But God has identified Himself with us, and will not deny Himself by leaving us incomplete, not to say extinguished. Hence our instinctive belief in immortality, which, in spite of the various mistaken notions as to the nature of the future life, is more susceptible of scientific explication, as a preservation of form, than Dr Ward seems to suppose. Even Dr Carus has taken firmer grip of the law. The non-mortality of the soul or ego is not less distinctly favoured by the instinctive judgment of mankind than it is by the philosophic judgment, for with this latter it really coincides. There is indeed not a shred of scientific evidence to shew that the ego or soul itself is conterminous with its objective manifestations through the body. Quite logically, the soul or ego owns no dependence for its continuity on the continuity of the body. It claims a higher sphere for the fulfilment of its own being and purpose. Of course, the matter has its difficulties. Soul is correlated with body, apart from which we have no experience of its action or existence. There is the question of its being a possible product of organization, liable, as such, to perish with the perishable physical organism. These and like questions raise serious speculative difficulties. It is not so easy, for speculative thought to-day, as it was for the Greeks, to make the soul an independent entity, capable of subsisting and acting apart from body, seeing we have no actual experience of such a thing.

Thus Plato took the soul, as self-moved, to be "indestructible," "this power of self-motion" being "implied in the very essence and definition of a soul" ('Phaedrus,' 245 C-E). Again, in the 'Phaedo,' the soul is a principle able "to lead and govern"—"something much more divine" than "mere harmony" ('Phaedo,' 94-95). Of course, Plato did not distinguish, with the clearness of thinkers later, between individual souls and the informing principle of the universe. Highest in the view of Aristotle was the intellectual or Noëtic soul, which, as Grote says, retained in itself all the lower faculties, which existed apart from it. The soul was, for him, "the first actuality" of the organic body. Far as

the cry may be from Plato to the speculative thought of to-day, our faith in immortality is grounded in the nature and essence of the human spirit, related as closely as may be to God. But the acceptance of an evolutionary view of the meaning of human existence marks a great difference since Plato, especially in its bearing on the old question of pre-existence. (For Aristotle's view, see his 'De Anima' by R. D. Hicks in Camb. Univ. Press.) The spirit of man, as distinguished from his body, of which it is no mere function, is not conceivably the resultant of any possible combination of physico-chemical elements, according to our best scientific and philosophic thought. It is assuredly more essential to what is called the personality than is the body. "For soul is form, and doth the body make." The morphological influence of the soul throughout history has been great. But the form is already progressive, as required by evolutionary science, and due to interaction with environmental forces. But that science teaches us that no known principle of physics or of chemistry can really explain the development of a definite form in the organism. It is enough now to say that what passes into immortality is the whole man or total personality, the body alone excepted. God is God of the living, not of the dead: life is indestructible that is in communion with God. He is the absolutely Good, the ethically Perfect, and in the reasonableness of His universe throughout we must believe. This, too, because the reasonable universe is, as idealism demands, *our* universe. He cannot but complete His own work in us. His whole divinity is pledged to its perfection and fulfilment. Some better, more rounded completeness awaits His world-system, if the cosmical process is to reach full significance, than any we here know. The continuity of our spiritual evolution will be preserved, when the present phenomenal conditions are overpassed. But, for all that, it seems to me that to ground the faith in immortality in some universal and schematised form is a far more difficult task than the ablest writers on the subject have realised. If we take the real principle of life to be something that does not spring out of our spatio-temporal exist-

ence; if we seek to justify our spiritual instincts or intuitions in their cravings or presentiments of immortality; if we desire not merely a logical valuation of the conceptions involved—such as those of the ego, self-consciousness, and personality—but their outreaching psychological significance; if we aim to relate all our subjective experiences, hopes, misgivings, in this connection to a transcendent truth of Immortality, as viewed in the light of reason, not merely of feeling and imagination; we shall, I think, very soon become convinced of the difficulties besetting any philosophic presentation of the theme. Indeed, I think we shall question whether it has had, or can have, such a form really given to it—I mean in any satisfying schematized sense. Yet Theistic Idealism, however diffident—not of the fact, but of the mode of conducting the proof, to whose difficulty the history of philosophy sufficiently testifies—can by no possibility leave the subject alone, as though put to permanent intellectual confusion, but must hold that much has been done, and that more can be done. It holds to our immortality only as a reasonable conclusion from all the facts and implications of life, physical, psychological, metaphysical, mental, moral, and spiritual. It holds that, just as the evidences for the Being of God are more convincing in their collective force than any of them taken singly, so the proofs of Immortality are stronger in a cumulative sense than any of them, taken singly, can be. It is a shallow thing to suppose that we know or see only so much of these matters as can be set down, with multiplication-table exactitude, by the writers of manuals or handbooks. “There is,” it has been significantly remarked, “a richer form of expression than mere objective description,” and description has dropped to that of merely moral needs and subjective values. Theistic Idealism holds to mind, in its actuality, as the primal attestation of our self-consciousness, and it appreciates the fact that materiality, in its varied forms and aspects, is becoming for us a vanishing quantity. It takes self-consciousness to be the highest product of evolution, and finds it to yield, in a final analysis, thought with its freedom, love with its passion, and will, with

its determinations, ethical and spiritual. In the living unity of consciousness, these three are one, and the force of their unified life is such as to wring from us the passionate conviction,—“Nay, God my Christ, I pass, but shall not die.”

How much has been done in bringing out the soul's immaterial and immortal character is impressively seen in a long line of thinkers from Plato, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Butler, and a host of others on to Martineau. The uses to which the substance category, in particular, was sometimes put, was not metaphysically justifiable, but the arguments testify to the persistent clinging to the belief in immortality, and the desire to demonstrate it. Moreover, I think certain recent writers on the philosophy of religion—Dr G. Galloway the most defective amongst them—equally unjustified in treating the question of immortality as of no metaphysical significance, but only ethical—a view which appears to me quite absurd. Look at a few samples of the belief, to which, on their notion, no metaphysical importance or value attaches, and remember that Christian psychology had made the self a spiritual substance, and of ethical quality. There is the view of Clement of Alexandria, that the soul is immortal and indestructible, with the body as its seat and instrument. The view of Gregory of Nyssa was that “there is nothing against probability” that the soul or “simple and incomposite essence” should remain when the composite is dissolved. By Athanasius it was held that “if the soul is moved by itself, it follows that it outlives the body.” The position of Augustine was, that the nature of the soul “has no kind of material existence in space,” but is a whole “present everywhere” in our experience. The attitude of Aquinas was, that the soul is an immaterial form (*forma separata*), and, as such, immortal, a view duly contested by Pomponazzi. Descartes, more modern and justifiable in his views than is often thought, defined spirit as the substance in which thought immediately resides, and held the simplicity or indivisibility of the soul (“une chose absolument une et entière”), so joining to a thoroughgoing mechanism a spiritual and immortal

entity. Leibniz emphasised the soul or monad as an identical unity of its own states, and was in favour of its persistence, with the characteristics of personality, indissolubleness, and indestructibility. The insistence extended to the uniqueness of the soul was very marked in Leibniz. Berkeley declares,—“What I am myself, that which I denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by *soul* or *spiritual substance*” (‘Principles of Human Knowledge,’ sect. 139). For Berkeley the soul is “indivisible, incorporeal, unextended”; it is “active, simple, uncompounded,” and therefore indissoluble and immortal. The maintenance of Butler was, that consciousness is “a single and indivisible power,” and that the conscious subject “in which it resides” is so, too. Kant is important enough, but I should certainly not like to have to subscribe to the position that these, and the host of earlier thinkers besides, had nothing to evidence or maintain on immortality that was of any metaphysical interest and value, if and when properly disentangled from elements of over-belief—nothing of what Münsterberg would call “a metaphysical value of conviction.” It was, of course, the case that, even in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, spiritualistic philosophers were wont to describe the soul from its relation to the body, rather than, in our modern way, from inner study of the conscious self. A materialistic flavour easily crept into thought aspects in this way, as we see at points in Descartes and in Locke, in Wolff and in Baumgarten. But, for all that, our thought must have insight enough to perceive, and courage enough to maintain, the large measure of agreement or community underlying these earlier pronouncements on the soul or Spiritual Substance and our present-day conceptions of the self. There is, undoubtedly, such a fundamental core of agreement between the modes of conception, although our modern conception of the soul, not as abstract substance, but as conscious self, has the obvious advantage of concreteness. Kant thought that the Cartesian claim for the soul was for a real substance, and was, as such, unwarranted: Descartes, of course, gave some unfortunate ground for this; but the claim of Descartes was really a better one than Kant imagined; it

was simply a *res cogitans* with thought for its essence—a spiritual substance claim. Among post-Kantian thinkers, there has been less disposition to define the nature of the soul, in any positive or structural fashion. It would be impossible to quote the host of recent examples of this real, but less defined form, of speaking of the soul and its immortality, and the Kantian objection of non-appeal to experience has disappeared. There is obviously less need and disposition to define what we do not perceive like a thing, but is well understood in and through experience. Fiske speaks of “the everlasting persistence of the spiritual element”; Martineau lays the higher destiny of man “on the strength of his higher nature”; Eucken, John Caird, and many others are content to speak simply, but in a distinctive sense, of the spiritual life. But the idea of the soul has passed into the accepted form of the immaterial, and its immortality has been generally held as that of a spiritualised self or spiritual entity, not the rarefied absurdity of a disembodied immortal ethical quality. But the curious philosophical position, to my mind, is that the writers whose defective metaphysical sense treats the question as of no metaphysical significance or value, yet hold it necessary to the conservation of the future values that the persons must be immortal. Do they deny the immortalised persons ontological significance? I reject as absurd Lotze’s notion that immortality does not belong to metaphysics; such an attitude is beneath any really idealistic metaphysics; and I do not profess to understand the philosophical consistency of those writers to whom such a spiritualised self or entity has no metaphysical significance or value. I fully admit the difficulties in explicating the nature of such spiritual entity, but can find no metaphysical excuse or extenuation for denial of the metaphysically significant fact. It is very easy to call in question all metaphysical attempts to deal with this self, but nothing appears to me so metaphysically deadening as the metaphysical impotence and negativity that here, just as in the case of Creation, takes an all too speedy refuge in mere blind mystery. Mystery may mean limitation, but not chaos and

darkness. I shall return to the metaphysical aspect presently. On the psychology of the soul, I have said enough elsewhere [see my Art. on "The Psychology of the Soul" in the 'Princeton Theol. Review,' 1908, pp. 437-444, and ch. xxi. of my vol. of 'Studies in European Philosophy,' 1909], but the fact of man's being *pneuma* or spirit is significant for immortality. At present I am content to remark that theistic idealism regards man's spiritual nature, in its metaphysical implications, as so well established that it is, for it, impossible to believe that his spirit should fail of a future life, beyond mundane conditions. But that does not keep it from holding to the ethical arguments for immortality in their full strength. But these are now so fully appreciated that it is the metaphysical aspect which is in danger of total neglect. To me, these two sides or aspects can nowise be separated, in any wise or worthy treatment of immortality. The idealistic or transcendental self, which has become a "partaker of the Divine nature," is a self which, in its ontological significance, derives strength from every accession of ethical elements. The ethical qualities are not bare abstract elements or ideals, but are concreted in the spiritualised self or entity. It is in such a self that the demand is resistless for the wages of going on and not to die. But it is, for all that, as Sidgwick said, "rather from a disinterested aversion to an universe so irrationally constituted, that the wages of virtue should be dust, than from any private reckoning about his own wages," that such a self holds to immortality. Such a self enlarges itself to the over-self or Universal Life, with its infinite content. Only thus does the true self find its ultimate reality. This is something very different from those tendencies of our time to reduce the faith in immortality to so vague an aspiration as to be but—

"The desire of the moth for the star,
Of the night for the morrow,
The devotion to something afar
From the sphere of our sorrow."

Judaic immortality, unlike this, was bound up in the present sense of God. Theistic Idealism thinks, with Pascal, that "*il importe à toute la vie de savoir si l'âme est mortelle ou immortelle.*" The meaning and the possibility of Immortality are thus on our hands. Lotze has said, in his *Metaphysics*, of the question of the immortality of the soul, that "we have no other principle for deciding it" beyond this "general idealistic conviction" that "every created thing will continue, if and so long as its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world." But the continuance of man's personal life—the continuity of his consciousness—as part of Humanity in whole, or the over-individual, is essential to the meaning of the world as a rational or theistic cosmos. The travail of the ages, and the purpose-laden energies and co-operative forces of Creation, demand such a reasonable and necessary issue of God's work. The light of Nature is not to be lightly despised, as presumptive evidence, in this connection, for nothing can be more decisive of the truth even of the Christian revelation than just its conformity to, as well as its elevation and confirmation of, the ideas of natural reason, at its highest, as to God's being all-good and all-wise. We may recall the words of Plato:—"God is perfectly and in all things righteous, and unrighteous in nothing; nor is there anything more like Him than the man who grows as righteous as he can" ('*Theaetetus*,' 176 C). In line with all this, Fiske, from the study of evolution, came to say that to deny the everlasting persistence of the spiritual element in man, as the terminal fact, would be to rob the whole world-process of its meaning. Such a denial of spiritual continuity, from the side of evolution theistically regarded, would be enough to provoke, in words of Martineau, "the insurrection of an outraged faith." So little is individual immortality to be viewed as oppugnant to cosmic unity. Theistic Idealism holds, with Rothe, that the man who believes in a God must also believe in man's continuance after death, for otherwise there would not be a world that

could be thought of as realising God's purpose. Before we believe in a Beyond, then, we must needs believe in One beyond ourselves, and in our indissoluble union with Him. To consider Immortality, save as we are inseparably connected with God, is to enter the quicksands of uncertainty. Not on our own consciousness must we rest our faith in immortality, but rather take it as an inferred truth, resting on the conception of man as in God—in an ontological sense, but also in an ethical one, though the ethical world is but in the making. Then the truth of Immortality has gotten an immovable centre. But it is not meant, in saying this, to derogate anything from the significance and relevance of the genesis and development of the ego. Its origin lay not in matter: matter had time priority over it; but it has logical priority, as we have seen, over matter: the potentiality of the world, indeed, belongs to the ego. Not as an isolated self is the ego evolved, but with constant reference to the non-ego: self-conscious ego was not before the beginning of experiential process: the "I" is evolved only through world-experience, the ego and the world being necessary to each other. The ego thus grows into a "subject conscious of subject"—in other words, self-conscious. As such, it is actuality; and it is an individual, positive and constructive, as such, within the world-whole. As such, however, it seeks its Other—the objective complement of its being—although its consciousness of the non-ego counts for it less than the quality or content of its own being. If it affirms itself, and negates all else, it is yet that it may go out of itself, and make all else—even God and the universal—its own. But the question whether the development is from the altruistic to the egoistic, as Royce, Dewey, and others contend, need not trouble us here. What does concern us is, that, already in its assertion that "I am I," the concrete ego has, in its positive awareness, proclaimed its conscious superiority to all phenomenal or physical conditions—affirmed its own non-mortality, its independence, as soul or selfhood, of the body. To it, body and organic life are mere adjuncts of selfhood or personality. I think

we may not forget that the world, as the sphere and theatre of the religious life, would be meaningless, and a torso, were we not to recognise that our life here, in its highest hours, seems always ready to break through into some richer, fuller being than we have ever known or realised—of which, indeed, it is only prophetic. The spiritual order, of which I have spoken in an earlier chapter, demands, as a cosmic series, the continuance of life beyond the grave, as a necessity of such an order, cosmically regarded. All the grand world-movements and ascents find their terminal fact in man, as free spiritual being—Creation's "diapason closing full in man." All the forces of nature, and all the powers of spirit, are taken up into, and represented in, him, a being with "constitutional convictions prescient of futurity." Evolutionary thought cannot escape the invincible force of the forward-looking teleologic trend of the whole system of things, so tributary to man as their crown and climax. His immortality seems the only rational consummation of the cosmical process. In him we reach nature's final survival-value. The "intimations of immortality" neither the latest science nor the newest philosophy has been able to crush out or destroy, nay, they are often notably present in these and other higher realms. On scientific grounds one must hold the belief in Immortality to be vastly more accordant with the known or ascertained laws of the universe than any theory of annihilation. The hypothesis of Theistic Idealism is, in its sure philosophical grounding, that we, ethical personalities, are planted in this world as a sphere of moral progress and probation, under a Deity Who is God of eternal order, love, and justice, Who will not allow the final note in the symphony of creation, with its vast spiritual ends, to be a note of abject and dismal failure. No other hypothesis carries such reason-compelling weight or presumptive evidence. There is here no question of Creation in and by itself, but of Creation with God in the midst of her—immanently realising the fulfilment, to which His divinity is pledged, of all those spiritual ideals, which are the most precious of His creations,

within every ethical personality He has made. For each of them "there shall never be one lost good," or, as Calderon put it, "Hacer bien nunca se pierde"; for only in such perfect personal realisation can any corporate immortality be wholly justified. Only on pain of irrational rejection of all that is most in line with the moral extension and spiritual continuity of our present life—only in the acceptance of what is in contradiction to what we most surely know—can we refuse the belief in immortality.

Dr Ward, who has had some good things to say on Immortality, discusses memory, environment, and other highly conjectural matters in this connection, and tells us these may help us conceive more definitely the possibility of the future life. So, no doubt, they do; and yet I think we shall do better, and reach a surer, as well as higher, result, by following the clues, hints, suggestions, and implications, of our spiritual life when, in its highest reaches and most inspired moments, it tries to view things *sub specie aeternitatis*. As for memory, the concern of Hegelians, that immortality be not undervalued by any loss of memory, need not trouble us, for any predication of immortality is of our personality as historically known. There is not much knowledge or discriminating thought where it is not seen how little the dependence of memory on brain-activities disproves personal survival after death. Memory, and self-determination in its uniqueness, spurn every physical solution. And as for environment, the immortality, with which our Idealism is concerned, being that of the soul, it is mainly to be remembered that its true environment is God, its "dwelling-place." Hence a good deal of purely conjectural discussion may very well be passed by, in reference to what we shall be as supposedly pure essences. What is certain, by the law of conservation of energy or values in the spiritual kingdom, is, that there shall not be one lost good; that the disciplined powers of the soul, the rational, moral, and spiritual capabilities in their plenitude, and the splendid treasures of memory, shall be carried with us, into that enlarged and liberated life; to him who here

hath shall there be given. With Höffding we must say that "faith is fidelity, and the content of faith is, that fidelity prevails throughout existence. Fidelity is conservation, continuity throughout all changes." But, overpassing Höffding's timid and halting attitude, Theistic Idealism boldly holds to the persistence of so unique a value as that of personality—itself the very norm of value—in the form of personal immortality. This is as distinctive of Theistic Idealism as the opposed doctrine—that of impersonal immortality—is distinctive of Moslem philosophy. It would, of course, be the veriest superstition to suppose that the mere article of death should transform our ethical being or character; but it is a most reasonable belief that the faith which persists in spite of change, shall persist through so great a change as the dissolution of the body. In that dissolution, the mind or soul may lose its instrument or organ of expression or communication, but that does not rationally import that mind or soul has in any wise ceased to exist, persist, and expand. Recent psychology has shewn the subtle and intimate connection of soul and body, but, after all, has not done a great deal here; Dr Mellone has even said that "modern psychology has nothing to contribute to the solution of our problem." The psychologist has, at least, told us a good deal that was already pretty obvious, but the question of immortality, as one of the destiny of soul or mind, belongs to the psychologist rather than to the biologist or the physicist. It is surely the concentration and deepening of the spiritual personality that will furnish us with the deepest and richest insights into the possibilities of the life of spirit, freed from the clogging associations of the corporeal, such life of spirit radiating for us the fundamental value and basal meaning of all the vast and hitherto confused evolutionary processes. That such depths of spiritual meaning or implication lie behind the world of appearances, no philosopher of any insight can doubt: in their spiritual perception lies our profoundest conviction of the life immortal. One cannot but find in the energy of spiritual personality

a formative and organising potency superior to any forms of energy that affect the molecular changes of the body. The doctrine of immortality we may certainly associate with the self-transcendence of the ego, which Bergson has emphatically claimed as characteristic of our present life, whose "impulse" is "towards a higher and higher efficiency," as tending "to transcend itself." If, in the great moments of this life even, we have experience of personality as in some sort transcended, it seems very reasonable to regard the possibility of infinitely greater transcendence in the life to come as a very open one. Of course, Theistic Idealism must recognise that the life of spirit—or the spiritual—appears to us under corporeal conditions or connections, but its grasp of the underivability of spirit and the independence of the spiritual is so strong and sure, that it does not dream of referring to these for origin, instead of to a transcendental force.

Whatever scientific assumptions there may be for the truth of immortality, these our theistic idealism will take up into itself, and set in their place in the logic of the moral order of the universe. Initially, science reads a lesson to theistic idealism by the unflinching manner in which it leads us through things unimaginable—the sublimation of matter, the nature of the ether, molecular combinations, complex organic processes, as examples from physics and biology—bating not one jot or tittle to the weakness of our scientific faith or imagination. The scientific principle of continuity has been used, from the side of physics, by the authors of the "Unseen Universe," to point the continuation of our life as taken up into "a Divine over-life." From the vital side, the continuity of life has been strenuously maintained by Weismann and others. Weismann's view regards "the power of living on indefinitely when the vital processes have once begun, as the fundamental peculiarity of living matter." The position of those who, on the other hand, taking their cue from Hume's philosophy, reduce the world to a series of mere sensations, and yet make the soul's existence dependent

upon the bodily organism, is one from which logical consistency has wholly disappeared. The mark of the world, no doubt, is impermanence or change; but the mark of man is just as certainly permanence, or identity in change; hence the persistence of the soul, the abiding character of personality, to which, in its eternal ideals, hopes, and aspirations, the universe would be no longer reasonable throughout, but a hideous anti-climax and deception, were no future theatre for its activities provided. We have, no doubt, grown more reluctant to deal in questions of theodicy than in days when great theodicies, like those of Rosmini and of Leibniz, were given to the world, because we have grown more distrustful of the power of thought to lift the shadows off the universe for us. But philosophy, at any rate, must fulfil the trust of reason in some better guise than that, and must, through moral feeling and sentiment, press to what rational insights may be possible. It must press to the implicates of Absolute Goodness, and of Absolute Justice, both already believed in by Plato ('Phaedo,' 65, D and E; 'Republic,' Bk. II., 381). For even the 'Phaedo,' with its serene confidence, is already a striking testimony to the philosophical difficulty of regarding what has come into being as capable of being lost—a foreshadowing, indeed, of our modern thought that, despite transformations, essences do not cease to be. If we are to take the universe as a moral order—the theatre or scene of God's absolute moral purpose—the ethical idea or conception of God then requires that His interest in the world run on into the life beyond the grave. The objective spiritual values of the life beyond the grave—or the truth of Immortality—are then to be found in the absolute sanction of virtuous effort and sacrifice, in the impartation of unseen strength to humanity in its perplexities, and in the vouchsafing of solace in its sorrows. These make possible the splendid subjective manifestation of a Fichte:—"When I shall one day follow, it will be but joy for me; sorrow shall remain behind in the sphere I shall have left." If we cannot

make a complete logical justification or demonstration—and demonstration is here out of the question—of the truth of immortality, we are in no worse case than science, whose belief in the uniformity of nature and other matters no more admits of complete logical justification than does our belief in immortality. We cannot—if we will apply time-reference to such a subject—prove an event so future. We can only hold to the essential reasonableness of the world-development, for which the ethical postulate of immortality makes, as tending to prove the fulfilment and satisfaction of our upward ideal and striving. This reasonable faith follows from the moral perfection of the Creator, in which it is grounded. As for all our spiritual symbolism—whether the Resurrection, or the Ascension, and the rest—what we are here concerned with, philosophically, is their essence, which lies in the central and eternal truth of life continued in and with God—life uninterrupted even by death. Not a mere continuance of life is here implied, but also of the sense or consciousness of life. For it is in the highest degree a case of *vivere*, not of mere *esse*. This will be fully appreciated only by an idealistic or transcendental metaphysics. The modern claim of immortality for personal spirit or the spiritual life, intrinsically, is no less assumptive or supposititious, than was that of the banned metaphysical substance of the Scholastics, though it is so much more worthy of acceptance, so much more justified in its form. Its appeal is simply to the spiritual as a reality in itself, and its postulation of immortality for the spiritual subject owes more to the fine persistence of the Scholastics, however mistaken or overlaid, in their quest of a perduring principle, than the curt, unsympathetic, and not over-learned, criticism of some modern writers has been able to appreciate. Nor has modern thought much whereon to plume itself, if we care to think only so far back as the neglected philosopher Fries, in whose Kantianism psychologised, faith in immortality was not an hypothesis upon a future life, made by a soul shut up within the limits of time, but was simply the consciousness of our just and virtuous personal dignity, whereby our reason posits its own being in the eternal being

of things, and overcomes the limits of time. For then, as now, it was by intrinsic virtue or value, that the spirit rose to the height of its eternal destiny; then, the pure faith of reason in that which is eternal, was strengthened by feeling and presentiment (*Ahndung*), while, now, the stress is laid on aspiration or ideal striving. Our advance lies really in the cumulative force of the arguments we can marshal as making for immortality, considered in the overwhelming conviction wrought of the superior form in which these can now be presented. One of the compelling proofs of the transcendent truth of Immortality is to be found in the universality of the consciousness, among those who hold that truth in variant forms, that the real and active principle of life is not exhausted in our present spatial and temporal form of existence, a view favoured by Keyserling. It is, perhaps, in this consciousness which the "I" has of itself, as a force which, in its principle or essence, knows no bound or limit, that we may already find the truth of immortality in an universal and schematised form. To ask that this position or spiritual and metaphysical conviction be reduced to a theoretically impregnable significance is, in its solemn absurdity, very like asking a truly live man to set out the critical significance of his life in the present. It is the consciousness of life that counts, for our purpose, in both cases—not mere life or existence. This consciousness, in its forward-looking aspect, has its metaphysical value of conviction. The consciousness is the critically indestructible argument, but it is not transferable to the sceptic or critic whose experience comes short in depth or height, or makes it a psychological impossibility for him. It is of something quite in advance of a mere theoretic consciousness we have been speaking, for that would be a mere abstraction. It is yet of something not peculiar to this or that individual consciousness, but something which leads every live—every normally quickened and enlightened—consciousness to cry—*Non omnis moriar*. If there were no such immortality, there would be, for Theistic Idealism, no God, the world being so incomplete, and cruel, and unjust. Our idealism is here less concerned with any idea or form of

corporate immortality, significant as that is for the Whole to which we belong, than it is with the fact that God has so delegated to the soul something of His own being, that the soul, as and when developed, claims the immortality whereof we speak as a natural, inalienable, and immortal right, which Divinity is pledged, by His own moral action, never to destroy. If it is unthinkable that God should lie, that unthinkableness extends to His action no less than to any supposed word of His. The moral interest of God in the race would utterly belie itself, did it not evidence such a sense of the worth of human life and of all the finest flowering of humanity, as must ensure and guarantee the persistence and permanence of the spirit of man in the life beyond the grave. Augustine said—"What does not perish for God cannot perish for itself." Such considerations as the moral perfection of the Creator, the reasonableness of His universe, and the worth, to Him, of human life, are all important for man's belief in immortality; these are all concerned with God, and with those objective values, aspects, and relations, which are almost wholly absent from many discussions. But I do not fail to lay idealistic stress on considerations belonging to the nature of man.

Theistic Idealism, as I conceive it, rejects the sharp severance of the metaphysical and the ethical aspects of immortality sometimes found in recent philosophy of religion, with an attribution of all values to the latter, and none to the former. Our idealism does so because it regards such a complete separation as unphilosophical and unjustified. For if there is to be immortality, it is, for our theistic idealism, an immortality based on the reality and worth of the human personality—of the spiritualised self or spiritual entity—weighted, as such, with metaphysical significance. It is an immortality of the soul, as imperishable seat of this human personality, not an immortality of ethical ideas or qualities functioning *in vacuo*, as they almost appear to do in certain ethical treatments. This all too common weakness or evasion, before the metaphysical issue, is anything but courageous or creditable in the metaphysical sense, which has something of its own to

respect in the face of one-sided ethicalisms. *Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem*, is an excellent principle; equally excellent I take to be the insistence that entities are not to be diminished, ignored, or eliminated, without necessary and justifiable cause. There can be no security for the ethical claim unless it accords with true metaphysics, for it is a serious oversight to forget that every ethic needs and implies a metaphysic, with which it should harmonise and be at one. Hence to say, with some recent philosophies of religion, that nothing exists of metaphysical value for immortality, is to leave the ethical claims anything but well founded. Siebeck did better, expressly acknowledging, like some others since, the proofs to be partly metaphysical, and partly moral ('Lehrbuch der Religionsphilosophie,' p. 425). If metaphysics can do nothing to help our hold on immortality by unfolding or expiscating the fundamental meaning and significance of personal spirit, as it fronts the future life, then—I dare to say it—all our fine ethical theorisings will lack the *rappports* and support necessary to carry us through the difficulties. Over an ancient mantelpiece in Bruges, Maeterlinck found the words inscribed: "Yet more is to be found in me." That is precisely what the soul, in its metaphysical bearings on immortality, would say to such present-day philosophies of religion. When we are told, on one hand, that the survival of man is purely an affair of experimental psychology, and, on the other hand, that it is solely a question of the ethical consciousness, we remain unconvinced, and turn to the testimony of the ontological consciousness, as concerned with the deepest and most fundamental aspects of reality considered by mind. Is the unseen world conceived as one of ethical ideas and ideals, but without any metaphysics? How absurd! Yet appallingly little has recently been done in the direction which I have now indicated. We must remember that the soul, in its most developed form, is never a thing complete. Moreover, it is worth recalling that its perfecting is not due merely to its own care and effort, but to what the Scholastics called the entitative habit (*habitus*

entitativus)—the infusion of sanctifying grace in such wise as to affect the very substance of the soul. Yet even of such souls the ontological consciousness argues nothing, for the pure ethicist, of any metaphysical significance for immortality, be it ever so charged with transcendental energy! Of course, one does not expect anything rich or suggestive on such a subject in text-book formulations; these do but set down, in parched formulas, conventionally accepted findings. But, for minds of wider outlook and deeper demand, the metaphysical implications must be added to the ethical and the psychological, as matter of interested inquiry and endless suggestiveness. The result is, as I have insisted, cumulative, taking up into its theistic conviction all the converging lines of thought. There are men whose instinct for immortality may be vastly more significant than any opinions they may have on that subject, and it is the significant things we must learn to note. There have been great and significant thinkers, whose weight or whose want of ontological consciousness, in respect of immortality, presents very striking contrasts, to any deeply reflective study. I should as soon discount the weight, because of the want, as I would discount genius because we have so much dulness and commonplaceness with us. We are here in an atmosphere quite other than that of a Schopenhauer or a Hartmann or any other who may be under the dominance of purely biological facts, and we cannot descend to that level, when we are dealing purely with the soul, conscious of itself as such. Theistic idealism forbids it. We are in an atmosphere where we cannot be content simply to pass from our ethical needs to the assumption of their satisfaction, without any exercise of metaphysical thought on the issues involved. These are not simply hypothetical, for it is the position of our Theistic Idealism that there are metaphysical implications in our experience at its highest reaches of communion with God, according to the ontological consciousness as it fronts immortality. It is not a forward-looking aspect merely whereof we now speak: it is, in relation thereto, our present spontaneous sense of, and

impulse towards, spiritual self-preservation; but the contents of such consciousness are not those of a detached self, in isolation from its true correlative, which is God: there can be no consciousness of the indestructibility of the substance of consciousness apart from this God-consciousness. Any consciousness, in the forward-looking aspect, must be strictly continuous with the ontological consciousness in the present. The spiritual Beyond is not simply an affair of post-mortem æons, but is already a real ideal for the transcendent aspects of our concrete life-experience, wherein our ultimate reality is grasped in union with the Mind and Will of the Absolute Self. The eternal is thus already in time, and the futurist aspect is but the as yet unfulfilled purpose of that Absolute Will. "The true life," said Fichte, "lives in the eternal. It is a whole in every instant, the highest life which is possible at all." To exclude all metaphysical values from such a sphere of absoluteness, as that which I have just described, is surely absurd enough, whether you can exactly tabulate these values or not. Life is happily not a thing of mere text-book values. So when Baron von Hügel, in his work on "Eternal Life," that higher form of immortality than mere survival, speaks of the intolerable horror of succession felt by the awakened soul, and of its longing for simultaneity—"an utterly abiding Here and Now"—purely ethical philosophy of religion finds in such a phenomenon nothing that imports metaphysical relation or significance. It does justice to our ethical consciousness in respect of our ethical striving, but, by an arbitrary and unphilosophical procedure, takes no account of the metaphysical implications of our ontological consciousness. This it does, although the rise of our immortality, as eternal life, has been described as "an experience, requirement, force, conception, ideal, which is, in endless degrees and ways, latent or patent in every specifically human life and act; which, in its fullest operativeness and its most vivid recognition, is specifically religious; and which, in proportion to such fulness and recognition, is found to involve the consciousness" of all "the highest realities" which are "sought

after or found by man." Such a default or abdication of metaphysical sense or instinct does not at all appear to me satisfying. It leaves the ethical position without the metaphysical support which is essential to it. If the beginnings of Immortality, as Eternal Life, as realised on earth and affording our highest presages, consist of "the keen sense of His Perfection, Simultaneity, and Prevenience, as against our imperfection, successiveness, and dependence," let the philosophy of religion cease to impoverish itself, and lower its theme, by declaring such things to have no metaphysical relation or value. To treat Immortality as only begun, and solely known, beyond the grave, is to choose the least illumined and least illuminating method of dealing with the subject. It is, as I have shewn elsewhere, one of many "minimal" and disappointing things in Dr Galloway's work ('*Bibliotheca Sacra*,' two Nos., 1914-16). There can be no vital strength in the discussion till such externalism is surmounted, and the subject viewed as already begun and known in part. We do not enrich our knowledge of the future life by ignoring our present experience in its highest and most significant reaches. Even Dr Bradley feels and admits the importance for the question of immortality of the self, in its reality, that is here and now, not the bare unrelated existence of the self after death. He approves, in his 'Essays' (p. 439), "the form of prolonged existence" in so far as this "is necessary in the interest of religion." Dr Bradley's metaphysical instincts serve him well in this percipience of the importance of our present self, but he rather fails to appreciate the real situation when he curiously contents himself with adding (p. 438) that any metaphysical considerations must here be irrelevant and valueless for religion! Obviously, that would be so, if the immortalised self were a mere ontological thing, but how absurd it were so to conceive the spiritualised self! How far we are from dealing with bare ontological being must be evident to any who reflect that the spiritualised self or reason, here fronting the future, is simply laden with concrete spiritual contents, for which it is surely no

irrelevant or valueless affair that they have gotten real ontological home and dwelling-place. It is, as Bradley himself said, "necessary in the interest of religion." To leave religion without the requisite metaphysical support is suicidal, here as elsewhere. You may call it irrelevant, for the nature of religion, but not for the vital fact of its existence. Of course, no mere continuance or survival would make the soul religious. But the ontological consciousness of the soul that lives, and moves, and has its conscious being in God, is, to theistic idealism, no bare consciousness of being, but a God-united consciousness with a richness in the metaphysical value of its conviction all its own. Its conviction of immortality is neither a vague hope nor a blind belief, but an assured, at times an overpowering, conviction of the spiritualised reason, based on all the lines of thought and reasoning open to it concerning Man, the World, and God. The possibility of this permanent distinction Theistic Idealism proclaims to the experience of every soul of man, not merely to esoteric philosophers. Still, as an affair of reason, it is a strictly philosophic concern, and we are not here concerning ourselves either with faith or with theology. No realm or aspect of thought or experience is hid from, or alien to, any Philosophy which is thoroughgoing and worthy the name, in the view of Theistic Idealism. Mundane philosophies may mistakenly elect to exclude the circuits thereof, and impoverish themselves and the world, but these are, and will remain, open to the reason and the thought that will fearlessly traverse them, in the search for the fullest consciousness possible to experience. Such reciprocities between God and man as I have described—such interlockings of the Divine and the human consciousness—carry the deepest, the most fundamental assurances of immortality. In such authentication of our immortality lies the peerless significance of personality. In it, too, lies for human life the crown of true idealism.

Far the most satisfactory treatment of this topic, in the most recent philosophy of religion, has been that of Prof. Ladd, in his valuable work on 'The Philosophy of Religion.'

The treatment of the metaphysical aspect is, indeed, largely implicit, but it is there. He says (vol. ii. p. 533) that "man has felt within him, and has responded to, the obligations inherent in the very being of a Self," and the capacity of this self is not here exhausted (p. 546). He admits, further, that one "who has realised the convictions of subjective religion in their highest intensity," may "develop a certainty of immortal life, which admits no doubt, and which feels no lack of joyful assurance. The Self is convinced that it has already gained possession of life eternal" (vol. ii. pp. 547-548). This he admits, as I, of course, do, is no valid argument for all. The experience is a "fact," however, he contends; but it is more than a fact, I urge, it is a possibility, an open possibility. As such it might even be pressed as proof for all. I have dispensed myself from dealing more fully with the cosmic and the naturalistic aspects in this chapter, because Ladd has so fully occupied himself with them, and I have desired to make my treatment complementary to existing treatments, and as distinctive as possible from them. I refer to Ladd, however, because his position here is not without agreement with my own. This is so, for example, in the case of what he elsewhere says of the ontological consciousness, on which form of consciousness I have largely based my previous insistences. "Without the metaphysical instinct, and the conclusions and postulated truths at which the mind of man arrives by impulsion from this instinct, there could be no form of religion whatever. A non-metaphysical religious being is an absurdity, a contradiction in terms. It is in the needs and activities of man's 'ontological consciousness' that both religion and philosophy so largely have their rise" (vol. i. p. 47). This is in line with what I have already urged, in connection with the discussion of immortality, where I have shewn the futility of religious attempts at proof in utter disregard of the ontological consciousness. In the immanent dialectic involved, the ontological consciousness is of the essence of reason, and nothing could be more absurd than to say or suppose that

it imports nothing for our religious development. To regard the form and the development of our religious thought on immortality, as an affair quite apart from metaphysics, is both mistaken and misleading, due to grave defect of metaphysical instinct and acumen. But I think I have said enough to shew the baneful effect of the lack, in some recent philosophies of religion, of any proper recognition of the significance and value of the ontological consciousness. But Theistic Idealism, as I conceive it, is a philosophical system which makes count and reckoning of the highest data and considerations, in its thought of Immortality, as well as of lower arguments and weaker points of view. For everywhere, as a system, it is content with nothing less than the highest that may be thought or said. Hence its inability to treat immortality merely as that which is to be, since that would be to do despite to that inmost centre in us all where dwells the soul or spiritual essence which, in its conscious superiority to spatio-temporal manifestations, already knows itself partaker of the life immortal. For, as said Renan, God is "essentially the *locus* of souls" ("essentiellement le lieu des âmes").

I have adopted the line of dealing with the metaphysical implications and relationships of Immortality set out in previous pages, rather than such an extreme metaphysical position as Dr Schiller adopts, in 'Riddles of the Sphinx' (edn. 1894), though there are points in his presentation with which I firmly agree. He holds the "metaphysical" to be "the only absolutely secure basis" for the assertion of immortality. But he argues for the ultimate self-existence of spirits—the plurality of ultimate existences—including the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul, in a way which is so little drawn from, and fitted to, experience, that I am unable to accept his presentation in its entirety. Notwithstanding Dr Schiller and Dr Ward, I think the pre-existence part of the theory has as grave difficulties as Dr Rashdall thinks it has, and these lie in a highly conjectural or hypothetical region. Dr Schiller is so far experiential, however, as to regard "the whole-world pro-

cess" as "a process taking place in the interaction between the egos and the Deity," but he admits that his "plurality of ultimate existence" is "too remote from the phenomena of our world to be at once appealed to in settling the nature of *our* future life" (Ibid., p. 404). On both points one can agree with him; also, that "the insufficiency of our data renders the question a difficult one" (p. 405). One can agree, further, on the importance of "self-identity," and the part played by "memory" in it—or "the continuity of the chain of consciousness"; and with his insistences on the "reality" of the "self," as a contention badly lost sight of by pure ethicists. But, these points of agreement apart, I prefer to keep more closely to the appeal to the ontological consciousness, and to experience, in its higher reaches, difficult as the matter may be. In his 'Humanism' (edn. 1912), Dr Schiller has an interesting discussion of the ethical aspects of Immortality, wherein he makes the significant contention that the ethical postulation of immortality has a good "claim for recognition in our ultimate metaphysic" (p. 343), "metaphysics" being "the supreme court," to which "the case must be carried" (p. 337). These proper insistences on the dependence of ethic upon metaphysic should not have been shorn of their force and value by Dr Schiller, at the beginning of 'Humanism,' laying the basis of metaphysics in ethic, and that, too, in no deep or satisfactory fashion. "At a blow" (p. 8), he "awards to the ethical conception of Good supreme authority" over the logically True, and the metaphysically Real. What I said elsewhere on such a position holds good in this case also (see my 'Studies in European Philosophy,' pp. 338-340). The real character of the ethical is first guaranteed by the metaphysics of spirit. His "idealistic experientialism" merges all "fact," all "knowledge," "our whole experience," "in value." "Idealistic" with a vengeance, since it involves a chaotic and irrational treatment of epistemology and metaphysics, and a wholesale and hopeless sinking in the quagmire of subjectivism. Theistic idealism rejects such a destitution of theoretic interest, and maintains in its in-

tegrity the objective knowledge of things and their laws, in the service of ideal-forming intelligence.

It is, of course, not necessary that there be belief in a personal God, in order to some sort of belief in immortality, but the position of Theistic Idealism is, with Renan, "*C'est en Dieu que l'homme est immortel.*" Hence the justice which that Idealism seeks to render to the metaphysical aspects, God being, for it, the being of our being and more real than reality. But the metaphysical aspect, which finds for the ontological consciousness such full and rich expression in the words, "*Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit,*" notwithstanding their anthropomorphic form, stands not alone, but reinforces itself with the ethical aspects and considerations. For it is no philosophical doctrine of immortality, precise and dogmatic as such, which Theistic Idealism essays to present: it aims rather at a well-founded and deeply-wrought conviction, woven of the metaphysical and the ethical strands of consciousness in the unified and indivisible soul or self. Such is the cumulative result whereof we spoke. To any rich ontological consciousness, the strength of the ethical reinforcements is tremendous. It is quite necessary to say this, so that it may be clearly seen that, in seeking to do metaphysical justice, there has been no trace of undervaluing the ethical factors. That man lives a shallow life whose experience has not verified a thousand times the truth of Emerson's remark, that "*strength enters just as much as the moral element prevails.*" Our demand is here for the survival of our moral value: it is a demand to know the secret of the world which here we have so eagerly pursued. But it is too tenuous and barely abstract to say, with Renan in his '*Dialogues Philosophiques,*' that it is the survival of the idea or the ideal, in ghostly or etherealised fashion, unless, as he sometimes does, we make God the ideal, and an object of desire and love. The survival of our moral value, of which I have just spoken, was already held, in a valid enough way, by Kant, because it was intolerable for the moral consciousness that it should be otherwise. But to-day ends are taken to presuppose

values, rather than values ends. Hence it is the notion of value we have to think of, rather than the moral end. And the conclusion of the latest philosophical thought is, in Prof. Urban's words, "that values are not really values, if the essence of value is not conserved." In the logic of valuation, we are here driven, by the intolerableness of the opposite—not its inconceivability—to hold the conservation of value. Hence Wundt, Höffding, Varisco, and others, in variant ways, have done so. Our postulate of immortality, therefore, rests at this point on the consideration that what is essential in our ultimate moral values, which are personal values, must needs be conserved. This, because of the absolute elements involved; because personality is the highest value; and because reality is the support of values. Between value and reality there can be no final divorce. Death does not alter the moral content of life, much less does it annihilate it: life, in its developed moral consciousness, has acquired such a sense of its worth and reality, that you cannot keep it from regarding itself as eternal in its essence. And only in terms of consciousness, of course, can we speak of end or of value. But Theistic Idealism, just because it is *theistic* idealism, makes me hold to Immortality, not because it satisfies certain needs of mine, but because it is involved in my objective relationship to God. I hold to it, not alone or primarily because it has value or utility for me, but because it is bound up for me in God's objective faithfulness. Its footing of superiority to the mere satisfying of my needs is the core and essence of its value to me. Its essential truth-value determines my valuation, and is not made by it. "Sentimus experimurque nos aeternos esse," said even Spinoza, and the feeling and experience deepen, in value, as our consciousness grows, both ontologically and ethically. But this experience, again, is because we are in and for God. Theistic Idealism therefore agrees with the statement—and applies it to the present case—that "every idea of religion which, like Prof. Höffding's, centres in man, instead of God, denotes by the nature of the case an interested and utilitarian thing; and that only when its determining

centre of gravity lies outside of ourselves, and it is interpreted as self-surrender to an infinite object, is religion free of that mercenary quality which may cling even to an austere moralism" (H. R. Mackintosh, 'Mind,' 1907). But Höffding ignores the theistic solution of immortality, and is unsatisfactory on the subject, "the principle of the conservation of value" being sole God for him; but this, it has been properly said, "amounts to no more than the formal reduplication of a philosophical ideal, already sufficiently determined quite apart from the name God" (Ibid.) So Höffding's critical monism remains really no better than a variety of pantheism, and his use of valuation hinders rather than helps reason or intelligence in its endeavours after the comprehension of life. There is a measure, as there is a manner, in which value can be helpfully and vitally used, but this is more than can be said of Höffding, or of recent philosophies of religion that have been too largely dominated by him. These all resolve the essence of all religion into belief in conservation of value, such value having relation only to feeling and will. They leave aside the question of what is true in itself, not merely for us. The world of values is one in which we have to do with the relation of higher and lower: such a scale of values may have obvious use, in setting forth what may represent, for us, the order of reality. But such a value-conception of religion is wholly anthropocentric. And if you throw God into this world of comparative values, you derogate from the dignity of Deity. In view of His grace, there is, as we saw in the chapter on "The God of Theistic Idealism," an obvious sense in which He is, for us, the highest value, but if we are content to view Him only thus, we are obviously reducing Him to the level of existing for us—for human end. He is not taken as for or in Himself. Such a "supreme value—" God is not God at all, save in limited or fragmentary sense. Not in any comparative sense, but absolutely, is God the highest Good. Philosophy of religion which makes the content of religious knowledge nothing but value, cannot afford the highest degree of positive inspiration, and cannot effect the elimination of doubt. "There is no

value the opposite of which cannot be affirmed." An example of the confusion of thought which sometimes exists is seen in the case of a writer who recently talked of "demonstration" of "the truth" of religion, where the method of "values" had been employed. The religious value-judgments, as such, have nothing to do with truth; they cannot yield theoretic knowledge of truth; they give not knowledge of objective reality; and, without objective truth being reached, how can there be "demonstration" of "the truth" of religion? So in the æsthetic sphere, you cannot "demonstrate" the "truth" of æsthetic worth or value; that is felt, not known—*sen- tito* not *conosciuto*, as the Italians say. In moral or religious values we have but the expression of our subjective attitude to the truths or objects involved, but knowledge of them—"demonstration" of them—is just what, from the nature of the values, we do not and cannot get. This is not to say that judgments of value have not their place: by the side of theoretic knowledge or judgments, they have their use; but they are all stamped with subjectivity and relativity, which is too often practically overlooked or forgotten. Such values, having no unconditioned character, cannot be for Theistic Idealism—as they are for Höffding—the essence of religion: our idealism seeks values that are of universal validity, and grounded in a necessity of reason. Its idea, as necessary, of the Absolute, does not depend on the will, or on any individual arbitrariness, nor does it remain founded on mere religious instinct: it plants itself on the manner in which man personally relates himself to God, the personal Absolute. It is through knowledge that this relation must be fully brought out, in its truth and its necessity. Truth is of independent value.

I come back to say that making the soul of value is here the important thing. The soul is no static quantity, and the greatness of its growth is measured by its passion for Immortality. To keep and train the soul thus for immortality is a higher, worthier thing, than merely to hold an immortality of the soul. It is such vital directions or modes

of spiritual thinking that are most required. The soul is destined for ideal or spiritual creativeness, and to the maintenance of this irreducible originality of the soul, we must give ourselves, rather than to thinking directly of our immortality, if the consciousness of immortality is to be strongly ours. We can afford to be thus self-forgetful, knowing that there is a metaphysical basis for our belief in the future life, in the fact of the Divine World-Will, for we surely do not suppose that God's Providential government ends, or is conterminous with, our earthly life. All other world-spheres are His, and we are His. Therein do we find the highest pledge of our immortality. What core of certainty awaits our thought here—and its metaphysical significance is undoubted—lies in the conception of an infinite development of the kingdom of God, in no mere religio-moral sense, with the perfecting of the individuals whereof it is composed. What the outlook on the Beyond brings to consciousness is, the worth of our present spiritual activity. The soul has here concentrated, in accordance with the view I have been pressing in this chapter, such fulness of hard-won force, as must find scope in the higher spheres of the world to come. It seems a reasonable belief that there is an eternal purpose for us in the Divine counsels, and this confidence strengthens our consciousness of the infinite value of what we are and do, here and now. In the fact that God is here immanent in our souls, we have the guarantee of the conservation and strengthening of our souls in God hereafter. Diviner certitude there is none. Eternal life in the midst of time is the true immortality, though certain philosophies of religion are ignorant of it, and some agnosticisms acknowledge it not. It is this life of God in the soul of man, here and now, that is the great and significant thing in our claim for personal immortality. Our conviction of the immortality deepens as our life here is thus enriched and deepened, by its rooting in an order which is above time, the while our experiences are in time. The rooting remains, for all that, the deeper thing, the determining factor, for the life, the time relations and

connections being secondary and inferior. Our consciousness of the time-series, as shewn in our chapter on "The Metaphysics of Time and of Eternity," is itself no event in the time-series, but lies above it. The unity and continuity of our spiritual interest and activity have a significance which may be truly called eternal; for it is just the Eternal which is being revealed to us in and through time. This time-superiority of the spiritual life is, therefore, to be cultivated and maintained in its significance for the faith of immortality. There is thus something better than to perform such feats as the projection into the future exemplified by a writer, who once quaintly said that "there is not any property or circumstance of my being that I contemplate with more joy than my Immortality. I can easily overlook any present momentary sorrow, when I reflect that it is in my power to be happy a thousand years hence" [Harrison's 'British Classics,' vol. ii., London, 1785]. Better and more efficacious than such an imaginative projection would have been a deepened spiritual consciousness of communion with God in His timeless unconditioned being here and now, since we are called to share His eternal life in the living present. The characteristic of that life—so far as we rise to share it—will be found in the conception of the co-existence of all things, rather than in the sense of their succession. To see things, in our measure, as God sees them, is to gain present power to bear sorrow. It deserves to be expressly remarked what great advantage accrues from the personal Absolute of Theistic Idealism, since thereby is secured the real immortality of man. Weisse already had this insight, although he reserved immortality only for the regenerate. That this denial to man of eternal life is not yet a denial to him of immortality, was duly set out by Conradi. But the whole grounding of man's personal immortality lies in the fact that it is the Absolute Personality Who is his maker, trainer, supporter, inspirer, companion, guide, and judge, and Who cannot conceivably forsake His own work, abandon His own ends, and sunder the sacredest ties. It is not surprising to our theistic idealism that that fine spirit, F. W. New-

man, should have said, in his quaint poems on "Theism" (p. 76):—

"In short, close friendship between the Eternal and the perishing
Appears unseemly to the nature of the Eternal,
Whom it befits to keep His beloved, or not to love at all.

But to say that He loves no man is to make religion vain.
Hence it is judged that 'whatsoever God loveth, liveth with God.'

It will be seen that our contention, in the foregoing reflections, is that the soul's *vigor et coelestis origo* be maintained, and that we learn to value ourselves properly as heirs of immortality. How far we have advanced in this direction is very evident from F. M. Cornford's fine work, 'From Religion to Philosophy,' as seen in Greece, or from the words of Cicero, who could speak of nothing fruitional, but only of "a certain presage, as it were, of a future existence; and this takes the deepest root, and is most discoverable in the greatest geniuses and most exalted souls." But it does not follow, because we have travelled far, that we have travelled as we should or might. It would be nothing short of blasphemous to think so; but here we are only concerned to say it would be thoroughly unphilosophical. For the undervaluation of our possibilities, privilege, and endowments, in this direction can only be so accounted. I have long been convinced that much of the modern interest in immortality brings little certitude and satisfaction because it is a merely languid and external sort of interest. It is in need of Emerson's admonishing words:—"Higher than the question of our duration is the question of our deserving. Immortality will come to such as are fit for it, and he who would be a great soul in future must be a great soul now" [Essay on "Worship"]. On the other hand, there is an interest in immortality which is serious and real, and yet narrow in its grounding and mistaken in its conceptions. It is well illustrated by the outworn procedure of a recent writer, who thinks immortality a truth of theology or revelation, with which philosophy has nothing to do (W. Temple, 'Hibbert Journal,' 1916). Enough has been said in this chapter to shew that the absurdity of such a view of

philosophy in this connection is equalled only by its ingratitude. There is no metaphysic to-day worthy the name which does not, as a metaphysic of experience, turn the scrutiny of reason to every form of spiritual being and its implications, and render the highest service by setting out its rational justification. It certainly does not ignore the activity and validity of the ontological consciousness, in the discussion of immortality, however this writer may take no account of the fact. And, in close connection therewith, the psychological viewpoints are also more significant than he imagines. One wonders what sort of entity is the soul of those theological people who are so anxious to have it kept inviolate from all metaphysics and from all psychology. It does not matter to true philosophy where or how experience has been gained—whether from revelation or not—what it deals with are truths that in some sense shine by their own Light, and what it insists upon is, the bringing all reality, all experience, to the bar of reason, the scrutiny of rational judgment. This is not to say that philosophy does not become greatly enriched, and hugely indebted, in the process. For philosophy simply does not exist for us as the tenuous, shadowy form of knowledge described by the writer already quoted, with whose theological contentions in themselves I am in entire accord. Not in vain has modern psychology shewn what a real and unified self is the human soul, and it is this self, theistic idealism asserts, which is immortal. Such a self, when thoroughly spiritualised, proves not only the crown of evolutionary process, but points to indefinite possibilities of future development. Wundt's law of the increase of spiritual energy has taught us, as James puts it, that there is "no formal limit to the positive increase of being in spiritual respects" [W. James, 'Human Immortality,' pp. 80-81]. Because such increase of spiritual being is so dear to the heart of God—being what He is—theistic idealism is assured that such endless opportunity will be provided in the world to come by the faithful love of God. But it is impossible to doubt the important senses in which each of us makes his own immortality, conditioned as our future life must be by our present

spiritual development. That developement may seem to us unfavourably hampered by our bodily organization, matter being "an admirably calculated machinery for regulating, limiting, and restraining the consciousness which it encases" [Schiller's 'Riddles of the Sphinx,' p. 293]. But our idealism has shewn the priority of mind to matter; and, as the spiritualisation of matter proceeds, consciousness becomes "less engrossed by the mechanism of life," and "the body itself becomes more and more fitted to be the body of a spiritual being" [Ibid., p. 301]. We are without excuse if we make the body the grave of the soul, instead of its instrument and servant. For any idealistic-spiritual metaphysic, indeed, corporeal existence—even of the world—has disappeared, and only spiritual being has validity for the comprehending spirit: "Alle Realität ist Geistigkeit" sums the situation. All which must be added to that impress of spirit on body—that in-working of spirit which leaves on body its stamp and traces—which effects the spiritualisation of matter already referred to. The case is one in which this result is attained through mechanism and spontaneity working into one another, spirit serving itself of mechanism as means. Our spiritual activity in its highest performances has got very completely away from the fetters of mechanistic process [see L. Busse, 'Geist und Körper, Seele und Leib,' pp. 478-480]. It is this reality of the soul or spiritual self that is the important thing, to our modern thought, for it is upon this that its persistence must be held to depend. That that which is, must so continue to subsist, had its stress or emphasis by Aquinas rather on the other, or divine side, of the matter: the soul *was*, to Aquinas, because of the immobility of the Divine Godness ("remanebit ex immobilitate divinae voluntatis"). And so with those who follow him; Gratry, for example, holds it is enough to shew that the soul is immortal, that it, in this sense, really *is* (A. Gratry, 'De la Connaissance de L'Ame,' pp. 218-219). That aspect has, of course, its truth and value for our theistic idealism, but our present day stress is of less inferential, more direct character, in its study of the real and unified self, as we now find it. The procedure of Theistic Idealism is, in this

matter of Immortality, to make a scrutiny of the universal human consciousness, and to bring back such cumulative results as the following:—that immortality appears as a demand of the spirit; that it is a demand of religion in itself; that it is a demand of philosophical thought along various lines, including (1) the psychological implications, (2) the metaphysical aspects and relations, (3) the teleological line of proof, and (4) the moral argument. All the strands of this rich, cumulative result point to human personality and its relation to God. But this pre-supposes the personality of God, and the personality of God and the immortality of man are the two most universal foundations of the moral continuance of human kind, to our theistic idealism.

The whole universe, then, is, in its core and inmost essence, spiritual, for our idealism; and matter and its forces are but manifestations of the spiritual. But, before we can argue for the continuance of man's life in immortality, we must be sure of the real worth and spiritual value of the life we would so project and prolong. The cynical pessimist would with right have something to say of an immortal life bearing no blessing, and bereft of blessedness. Immortality were a thing of little consequence severed from the ideal spiritual possibilities of man's being. From the life, on the other hand, that consists of the consciousness of God and communion with Him, the expectation of immortality is inseparable. It is this capacity of becoming conscious of the Infinite, said Lotze, that is the distinguishing endowment of the human mind. It has this capacity because, as he significantly remarked, it is a real unit-being, and is so not simply because it appears to itself as such, but chiefly because it appears to itself at all. We see, then, the essentialness of the positive character of life for immortality, a conception infinitely in advance of that of mere endlessness, which might be no more a desirable thing and a blessing than for Tithonos. "Harmony, concrete unity, integrity," it has been said, are the characteristic notes of this life throughout, from the psychological viewpoint. The life eternal, as we saw in our chapter on "The Metaphysics of Time and of Eternity," is

not the negation of a mere time-limit: it is the negation of what is chaotic, incomplete, disruptive. Thought has too much occupied itself with immortality as a gift, and too little with it as an achievement. But every such gift is a task—*Jede Gabe Gottes ist eine Aufgabe*. “If I assume this noble task, I can never reach its end; and so surely as it is my vocation to assume it, I can never cease *to act*, and hence can never cease *to be*. That which men call Death cannot interrupt my activity; for my work must go on to its completion, and it cannot be completed in Time; hence my existence is limited by no time, and I am eternal: with the assumption of this great task, I have also laid hold of Eternity” (Fichte’s ‘Vocation of the Scholar,’ Lect. III.) That supernal world is objectively real and eternally true, and, if Fichte has shewn it to be a projection of will and feeling, that is in supplement to its being a like demand of the speculative reason, as we have abundantly shewn. This whole forefeeling of a future life—this forthputting of spiritual antennæ—betokens illimitable possibilities, no less than limitless desires. Any less view would seem to theistic idealism unworthy of the moral responsibilities of a faithful Creator.

As I have just spoken of Fichte, I may here note his notion that, to help maintain the faith in immortality, the pre-existence of the soul must be granted. I have, earlier in this chapter, indicated my view of the difficulty involved in such a conception as necessary, and I shall allow Martineau to express what is largely my own view on the subject, but without implying commitment as between creationist and traducian theory. “If, at a certain stage in the development of the cosmos, the Supreme Mind set up at a given centre a personal subject of thought and will like His own, with adequate assignment of causality, what is to prevent this from being a freehold in perpetuity, and to reduce it to a terminable loan? Why may not the communicated Divine nature endure as long as the uncommunicated Source on which it lives?” And again,—“The dictum, therefore, that whatever begins must end, is one to which we are not bound

to surrender: and the only pre-existence which we need allow to the soul is latent within its Divine Source, ere yet idea has taken effect and the personal monad been set up" [J. Martineau, 'Study of Religion,' vol. ii., 2nd edn., p. 334]. That, of course, is a mere clearing of the path for the positive claims or doctrine which I have already set forth. Although, as we saw, Dr Schiller based his argument for immortality on metaphysical grounds, he has elsewhere, subsequently, admitted the independent validity of the ethical line of argument for immortality, without, however, seeking the strength to be found in their conjoint appeal. [In 'The New World,' 1897.] I will dare to utter that whereof I am firmly convinced, that no man knows anything of the profound depth and tremendous force of the conviction open to us of the truth of immortality, who does not allow all the possible considerations, psychological, metaphysical, ethical, and spiritual, to weave themselves together in the whole texture of his brain and in every fibre of his spiritual being, as one vital cumulative issue. Not a demonstration certainly, but a result too broad, and various, and vital, in the bases of its appeal, to have need to descend to demonstration. It feels no more need of demonstration than life does: it would be as absurd in the one case as in the other. The trouble is, to make the conviction so gained in our best hours one of our habitudes of mind or soul. But even that can be much more fully done than we are wont to believe. If it be objected that I am describing an attainment of privileged or gifted souls, the reply is that I am not doing anything of the kind; I am merely expounding the possibilities inherent in the system of theistic idealism, and open to all. That is surely the highest that can be said. For in no other way or sense can either God or Immortality become objects of a universally valid knowledge. And when we consider the utter lack of objective grounding which marks the ordinary moral and psychological arguments for immortality; how these leave immortality a mere matter of hope, need, desire, longing, with no manner of full, objective certainty; it will surely be admitted what need and room exist for such metaphysi-

cal suggestions and supplementary representations as I have given. I have spoken of Kant, of Fries, and others, who leave the subject without any sort of objective grounding. Another instructive and little known example of like sort is Beneke. He is like Kant in his point of departure, but, though a critical empiricist, he has a much better psychological grounding than Kant. The psychological standpoint, however, which he represents, yields nothing but the barest subjective result for our subject. For him, too, there is in this life no certain knowledge of immortality. Beneke was an independent thinker, and not without desire to reach ontological result in his use of psychological analysis. A theory of his own he had, based on the developmental relations of the soul, wherein, out of the soul's experiences, traces were supposed to remain, out of which, in the course of time, richer experiential results were wrought, thought was sharpened, and firmer positions gained. Yet, when the inner being of the soul and its strength have been considered, we are left with nothing but the highest probability of the truth of immortality, with the usual subjective needs in default of any sort of knowledge. What need for wonder that the philosophic mind should, on occasion, present, not the strong, secure consciousness of a Fichte, but the pathetic uncertainty of an Amiel? But it is not possible that strong and sublimated souls should be holden in the bonds of such uncertainty, so assured is their conviction that the God Who is the Absolute and Eternal Reason has provided some better thing for us—a conviction woven of many strands of thought and feeling, and springing from the sense of our kinship with the Infinite. You may heap up psychological facts of sensation, perception, memory, imagination, reason, feeling, will, and choice, but they are unaccounted for until you have found the active, unifying soul, the creative spirit, the perduring personality, as a metaphysical entity. And when this soul makes manifest its splendid self-identity, and self-persistence, throughout all change and the unceasing flow of consciousness; when it nobly sustains the life of aspiration after union with the Highest, and realises the life of conscious fellowship

with God; why does it not then receive the strength which objective consideration and ontological support are fitted to bring? The debt to metaphysical reflection and philosophy of religion is, on this score, far from burdensome, and yet much of the highest value might here be done. One does grow weary of the thinness of the ethical residuum furnished by our own bare moral aspirations, with never a strong word on the objective love, goodness, faithfulness, righteousness, justice, reasonableness, pledges, and moral responsibilities, of God, and with never a word at all on the rich and powerful functionings of the supporting ontological consciousness, to which history and experience bear striking witness for the finding out. It is not enough to sit in silent confidence in the ways of the Eternal: rational-spiritual insight has been given us just that it may help us make in some sort our theodicy explicit. Though I have no call here to go into that, yet there has been the need to point out the necessity for making explicit certain things which have been ignored or left implicit. Theistic idealism regards the secret of Immortality as held in full and satisfying form only by those who realise, in some manner or degree, eternal life in the midst of time, but it does not discount other forms of belief in which it is claimed as the inalienable prerogative of man. For man's life were poor indeed if there were not in it some sense of the reality of the moral universe and of his own abiding relations to it, some divinations of a transcendent world, and some outreachings of his spirit after supernal reality, however these may call for perfecting and development under the powers of rational and spiritual insight. In this work, as philosophical, I am concerned, not with the religions, but with the religious activity of the spirit, in which activity lies the common base of the religions. With the spirit, as such a creative and developing activity, and not simply as a metaphysical entity, my insistences have been concerned. And, though I have put forward a plea for some recognition of the implications and ontological relations and suggestions involved in a discussion of immortality, I am yet forward to say that a purely meta-

physical argument, rigid and standing by itself, can hardly be other than distasteful and unsatisfying, especially, I mean, if based on pure reason, in a narrow and restricted sense, and on human experience, at a minimum of religious enlightenment. I shall take for illustration a great but little known thinker, Bolzano, whose work on this subject, though he died in 1848, has never before been brought under the notice of English readers. But even his philosophic work generally is only now being appreciated. Bolzano had so great faith in reason and human experience as to think a purely metaphysical proof of immortality possible, without drawing upon the aids derivable from religion or revelation. Bolzano has some interesting and acute criticism of Kant. He realises the difficulty of the problem, but thinks it depends on metaphysics. He holds that everything real exists, either in and by itself, or as a property, or adherence, or accident of something else. It is indubitable, for him, that there are substances in the world, and that these are either simple or composite, the former being the ultimate elements of the world. Here Bolzano has obvious affinities with Leibniz. Bolzano's first proof is based upon the nature or essence of the soul. He thinks our representations, judgments, feelings, desires, decisions, &c., must be considered as real, and as belonging to a soul or spirit. The simplicity of this soul he then discusses, but I must forego details. From this he passes to consider the self-identity and unified character of the soul. His second proof, which opens a field for objections, is concerned with the soul's origin. His contention is that the soul, as a simple substance, has not had its origin in time, but from eternity. What was not born in time, cannot, in his view, ever perish. Discussing the theory of the soul's birth in time, he speaks of its existence as an effect, in which connection he largely uses the causal category. His third proof is drawn from the life and development of the soul after its creation. Such a bare, brief outline gives, of course, no idea of the skill and power with which Bolzano reviews all the possibilities involved, but, admitting these, we surely cannot say that such a demon-

stration is satisfying, or anything than bald. Thin, too, just as we saw bare ethicism is thin. It does not suffice, certainly, to generate in us that faith in immortality which Bolzano hoped. His first proof, which chiefly interests us, goes not a little way to set up confidence in the immortality of our spirit, but one would not think of ascribing to it decisive value, standing thus as a bare postulation of ordinary reason and experience. Neither the reality of the self or spirit, nor our consciousness thereof, in the prospect of immortality, is at the highest, when the soul stands merely in its own powers and rights, as thinkers like Dr M'Taggart would have it stand. Whoso has felt the spirit of the Highest working within him must feel it so. This is not to say there is no argument for natural immortality; I am merely noting the difficulty of making it adequate or satisfying. As for Bolzano's second proof, in which he seeks to sustain the pre-existence of the soul, that, of course, had in some sort been already put forward by Plato and by Leibniz, but Bolzano, in perfectly independent manner, works out his own conclusions. Leibniz, it may be observed, oscillated between the pre-existence of the soul and creationism in a way of his own. Not so Julius Müller, who held to pre-existence under the influence of Kant and Schelling. There is a reservation to be made here, not confined to Bolzano, namely, that even if the soul were taken to exist from eternity or indefinitely past time, it would not follow that it will have eternal future. For it is admittedly finite, imperfect, and dependent for its strength and support upon the Absolute Being, Who, so far as strict logical possibility goes, might, at least in some instances, relegate the souls to the realm of non-existence. Bolzano's third proof presents no particular difficulty, but has no distinctive weight for his own position. Now, one may allow Bolzano's proof all the metaphysical merit it deserves, but, taking it so far as it goes, it comes short of being a rounded, full-orbed claim or demonstration of immortality. Its ordinary reason and human experience, viewed as apart from Divine relation or connection, leave the spirit far too empty of positive

and concrete content; the self-identity is left too empty and formal; the will remains too hungry, formal, and potential; in these and other ways the spirit is made to appear far too destitute of concrete spiritual content of its own. That is the incalculable price paid for its sundered relation. Such partial proofs Theistic Idealism does not so much reject, as it subsumes and transcends them. Theistic idealism claims, as a system, to be judged by the highest it can present, not by the lowest it allows, as this latter would obviously be an unjust standard of judgment, though it may be a measure of its catholicity and breadth of mind. No, if we are to present some view of the immortality of man, it will be one in which he represents and embodies the transcendent worth of human personality, in which his soul outweighs in value the whole world, in which his autonomy of spirit directs all things and is directed by none, and in which the rich and varied consciousness of the person, as person, is seen in fullest bloom. It is a consciousness that stands not by and of itself, but is rooted or ensouled in the Absolute Being, to Whose will and working it freely unites itself, gaining ceaseless inspiration and limitless strength thereby. The suggestion that such a being should utterly go under or cease to be, is quite unthinkable, and utterly repugnant to reason. But that result has involved a vast deal more than is implied in Bolzano's proof. Regarding his position on the pre-existence of souls, I may, before passing from the subject, refer to Dr Rashdall's remarks on the point. "It is," he says, "undoubtedly impossible positively to disprove the hypothesis of eternally pre-existent souls." "It is a theory not incapable of satisfying the demands of the religious consciousness, and may even form an element in an essentially Christian view of the universe"; but, to his mind, it is "opposed to all the obvious indications of experience." Then, after stating the theory and the extremely unlikely presuppositions it involves, he concludes that "such a conception" seems to him "to belong to the region of Mythology rather than of sober philosophical thought" [see his 'Phil-

osophy and Religion,' New York, 1910, pp. 93-96]. I am in substantial agreement with him, though, of course, grave difficulties inhere in creationist and traducian theories also, especially when pressed in an exclusive sense. If the pre-existence theory lightens the trouble caused by the fact of congenital sinfulness, it does so by an obvious loss of unity to the race.

From all we have seen, in the course of our discussion, of man as capable of rising to moral and metaphysical heights, we cannot but conclude that the whole scheme of the universe would end in complete self-stultification, were not his immortality an unbreakable certainty. But no conviction of immortality, based on our prophetic feelings and instincts, can be adequate or satisfying, so long as our life is not taken as linked with that of God, and included in His great eternal purpose. Not till then is the miasma of philosophic doubt dispelled, and this Dr D'Arcy, in his recent brief, but interesting, discussion of the subject, has fully realised. The most significant sentence is,—“Man's innate sense of absolute value is witness of his value to God and the one sure proof of future life” [p. 227]. For my own part, I am ready to allow large importance to this view, as I have already shewn on my own account, and, for that matter, before Dr D'Arcy's work had come under my notice. But there are one or two things to be said. If this is to be called a “proof,” it must be noted how purely subjective an affair is “man's innate sense of absolute value,” and how many would disown having such a “sense” in any assured manner, so that it is no more than an open possibility. Even as such, of course, it is not to be denied great worth and relevance. But “proof,” or a certainty that excludes doubt, you cannot extract from a subjective value. Dr D'Arcy may be taken to import objective aspect in saying our sense of value is witness of our “value to God,” and there are remarks in his context that may be taken to point to such objective reference. But the difficulty of reaching objective aspects or considerations is here so great, and the need for them

so deeply felt, that the matter should not be left so implicit. In view of my earlier insistences in this chapter, I doubt the wisdom of "the one sure proof" being made to bear the whole weight of immortality. The rich cumulative issues we have already gained, and the variety of so-called "proofs" we have considered, cannot be so narrowed or compressed to a single subjective point or aspect without great impoverishment or loss to our theme. Some of the remarks I have made in other chapters on the nature of value may be applied here. Dr D'Arcy's discussion is good so far as it goes, and escapes the thinness of much bare ethicism, but in this work I have no call to follow him in his theological references to the Resurrection. If we are to take "man's innate sense of absolute value," in this connection, I do not know anything better than the ontological consciousness of Augustine has given us in his work 'On the Trinity':—"For it is eternal to the soul to live; it is eternal to know that it lives."

There is now something to be said concerning the consciousness of the self or ego. That consciousness is, of course, always found or known by us as bound to the body. But there is no need to infer, therefrom, that the dissolution of the body means the annihilation or destruction of my immediate self-consciousness. The activities of my intellect, thought, and will, are super-organic or immaterial. My immediate consciousness of my self or ego is no mere quality or function of the body; we have no right or title to affirm that it originates or springs from the body; nor have we any right to forget that it is by means of the capabilities of sensation and thought found in my immediate self-consciousness that I am first of all able to perceive my body. We have no right to treat the self or conscious ego as a derived concept, rather than an immediately given fact or inner reality. Such immediate consciousness of the self or ego is a magnitude for or by itself, and I have shewn elsewhere in this work, especially in its opening chapter, the paramount philosophical importance of such self-consciousness, and of meting out justice

to it. It will be seen that it is rather my immediate self-consciousness that has given me my body, than my body that has given me my consciousness as a self or ego. If it be said that the body has a temporal priority over the rise of our immediate self-consciousness, that does not touch the logical priority of my immediate self-consciousness over the body, as already pointed out, nor does it prove that my self-consciousness has sprung from the body, is a mere function of it, and will be dissolved with it. It is not for idealism to be betrayed so easily into materialistic assumptions. You may call me product, but I am a self-positing activity, not a mere product. Of course, the unspeakable closeness of the relation of the human spirit or consciousness to the bodily organisation is not to be denied, and some have even barred the way to immortality for themselves by raising this closeness or intimacy to indispensableness. But it follows, from what I have said, that no man can give any deeper account of his body than that it is a form of his consciousness. We have seen how it enters into his consciousness, there to condition and affect it in subtle and myriad ways, but does any live man say that it rules his spirit, and is not ruled and subjugated by his free personality? You cannot extract the unique unity of the "I" from the body, for out of that mere mechanical unity of atoms no self-consciousness could ever arise. The world of the body is the world of change; but the body offers determinate paths for the activities of the ego; the note of the world of consciousness or personal spirit is permanence or abidingness. What wonder, then, that, in the dissolution of the body which we call death, the personality or immediate consciousness of the self or ego should abide. It needs only such a modicum of imagination as Mill suggested in the memorable words quoted near the beginning of this chapter. There is something irrational in the suggestion that the soul, which feels somewhat of a captive while imprisoned in the body, should, on being emancipated or liberated from its present limiting con-

ditions, be anything else than free and immortal. There is instinctive revolt in our nature against the idea of annihilation—a revolt that deepens with our development. The suggestion of some form of embodied existence for the dead—what has been called a resurrection body—may very well have an element of truth or value, but in this connection I am not philosophically concerned to pursue that inquiry. What I am concerned with is the survival of my real concrete self, not some characterless ego which is a product of abstraction, and such survival means the growth, continuity, and development of my present self, not its mere persistence. Not this persistence, but the felt and profound spiritual potentialities of this self or “I” is here the important thing for our thought. Of course, these spiritual potentialities are those of a self or “I” which is constituted by the totality of its own present and past. But my immediate consciousness of the “I” does not always shine at its fullest power. Nor is the identity of the “I” a literal sameness, but it remains the “I” in the process of continuity and inclusion. The soul in its individuality is never a mere part or a mere determinate appearance of an Universal Soul. The survival of the “I,” which here has lived in and for God, will mean a fuller theistic entrance into the Life of God. Such fuller and more universal life, realised in Him, will obviously be no mere *dolce far niente*, though “rest” doth remain for those whose life is in God. No longer is the separateness of the self—though there is no absorption—that which commands attention, but its harmony with, and its subjection to, the Universal Life, so that in it this latter freely lives and acts. For its life is “hid with Christ in God”; is one of perfect union with the Divine or Perfect Will. Such is the true, the eternal life. How could there be disharmony, where all is subordinated to the ubiquity and eternity of the life within? It is this relation of our life to the Universal Life of God, and not a barren theory, that Theistic Idealism offers, in its conception of Immortality; and

it is to God, as so presented, that the contemplative man, the philosopher, desires to attach himself. It may not transport us to the New Jerusalem, but it does what is most needful for us—it brings the New Jerusalem down to earth, so that, in a true sense, we can say,—Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men!

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